Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1czfxjq3qhh5rec… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1czfxjq3pf4klke3y83fxq0e4kzu6s25grkfz8rw9w76vhp67850eheqhh5recxpf2yaaphwynxhu6jjcfz5u77zegd297f8c9jxd72l54qd) , the logic the CaperRegist…o/component/component_tdx_2_1czf2tnh8zvdqcxmv43xq6200l3vnh9ujz3us69mdz9xw8jmgdqgj84p56mwqp27edhj9hw0unrjlz7vgd8g4jjt9j2flxu9rj3a4n5qjax0) has resolved to since the full redeploy of 611 October 2026, read 711 October) and the contract sou…acts/common/src/lib.rs) as of 1827a720a1903d, the source that redeploy published. It moved the proposal fee to creation and gave the upgrade’s activate leg a deadline; the answers on both describe itade a trade name its caper by component address instead of cashtag, which changes no answer here. Each earlier full redeploy a…moved; 21 September (4b53957); and 25 September (012387e), which…s treasury a share of the skim; and 6 October (1827a72), which moved the proposal fee to creation and gave the upgrade’s activate leg a deadline, both described in the answers below. Read the pair off the ledger…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cpltlrzzfxjq3… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cpltlrzfnvky7ekmtvlzr55fa8hzwddt7tmmdn2q3jrqc8pske3jk5zfxjq3pf4klke3y83fxq0e4kzu6s25grkfz8rw9w76vhp67850ehe) , the logic the CaperRegist…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cpndqmgr5n6fsf6kausxlyllm4rpuc2zwhn94adws7zegkenqsad8z) has resolved to since 1 October 2026zf2tnh8zvdqcxmv43xq6200l3vnh9ujz3us69mdz9xw8jmgdqgj84) has resolved to since the full redeploy of 6 October 2026, read 7 October) and the contract source (con…acts/common/src/lib.rs) as of 4b53957, the commit the full redeploy of 21 September 2026 published. That1827a72, the source that redeploy published. It moved the proposal fee to creation and gave the upgrade’s activate leg a deadline; the answers on both describe it. Each earlier full redeploy also replaced the core, the registry and the logic together, as the one of: 18 September had, when the $XRD caper was removed. The full redeploy of; 251 September 2026 published (4b53957); and 25 September (012387e), which removed the trade fee …s treasury a share of the skim; the answers on fees and the skim describe it. Read the pair off the ledger…est-lived fact on this wiki – eightat least nine have been current since 11 Se…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

A caper I hold owns tokens in …osal may activate the other's. Since the redeploy of 6 October 2026 the second leg has a deadline of its own: it must run within seven days of the moment the candidate first becomes activatable (EXECUTION_WINDOW_SECONDS), or it aborts with “Activation window closed”. Before then only the first leg was bound by the proposal’s execution deadline, and a proposed candidate could sit in the pending slot indefinitely; the fix (contracts/PENTEST.md, H-4) entered the source on 1 October and reached the ledger with that redeploy. Why a transaction failed (/wiki/help/why-a-transaction-failed) lists that message with the leg’s other two refusals. Individual capers govern thei… contract instead of the copy.

How does a proposal pass? It h…one must call trigger_proposal, which prices the execution fee, – free, and open to any account – which locks a baseline – the time-w…s it cost to open a proposal? TwoOne payments, at two different moments. At creation, a flat 500 XRD proposal feecreation: 1% of the largest option's XRD-equivalent value, with a floor of 500 XRD, banked irrevocably into the …r the proposal passes or fails – it is the spam gate, and since 11 September 2026 that is all it is. Until then it. The largest option prices it because the winner is unknown until the tally, and pricing a smaller one would let a proposer pad a large ask with a cheap decoy, so any slate whose largest option is under 50,000 XRD pays the floor. A PAYOUT in a caper token converts at the issuing caper's trailing time-weighted average price rather than its spot, so a dump in the creating transaction cannot shrink the basis; a DIVEST converts at the target's trailing average, an INVEST is XRD already, and DEBATE, UPGRADE and METADATA name no amount, so they pay the floor. Send more than the fee and the change comes back in the same transaction. Nothing is due later: trigger_proposal takes no payment, for any kind. Until 11 September 2026 the fee doubled as a settlement-gas a…nd none draws on the treasury. Then, at the trigger, an execution fee of 10% of the winning action's XRD-equivalent value, priced off the curve's trail From 29 August to 6 October 2026 the fee also came ing time-weighted average rather than its spot – the same read that locks the pass baseline, so a dump in the triggering transaction cannot shrink it: a PAYOUT in a caper token converts at the issuing caper's trailing average, an INVEST is XRD already, a DIVEST is priced at the target's trailing average, and UPGRADE and METADATA name no amount, so wo parts: a flat 500 XRD at creation, and a 10% execution fee on the winning action at the trigger, with every ballot voting on whether the proposer or the treasury paid it. It was dropped because neitheir basis is zero and the trigger is free either way. Who pays it is the ballot's second question: every ballot also votes proposer-pays or treasury-pays, settled by plain weight majority, and a tie is a treasury waiver. Treasury-pays nets to nothing, because the fee's sink is the caper's own treasury, so a treasury-pays trigger costs the caller nothing and stays fully permissionlessanswer worked: “treasury pays” was the treasury paying itself, “proposer pays” fell on whoever called the permissionless trigger, and a simple majority on the fee could stall an action that had already cleared the supermajority. What can a proposal actually… The first is cost: a debate never reaches a trigger, so it never incurs the 10% execution fee, and the flat 500 XRD creation feeames no amount, so it pays the 500 XRD floor at creation, and that is the whole price of putting… let the market veto spending.

