Type DeSci DAO – psychedelic s…rdship layer On-chain record 2930 proposals, 51 followers; quor… 1,023,341.55 PSY (read 2026-08-159-30) $PSY supply 102,334,155 in …ding proposals voted July 2026, one September 2026 Website psydao.world (https://psydao.world)

PDP-30 and the unpaid bio/acc award The next batch put one proposal to the space, and its subject was PsyDAO's own ecosystem. Bio Protocol (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz) 's bio/acc programme paid BioDAOs in BIO for reaching growth milestones, and the proposal closing its first season (https://snapshot.box/#/s:bioxyz.eth/proposal/0x73d7a19aeb4f25c801958acfe07ff4ae346f8fe12a9394e45726cc7b8445930a) , passed on 18 September 2025 by 109,115,538 BIO to none, awarded PsyDAO 3,000,000 BIO for the Trading Day milestone: Bio's bio/acc cell found a 24-hour window on 4–5 January 2025 in which PSY trading volume crossed $5m across Ethereum and Base. The award was to be paid in vesting BIO, released linearly over two years from that vote. PDP-30, “BIO Asset Recovery” (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0xbf87b5e802a4e24a5bbb0ff3b7a5b16a508f4329dcc35027750c83831930175c) , filed by PsyDAO's operations lead, says none of it has arrived: by its count 1,397,260 BIO had matured by 24 August 2026 and nothing had been delivered, after eleven months of attempts through several channels. It asked for up to 1,000,000 BIO from the For-Profit wallet to instruct independent Swiss counsel, serve a demand letter at Bio's seat in Zug and, if Bio still did not pay, open debt enforcement or file a claim. Everything past the first 100,000 BIO was gated on counsel's written view that the claim was sound, and the mandate would end automatically if Bio paid. Members rejected it on 18 September 2026, 13,141,789 PSY against and 1,468,955 for, on ten ballots. Unlike the July batch, no single holder decided it: 0x270f6ef8d0… cast its 5,512,850 against, and the other opposing ballots still outweighed every vote in favour five times over. The proposal record does not say why members declined to pursue the claim.

How Caper approaches this Psy…uns natively. Funding arrives onthrough a bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , whose fee on every buy lands into the caper's own treasury, and…-and-exit-rights) ). The call asserts both buckets are non-empty (exit() in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), stakes the amount of each to hand in, asserts both are above zero and withdraws them from the member's account (exit() in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs); the governance tokens are then sold back through the curve, paying the same fee and skim as any sell. So the right belongs to people …n-weighted vote does not have.

How Caper approaches this Psy… minted only by taking part – 0.01one per XRD of gross value on either leg of a trade, and one per ballot castranked ballot cast, and nothing at all for trading – so a holder who has neither traded nover voted weighs nothing however…e ballot it would have had to tradvote for its weight rather than merely hold it, and no amount of buying substitutes for that. And to stop a proposal that …ifference. Any member who has traded or votedcast a ballot can call exit at any time, wi…iki/governance/voting) those acballots mint and redeeming a share …rts both buckets are non-empty (exit() in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), so the right belongs to people who have actually held and traded the token and voted with it – which means the exit is bounded by participation rather tokenhan by capital. And because leaving moves th…n-weighted vote does not have.

How Caper approaches this Psy…ch locks the caper's trailing seven-day average token price as a baseline and opens a forty-eight-hourthe market window, and the action execut…n-weighted vote does not have.

How Caper approaches this Psy…se tokens are minted only by tradaking part – 0.01 per XRD of gross value on eithe curve,r leg of a trade, and one per ballot cast – so a holder who has nevither traded nor voted weighs nothing however large t…ce. Any member who has traded or voted can call exit at any time, wit…s together with the soulbound vote tokens that trading mints (/wiki/governance/voting) those acts mint and redeeming a share of the u…n-weighted vote does not have.

