Topic Fundraising Inflow Bond…50% to the founder) · proposal, & vote & execution fees · direct payments to the …asury/dao-treasury-management)

A caper is a fundraising vehic…R treasury in tokens; proposal, vote and execution and vote fees also go to your caper's …phase opening at all, and the flat creation500 XRD floor of the proposal fee is the whole cost of aski…her than a sequence of rounds.

What the treasury takes in Ca…overnance fees members pay. Those are two-tier: a flat 500 XRD to open a proposal, bankede proposal fee is paid once, at creation, and kept whether ithe proposal passes or fails, and a: 10% execution fee on the winning action’s XRD basis —of the largest option’s XRD basis, at least 500 XRD – the amount sent for a PAYOUT,…r’s trailing TWAP for a DIVEST — charged at the trigger rather than at creation, and. A token amount is priced off that three-day ave…n the same transaction as the triggerproposal would otherwise set the basis it is charged on, and waived entirely when the ballot’s second question returns “treasury pays”. A DEBATE winner pays it in no case at all, having neither an XRD basis nor a trigger to be charged at. A DEBATE, which has no XRD basis, pays the floor, and so does any slate whose largest option is under 50,000 XRD. Triggering a passed proposal costs nothing; until 6 October 2026 the trigger collected a 10% execution fee on the winning action, which the ballot could waive by voting “treasury pays”. Each ranked ballot costs its…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Launching a caper One transac… of a trade at launch, 1%once 10.821.4% of the supply has sold, and …alf of whatever is left every 120% sold after that.VAMPIRE CAP…th pricing · fresh or vampire.

The founder slice Unlike a fi…the tokens ever sold, about 0.084165% once the whole supply has so… × (1 − s) × x10) for x = 2−s/120%, where s is the fraction of… at genesis, half that once 1.0199% of the supply has sold, 1% by 10.821.4%, and half of what is left with every further tenfifth sold, which the founder, th…fee on subsequent direct buys.

A caper is a fundraising vehic…der: 90% of your half in XRD, priced along the stretch of curve the trade moves throughat one rate read where the trade starts, and 10% as a slice of the to…her than a sequence of rounds.

The founder slice Unlike a fi… the rate is charged in XRD – non ever 94.5% of one figy XRD the curve struck at the door, but the rise in the curve's backed potential across the stretch the trade moves through, taken out of the payment ontakes from a buy, out of the payment before it funds the curve, and on every XRD it pays out to a sell, out of the payout, at one rate the trade reads: a buy befowhere it funds the curve and out of the payout on a sestarts, a sell at the bottom it would reach if every token handed in retired. The rate only falls, which is what makes a trade cut into pieces pay exactly what it pays wholeso a trade pays at least what the same trade cut into pieces would (buy_leg and sell_leg, contra…fee on subsequent direct buys.

What the treasury takes in Ca…th trading in either direction, and empties onlypays out in two ways: through a proposal that carri…entals/dao-governance-models) , and through an exit, which pays a departing member a share of it set by their vote weight, with no vote at all ( Leaving a caper (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) ). For how the broader industry…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Launching a caper One transac…nt the very first tokens, and the founder earns the reward:every trade pays a skim: 49.5% to thecaper’s own treasury, 50% to the founder and 0.5% to $CAPER. It is 100% ofa trade at launch, 1%once 10.8% of the supply has s…hatever is left every 10% soldafter that.VAMPIRE CAPERMigrat…th pricing · fresh or vampire.

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bonding-curve buys · founder slice · trade & proposalthe skim (49.5% to the treasury, 50% to the founder) · proposal, vote & execution fees · direct payments to the…asury/dao-treasury-management)

A caper is a fundraising vehic… and tokens out to the buyer. WEach trade pays a skim, largest while the caper is young, a slice of each tradend half of it accrues to you, the founder, paid in the curve's own composition — two thirds of the rate: 90% of your half in XRD, priced along the stre…urve the trade moves through, one thirdand 10% as a slice of the tokens the …tead of being fixed up front. Trade and proposal fees flow in49.5% of the skim goes to your caper's treasury in XRD and 0.5% to the $CAPER treasury in tokens; proposal, vote and execution fees also go to your caper's treasury. - D…her than a sequence of rounds.

The founder slice Unlike a fi… curve's position, and splits it in the same proportions the curve itself is made of. A bonding curve whose price rises as the n-th power of supply holds exactly 1/(n+1) of its market value as reserve. Caper's price is a squarthis skim between the founder, the caper's own treasury and the proot of circulation at the origin, so n = ½ and the reserve fraction is two thirds: two thirds of a young caper's worth is XRD in the vault, one third is claim on buyers yet to arrive. The skim follows that line. Two thirdstocol-wide Commons. The skim is paid 94.5% in XRD and 5.5% in tokens. 94.5% of the rate is charged in XRD – never two thirds94.5% of one figure struck at the d…g, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs); one third. It splits 11:10: 49.5% of the skim to the caper's own treasury and 45% to the founder. 5.5% is a slice of the tokens the … tokens handed in on a sell – tithed 30/31split 10:1: 5% of the skim to the founder and 1/310.5% to the protocol-wide $CAPER t…ing the badge loses the cut. Nothing about that ratio was chosen. The peak is: tThe live logic component stores…llateralization_peak as 1, so at the XRD leg pepeak the founder takes at 66.67most 45% of the curve XRD a trade moves and the token leg at 100% × ⅓ = 33.335% of the tokens it moves. Befo…n coin. That ceiling is gone. AThe buy leg alone still holds the founder under 5% of the tokens ever sold, about 0.084% once the whole supply has sold, but a sell's token leg is not minte… tenth sold, which the founder legs, the caper's treasury and the Commons tithe take from every trade for the life of the caper. The 0.5% trade fee (/wiki/markets/trading) is charged alongside it: on a buy, buy_token_raw takes the fee off the gross first and the skim is priced on what is left, and buyre is no other trade charge: buy_apply and sell_apply deposits the fetreasury's share into the caper's own treasury on every buy for the life of the caper. A sell pays no trade fee, only the skimtrade. So a mature caper pays its founder and its treasury a small fraction of what a you…fee on subsequent direct buys.