What is the Caper Commons? The…the cast; and the proposal fees above – 500 XRD flat at creation and 10% of the winning ac1% of the largest option at creation, at the triggerleast 500 XRD. Both are deposited into the …500) and proposal_fee_rate (0.01) are written once when the c…sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cqma5fhpltlrz… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cqma5fhxglr6z6s6ym9y73zm4r9lnuzq474ent08xtsplmdufn8npmpltlrzfnvky7ekmtvlzr55fa8hzwddt7tmmdn2q3jrqc8pske3jk5) , the logic the CaperRegist…sad8z) has resolved to since 30 Septem1 October 2026) and the contract sou…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

What is the Caper Commons? The…zero, is half the peak once 1.0199% of the curve cap has sold and 1% of a trade by 10.821.4%, and halves again with every further tenfifth of the supply sold, so ever…sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cr40xf3qma5fh… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cr40xf3hk3wauqz7pjnvvm067a5hu9ss52wwawdzuz8uxqlj0szvu9) , resolved fromqma5fhxglr6z6s6ym9y73zm4r9lnuzq474ent08xtsplmdufn8npm) , the logic the CaperRegistry (https://d…puc2zwhn94adws7zegkenqsad8z) on 25has resolved to since 30 September 2026) and the contr…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

What is the Caper Commons? The… charge on a trade, and it is priced along the cura rate on what the trade moves rather than as a flat share. Since 15 Septemb…g else is charged on a trade. The skim is taken at the rate each token's own point Each trade reads one rate: a buy the rate where it starts, a sell the rate at the bottom it would reach if every token handed in retired. The rate only falls as the curve fills, so a trade pays at least what the same trade cut into pieces would, and never less than the rate's integral along the curve carries, which is why; from 18 September 2026 to 30 September 2026 the contract integrated that itself, so a trade cut into pieces paysid exactly what it would have paid whole. It divides three w…sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1czmc8h0r40xf3… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1czmc8h097upkzdpptzjz7k00fh8msjtq7m634zd74g7qxyhuxrck0ur40xf3hk3wauqz7pjnvvm067a5hu9ss52wwawdzuz8uxqlj0szvu9) , resolved from the CaperRe…o/component/component_tdx_2_1czpmphaq634vp8t6vuqhujgcx056gseprzejluktgnexleczmt0jdapndqmgr5n6fsf6kausxlyllm4rpuc2zwhn94adws7zegkenqsad8z) on 235 September 2026) and the contr…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

Type Reference Covers Tokens …n the $XRD caper was removed. df108e5, committed after it, charges the trade fee on sells too; it changes the core, so it takes effect only wiThe full redeploy of 25 September 2026 published 012387e, which removed the trade fee and gave each caper’s treasury a share of the skim; the another redeploy, and the answers below describe the deployed componenswers on fees and the skim describe it. Read the pair off the ledge…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

How does governance work? In t…D leg comes out of that payout. A sell pays no trade fee, split between the caper's treasury and the founder. Nothing else is charged. Since 15 September 2026 this…aws and burns when you redeem.

What is the Caper Commons? The…ich is $CAPER's own. It takes 1/310.5% of the skim's token leg on every buy and every sell of every caper, paid in that caper's own token, so it builds a small standing position in each of them. The skim's XRD leg goes to the founder aloneIt also receives every registration fee. The rest of each skim goes to the traded caper's own treasury and its founder. Its policy is set by $CAPER … What are the protocol fees? Threewo, and each is paid at the point of use. The 0.5% trade fee on every buy;: the 100 XRD vote fee, charged…inning action at the trigger. All threeBoth are deposited into the caper's own treasury. A selltrade pays no trade fee, and that covers the sell inside an exit and the sell side of a swap; a swap's buy side pays the targetfee. The redeploy of 25 September 2026 removed the 0.5% trade fee, and a trade now pays only the skim (below), 49.5% of which goes to the traded caper's own treasury, like any buy. The trade fee is taken off a buy's gross first, and the skim (below) is then priced on what is left, not alongside it. That holds for the sell inside an exit and for both legs of a swap: the sell leg pays the sold caper's skim and the buy leg the bought caper's. See trading (/wiki/markets/…xpose it, or any other setter. trade_fee (0.005), vote_fee (100), collateraliza…llateralization skim a fee? No, and it is worth separating. Since 15 September 2026 every trade is skimmed, buys and sells alike, and the two charges are taken in sequence rather than side by side: on a buy the trade fee comes off the gross first, and the skim is priced on what is left. Two thirds of the rate is taken in XRD – a share of the curve XRD the trade moves, at the rate each token's own point on the curve carries, which is why a trade cut into pieces pays exactly what it would have paid whole – and goes to the founder. The other third is a slice of the tokens the trade m. It is the one charge on a trade, and it is priced along the curve rather than as a flat share. Since 15 September 2026 every trade is skimmed, buys and sells alike, and since 25 September 2026 nothing else is charged on a trade. The skim is taken at the rate each token's own point on the curve carries, which is why a trade cut into pieces pays exactly what it would have paid whole. It divides three ways: 49.5% to the traded caper's own treasury, in XRD; 50% to the founder, 90% of that in XRD and 10% in the caper's own token; and 0.5% to the Caper Commons (aboves), split 30:1 between the founder and the Caper Commons (abin tokens. So 94.5% of the skim is a share of the curve XRD the trade moves and 5.5% is a slice of the tokens it move)s. At the peak of 1, on an empty curve, that is 66.6794.5% of the curve XRD the trade moves, paid in XRD, and 33.33% of the tokens it moves. The skim never touches the caper's treasury, so it is not a protocol fee – it is the founder's compensation and 5.5% of the tokens, of which the founder's part is 45% of the XRD and 5% of the tokens. Its rate, set by the bondin…sing-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in …ler. It pays like one too: there is no trade fee on a sell, and part of the tokens sale pays the target caper's skim, so part of the payout goes to the target's treasury and founder, and part of the payout gotokens to the target's founder and t… contract instead of the copy.

Type Reference Covers Tokens …Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1czqsy8nmc8h0… (https://dashboard.radixscan…/component/component_tdx_2_1czqsy8ncz6mcfp43mmnus39kk2l73f8x7wrxjwnzmth93aruhv43pmmc8h097upkzdpptzjz7k00fh8msjtq7m634zd74g7qxyhuxrck0u) , resolved from the CaperRe…o/component/component_tdx_2_1crf8dl07k744cd0ekefyxf450r93jjwe9ewl6shl4zqr8vngjmnnxgzpmphaq634vp8t6vuqhujgcx056gseprzejluktgnexleczmt0jda) on 203 September 2026) and the contr…acts/common/src/lib.rs) as of aaad5224b53957, the commit the logic upgradefull redeploy of 219 September 2026 published. The registry is the one the full redeploy of 18 September 2026 published, which replaced the core, the registry and the logic together when the $XRD caper was removed; the three logic upgrades since have each activated a new CaperMain against it and left it aloneat redeploy replaced the core, the registry and the logic together, as the one of 18 September had when the $XRD caper was removed. df108e5, committed after it, charges the trade fee on sells too; it changes the core, so it takes effect only with another redeploy, and the answers below describe the deployed component. Read the pair off the ledger…est-lived fact on this wiki – seveneight have been current since 11 Se…o the evening of 19 September —– and every registry the platfo…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

