Overview

PsyDAO is a decentralized network for psychedelic science and culture that awards grants to researchers and creators, governs a shared treasury on-chain, and holds funded intellectual property toward an open commons rather than a patent thicket. It sits inside the wider decentralized science movement as one of its culture-and-science hybrids, alongside Bio Protocol cohort members such as CryoDAO and VitaDAO.

Two tokens divide the work. $PSY is the governance token: one PSY is one vote over the treasury. $PSYC is a stewardship layer whose holders verify funded milestones. The distinction matters more after April 2026 than before it, because the restructuring described below was written specifically to make each tier accountable to the other.

PsyDAO is unusually legible for a DAO of its size: its treasury page publishes live holdings, its proposals and tallies are public on Snapshot, and its own governance record documents a funding-model failure in the organization's own words. That combination makes it a useful worked example rather than a directory entry, which is how this page treats it.

The 2026 restructuring

On 30 April 2026 the community passed PDP-22, “PsyDAO Rebirth”, authored by the core team. The proposal is candid about what went wrong. The DAO had been built on a token-flywheel thesis – that tokenised scientific IP would generate a secondary market large enough to refill the treasury – and, in its own words, the IP tokens “produced no meaningful secondary market activity, and the cost of launching them drew materially on the DAO’s capital and contributor time.”

The proposal then names a governance failure downstream of it: an accountability gap inside the PSY / PSYC structure, described as information asymmetry between the few people with real-time visibility into wallet activity and everyone else, let a former co-initiator retain roughly $224,000 in DAO assets before the pattern was surfaced. The treasury stood at about $620,000 liquid at the time of writing.

What the proposal changed is structural rather than rhetorical. Outflows were routed through a three-wallet architecture – Treasury, Public Benefit, For-Profit – so that every disbursement requires an explicit allocation vote. Contributors moved to a node model, compensated through the initiatives they run rather than a flat payroll, with the DAO as a thin connective layer. And an accountability layer was added on top: quarterly transparency reporting, multi-party control of all admin, conflict-of-interest disclosure and a formal dispute process.

Read against the industry pattern, this is the rarer of the two endings a DAO reaches when its funding thesis fails. The commoner one is the wind-down: ApeCoin DAO voted itself into a corporate successor, and Aura Finance dissolved itself outright. PsyDAO instead kept the mission and rewrote the plumbing, which is the shape How DAOs fail describes as recoverable – the failure was in the value-capture design and the information flows, not in whether anyone still wanted the work done.

How PsyDAO decides

PDP-25, passed 23 June 2026, pins down the process. Anyone may post an idea at any time, but a votable proposal has to be submitted through Discord on one of three templates – Public Benefit (impact-first research, open knowledge, harm reduction, community, art), For-Profit (projects built to return money to the treasury) and Stewardship (ongoing roles that keep the DAO running). The idea board on the public site is explicitly an on-ramp, not a submission.

Valid proposals are then batched and voted every two months, each vote running a 10-day comment period followed by a 4-day Snapshot ballot (5 and 4 days for small items). Funded projects report progress, and non-conflicted PSYC holders verify each milestone, or an agreed revision of it, before the next payment is released. The treasury policy is set in the same proposal: the Main Treasury holds 20% of assets, with the remainder split 70/30 between For-Profit and Public Benefit, and projects are funded one milestone at a time. Every wallet is under multi-party control, with signers drawn from the Swiss Verein executive committee plus designated stewards.

Milestone-gated release and a batching cadence are both deliberate answers to the failure PDP-22 diagnosed, and they are worth reading alongside the general treatment in DAO treasury management: money that leaves in tranches against verified work is much harder to lose quietly than money that leaves against a passed vote.

The vote is concentrated

The psydao.eth Snapshot space carried 29 proposals and 51 followers when read on 15 August 2026. Voting power comes from two erc20-balance-of strategies over the same ticker on two chains: PSY on Ethereum at 0x2196…1D47A, total supply 102,334,155, and PSY on Base at 0x85d0…9a97, total supply 2,347,457 (both read by eth_call at Ethereum block 25,759,465, 2026-08-15T09:10:35Z). The space quorum of 1,023,341.55 is exactly 1% of the Ethereum supply. The two figures do not add: re-read on 20 August 2026 at Ethereum block 25,797,736, the Base L1StandardBridge holds 2,347,457.07 PSY on Ethereum, matching the Base supply to the wei, so the Base token is a minted representation of escrowed Ethereum PSY and the total in existence stays 102,334,155. Summing balances across the two chains is still the right way to compute a voter's power, because the escrowed tokens sit at the bridge address and nobody votes with them, but summing the two supplies would overstate the DAO by 2.3%.

The first funding batch under the new process ran on 10 July 2026, and its tallies are the most instructive thing in the record. Four proposals were put to the space and three were rejected:

• PDP-26, The Bridge Career Fellowship (Public Benefit) – rejected, 1,312,630 for against 5,782,293 opposed, on 10 voters.
• PDP-27, OPSY: Open Psychedelic Science Ecosystem – rejected, 1,712,386 for, 5,561,710 opposed, 483,339 abstaining, on 9 voters.
• PDP-28, The Doors of Perception – rejected, 1,552,388 for against 5,512,850 opposed, on 8 voters.
• PDP-29, Lucy’s Magazine – passed unanimously, 7,757,435 for and nothing opposed, on 9 voters.