The trade fee Capers charge a 0.5% trade fee —What the treasury takes in Capers charge no trade fee: the skim is the only trade charge. Its peak rate is a field written into the logi…proposal in the $CAPER caper. It is charged on buys only: - Buy-leg fee → your treasury. The 0.5% taken off each incomA caper's treasury takes in: - Skim share → your treasury. 49.5% of every trade's skim, ing XRD payment, on buys and sells alike, is deposited straight into yo…FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) ). - No fee on a sell. Selling back into the curve pays the founder skim and nothing else. Until the redeploy oftrade fee. Until the redeploy of 25 September 2026 every buy paid a 0.5% trade fee into the caper’s own treasury. Before 18 September 2026 a sell paid the same 0.5%, int…he sell-side fee went with it. The redeploy of 25 September 2026 removed the buy-side fee and gave each caper's treasury 49.5% of the skim instead. The result is a treasury that grows with genuine buy-side interesttrading in either direction, and empties only through a p…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Money that never touches the c…ing a single token. Curve buys, and the trade fee theyeasury's share of the skim every trade pays, are the inflows that arrive o…exit (/wiki/markets/trading) .

A caper is a fundraising vehic… own composition — two thirds in XRD off the trade's grossof the rate in XRD, priced along the stretch of curve the trade moves through, one third as a slice of the …her than a sequence of rounds.

The founder slice Unlike a fi…follows that line. Two thirds is skimmed in XRD off the gross of the trade –of the rate is charged in XRD – never two thirds of one figure struck at the door, but the rise in the curve's backed potential across the stretch the trade moves through, taken out of the payment on a buy, before it funds the curve, and out of the payout on a sell, which is what makes a trade cut into pieces pay exactly what it pays whole (buy_leg and sell_leg, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs); one third is a slice of the …fee on subsequent direct buys.

The founder slice Unlike a fi…lization_rate returns peak × (0.005 + 0.995 × (1 − s) × e−52s)2% × x + 98% × (1 − s) × x10) for x = 2−s/10%, where s is the fraction of t… at genesis, half that once 1.301% of the supply has sold, 1% by 10.8%, and a floor of 0.5% after thathalf of what is left with every further tenth sold, which the founder legs and t…fee on subsequent direct buys.

Launching a caper One transac…fa trade at launch, 1% once 10.8% of the supply has sold, and 0.5% from then onhalf of whatever is left every 10% soldafter that.VAMPIRE CAPERMigrate an exist…th pricing · fresh or vampire.

The founder slice Unlike a fi…res collateralization_peak as 0.051, so the XRD leg peaks at 3.33% of66.67% of the curve XRD a trade's gros moves and the token leg at 5100% × ⅓ = 1.6733.33% of the tokens it moves. Befo…a 0.15 peak and on buys alone, and at 0.075 from then until the logic upgrade of 18 September 2026, and at 0.05 until the upgrade of 19 September 2026. The token leg then came …eralization_rate returns peak / √× (0.005 + 0.995 × (1 +− s / COLLATERALIZATION_SCALE) × e−52s), where s is the fraction of the supply in circulation and the scale is 0.0225, so the rate is 5100% of a trade at genesis, half that once 6.751.3% of the supply has sold, and 0.74% with the whole supply sold. It never reaches zero, so1% by 10%, and a floor of 0.5% after that, which the founder legs and the Commons tithe take a small slice offrom every trade for the life of t…on a buy, buy_token_raw takes ithe fee off the same gross paymentfirst and the skim is priced on, so neither charge is computed from what the other what is left, and buy_apply deposits ithe fee into the caper's own treasury…fee on subsequent direct buys.

Launching a caper One transac…ns, and the founder earns the taperingrewardreward: 100% ofa trade at launch, 1% once 10% of the supply has sold, and 0.5% from then on.VAMPIRE CAPERMigrate an exist…th pricing · fresh or vampire.

Money that never touches the c… single token. Curve buys and fee legsthe trade fee they pay are the inflows that arrive o…exit (/wiki/markets/trading) .

The founder slice Unlike a fi…ife of the caper. A sell pays it the same way, off the gross payoutno trade fee, only the skim. So a mature caper pays its f…fee on subsequent direct buys.