What is the Caper Commons? The… a positive vote-token amount, withdraws both from the account the payout goes to, and aborts the call ("Exit re… rather than paying out zero. Taking bothBoth come from onthe account is also new on 1the payout goes to: since the redeploy of 21 September 2026: the earlier call accepted two buckets, which lettransaction first calls exit_open, which records that account's vote-token balance, and exit accepts only the vote tokens the balance has lost since, so one account's vote tokens cannot be paired with another's gover…sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cr3qm57zqsy8n… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cr3qm57h5fld30uq8ufefx60ycfuucyu5m7v4zkl9pwkca6d6g7zggzqsy8ncz6mcfp43mmnus39kk2l73f8x7wrxjwnzmth93aruhv43pm) , resolved from the CaperRe…/component/component_tdx_2_1cr65qc2r33ky36j49lp3mdee7x45pzewr8dp0q6z2ya57mkajmtch9f8dl07k744cd0ekefyxf450r93jjwe9ewl6shl4zqr8vngjmnnxg) on 1820 September 2026) and the contr…acts/common/src/lib.rs) as of 4c4d175aaad522, the commit the logic upgrade of 189 September 2026 published. That upgrade swapped the logic alone; the registry is the one the full redeploy of 158 September 2026 published, which replaced the core, the registry as well asnd the logic, the second time in a week, and whose CaperMain component_tdx_2_1cq6jcm9… the upgrade retired. The two earlier pairs still exist and still answer: CaperMain component_tdx_2_1cq64v5tw… with registry component_tdx_2_1cr7l4u…ogether when the $XRD caper was removed; the three logic upgrades since have each activated a new CaperMain against it and left it alone. Read the pair off the ledger rather than off this row. A CaperMain address is the shortest-lived fact on this wiki – seven have been current since 11 September 2026, lfive from 11 toof them in the forty hours to the evening of 159 September, — and component_tdx_2_1cr8psn5… with component_tdx_2_1cqtsx3p… before thatevery registry the platform has retired still answers, still resolves a current_main, and returns whichever one was current the day it was replaced. That is why a stamp has to n… vintage as well as an address, and why current_main is the only address worth quoting Related What is a caper (/w…help/why-a-transaction-failed)

What is the Caper Commons? The…fee is taken off a buy's gross, in parallel with the skim (below) first, and the skim (below) is then priced on what is left, not alongside it. See trading (/wiki/markets/…med, buys and sells alike, and the two charges are taken in sequence rather than side by side: on a buy the skimtrade fee comes off the same gross as the trade fee. Two thirds of the rate is taken in XRD – off the payment on a buy, off the payout on a sellgross first, and the skim is priced on what is left. Two thirds of the rate is taken in XRD – a share of the curve XRD the trade moves, at the rate each token's own point on the curve carries, which is why a trade cut into pieces pays exactly what it would have paid whole – and goes to the founder. Th…sing-funds) works through it.

What is the Caper Commons? The…zero, is half the peak once 1.301% of the curve cap has sold and 1% of a trade by 10.8%, and then settles at a floor of 0.5%halves again with every further tenth of the supply sold, so every trade is skimmed fo…sing-funds) works through it.

How does governance work? In t…create_caper, withdraw_founder, exit and the two address reads and exit. A correction, stated plainly…aws and burns when you redeem.

What is the Caper Commons? The…100), collateralization_peak (0.051), proposal_fee (500) and prop…Caper Commons (above). At the 0.05 peak that is 3.33%peak of 1, on an empty curve, that is 66.67% of the curve XRD the trade moves, paid in XRD, and 1.67% in token33.33% of the tokens it moves. The skim never touches the …s zero, is half the peak once 6.751.3% of the curve cap has sold, and keeps falling towards 0.74% without reaching zero1% of a trade by 10%, and then settles at a floor of 0.5%, so every trade is skimmed fo…sing-funds) works through it.

How does governance work? In t… rejected anywhere but $CAPER. The $XRD caper, which refused every proposal until 11 September 2026, now takes them, and its ballot is weighed in native XRD (contracts/PENTEST.md, I-1). It has no curve, so since the redeploy of 15 September 2026 its second phase reads a reference basket instead – the component's xrd_basket field, which lists CAPER alone – and the test is inverted: an $XRD proposal passes if the basket's window average is at or below its baseline, so moving XRD into capers is the veto. Between 11 and 15 September both averages read zero, the tie passed, and the ballot alone decided. Each of those refusals arrive… for the tokens it takes back, and the trade fee and the skim's XRD leg both comes out of that payout. A sell pays no trade fee. Since 15 September 2026 this …aws and burns when you redeem.

What is the Caper Commons? The…he 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell; the 100 XRD vote fee, charge…inning action at the trigger. Where they land differs by leg: the proposal fee, the vote fee and the buy leg of the trade fAll three are deposited into the caper's own treasury, while the sell leg is not – it accrue. A sell pays tno the root $XRD caper, which collects the fee on every sell on the platform, includingrade fee, and that covers the sell inside an exit and the sell side of a swap. A; a swap's buy side pays the targ…per's treasury, like any buy. Both legs of tThe trade fee areis taken off the tradea buy's gross, in parallel with the…ed, buys and sells alike, and on a buy the skim comes off the same gr…sing-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in …ler. It pays like one too: the trade fee goere is tno the root $XRD caper, and while the target's skim is running,rade fee on a sell, and part of the tokens and part o…founder and the Caper Commons. The one token this cannot reach is $XRD, which has no curve of its own. Can a proposal change how the… contract instead of the copy.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cq6jcm9r3qm57… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cq6jcm9hd6uakguta74dvv63qa2p4seap47htt0px8rftecq2wd3nar3qm57h5fld30uq8ufefx60ycfuucyu5m7v4zkl9pwkca6d6g7zgg) , resolved from the CaperRe…wr8dp0q6z2ya57mkajmtch9) on 178 September 2026) and the contr…acts/common/src/lib.rs) as of 890e2a74c4d175, the commit the full redeploylogic upgrade of 158 September 2026 published. That redeployupgrade swapped the logic alone; the registry is the one the full redeploy of 15 September 2026 published, which replaced the registry as well…gic, the second time in a week, and whose CaperMain component_tdx_2_1cq6jcm9… the upgrade retired. The two earlier pairs still …help/why-a-transaction-failed)