How Caper approaches this Psy…tly, and the answer is not a better tally. There is no tally. A caper has no ballot, no ranking, no quorum and no vote entry point on its deployed contract. A proposaligger turnout. A caper does tally: holders rank every option on one ballot and a Borda fold passes the leader only if its share of the weight actually cast clears 1.5 / option_count. What differs is what weight is. A ballot does not count a balance – it counts holdings multiplied by the member's soulbound vote tokens (/wiki/governance/voting) , each against its own supply, and those tokens are minted only by trading on the curve, so a holder who has never traded weighs nothing however large the bag. And a pass is not the end of it: it earns a trigger, which locks the caper's trailing seven-day average token price as a baseline, sits and open fors a forty-eight-hours, and passes if the live curve price i window, and the action executes only if the time-weighted price over that window closes at or above thate baseline when anyone settles it (see proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) ). There is therefore no total weight cast for one address to hold 71% of. The equivalent of 0x270f6ef8d0…'s position is a sale: to stop equivalent of 0x270f6ef8d0…'s position is therefore two-sided. To carry the ballot it would have had to trade for its weight rather three proposals it opposedan merely hold it. And to stop a proposal that had already carried the ballot, it would have had to sell enough of the token to pushhold the price below where it had …n-weighted vote does not have.

How Caper approaches this PsyDAO’'s core loop – raise a community treasury, then votmove grants out of it – is the sh…bonding-curve) into the caper’'s own treasury, and each grant is a governance-approved PAYOUT proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) that moves a chosen amount to the grantee once members vote it through (/wiki/governance/voting) . T: one typed action naming a currency, an amount and a recipient, frozen when it is raised. The July tally is the part of PsyDAO’'s record a caper answers differently is the July, and the answer is not a better tally. There is no tally. CA caper’s vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) has no ballot, no ranking, no quorum and no vote entry point on its the product of the tokens a member holds and the votes they have actually cast, (t·v)/(V·T), so a large balance that never votes carries no weight at all. Holdings still count – t is a multiplier, not a cap – but weight has to be earned by turning up, which narrows the gap between a 5deployed contract. A proposal locks the caper's seven-day average token price as a baseline, sits open for forty-eight hours, and passes if the live curve price is at or above that baseline when anyone settles it (see proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) ). There is therefore no total weight cast for one address to hold 71% of. The equivalent of 0x270f6ef8d0…'s position is a sale: to stop the three proposals it opposed, it would have had to sell enough of the token to push the price below where it had been trading for the previous week, and wear whatever that cost on the way down. A 5.4% holder cand the rest of a thin electorate rather than widening it. The second difference is the recourse available to still be decisive. What changes is that it pays the market price of being decisive instead of casting the same balance for nothing. The recourse the sevten members who voted for PDP-26 and lost. A caperturned out have is the second difference. Any member who has vottraded can call exit at any time and , without a proposal and without a quorum, surrendeem a share of the treasury sized by that same canonical weight, without a proposal or a quorumring governance tokens together with the soulbound vote tokens that trading mints (/wiki/governance/voting) and redeeming a share of the undeployed treasury sized by both (see rage-quit and exit righ…-and-exit-rights) ). The call surrenders governance tokens and soulbound vote tokens together and asserts both buckets are non-e…pty, so the right belongs to participants: a holder who never voted has no exit to take raeople who have actually held and traded ther than a zero-valued one. That is a narrower guarantee than “anyone canoken. And because leaving moves the same price a proposal is settled against, the member who walks always leave”, and a stronger one for the members it covers – it is exactly the engaged from a decision is also the one objecting to it – the exit and the veto are one act, which is exactly what a losing minority in a thin vote otherwise pushes toward quiet disengagementtoken-weighted vote does not have.

Type DeSci DAO – psychedelic s…-15) $PSY supply 102,334,155 oin Ethereum; a furtotal; ther 2,347,457 on Base are bridge-escrowed, not additional (read 2026-08-20) Treasury $873,594 across six…o.world (https://psydao.world)

The vote is concentrated The …tly 1% of the Ethereum supply. The two figures do not add: re-read on 20 August 2026 at Ethereum block 25,797,736, the Base L1StandardBridge (https://etherscan.io/address/0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35) holds 2,347,457.07 PSY on Ethereum, matching the Base supply to the wei, so the Base token is a minted representation of escrowed Ethereum PSY and the total in existence stays 102,334,155. Summing balances across the two chains is still the right way to compute a voter's power, because the escrowed tokens sit at the bridge address and nobody votes with them, but summing the two supplies would overstate the DAO by 2.3%. The first funding batch unde…hed in full by the DAO itself.