The two fee legsrade fee Capers charge a 0.5% trade f…proposal in the $CAPER caper. Both legs carry the same rate; they lanIt is charged ion different places, and that is the distinction worth understandingbuys only: - Buy-leg fee → your treasu…e FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) ). - Sell-leg fee → the base $XRD caper. The 0.5% taken when someone sells back into the curve does not touch your caper — it accrues to the treasury of the protocol’s root $XRD caper (the base caper native-XRD holders migrate into), where its members claim it on the same participation-weighted terms as any other caper: each exit (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) pays the canonical weight (t·v)/(V·T), and exit() withdraws a positive amount of v from the member’s own account alongside the governance tokens. That gate is a voting record and nothing else, and it became oneNo fee on a sell. Selling back into the curve pays the founder skim and nothing else. Until the redeploy onf 118 September 2026. Until that date v was minted on a sell paid three surfaces — 0.01 per XRD of gross value on the buyer’s outlay, the same on the seller’s gross curve payout, and one per ranked ballot — so anyone who had merely traded held some. The redeploy of that date removed the two trade-side surfaces and took the rate field with them: the deployed logic component’s on-ledger state carries no vote_rate at all, and VOTE_MINT is a flat 1 per ballot regardless of what the ballot cost. The reason is the exit right this very sentence describes — while trading minted v, one transaction could buy a position, mint the record that opens the exit, and redeem on both, which made a claim on the pooled sell-leg fees something a stranger could simply purchase. So what the assertion rules out now is anyone who has never cast a ballot. A share of this pool is bounded by participation rather than by capital, and buying $XRD is no longer a way to reach it. No one takes a flat pro-rata slice. So a caper earns from the buy-side demand it attracts, while sell-side churn flows out to the wider XRD holder base — distinct from the $CAPER commons, which is funded by the 1/31 founder-slice aboveame 0.5%, into the treasury of a root $XRD caper that pooled every sell, swap and exit fee on the platform. That caper was removed, and the sell-side fee went with it. The result is a treasury th…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

The one caper whose denominator is a constant Every caper divides an exiting member's claim by its own circulating supply. The root $XRD caper is the exception, and the reason is a property of XRD rather than a design choice: genesis creates XRD with track_total_supply: false, so its on-ledger total_supply() returns nothing on any network. There is no float to divide by. So effective_circulation substitutes a fixed 24,000,000,000 — XRD's maximum supply, being the 12bn minted at genesis plus roughly 12bn released as network emissions over about 40 years (https://learn.radixdlt.com/article/what-is-the-xrd-token) . The invariant that matters is that the denominator must be at least the sum of every member's holdings, because that is what keeps the sum of all exit shares inside the treasury. The 24bn cap is the tightest constant that always satisfies it, since no set of members can ever hold more. Erring high has two consequences worth knowing if you hold $XRD. Claims on the pooled sell-leg fees are conservative — divided by the cap rather than by the live float, so an exit pays less than a float-based split would and the treasury cannot be over-drawn. And the constant cannot distort governance: the denominator cancels out of the settle path's top_weight / total_weight ratio, so it moves how fast the treasury pays out and never which option wins. Both properties are read off effective_circulation and exit in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs.

The founder slice Unlike a fi… collateralization_peak as 0.075, so the XRD leg peaks at 53.33% of a trade's gross and the token leg at 7.5% × ⅓ = 2.51.67% of the tokens it moves. Befo…eptember 2026 the skim ran at twice thata 0.15 peak and on buys alone, and at 0.075 from then until the logic upgrade of 18 September 2026. The token leg then came only…the curve like anyone else.) Crucially tThe slice is front-loaded, not perpetual: it tapers linearly from its configured peak at genesis down to zero once ~30%: collateralization_rate returns peak / √(1 + s / COLLATERALIZATION_SCALE), where s is the fraction of the supply is in circulation. Past that point the skim itself is gone: collateralization_rate returns zero and the scale is 0.0225, so the rate is 5% of a trade at genesis, half that once 306.75% of the supply ihas sold, and 0.74% with the whole supply sold. It never reaches zero, so neither founder leg nors and the Commons tithe takes anything from a trade again a small slice of every trade for the life of the caper. The 0.5% trade fee (/wiki/markets/trading) does not taper withis charged alongside it —: on a buy, buy_token_raw takes…oss payout. So a mature caper charges no founder tax, butpays its founder a small fraction of what a young one does, and the curve is never quite the …or the risky early bootstrap without imposing a permanent taxhile keeping the charge on a mature, liquid token small. For vampire capers bound to …fee on subsequent direct buys.

A caper is a fundraising vehic… and tokens out to the buyer. AWhile the caper is young, a slice of each buytrade accrues to you, the founder, …n — two thirds in XRD off the paymenttrade's gross, one third as a slice of the tokens that buy minte trade moves. Both land in badge-gated va…her than a sequence of rounds.