What is the Caper Commons? The…), collateralization_peak (0.075), proposal_fee (500) and pro…er Commons (above). At the 0.075 peak that is 53.33% in XRD and 2.51.67% in tokens. The skim never to… peak when circulation is zero and tapers linearly to zero at 30% of the curve cap, after which trades are not skimmed at all, is half the peak once 6.75% of the curve cap has sold, and keeps falling towards 0.74% without reaching zero, so every trade is skimmed for the life of the caper. The rate falling does not me…sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens …tokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cq64v5twjcm9… (https://dashboard.radixscan…component/component_tdx_2_1cq64v5twlsaverknjplmh92cv3cdmnazs9q72mnz056u2tujjflhcrjcm9hd6uakguta74dvv63qa2p4seap47htt0px8rftecq2wd3na) , resolved from the CaperRe…/component/component_tdx_2_1cr7l4u0c6rwktxk89k2g5fsdexdjftnurllnxenz0kpzfasmndvzzv) 65qc2r33ky36j49lp3mdee7x45pzewr8dp0q6z2ya57mkajmtch9) on 17 September 2026) and the contract source (con…contracts/common/src/lib.rs) at bd589s of 890e2a7, re-read 13 September 2026. The genesisthe commit the full redeploy of 115 September 2026 published. That redeploy replaced the registry as well as the logic:, the pair this row named until then,second time in a week. The two earlier pairs still exist and still answer: CaperMain component_tdx_2_1cr8psn5… andq64v5tw… with registry component_tdx_2_1cqtsx3p…, still exists and still answers, whichr7l4u…, live from 11 to 15 September, and component_tdx_2_1cr8psn5… with component_tdx_2_1cqtsx3p… before that. That is why a stamp has to name a …help/why-a-transaction-failed)

How does governance work? In t…September 2026, now takes them: with no curve its baseline an, and its ballot is weighed window averages are both zero, the tie passes, so its second phase is a formality and the ballot alone decides, weighed in native XRD (contracts/PENTEST.md, I-1) native XRD (contracts/PENTEST.md, I-1). It has no curve, so since the redeploy of 15 September 2026 its second phase reads a reference basket instead – the component's xrd_basket field, which lists CAPER alone – and the test is inverted: an $XRD proposal passes if the basket's window average is at or below its baseline, so moving XRD into capers is the veto. Between 11 and 15 September both averages read zero, the tie passed, and the ballot alone decided. Each of those refusals arriv… inventory vault when I sell? YMost of your tokens go back into the inventory vault, and your XRD comes out of the… priced along the same curve. The protocoNothing is burned. The exception is the skim's token leg (below): while the skim is running, a slice of the tokens you sell dgoes not burn anything on sellto the founder and the Caper Commons and stays in circulation. The curve pays only for the tokens it takes back, and the trade fee and the skim's XRD leg both come out of that payout. Since 15 September 2026 this also means selling can never bring a caper's circulation to zero. Is there a minimum trade siz…aws and burns when you redeem.

What is the Caper Commons? The protocol-wide treasury that hold, which is $CAPER's own. It takes 1/31 of the skim's token leg ofn every caper's per-buy skim –buy and every sell of every caper, so it builds a small standing position in every caperach onf the platformm. The skim's XRD leg goes to the founder alone. Its policy is set by $CAPER …ot $XRD caper, which collects every sell, swap and exit fee on the platformthe fee on every sell on the platform, including the sell inside an exit and the sell side of a swap. A swap's buy side pays the target caper's treasury, like any buy. Both legs of the trade fee are taken off the trade's gross, in parallel with the skim (below). See trading (/wiki/markets/…0), collateralization_peak (0.1075), proposal_fee (500) and pro…, and it is worth separating. EverySince 15 September 2026 every trade is skimmed, buy is also skimmed for the caper's founder and the Caper Commons (above) in a 30:1 split, taken partlynd sells alike, and the skim comes off the same gross as the trade fee. Two thirds of the rate is taken in XRD – off the payment and partly as a slice of the tokens the buy mints. Iton a buy, off the payout on a sell – and goes to the founder. The other third is a slice of the tokens the trade moves, split 30:1 between the founder and the Caper Commons (above). At the 0.075 peak that is 5% in XRD and 2.5% in tokens. The skim never touches the caper's tre…of the curve cap, after which buytrades are not skimmed at all. The … smaller share of much larger buytrades can still be more money. Before that redeploy only buys were skimmed, at a peak of 0.15. Raising funds (/wiki/markets…sing-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in …he market as any other seller. It pays like one too: the trade fee goes to the root $XRD caper, and while the target's skim is running, part of the tokens and part of the payout go to the target's founder and the Caper Commons. The one token this cannot rea… contract instead of the copy.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cr8psn5q64v5tw… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cr8psn5gl7sf8dyx57yj3xtytv8gsfjd45h8dayqt77vqqg4603psxq64v5twlsaverknjplmh92cv3cdmnazs9q72mnz056u2tujjflhcr) , resolved from the CaperRe…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cqtsx3p6kxwc7lc0av6x7k6rasf2lqwhcxhlr3zf2t32jff3hfv2ttr7l4u0c6rwktxk89k2g5fsdexdjftnurllnxenz0kpzfasmndvzzv) ) and the contract source (c…ntracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, contracts/core/src/caper_registry.rs, contracts/common/src/lib.rs) at 3180b5b, 7bd5892a, re-read 13 September 2026. The component this row named until that date,genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026 replaced the registry as well as the logic: the pair this row named until then, CaperMain component_tdx_2_1cr8psn5… and registry component_tdx_2_1cpz5lthqtsx3p…, still exists and still answers as a CaperMain – it is simply not the one the registry resolves to any more, which is why a stamp has to …help/why-a-transaction-failed)

How does governance work? In t… rejection is always votable. TwoOne further reasons are is structural rather than about your balance: the $XRD caper cannot take proposals at all (it has no bonding curve, so the optimistic phase would have no market signal to resolve against), and an UPGRADE option is rejected anywhere but $CAPERan UPGRADE option is rejected anywhere but $CAPER. The $XRD caper, which refused every proposal until 11 September 2026, now takes them: with no curve its baseline and window averages are both zero, the tie passes, so its second phase is a formality and the ballot alone decides, weighed in native XRD (contracts/PENTEST.md, I-1). Each of those refusals arriv… closed the gap: the registry stillthen at component_tdx_2_1cqtsx3p… now resolvesd current_main to a component whose guard reads matches!(action.kind, 0 | 1 |…ballot you cast, and they are the bucket exit()what exit() withdraws and burns when you redeem.