Type DeSci DAO Focus Psychedelic science & culture Raise ~$2M ($PSY token sale) Grants 6 awarded ($280k); Alchemist micro-grants (≤$2k) Governance Ostrom-inspired dual-token ($PSYC / $PSY) Ecosystem Bio Protocol (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz) Status Active — site reports a live node, grants and on-chain treasury Website psydao.world (https://psydao.world)

Overview PsyDAO is a decentralized collective advancing psychedelic science through community-funded research and open intellectual property (https://psydao.world) . It promotes progress via distributed coordination, crowdfunding, and collective ownership of IP so psychedelic medicine and knowledge stay accessible rather than enclosed. It sits within the broader DeSci (/wiki/desci/what-is-desci) movement as one of the field's culture-and-science hybrids. Governance uses an Ostrom-inspired dual-token system (https://psydao.world) : $PSYC holders steer research direction while $PSY functions as the wider ecosystem and membership token. The $PSY sale raised roughly $2 million for psychedelic science (https://mirror.xyz/0x3ccF80a0f26ED8BC2E11d2a4e0813816048BCA38/zP8Adajzgf07b1Pl857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) .

Research & grants PsyDAO has awarded six grants totalling about $280k across science, technology, and culture — spanning next-gen empathogen (MDMA-prodrug) optimization, endogenous-DMT research commons, a psychedelics-and-longevity comparison study, dissociative-drug development, a multi-agent AI research-discovery system, and token-incentivized open-science tooling. Alongside the larger grants it runs an Alchemist micro-grant track offering awards up to ~$2k to researchers, artists, and community builders. Grant direction and treasury allocation are decided on-chain by token holders (/wiki/governance/voting) , and funded work is released toward an open-IP commons rather than locked behind patents.

How Caper approaches this PsyDAO's core loop — raise a community treasury, then let members vote grants out of it toward open science — is the exact shape a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) runs natively. On Caper, the raise happens on a bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) into the caper's own treasury, each grant is a governance-approved PAYOUT proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) that moves a chosen amount to the grantee, and voting weight is stake weighted by participation (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) rather than split across two token classes. Members also keep a pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) on the undeployed treasury — a built-in accountability lever a dual-token grants DAO usually has to design separately.

External links - PsyDAO — official website (https://psydao.world) - $PSY raises $2M — PsyDAO on Mirror (https://mirror.xyz/0x3ccF80a0f26ED8BC2E11d2a4e0813816048BCA38/zP8Adajzgf07b1Pl857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) - PsyDAO writing — Paragraph (current publication) (https://paragraph.com/@psydao-2) - Bio Protocol ecosystem (https://www.bio.xyz)

Type DeSci DAO – psychedelic science & culture Governance PsyDAO Proposals (PDPs), voted on Snapshot (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth) with $PSY; PSYC is the stewardship layer On-chain record 29 proposals, 51 followers; quorum 1,023,341.55 PSY (read 2026-08-15) $PSY supply 102,334,155 on Ethereum; a further 2,347,457 on Base Treasury $873,594 across six assets and three wallets (site figure dated 2026-08-11) Restructured PDP-22 “PsyDAO Rebirth”, passed 30 April 2026 Ecosystem Bio Protocol (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz) Status Active – four funding proposals voted July 2026 Website psydao.world (https://psydao.world)

Overview PsyDAO is a decentralized network for psychedelic science and culture (https://psydao.world) that awards grants to researchers and creators, governs a shared treasury on-chain, and holds funded intellectual property toward an open commons rather than a patent thicket. It sits inside the wider decentralized science (/wiki/desci/what-is-desci) movement as one of its culture-and-science hybrids, alongside Bio Protocol (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz) cohort members such as CryoDAO (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/cryodao) and VitaDAO (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/vitadao) . Two tokens divide the work. $PSY is the governance token: one PSY is one vote over the treasury. $PSYC is a stewardship layer whose holders verify funded milestones. The distinction matters more after April 2026 than before it, because the restructuring described below was written specifically to make each tier accountable to the other. PsyDAO is unusually legible for a DAO of its size: its treasury page publishes live holdings, its proposals and tallies are public on Snapshot (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth) , and its own governance record documents a funding-model failure in the organization's own words. That combination makes it a useful worked example rather than a directory entry, which is how this page treats it.