The founder slice Unlike a fi…f curve activity. On each buy and each sell the protocol takes a collatera…rds is skimmed in XRD off the payment before it funds the curve; one third is a slice of the tokens that buy mints,gross of the trade – the payment on a buy, before it funds the curve, and the payout on a sell; one third is a slice of the tokens the trade moves – the mint on a buy, the tokens handed in on a sell – tithed 30/31 to the founder a…ng about that ratio was chosen, and the founder's ceiling falls out of it. The token leg peaks at 15% × ⅓ = 5% of each mint, and because the slice is a fixed fraction of every mint, the founder's share of the coin is just the average of that fraction across the curve travelled — which cannot exceed its own peak. So the skim never grants a fou. The peak is: the live logic component stores collateralization_peak as 0.075, so the XRD leg peaks at 5% of a trade's gross and the token leg at 7.5% × ⅓ = 2.5% of the tokens it moves. Before the redeploy of 15 September 2026 the skim ran at twice that peak and on buys alone. The token leg then came only out of new mints, so a founder could never be handerd more than 5% of their own coin, on any path, with no vesting schedule or cliff enforcing it. The realised share starts just under 5% and decays as the caper grows: about 4% at a tenth of supply sold, under 1% near the top. That ceiling is gone. A sell's token leg is not minted: it is a slice of the tokens the seller hands in, and it changes hands instead of retiring, so every round trip through a young curve pays the founder on the way in and again ofn the curve. (That bounds what the skim hands over, not what a founder may hold — they canway out. Whoever churns a young caper pays for it; the founder's share of supply has no fixed cap. (A founder can also buy on the curve like anyone …s tithe takes anything from a buytrade again. The 0.5% trade fee (/…ing) does not taper with it — on a buy, buy_token_raw takes it off the same gross payment before the skim is computed and independently of ipriced on, so neither charge is computed from what the other left, and buy_apply deposits it i…buy for the life of the caper. A sell pays it the same way, off the gross payout. So a mature caper charges no … the curve is never quite the buytrader's only counterparty. This r…der still earns this same per-buytrade slice; what differs is that h…fee on subsequent direct buys.

The two fee legs Capers charg…eight (t·v)/(V·T), and exit() asserts a non-empty bucket of vwithdraws a positive amount of v from the member’s own account alongside the governance toke…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

The two fee legs Capers charg…T, the position valued at the foreigntarget caper’s spottrailing TWAP for a DIVEST — charged at the…igger rather than at creation, and priced off that three-day average rather than the spot price, because a dump in the same transaction as the trigger would otherwise set the basis it is charged on, and waived entirely when the …vernance tokens. That gate is not a purea voting record, and not a pure trading record either: v is minted at one flat rahing else, and it became one on 11 September 2026. Until that date v was minted on three surfaces — 0.01 per …ler’s gross curve payout, and exactly 1one per ranked ballot, since the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that identical rate. So anyone who has traded holds some, and so does anyone who has voted. What the assertion rules out is a bystander who has done neither claiming a slice — so anyone who had merely traded held some. The redeploy of that date removed the two trade-side surfaces and took the rate field with them: the deployed logic component’s on-ledger state carries no vote_rate at all, and VOTE_MINT is a flat 1 per ballot regardless of what the ballot cost. The reason is the exit right this very sentence describes — while trading minted v, one transaction could buy a position, mint the record that opens the exit, and redeem on both, which made a claim on the pooled sell-leg fees something a stranger could simply purchase. So what the assertion rules out now is anyone who has never cast a ballot. A share of this pool is bounded by participation rather than by capital, and buying $XRD is no longer a way to reach it. No one takes a flat pro-rata…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Launching a caper One transac… or migrate an existing token. A vampire launch names its origin token at creation and can be refused there on three counts, and the escrow itself on four more; each one is catalogued with its remedy in why a transaction failed (/wiki/help/why-a-transaction-failed) . CAPER PROTOCOLLaunching a ca…ts empty. Buyers mint the veryfirst tokens, and the founder earns thetaperingreward.VAMPIRE CAPERMigrate an…ing token into your caper at afixed ratio = cap / origin supply. A fullmigrationfills the entire curve, leaving noheadroom and an empty reserve.…th pricing · fresh or vampire.

Launching a caper One transac… or migrate an existing token. A vampire launch names its origin token at creation and can be refused there on three counts, and the escrow itself on four more; each one is catalogued with its remedy in why a transaction failed (/wiki/help/why-a-transaction-failed) . CAPER PROTOCOLLaunching a ca…th pricing · fresh or vampire.

The founder slice Unlike a fi…can withdraw from at any time. The gate is the founder badge, a single indivisible bearer token minted to you at creation, which founder_take_pair checks by resource address and nothing else (contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs). It carries no transfer restriction, so the future stream is itself saleable — and losing the badge loses the cut. Nothing about that ratio was…fee on subsequent direct buys.

A caper is a fundraising vehic…ght to a trigger, which opens a 48-hourthe market window and locks the trailing seven-day TWAP at that moment as the bas…her than a sequence of rounds.

A caper is a fundraising vehic…on on one ballot – up to four executable onesanswers, each an executable action or a debate position, plus a standing “do nothing” …ss executes nothing by itself; where the winner is one of the five executable kinds it earns the right to a trigg…t that moment as the baseline. Where the winner is a DEBATE position – the sixth option kind, live since 5 September 2026, which carries no execution fields and is asserted empty of them at creation – the proposal is terminal at the tally instead: trigger_proposal refuses a DEBATE winner by kind, so a question put to the members can be ranked, won and recorded without any second phase opening at all, and the flat creation fee is the whole cost of asking. The action goes through only …her than a sequence of rounds.

The two fee legs Capers charg…stion returns “treasury pays”. A DEBATE winner pays it in no case at all, having neither an XRD basis nor a trigger to be charged at. Each ranked ballot costs its …ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Launching a caper One transac…o your caper at afixed ratio = 80% of cap / origin supply. Allof it can move over, filling four fifths ofth fullmigration fills the entire curve and, leaving the rest to buyersnoheadroom and an empty reserve.Anyone can launch a caper in …th pricing · fresh or vampire.