How does a proposal pass? It h…w's average is at or above it. A pass does not wait indefinitely: the resolve stamps a deadline seven days out, and an execute call after it aborts with “Execution window closed”. All three window lengths are …ls – it is the spam gate, and since 11 September 2026 that is all it is. Until then it doublesd as thea settlement-gas allowance the treasury drawsew on to reimbursefund whoever cranksed the settle path, up to 5 XRD pera call and 500 XRD per proposal. A proposal funds its own settlement out of what it banked and cannot bleed the treasury past that, which is how a proposal still gets resolved and executed when nobody is paid to care. Then, at the trigger, an execution fee of 10% of the winning action's XRD-equivalent value, priced at that moment's spot: a PAYOUT; the pen-test fixes removed that allowance outright (contracts/PENTEST.md, L-2). Every crank is now paid for by whoever sends it, in that transaction's own network fee, and none draws on the treasury. Then, at the trigger, an execution fee of 10% of the winning action's XRD-equivalent value, priced off the curve's trailing time-weighted average rather than its spot – the same read that locks the pass baseline, so a dump in the triggering transaction cannot shrink it: a PAYOUT in a caper token converts at the issuing caper's spottrailing average, an INVEST is XRD already, a …EST is priced at the target's spottrailing average, and UPGRADE and METADATA nam… let the market veto spending.

What is the Caper Commons? The… the contract requires both a non-emptypositive governance-token buckeamount and a non-emptypositive vote-token bucketamount, withdraws both from the account the payout goes to, and aborts the call ("Exit r…) rather than paying out zero. Taking both from one account is also new on 11 September 2026: the earlier call accepted two buckets, which let one account's vote tokens be paired with another's governance tokens. Where the v comes from. One s…tember 2026. exit() asserts a non-emptypositive vote-token buckeamount and aborts on "Exit requires…d carries no delay of its own todayon this deployment because the registry's upgrade_delay_seconds reads 0. That figure is fixed for the registry's life: since 11 September 2026 it is a constructor argument with no setter. Read any of these numbers you…sing-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in …blueprint is called CaperMain. Since 11 September 2026 the second leg also activates only the candidate its own proposal voted for, and only if governance put it in the registry's pending slot: the slot records which path proposed it, and neither the admin badge nor a proposal may activate the other's. Individual capers govern thei… contract instead of the copy.

What is the Caper Commons? The…zero. Where the v comes from. TwoOne surfaces, one rateamount. Casting a ballot mints you vote_fee × vote_rate = 1 vote token; every buy and every sell mints 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value. The contract is explicit that this is deliberate – voting earns v at exactly the trading rate, so neither surface out-farms the otherVOTE_MINT = 1 soulbound vote token, banked in the same call that banks the fee and appends the ballot. Nothing else mints any: buying, selling and swapping all mint zero, and so does a transfer in. Until the redeploy of 11 September 2026 trading minted v too, at a rate held on the logic component as vote_rate, and that field is now gone from the component and from the source. The practical consequence is that the exit opens only once you have either voted or traded, and the redemption sell leg itself mints nothing, because it is a redemption rather than a membership trade. Do I have to have voted to exit? No. You have to have taken part, and trading countscast a ballot. Do I have to have voted to exit? Yes, since 11 September 2026. exit() asserts a non-empty vote-token bucket, and vote tokens mint on three surfaces at one rate – 1 per ranked ballot cast (vote_fee × vote_rate), 0.01 per XRD of the buyer's gross outlay on a buy, and 0.01 per XRD of gross curve payout on aaborts on "Exit requires vote tokens" rather than paying out zero, and casting a ballot is now the only way a member earns one. A holder who has only ever bought, sold, swapped or received a transfer holds none and cannot redeem a treasury share. They can still sell, both pre-fee. A single buy therefore opens the exitack on the curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , which draws on a different pool and needs no v – what they cannot reach ins the same transaction that opens the position, and a purely financial holder is not excluded from anything. The holder who cannot exit is the one whose tokens arrived by transfer – a gift, an airdrop, an OTC hand-over – because a transfer mints nothing, andtreasury. This answer was No on every earlier deployment, and a good deal of third-party writing about Caper still says so. The change closed a hole rather than adding a hurdle: while trades minted v, a single transaction could buy the position, mint the vote token off that same buy, and redeem on both – so the exit right was purchasable, and the trade fee was its price. Making the cball aborts on "Exit requires vote tokens" rather than paying out zero. This is also the precise sense in which the vote token is soulbound (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) : it constrains transfer, not acquisition. Anyone may mint their own at the published rate;ot the sole source prices it in participation instead. The fee is sunk, it is one ballot per account per proposal, and v is soulbound (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) , so nobody can acquirebuy anybody else's. When do vote …etail follows from it: vote() reads your vote-token balance before its own mint, so a first ballot from a wallet that has never traded is cast at zero weight and still mints the token that gives the next one weight. A wallet that bought its position on the curve has no such first-ballot penalty, because the buy already mintedcounts its own mint in both your balance and the supply it divides by, so a first ballot already weighs something. That ordering changed with the ballot becoming the sole source of v, and the code states the reason: if the snapshot were taken before the mint, every member's first ballot would score zero and no caper's first proposal could pass at all. Does exit pay me anything be…e_fee (0.005), vote_fee (100), vote_rate (0.01), collateralization_peak (0.15)…sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens …rading (/wiki/markets/trading) , Why a transaction failed (/wiki/help/why-a-transaction-failed)

How does governance work? In t… rejected anywhere but $CAPER. Each of those refusals arrives as a named message from the contract rather than a silent failure, and Why a transaction failed (/wiki/help/why-a-transaction-failed) lists them all with what to do about each one. The affordance itself is not … exit() burns when you redeem.