The 2026 restructuring On 30 April 2026 the community passed PDP-22, “PsyDAO Rebirth” (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0x2a232572170e997c4defa745459d4d9f729a025e6897b55c247c0eebad166b06) , authored by the core team. The proposal is candid about what went wrong. The DAO had been built on a token-flywheel thesis – that tokenised scientific IP (/wiki/desci/ip-nfts) would generate a secondary market large enough to refill the treasury – and, in its own words, the IP tokens “produced no meaningful secondary market activity, and the cost of launching them drew materially on the DAO’s capital and contributor time.” The proposal then names a governance failure downstream of it: an accountability gap inside the PSY / PSYC structure, described as information asymmetry between the few people with real-time visibility into wallet activity and everyone else, let a former co-initiator retain roughly $224,000 in DAO assets before the pattern was surfaced. The treasury stood at about $620,000 liquid at the time of writing. What the proposal changed is structural rather than rhetorical. Outflows were routed through a three-wallet architecture – Treasury, Public Benefit, For-Profit – so that every disbursement requires an explicit allocation vote. Contributors moved to a node model, compensated through the initiatives they run rather than a flat payroll, with the DAO as a thin connective layer. And an accountability layer was added on top: quarterly transparency reporting, multi-party control of all admin, conflict-of-interest disclosure and a formal dispute process. Read against the industry pattern, this is the rarer of the two endings a DAO reaches when its funding thesis fails. The commoner one is the wind-down: ApeCoin DAO voted itself into a corporate successor, and Aura Finance dissolved itself outright. PsyDAO instead kept the mission and rewrote the plumbing, which is the shape How DAOs fail (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) describes as recoverable – the failure was in the value-capture design and the information flows, not in whether anyone still wanted the work done.

How PsyDAO decides PDP-25, passed 23 June 2026 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0x951768ed5710c5fb1fec4cdcf6495f44fb61033e8ccf1ada377d2c77bf3e62bc) , pins down the process. Anyone may post an idea at any time, but a votable proposal has to be submitted through Discord on one of three templates – Public Benefit (impact-first research, open knowledge, harm reduction, community, art), For-Profit (projects built to return money to the treasury) and Stewardship (ongoing roles that keep the DAO running). The idea board on the public site is explicitly an on-ramp, not a submission. Valid proposals are then batched and voted every two months, each vote running a 10-day comment period followed by a 4-day Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) ballot (5 and 4 days for small items). Funded projects report progress, and non-conflicted PSYC holders verify each milestone, or an agreed revision of it, before the next payment is released. The treasury policy is set in the same proposal: the Main Treasury holds 20% of assets, with the remainder split 70/30 between For-Profit and Public Benefit, and projects are funded one milestone at a time. Every wallet is under multi-party control, with signers drawn from the Swiss Verein executive committee plus designated stewards. Milestone-gated release and a batching cadence are both deliberate answers to the failure PDP-22 diagnosed, and they are worth reading alongside the general treatment in DAO treasury management (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) : money that leaves in tranches against verified work is much harder to lose quietly than money that leaves against a passed vote.