A caper is a fundraising vehic…s a proposal to spend it, and under optimistic governancespending clears two phases (/wiki/governance/proposals) that proposal passes by default: at the close of a 48-hour window the contract compares the token's spot price against the trailing seven-day TWAP baseline locked in when the proposal was created, and the action executes unless the market has s. The first is legislative: holders rank every option on one ballot – up to four executable ones plus a standing “do nothing” – each ballot weighted w = (t · v) / (V · T), and a Borda fold picks a leader that must clear a supermajority of 1.5 / option_count of the weight actually cast. A pass executes nothing by itself; it earns the right to a trigger, which opens a 48-hour window and locks the trailing seven-day TWAP at that moment as the baseline. The action goes through only if the window's own TWAP finishes at or above that line, so the vote legislates and the market ratifies: holding is consent, and only selling that holds the price below that linedown for a real share of the window vetoes what the ballot decided. PAYOUT sends XRD or tokens t…her than a sequence of rounds.

The two fee legs Capers charg…he deployed CaperMain exposes eighteen public functions and not one of them is a fee setterno fee setter of any kind, so changing the schedule mea…sited straight into your caper'’s own treasury, alongside the proposalgovernance fee as members pays to open a proposal. That fee is not a flat figure: it is max(500 XRD, 10% of the action's own. Those are two-tier: a flat 500 XRD to open a proposal, banked at creation and kept whether it passes or fails, and a 10% execution fee on the winning action’s XRD basis) — the amount sent for a PAYOU…on valued at the foreign caper'’s spot price for a DIVEST — so a small proposal pays the 500 XRD floor while a large one pays a tenth of what it moves. There is no vote fee: under optimistic governance nobodycharged at the trigger rather than at creation, and waived entirely when the ballot’s second question returns “treasury pays”. Each ranked ballot caosts a ballot, so there is nothing to charge forits voter a further 100 XRD, into the same treasury (see the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq…sells back into the curve doesn' not touch your caper — it accrue…o the treasury of the protocol'’s root $XRD caper (the base ca…rnance tokens. That gate is no longer a vott a pure voting record, and not a pure trading record. either: v is minted by trading, not by votingat one flat rate on three surfaces — 0.01 v per XRD of gross trade value on both legs, on the buyer's gros’s outlay and, the same on the seller'’s gross curve payout — so anyone who has touched the curve holds some, and exactly 1 per ranked ballot, since the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that identical rate. So anyone who has traded holds some, and so does anyone who has voted. What the assertion rules out is a bystander who has never tradeddone neither claiming a slice, not a holder who never voted. No one takes a flat pro-rata…pties only through a proposal that carried its ballot and that the market then declined to veto (/wiki/dao-g…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bond…uys · founder slice · trade & governanceproposal fees · direct payments to the…ia PAYOUT · INVEST · DIVEST · VOTEUPGRADE · METADATA proposals Related Bonding c…asury/dao-treasury-management)

A caper is a fundraising vehic…ing fixed up front. Trade and governanceproposal fees flow into your caper's t…ury capital doesn't sit idle. Holders pass proposals to spend it —A member opens a proposal to spend it, and under optimistic governance (/wiki/governance/proposals) that proposal passes by default: at the close of a 48-hour window the contract compares the token's spot price against the trailing seven-day TWAP baseline locked in when the proposal was created, and the action executes unless the market has sold the price below that line. PAYOUT sends XRD or tokens to… unwind a holding by the same voroute that acquired it. Because …her than a sequence of rounds.

The two fee legs Capers charge a 0.5% trade fee – the configured r— a field written into the logic component when the platform is instantiated rather than a constant of the contract, and nothing can rewritable within [0, 10%] by the same update_fees call that sets the two governance fees below – but the two legsplace. The deployed CaperMain exposes eighteen public functions and not one of them is a fee setter, so changing the schedule means publishing a fresh logic component and moving the platform onto it through a governed UPGRADE proposal in the $CAPER caper. Both legs carry the same rate; they land in different places — a, and that is the distinction worth understandi…, alongside the proposal fee and vote fee members pays to createopen a proposals and vote. Those two are configured fields rather than protocol constants — they start at 500 XRD and 100 XRD, and an admin rewrites them alongside the trade fee in a single update_fees c. That fee is not a flat figure: it is max(500 XRD, 10% of the action's own XRD basis) — the amount sent for a PAYOUT, the XRD outlay for an INVEST, the position valued at the foreign caper's spot price for a DIVEST — so a small proposal pays the 500 XRD floor while a large one pays a tenth of what it moves. There is no vote fee: under optimistic governance nobody casts a ballot, so treat the figures as the current schedulehere is nothing to charge for (see the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq…-a-caper) pays the canonical vote weight (t·v)/(V·T), and exit()…sserts a non-empty bucket of vote tokens alongside the governance tokens, so a holder who never voted has no exit to take rather than a zero-valued one. That gate is no longer a voting record. v is minted by trading, not by voting — 0.01 v per XRD of gross trade value on both legs, on the buyer's gross outlay and on the seller's gross curve payout — so anyone who has touched the curve holds some. What the assertion rules out is a bystander who has never traded claiming a slice, not a holder who never voted. No one takes a flat pro-rata…with genuine buy-side interest, and governance activity, deployed only by voteempties only through a proposal the market declined to veto (/wiki/dao-governance/concept…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

The founder slice Unlike a fi… circulation. Past that point every buy is slice-free — the curve is the buyer's only counterparty and neither founder nor protocol takes any further cutthe skim itself is gone: collateralization_rate returns zero once 30% of the supply is sold, so neither founder leg nor the Commons tithe takes anything from a buy again. The 0.5% trade fee (/wiki/markets/trading) does not taper with it — buy_token_raw takes it off the gross payment before the skim is computed and independently of it, and buy_apply deposits it into the caper's own treasury on every buy for the life of the caper. So a mature caper charges no founder tax, but the curve is never quite the buyer's only counterparty. This rewards the founder for…fee on subsequent direct buys.