Type Reference Covers Tokens … Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cpz5lthr8psn5… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cpz5lth3cvzqkscgvaxtsxffgsnel5x9ndsde4006qg3cu2u5zwmv2r8psn5gl7sf8dyx57yj3xtytv8gsfjd45h8dayqt77vqqg4603psx) , resolved from the CaperRe…tracts/common/src/lib.rs) at 3a8af9c, 30 August 2026180b5b, 7 September 2026. The component this row named until that date, component_tdx_2_1cpz5lth…, still exists and still answers as a CaperMain – it is simply not the one the registry resolves to any more, which is why a stamp has to name a vintage as well as an address Related What is a caper (/w…rading (/wiki/markets/trading)

How does governance work? In t…sal, resolve_proposal and the fivesix execute_proposal_* paths are phase two – six methods for five executable kinds, because an UPGRADE executes in two legs (below). Alongside them sit the marke… exit() burns when you redeem.

How does a proposal pass? It h…'s average is at or above it. BothAll three window lengths are readable straight off the live component, as voting_period_in_seconds, proposal_window_in_seconds and twap_window_in_seconds; on this Stokenet deployment both are drill tuning – but only two of them are drill tuning. The constants’ own comments mark the voting period and the market window as Stokenet tuning that a production deployment retunes by shipping a new logic package; the trailing baseline is a designed constant, set deliberately longer than the market window so that a dump priced in during the vote still reads as a dump against it, and short enough that a trend does not decide the verdict by itself. Read the first two as drill figures. Do not read the third as one. The consequence is the desig… let the market veto spending.

A caper I hold owns tokens in … component, and if it passes, onetwo calls swaps the platform logic for every caper at once: execute_proposal_upgrade proposes the candidate to the registry, and execute_proposal_upgrade_activate activates it. They are separate methods so that a network running a real upgrade timelock can hold the second leg back until the delay has run; on this deployment the registry’s upgrade_delay_seconds reads 0, so both legs fit in a single transaction and the split is invisible from outside. The contract enforces that r… contract instead of the copy.

How does a proposal pass? It h…erage price over the trailing seven days – and opens a fixed 48-hourbaseline window – and opens the market window. After that window clo…is at or above it. Both window lengths are readable straight off the live compone…as proposal_window_in_seconds = 172800 and twap_window_in_seconds = 604800; on this Stokenet deployment both are drill tuning. The consequence is the desig…hat it intends to do, and the 48 hourswindow after areis the market's chance to price …d phase, where the market has 48 hoursthe window to price it. Correspondingly,… let the market veto spending.

What is the Caper Commons? The…to it. The voting period, the 48-hour proposal window and the seven-day TWAPmarket window and the trailing baseline window all sit on that compon…at is already open. One caveat on the first of those: the voting period: the voting period and the market window on this Stokenet deployment areads 600 seconds, and drill tuning – the constant's' own comment names that as drill tuning for the testnet rather than a product parameter – do not read ten minutess say so – so do not read either live figure as the intended production figurone. The upgrade path is open to…sing-funds) works through it.

How does a proposal pass? It h… of cast weight, five need 30% — figures that only read correctly against their ceiling. Ballots are full rankings scored Borda-style (apply_borda gives rank i a multiplier of option_count - 1 - i), so the most any single option can take is 2 / option_count of the total weight: 100% on a two-option ballot, 40% on a five-option one. The bar is three quarters of that ceiling at every width, so widening the ballot does not soften it. Phase two, the market. A leg… let the market veto spending.

How does governance work? In t…options, at least one of them executablean answer other than the no-op – an executable action, or a debate position (below), and at least one of them a n…its with SUBMIT PROPOSAL. One mcore reason, and it is the platform's rather than yours: the interface offers a sixth option kind the deployed contract does not have. Trection, because this page carried the opposite answer for a few hours on 5 September 2026. Until that morning the create-proposal form lists "’s sixth entry – “Debate topic (no execution)", and the published agent surfaces – the OpenAPI document (https://caper.network/.well-known/openapi.json) and the MCP tool manifest at /api/mcp (a tools/list call, not a browser GET) – both name DEBATE among the kinds a proposal action may take” – named a kind the deployed contract refused. The logic component currentlythen registered as current_main does not implement it: its per-kind guard assertsguarded creation with matches!(action.kind, 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5), so a proposalslate carrying a debate option (kind 6) aborts at creation. The abort message is worth naming, because it points at the wrong thing – it reads "Unknown action kind (VOTE actions are retired)", which is about the long-retired caper-as-voter kind and has nothing to do with the option you picked. The kind exists in the contract source and will work once a logic component carrying it is deployed and the registry moved onto it; until then, choose one of the five below. Verified live on 5 September 2026 against the deployed surfaces and contracts/logic/src/lib.rs at 3a8af9c, the commit the current component was built fromaborted with “Unknown action kind (VOTE actions are retired)” – a message naming a long-retired feature the proposer never touched. A logic upgrade published at 09:36 UTC on 5 September 2026 closed the gap: the registry still at component_tdx_2_1cqtsx3p… now resolves current_main to a component whose guard reads matches!(action.kind, 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6), and a debate option is accepted at creation. If you hit that abort before then, re-submit – nothing about your slate was wrong. What the kind does, and what it deliberately does not, is below. What happens to the inventor… exit() burns when you redeem.

How does a proposal pass? It h…osal actually do? Five things on the deployed component – six – and, since 5 September 2026, it can also decline the interface, per the debate-topic caveat above –o do anything at all, on purpose. The contract accepts six option kinds at creation, five of which execute, and every argument is frozen …r executed. The discriminants are 0, 1, 3, 4 and 5, and tof the five executable kinds are 0, 1, 3, 4 and 5; 6 is the non-executing sixth, DEBATE (below). The gap at 2 is deliberate: kin…paying-someone-from-a-caper) . What is a debate proposal? A question put to the caper that is settled by the ballot and goes no further. DEBATE (discriminant 6) is ranked alongside the executable options, it can win the Borda count outright, and there the proposal ends. The contract enforces the emptiness rather than trusting the form: creation asserts a debate option carries no currency, amount, recipient, target cashtag, target resource or candidate component – “DEBATE options carry no execution fields” – and trigger_proposal refuses a debate winner by name, “DEBATE options are terminal at the tally – nothing to trigger”, so a passed debate cannot park in a second phase it could never leave. Two consequences follow, and both are practical. The first is cost: a debate never reaches a trigger, so it never incurs the 10% execution fee, and the flat 500 XRD creation fee is the whole price of putting a question to the caper. The second is that a passing slate no longer guarantees an action – the contract requires an answer other than “Do nothing”, and a debate position is one, so a slate of positions plus the no-op is valid and can pass without anything happening to the treasury. That is the point: a caper can now hold a vote whose entire output is a recorded verdict, without the optimistic (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance) window that exists to let the market veto spending.