The vote is concentrated The psydao.eth Snapshot space (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth) carried 29 proposals and 51 followers when read on 15 August 2026. Voting power comes from two erc20-balance-of strategies over the same ticker on two chains: PSY on Ethereum at 0x2196…1D47A (https://etherscan.io/token/0x2196B84EaCe74867b73fb003AfF93C11FcE1D47A) , total supply 102,334,155, and PSY on Base at 0x85d0…9a97 (https://basescan.org/token/0x85d0E1BdE4E71AEDE97e0F0412c6E4B3D1E59a97) , total supply 2,347,457 (both read by eth_call at Ethereum block 25,759,465, 2026-08-15T09:10:35Z). The space quorum of 1,023,341.55 is exactly 1% of the Ethereum supply. The first funding batch under the new process ran on 10 July 2026, and its tallies are the most instructive thing in the record. Four proposals were put to the space and three were rejected: - PDP-26, The Bridge Career Fellowship (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0x0706edb32f7a719dbc0839495ee774ee3e53bb761fce9dc52256f677a0a411a8) (Public Benefit) – rejected, 1,312,630 for against 5,782,293 opposed, on 10 voters. - PDP-27, OPSY: Open Psychedelic Science Ecosystem (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0xdebf88063540caeef8b4e24b658dd636a004c2573ca210a0a358f3082335ae8e) – rejected, 1,712,386 for, 5,561,710 opposed, 483,339 abstaining, on 9 voters. - PDP-28, The Doors of Perception (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0x9ae84548d638e4b1ea83e6f3f5dbd7f41ddb395503b739dc94d440a1c6fe0749) – rejected, 1,552,388 for against 5,512,850 opposed, on 8 voters. - PDP-29, Lucy’s Magazine (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0xbd28c42c48d4a29685f3f6e68d4f9cc14d08d5c9ab7126d50debdfdc910590ea) – passed unanimously, 7,757,435 for and nothing opposed, on 9 voters. A single address, 0x270f6ef8d0…, cast 5,512,850 of voting power in all four ballots – about 71% of the total weight cast on the largest of them, and roughly 5.4% of PSY supply. It voted against PDP-26, PDP-27 and PDP-28 and for PDP-29, and the outcome matched its position every time. On PDP-26 seven of the ten voters chose “for” and the proposal still failed; on PDP-28 six of eight did. This is not a governance attack, and nothing in the record suggests bad faith. It is the ordinary arithmetic of a token-weighted vote where turnout is thin: total weight cast peaked at 7.76 million against a supply of 102.3 million, so participation ran at about 7.6% and a single ordinary-sized holder became decisive by showing up. The general case is set out in voter apathy and governance participation (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) ; PsyDAO is a clean, checkable instance of it, published in full by the DAO itself.

Treasury and funded work PsyDAO publishes live treasury holdings (https://psydao.world/treasury) , refreshed every ten minutes across the three wallets PDP-22 established. The site reported $873,594 across six assets for 2026-08-11: ETH $344,025, BIO (https://psydao.world/treasury) $215,364, PSY $143,712, USDC $97,985, WETH $36,457 and stETH $36,051. Two qualifications are worth carrying. About 16% of that figure is PsyDAO’s own governance token, whose mark-to-market value moves with the thing the treasury is meant to backstop; and a further 25% is BIO, the token of the ecosystem it belongs to. Stripping both leaves roughly $514,500 in ETH, stablecoins and staked ETH – the part that is uncorrelated with PsyDAO’s own success. That is the same reflexivity problem DAO tokenomics (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) describes, and PDP-22’s $620,000 “liquid” figure should be read with it in mind. On the spending side, the projects page (https://psydao.world/projects) lists four funded programmes – Next Gen Empathogens (MDMA prodrugs optimised for safety and therapeutic efficacy), eDMT (a research commons for endogenous DMT), BeeARD (a multi-agent AI research-discovery system) and Kené Café (a commerce and cultural project with Shipibo-Conibo partners) – alongside ten named grant recipients working on breathwork, dissociative-drug research, documentary chemistry, community education and art. PDP-22 records that the Next Gen Empathogens IP received a clean PCT written opinion in April 2026, and that the Kené licensing relationship survived the restructuring intact.

How Caper approaches this PsyDAO’s core loop – raise a community treasury, then vote grants out of it – is the shape a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) runs natively. Funding arrives on a bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) into the caper’s own treasury, and each grant is a governance-approved PAYOUT proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) that moves a chosen amount to the grantee once members vote it through (/wiki/governance/voting) . The part of PsyDAO’s record a caper answers differently is the July tally. Caper’s vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) is the product of the tokens a member holds and the votes they have actually cast, (t·v)/(V·T), so a large balance that never votes carries no weight at all. Holdings still count – t is a multiplier, not a cap – but weight has to be earned by turning up, which narrows the gap between a 5% holder and the rest of a thin electorate rather than widening it. The second difference is the recourse available to the seven members who voted for PDP-26 and lost. A caper member who has voted can call exit at any time and redeem a share of the treasury sized by that same canonical weight, without a proposal or a quorum (see rage-quit and exit rights (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) ). The call surrenders governance tokens and soulbound vote tokens together and asserts both buckets are non-empty, so the right belongs to participants: a holder who never voted has no exit to take rather than a zero-valued one. That is a narrower guarantee than “anyone can always leave”, and a stronger one for the members it covers – it is exactly the engaged minority a thin vote otherwise pushes toward quiet disengagement.