A single address, 0x270f6ef8d0…, cast 5,512,850 of voting power in all four ballots – about 71% of the total weight cast on the largest of them, and roughly 5.4% of PSY supply. It voted against PDP-26, PDP-27 and PDP-28 and for PDP-29, and the outcome matched its position every time. On PDP-26 seven of the ten voters chose “for” and the proposal still failed; on PDP-28 six of eight did.

This is not a governance attack, and nothing in the record suggests bad faith. It is the ordinary arithmetic of a token-weighted vote where turnout is thin: total weight cast peaked at 7.76 million against a supply of 102.3 million, so participation ran at about 7.6% and a single ordinary-sized holder became decisive by showing up. The general case is set out in voter apathy and governance participation; PsyDAO is a clean, checkable instance of it, published in full by the DAO itself.

Treasury and funded work

PsyDAO publishes live treasury holdings, refreshed every ten minutes across the three wallets PDP-22 established. The site reported $873,594 across six assets for 2026-08-11: ETH $344,025, BIO $215,364, PSY $143,712, USDC $97,985, WETH $36,457 and stETH $36,051.

Two qualifications are worth carrying. About 16% of that figure is PsyDAO’s own governance token, whose mark-to-market value moves with the thing the treasury is meant to backstop; and a further 25% is BIO, the token of the ecosystem it belongs to. Stripping both leaves roughly $514,500 in ETH, stablecoins and staked ETH – the part that is uncorrelated with PsyDAO’s own success. That is the same reflexivity problem DAO tokenomics describes, and PDP-22’s $620,000 “liquid” figure should be read with it in mind.

On the spending side, the projects page lists four funded programmes – Next Gen Empathogens (MDMA prodrugs optimised for safety and therapeutic efficacy), eDMT (a research commons for endogenous DMT), BeeARD (a multi-agent AI research-discovery system) and Kené Café (a commerce and cultural project with Shipibo-Conibo partners) – alongside ten named grant recipients working on breathwork, dissociative-drug research, documentary chemistry, community education and art. PDP-22 records that the Next Gen Empathogens IP received a clean PCT written opinion in April 2026, and that the Kené licensing relationship survived the restructuring intact.

How Caper approaches this

PsyDAO's core loop – raise a community treasury, then move grants out of it – is the shape a caper runs natively. Funding arrives on a bonding curve into the caper's own treasury, and each grant is a PAYOUT proposal: one typed action naming a currency, an amount and a recipient, frozen when it is raised.

The July tally is the part of PsyDAO's record a caper answers differently, and the answer is not a bigger turnout. A caper does tally: holders rank every option on one ballot and a Borda fold passes the leader only if its share of the weight actually cast clears 1.5 / option_count. What differs is what weight is. A ballot does not count a balance – it counts holdings multiplied by the member's soulbound vote tokens, each against its own supply, and those tokens are minted only by taking part – one per ranked ballot cast, and nothing at all for trading – so a holder who has never voted weighs nothing however large the bag. And a pass is not the end of it: it earns a trigger, which locks the caper's trailing average token price as a baseline and opens the market window, and the action executes only if the time-weighted price over that window closes at or above the baseline (see proposals). The equivalent of 0x270f6ef8d0…'s position is therefore two-sided. To carry the ballot it would have had to vote for its weight rather than merely hold it, and no amount of buying substitutes for that. And to stop a proposal that had already carried the ballot, it would have had to sell enough of the token to hold the price below where it had been trading for the previous week, and wear whatever that cost on the way down. A 5.4% holder can still be decisive. What changes is that it pays the market price of being decisive instead of casting the same balance for nothing.

The recourse the ten members who turned out have is the second difference. Any member who has cast a ballot can call exit at any time, without a proposal and without a quorum, surrendering governance tokens together with the soulbound vote tokens those ballots mint and redeeming a share of the undeployed treasury sized by both (see rage-quit and exit rights). The call asserts both buckets are non-empty (exit() in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), so the right belongs to people who have actually held the token and voted with it – which means the exit is bounded by participation rather than by capital. And because leaving moves the same price a proposal is settled against, the member who walks away from a decision is also the one objecting to it – the exit and the veto are one act, which is exactly what a losing minority in a thin token-weighted vote does not have.

External links

• PsyDAO – official website
• PsyDAO treasury – live on-chain holdings
• PsyDAO projects – funded science and art
• psydao.eth on Snapshot – every PDP, tally and voter
• PDP-22 “PsyDAO Rebirth” – the April 2026 restructuring, in the DAO’s own words
• PDP-25 – the funding and governance process
• $PSY raises $2M – PsyDAO on Mirror
• PsyDAO writing – Paragraph
• Bio Protocol ecosystem