How does governance work? In t…-known/openapi.json) and the MCP tool manifest (https://caper.network/api/mcp) at /api/mcp (a tools/list call, not a browser GET) – both name DEBATE among the … exit() burns when you redeem.

How does governance work? In t…submits with SUBMIT PROPOSAL. One more reason, and it is the platform's rather than yours: the interface offers a sixth option kind the deployed contract does not have. The create-proposal form lists "Debate topic (no execution)", and the published agent surfaces – the OpenAPI document (https://caper.network/.well-known/openapi.json) and the MCP tool manifest (https://caper.network/api/mcp) – both name DEBATE among the kinds a proposal action may take. The logic component currently registered as current_main does not implement it: its per-kind guard asserts matches!(action.kind, 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5), so a proposal carrying a debate option (kind 6) aborts at creation. The abort message is worth naming, because it points at the wrong thing – it reads "Unknown action kind (VOTE actions are retired)", which is about the long-retired caper-as-voter kind and has nothing to do with the option you picked. The kind exists in the contract source and will work once a logic component carrying it is deployed and the registry moved onto it; until then, choose one of the five below. Verified live on 5 September 2026 against the deployed surfaces and contracts/logic/src/lib.rs at 3a8af9c, the commit the current component was built from. What happens to the inventory … exit() burns when you redeem.

How does a proposal pass? It h…posal actually do? Five things, on the deployed component – six in the interface, per the debate-topic caveat above – and every argument is frozen …paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

How does a proposal pass? It h… the winner is ever executed. A sixthThe discriminants are 0, 1, 3, 4 and 5, and the gap at 2 is deliberate: kind –2 was VOTE, which let one caper cast aits treasury's ballot inside another –. It was retired with the escrow voting system and, did not come back with the ballots; the contract still rejects it by name, and the number was left unused rather than recycled, so a proposal built against the old ABI aborts at creation. The numbering is spelled out in paying someone from a caper (/wiki/foundations/paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

What is the Caper Commons? The…ther than a membership trade. Do I have to have voted to exit? No. You have to have taken part, and trading counts. exit() asserts a non-empty vote-token bucket, and vote tokens mint on three surfaces at one rate – 1 per ranked ballot cast (vote_fee × vote_rate), 0.01 per XRD of the buyer's gross outlay on a buy, and 0.01 per XRD of gross curve payout on a sell, both pre-fee. A single buy therefore opens the exit in the same transaction that opens the position, and a purely financial holder is not excluded from anything. The holder who cannot exit is the one whose tokens arrived by transfer – a gift, an airdrop, an OTC hand-over – because a transfer mints nothing, and the call aborts on "Exit requires vote tokens" rather than paying out zero. This is also the precise sense in which the vote token is soulbound (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) : it constrains transfer, not acquisition. Anyone may mint their own at the published rate; nobody can acquire anybody else's. When do vote tokens appear – at the cast, or after the count? At the cast. vote() makes one fused call into the immortal state tier, and that call banks the fee, appends the ballot blob and mints the vote tokens in a single transaction – so the weight and the exit right are yours the moment the ballot is accepted, not when crystallize_ballots folds it or settle_proposal freezes the verdict. A pending ballot confers its exit right immediately. One ordering detail follows from it: vote() reads your vote-token balance before its own mint, so a first ballot from a wallet that has never traded is cast at zero weight and still mints the token that gives the next one weight. A wallet that bought its position on the curve has no such first-ballot penalty, because the buy already minted. Does exit pay me anything besi…sing-funds) works through it.

How does a proposal pass? It h…ao-governance/concepts/voting/borda-countranked-and-alternative-ballot-methods) leader passes if and only i…ract still rejects it by name.

Type Reference Covers Tokens · trading · proposals · ranked ballots · price resolution · exit · fee… Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cqtt9nzpz5lth… (https://dashboard.radixscan…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cqtt9nzqg5qtgzwh5uj89rn4287f458wnh6gcqfw99k2uydl2wq5frpz5lth3cvzqkscgvaxtsxffgsnel5x9ndsde4006qg3cu2u5zwmv2) , resolved from the CaperRe…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cpqacn370778ukah6zs08jyeunyu4t52hj8dnay8nmf5ny62yar3rvqtsx3p6kxwc7lc0av6x7k6rasf2lqwhcxhlr3zf2t32jff3hfv2tt) ) and the contract source (c…ntracts/common/src/lib.rs) at 084d19d, 283a8af9c, 30 August 2026 Related What is…undations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curveVoting (/wiki/governance/voting) , Proposals (/wiki/governan…rading (/wiki/markets/trading)