External links - PsyDAO – official website (https://psydao.world) - PsyDAO treasury – live on-chain holdings (https://psydao.world/treasury) - PsyDAO projects – funded science and art (https://psydao.world/projects) - psydao.eth on Snapshot – every PDP, tally and voter (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth) - PDP-22 “PsyDAO Rebirth” – the April 2026 restructuring, in the DAO’s own words (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0x2a232572170e997c4defa745459d4d9f729a025e6897b55c247c0eebad166b06) - PDP-25 – the funding and governance process (https://snapshot.box/#/s:psydao.eth/proposal/0x951768ed5710c5fb1fec4cdcf6495f44fb61033e8ccf1ada377d2c77bf3e62bc) - $PSY raises $2M – PsyDAO on Mirror (https://mirror.xyz/0x3ccF80a0f26ED8BC2E11d2a4e0813816048BCA38/zP8Adajzgf07b1Pl857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) - PsyDAO writing – Paragraph (https://paragraph.com/@psydao-2) - Bio Protocol ecosystem (https://www.bio.xyz)

Type DeSci DAO Focus Psychede…ki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz) Status Active — site reports a live node, grants and on-chain treasury Website psydao.ioworld (https://www.psydao.ioworld)

Overview PsyDAO is a decentra…ntellectual property (https://www.psydao.ioworld) . It promotes progress via d…ed dual-token system (https://www.psydao.ioworld) : $PSYC holders steer resear…857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) .

How Caper approaches this PsyD…pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…ally has to design separately.

External links - PsyDAO — official website (https://www.psydao.ioworld) - $PSY raises $2M — PsyDAO…857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) - PsyDAO writing — Paragraph (current publication) (https://paragraph.com/@psydao-2) - Bio Protocol ecosystem (https://www.bio.xyz)

How Caper approaches this PsyD…pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) on…ally has to design separately.

Type DeSci DAO Focus Psychedelic science & culture Raise ~$2M ($PSY token sale) Grants 6 awarded ($280k); Alchemist micro-grants (≤$2k) Governance Ostrom-inspired dual-token ($PSYC / $PSY) Ecosystem Bio Protocol (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz) Website psydao.io (https://www.psydao.io)

Overview PsyDAO is a decentralized collective advancing psychedelic science through community-funded research and open intellectual property (https://www.psydao.io) . It promotes progress via distributed coordination, crowdfunding, and collective ownership of IP so psychedelic medicine and knowledge stay accessible rather than enclosed. It sits within the broader DeSci (/wiki/desci/what-is-desci) movement as one of the field's culture-and-science hybrids. Governance uses an Ostrom-inspired dual-token system (https://www.psydao.io) : $PSYC holders steer research direction while $PSY functions as the wider ecosystem and membership token. The $PSY sale raised roughly $2 million for psychedelic science (https://mirror.xyz/0x3ccF80a0f26ED8BC2E11d2a4e0813816048BCA38/zP8Adajzgf07b1Pl857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) .

Research & grants PsyDAO has awarded six grants totalling about $280k across science, technology, and culture — spanning next-gen empathogen (MDMA-prodrug) optimization, endogenous-DMT research commons, a psychedelics-and-longevity comparison study, dissociative-drug development, a multi-agent AI research-discovery system, and token-incentivized open-science tooling. Alongside the larger grants it runs an Alchemist micro-grant track offering awards up to ~$2k to researchers, artists, and community builders. Grant direction and treasury allocation are decided on-chain by token holders (/wiki/governance/voting) , and funded work is released toward an open-IP commons rather than locked behind patents.

How Caper approaches this PsyDAO's core loop — raise a community treasury, then let members vote grants out of it toward open science — is the exact shape a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) runs natively. On Caper, the raise happens on a bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) into the caper's own treasury, each grant is a governance-approved PAYOUT proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) that moves a chosen amount to the grantee, and voting weight is stake weighted by participation (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) rather than split across two token classes. Members also keep a pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) on the undeployed treasury — a built-in accountability lever a dual-token grants DAO usually has to design separately.

External links - PsyDAO — official website (https://www.psydao.io) - $PSY raises $2M — PsyDAO on Mirror (https://mirror.xyz/0x3ccF80a0f26ED8BC2E11d2a4e0813816048BCA38/zP8Adajzgf07b1Pl857gHGDv9DW93sKlSr6wBwrEiHA) - Bio Protocol ecosystem (https://www.bio.xyz)