A caper is a fundraising vehic…and a way for backers to exit. The raise never closes either, which makes a caper an open-end organization (/blog/the-open-end-organization) rather than a sequence of rounds.

The two fee legs Capers charg…ther caper: each exit (/wiki/governance/executionfoundations/leaving-a-caper) pays the canonical vote wei…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

The two fee legs Capers charge a flat 0.5% trade fee, – the configured rate rather than a constant of the contract, rewritable within [0, 10%] by the same update_fees call that sets the two governance fees below – but the two legs land in diff…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Launching a caper One transac…o your caper at afixed ratio = 80% of cap / origin supply, so 100% ofit can move ov. Allof it can move over, filling four fifths ofthe curve and leaving the rest to buyers.Anyone can launch a caper in …th pricing · fresh or vampire.

The two fee legs Capers charg…ical vote weight (t·v)/(V·T), so a holder who never voted claims nothing, and nand exit() asserts a non-empty bucket of vote tokens alongside the governance tokens, so a holder who never voted has no exit to take rather than a zero-valued one. No one takes a flat pro-rata sl…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bond… Deploy via PAYOUT · INVEST · DIVEST · VOTE proposals Related Bond…asury/dao-treasury-management)

A caper is a fundraising vehic…sition back into your treasury; DIVEST sells that position back into the same curve and books the XRD, so a treasury can unwind a holding by the same vote that acquired it. Because the curve guarantee…and a way for backers to exit.

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bonding-curve buys · founder slice · trade & governance fees Deploy via PAYOUT · INVEST · VOTE proposals Related Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , DAO treasury management (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management)

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bonding-curve buys · founder slice · trade & governance fees · direct payments to the treasury account Deploy via PAYOUT · INVEST · VOTE proposals Related Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , DAO treasury management (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management)

Money that never touches the curve A caper's treasury is not a vault buried inside the contract. It is a native Radix Account (https://docs.radixdlt.com/docs/account) , created in the same launch transaction and owned by the treasury component itself — so no external party, founder included, holds the keys to it. The component around it is a thin gate: depositing is public, while withdrawing, transferring, paying an exit and casting the caper's vote elsewhere are each restricted to a treasury admin badge that never leaves the caper's own custody. That asymmetry is the part worth planning around. Anyone can pay a caper directly. A freshly created account accepts deposits by default, so the treasury address takes XRD or any other token from a customer, a grant programme, a partner protocol, another caper's PAYOUT, or a plain wallet transfer — none of it routed through the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , none of it needing a proposal, and none of it minting a single token. Curve buys and fee legs are the inflows that arrive on their own; they are not the only ones a project can raise on. Revenue, donations and off-chain-negotiated funding all land the same way an ordinary payment does. Because the vessel is a real account rather than a bespoke escrow, its address drops into ordinary Radix tooling without adaptation — it is what a payer's wallet sends to, what a locker stores to, and what an executive proposal's recipient field takes. And because every outbound path is badge-gated, money leaves a treasury in exactly two ways: an executed proposal (/wiki/governance/execution) , or a member exit (/wiki/markets/trading) .

Paying someone whose account can refuse A PAYOUT does not deposit into its recipient. The treasury withdraws the voted amount and hands it to an account locker (https://docs.radixdlt.com/docs/locker) , asking it to try the direct deposit first. The distinction matters because on Radix an account can carry deposit rules that reject resources it has not opted into, and a plain deposit into such an account aborts the whole transaction. A DAO that pays grants, invoices or salaries to accounts it does not control would otherwise be one recipient's privacy setting away from an execution that cannot be completed. Radix's own documentation frames the locker as the fire-and-forget pattern (https://docs.radixdlt.com/docs/account-deposit-patterns) — "we'll try to send the package to your house, but if we can't, you'll have to come pick it up" — and it is the right shape for treasury spending precisely because it needs no prior coordination with the payee: no authorised-depositor badge, no allow-listing, no round trip before the vote. The payout lands straight in when the recipient accepts it, and waits in the locker to be claimed when they do not. Exits are paid through the same locker, so a departing member's claim cannot be blocked by their own deposit settings either.

What a public front door costs A permissionless deposit is also a permissionless way to put junk in someone's treasury, and the contract pays for that openness in two explicit places. Both are worth knowing generally: they are the failure modes any treasury contract inherits the moment it lets strangers deposit and then loops over what it holds. Nothing on-chain iterates the holdings. The treasury emits a one-off registration event the first time each new resource arrives, and indexers rebuild the balance sheet from that event stream plus the Gateway's view of the account. Redemption walks only the resource list its caller supplies — floored at XRD plus the caper's own token, then extended with the exiting member's own discovered holdings. The source states the reason plainly: iterating an on-chain registry would let anyone grow the per-exit loop without bound, and on the order of a hundred junk resources would push every exit past the cost-unit ceiling (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-execution-costs) and brick redemption permanently. Bounded-by-caller loses nothing, because the off-chain manifest already supplies the live set. Every exit leg rounds down to the resource's divisibility. A fractional amount of an indivisible token makes the withdrawal panic, and one panic aborts the entire exit — for every holder, not just the one who triggered it. An attacker arms that by depositing a single unit of a divisibility-zero token. Rounding each slice down means indivisible dust is skipped rather than fatal, which is a deliberate trade: a member's claim on odd dust is forfeited so that redemption itself cannot be turned off. For how the wider industry thinks about what a treasury ends up holding and who can put things there, see DAO treasury management (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) .

The two fee legs Capers charg…y, alongside the proposal fee (500 XRD) and vote fee (100 XRD) paid when members create proposals and voteand vote fee members pay to create proposals and vote. Those two are configured fields rather than protocol constants — they start at 500 XRD and 100 XRD, and an admin rewrites them alongside the trade fee in a single update_fees call, so treat the figures as the current schedule (see the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) ). - Sell-leg fee → the base $…tive-XRD holders migrate into) and, where its shared pro-rata with its membmembers claim it on the same participation-weighted terms as any other caper: each exit (/wiki/governance/execution) pays the canonical vote weight (t·v)/(V·T), so a holders when they exito never voted claims nothing, and no one takes a flat pro-rata slice. So a caper earns from the bu…ury/dao-treasury-management) .

The one caper whose denominator is a constant Every caper divides an exiting member's claim by its own circulating supply. The root $XRD caper is the exception, and the reason is a property of XRD rather than a design choice: genesis creates XRD with track_total_supply: false, so its on-ledger total_supply() returns nothing on any network. There is no float to divide by. So effective_circulation substitutes a fixed 24,000,000,000 — XRD's maximum supply, being the 12bn minted at genesis plus roughly 12bn released as network emissions over about 40 years (https://learn.radixdlt.com/article/what-is-the-xrd-token) . The invariant that matters is that the denominator must be at least the sum of every member's holdings, because that is what keeps the sum of all exit shares inside the treasury. The 24bn cap is the tightest constant that always satisfies it, since no set of members can ever hold more. Erring high has two consequences worth knowing if you hold $XRD. Claims on the pooled sell-leg fees are conservative — divided by the cap rather than by the live float, so an exit pays less than a float-based split would and the treasury cannot be over-drawn. And the constant cannot distort governance: the denominator cancels out of the settle path's top_weight / total_weight ratio, so it moves how fast the treasury pays out and never which option wins. Both properties are read off effective_circulation and exit in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs.

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bond…treasury management (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management)

A caper is a fundraising vehic…he buyer. A slice of each buy is skimmed off the payment in XRD and accrues to you, the founder — helaccrues to you, the founder, paid in the curve's own composition — two thirds in XRD off the payment, one third as a slice of the tokens that buy mints. Both land in a badge-gated vaults you can withdraw from at any time, so your proceedsstake grows with demand instead of being …and a way for backers to exit.

The founder slice Unlike a fi… founder out of curve activity — and it pays them in XRD, not tokens. On each buy the protocol tak…sized by the curve's position, and split at a fixed 30:1 ratio between the founder and the protocol-wide $CAPER treasury (the "Commons"). The two legs are denominated differently, and that is the whole point: the founder's 30/31 is skimmed in XRD off the payment before it funds the curve and lands in as it in the same proportions the curve itself is made of. A bonding curve whose price rises as the n-th power of supply holds exactly 1/(n+1) of its market value as reserve. Caper's price is a square root of circulation at the origin, so n = ½ and the reserve fraction is two thirds: two thirds of a young caper's worth is XRD in the vault, one third is claim on buyers yet to arrive. The skim follows that line. Two thirds is skimmed in XRD off the payment before it funds the curve; one third is a slice of the tokens that buy mints, tithed 30/31 to the founder and 1/31 to the protocol-wide $CAPER treasury (the "Commons"). Both founder legs sit in badge-gated vaults you can withdraw from at any time, while the Commons' 1/31 is minted as caper tokens against the curve and routed to the $CAPER treasury. Because no caper tokens are ever minted to the founder, the token carries no founder-stack sell-pressure overhang — the founder realizes value directly in the buyer's over-collateralization overpayment, instead of holding tokens they would later have to sell back into the curve.. Nothing about that ratio was chosen, and the founder's ceiling falls out of it. The token leg peaks at 15% × ⅓ = 5% of each mint, and because the slice is a fixed fraction of every mint, the founder's share of the coin is just the average of that fraction across the curve travelled — which cannot exceed its own peak. So the skim never grants a founder more than 5% of their own coin, on any path, with no vesting schedule or cliff enforcing it. The realised share starts just under 5% and decays as the caper grows: about 4% at a tenth of supply sold, under 1% near the top of the curve. (That bounds what the skim hands over, not what a founder may hold — they can buy on the curve like anyone else.) Crucially the slice is front…fee on subsequent direct buys.

The two fee legs Capers charg…loyed only by vote (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-gov…treasury management (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) .

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bond…treasury management (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management)

The two fee legs Capers charg…loyed only by vote (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models) . For h…treasury management (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) .

A caper is a fundraising vehic…he buyer. A slice of each buy accrues to you, the founder, as governance tokensis skimmed off the payment in XRD and accrues to you, the founder — held in a badge-gated vault you can withdraw from at any time —, so your stakeproceeds grows with demand instead of being …and a way for backers to exit.

The founder slice Unlike a fi… founder out of curve activity. On each buy, a collateralization slice of the newly-minted tokens is routed away from the buyer and split 30/31 to the founder (into — and it pays them in XRD, not tokens. On each buy the protocol takes a collateralization slice sized by the curve's position, split at a fixed 30:1 ratio between the founder and the protocol-wide $CAPER treasury (the "Commons"). The two legs are denominated differently, and that is the whole point: the founder's 30/31 is skimmed in XRD off the payment before it funds the curve and lands in a badge-gated founder vault you can withdraw from at any time) and 1/31 to the protocol-wide $CAPER treasury. Crucially this, while the Commons' 1/31 is minted as caper tokens against the curve and routed to the $CAPER treasury. Because no caper tokens are ever minted to the founder, the token carries no founder-stack sell-pressure overhang — the founder realizes value directly in the buyer's over-collateralization overpayment, instead of holding tokens they would later have to sell back into the curve. Crucially the slice is front-loaded, not pe…fee on subsequent direct buys.

Launching a caper One transaction mints the token, treasury, and bonding curve and hands the founder a badge. The only cost is a registration fee that scales with how short — how rare — the ticker is, and it can start fresh or migrate an existing token. CAPER PROTOCOLLaunching a caperONE TRANSACTIONONE TRANSACTION CREATES EVERYTHINGTokenTreasuryBonding curveFounder badgeCHOOSE A TICKER — SHORTER IS RARER6 characters10 XRD5 characters100 XRD4 characters1,000 XRD3 characters10,000 XRD2 characters100,000 XRD1 character1,000,000 XRDPaid to the $CAPER treasury.FRESH CAPERThe curve starts empty. Buyers mint the veryfirst tokens, and the founder earns thetapering reward.VAMPIRE CAPERMigrate an existing token into your caper at afixed ratio = cap / origin supply, so 100% ofit can move over.Anyone can launch a caper in a single click.caper.networkOne transaction · ticker-length pricing · fresh or vampire.

The two fee legs Capers charg…d vote. - Sell-leg fee → the protocol treasurybase $XRD caper. The 0.5% taken when someone sells back into the curve flows instead to the protocol-wide treasury, not to your caper — sdoesn't touch your caper — it accrues to the treasury of the protocol's root $XRD caper (the base caper native-XRD holders migrate into) and is shared pro-rata with its members when they exit. So a caper earns from the buy-side demand it attracts, while sell-side churn funds the commonslows out to the wider XRD holder base — distinct from the $CAPER commons, which is funded by the 1/31 founder-slice above. The result is a treasury th…pts/dao-treasury-management) .

The founder slice Unlike a fi… bound to an origin token the slice is forced to zero — the founfounder still earns this same per-buy slice; what differs is that holder's bootstrap is instead the migration vault populated as origin holders migrateof the origin token can migrate into the caper — a free mint that advances circulation without an XRD buy, with the resulting reserve gap backfilled by a fee on subsequent direct buys.

Topic Fundraising Inflow Bonding-curve buys · founder slice · trade & governance fees Deploy via PAYOUT · INVEST · VOTE proposals Related Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , DAO treasury management (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-treasury-management)

A caper is a fundraising vehicle as much as a governance one. Launching one costs a single transaction — and from that moment your project can take in money from anyone, anywhere. There are two sides to the flow of capital: - Raising. Every buy on your bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) moves XRD in and tokens out to the buyer. A slice of each buy accrues to you, the founder, as governance tokens you can withdraw at any time — your stake grows with demand instead of being fixed up front. Trade and governance fees flow into your caper's treasury. - Deploying. Treasury capital doesn't sit idle. Holders pass proposals to spend it — PAYOUT sends XRD or tokens to a contributor, vendor, or cause; INVEST buys into another caper's curve and books the position back into your treasury. Because the curve guarantees a market in both directions, there is always someone to raise from and a way for backers to exit.

The founder slice Unlike a fixed founder allocation minted up front, a caper pays its founder out of curve activity. On each buy, a collateralization slice of the newly-minted tokens is routed away from the buyer and split 30/31 to the founder (into a badge-gated founder vault you can withdraw from at any time) and 1/31 to the protocol-wide $CAPER treasury. Crucially this slice is front-loaded, not perpetual: it tapers linearly from its configured peak at genesis down to zero once ~30% of the supply is in circulation. Past that point every buy is slice-free — the curve is the buyer's only counterparty and neither founder nor protocol takes any further cut. This rewards the founder for the risky early bootstrap without imposing a permanent tax on a mature, liquid token. For vampire capers bound to an origin token the slice is forced to zero — the founder's bootstrap is instead the migration vault populated as origin holders migrate.

The two fee legs Capers charge a flat 0.5% trade fee, but the two legs land in different places — a distinction worth understanding: - Buy-leg fee → your treasury. The 0.5% taken off each incoming XRD payment is deposited straight into your caper's own treasury, alongside the proposal fee (500 XRD) and vote fee (100 XRD) paid when members create proposals and vote. - Sell-leg fee → the protocol treasury. The 0.5% taken when someone sells back into the curve flows instead to the protocol-wide treasury, not to your caper — so a caper earns from the demand it attracts, while sell-side churn funds the commons. The result is a treasury that grows with genuine buy-side interest and governance activity, deployed only by vote (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-governance-models) . For how the broader industry stewards what it raises — diversification, runway, and custody — see DAO treasury management (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-treasury-management) .