What happened to voting? It was removed. The logic component this platform runs today has no vote call, no ballots, no tally and no veto window: the whole ranked-ballot system was replaced by optimistic, price-resolved proposals, in which trading is the vote. Read the deployed blueprint yourself and the absence is the first thing you see – CaperMain's public surface is buy_token, sell_token, swap, migrate, create_caper, createHow does governance work? In two phases, and both of them are on the deployed component. A proposal is legislated by a ranked vote and then ratified by the market: the ballot decides what the caper wants, and the price over the following window decides whether it actually happens. CaperMain's public surface makes the split legible – create_proposal, vote, crystallize_ballots and settle_proposal are phase one; trigger_proposal, resolve_proposal, and the five execute_proposal_* paths, exit are phase two. Alongside them sit the market and membership calls: buy_token, sell_token, swap, migrate, donate_collateral, create_caper, withdraw_founder, exit and the two address reads. The component this replaced is still on the ledger and still readable, so the change is something you can diff rather than take on trust: the previous CaperMain (https://dashboard.radixscan.io/component/component_tdx_2_1cr0wpsnnfk3rkxzkn9e39n2su5sgd9nctfcxh4rmt9dtpre2ngalht) exposes vote, claim_vote_mint, finalize_proposal, release_ballots, veto_params, update_veto and update_fees, and not A correction, stated plainly, because this page carried the error. Between 26 and 28 August 2026 the platform ran a logic component with no vote call at all, and this FAQ described it accurately: proposals were resolved on price alone and trading was the only vote. That deployment was replaced on 29 August 2026, which reinstated ranked voting as a legislative phase in fronet of them survives into the deployed optimistic one and kept the window-TWAP resolutione. If you are reading older Caper material that describes ranked ballots, a Borda count, a vote fee or a ten-minute voting window, it is describing that component. The mechanics below are the live onessays voting was removed, or that the vote fee "went with the ballots", it is describing the intervening deployment. Everything below is read off the live component and the source it was built from. Why can't I open a proposal?…n the curve clears the gate. Two ohe proposal's shape is asserted too: it must carry between 2 and 5 ranked options, at least one of them executable, and at least one of them a no-op – the contract rejects a slate without a "Do nothing" option by name, so a rejection is always votable. Two further reasons are structural ra…t has no bonding curve, so there is no price optimistic phase would have no market signal to resolve against), and an UPGRADE proposaloption is rejected anywhere but $CAP… rail at the top of every page – labelled Propose an action — the market decides by trading –, which takes you to a caper, a…ce tokens are normal fungibles. Vote tokens are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders, only withdrawn to your own worktop to feed exit() – see the exit question below, which is the only thing they now do, and they are what your wallet trades on the curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) . Vote tokens are different: they are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders. They do two things, both on your own account – they carry half the weight of any ballot you cast, and they are the bucket exit() burns when you redeem.

How does a proposal pass, if nobody votes? On price. When a proposal is created the contract locks a baseline: the time-weighted average price over the trailing seven days of the caper's sampled circulation, converted into pric? It has to clear both phases, and either one can stop it. Phase one, the ballot. From the moment a proposal is created, holders cast a full ranked permutation of its options – every option ranked, none twice – for a 100 XRD vote fee that is banked into the caper's own treasury. A ballot's weight is the same expression the exit uses, (t·v)/(V·T), snapshotted at the moment of the cast. When the voting window closes, anyone may crank crystallize_ballots to fold the ballots in chunks, and then settle_proposal freezes the verdict: the Borda (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/borda-count) leader passes if and only if its share of cast weight clears 1.5 / option_count and it is not the no-op. Two options therefore need 75% of cast weight, five need 30%. Phase two, the market. A legislative space. The proposal then sits open forss does not execute anything. Someone must call trigger_proposal, which prices the execution fee, locks a baseline – the time-weighted average price over the trailing seven days – and opens a fixed 48-hour window. After theat window closes, anyone may call resolve_proposal, and the rule is one comparison –resolve_proposal compares the TWAP over the window itself against the baseline locked at the trigger, and the proposal passexecutes if and only if the live spot pricwindow's average is at or above ithat baseline. Both windows are read straig…he consequence is the design: holding is consent. Doing nothing passes a proposal, and the only way to defeat one is to sell enough of the caper's token to push the prica vote is the caper telling the market what it intends to do, and the 48 hours after are the market's chance to price that intention. Doing nothing ratifies; the only way to defeat a proposal that has already won its ballot is to sell enough to hold the window's average below where ithe token hasd been trading. That is the op…t rather than to a veto window: no turnout to organise, no quorum to price, and a dissenter's cost is the position they give up. What it trades away is protection against a proposal nobody notices – silence is a yes here, where in a quorum system silence is a no. The wider design space is set out on quorum and threshold design (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) . So how do I vote against something? You sell. There is no other lever, and that is deliberate – the same act that expresses disapproval also removes the disapproving holder's exposur, bolted onto a conventional vote rather than replacing it. The wider design space is set out on quorum and threshold design (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) . So how do I vote against something? Two ways now, and they bite at different moments. In phase one you rank the "Do nothing" option first, which is a real vote against rather than an abstention – the no-op can win the Borda count outright, and a leader that is the no-op fails by rule even if it clears the threshold. In phase two the outcome. A caper's trade feed (/wiki/markets/trading) during an open proposal window is therefore the tally, and the price at the moment of resolution is the resulyou sell, and the window's own TWAP is the tally. Selling after casting does not get you both: the crystallize crank clamps each ballot's stake to min(held at cast, balance now), so a holder who votes and then dumps has already shrunk the weight of their own ballot. Is there a quorum? No, – and there is no turnout at all – the concept does not apply. Nothing counts participants distinction matters, because there is a threshold. Nothing counts turnout or measures participation against the electorate, so there is no minimum share of the electorateholders an attacker can price and go and buy. The corresponding attack here is on the price rather than on the ballot: an attacker who can hold the spot above a caper's own trailing average for 48 hours can pass a proposal, which makes a thin, easily-moved curve the risk to watch. See DAO security and governance attacks (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks) . What does it cost to open a proposal? max(500 XRD, 10% of the action's XRD-equivalent value), paid into the caper's own treasury. The rate applies to what the action actually movesWhat the tally applies is a supermajority of cast weight: 1.5 / option_count, which is 75% with two options and 30% with five. A proposal on which one holder votes can clear that. The defence against a proposal nobody noticed is not the ballot – it is the second phase, where the market has 48 hours to price it. Correspondingly, the attack to watch is on the price rather than on the ballot, since a thin, easily-moved curve is cheap to hold above its own trailing average. See DAO security and governance attacks (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks) . What does it cost to open a proposal? Two payments, at two different moments. At creation, a flat 500 XRD proposal fee, banked irrevocably into the caper's own treasury and kept whether the proposal passes or fails – it is the spam gate, and it doubles as the settlement-gas allowance the treasury draws on to reimburse whoever cranks the settle path, up to 5 XRD per call and 500 XRD per proposal. A proposal funds its own settlement out of what it banked and cannot bleed the treasury past that, which is how a proposal still gets resolved and executed when nobody is paid to care. Then, at the trigger, an execution fee of 10% of the winning action's XRD-equivalent value, priced at that moment's spot: a PAYOUT is converteds at the issuing caper's spot, …is priced at the target's spot., and UPGRADE and METADATA name no amount, so they pay the 500 XRD floor. That floor is not arbitrary – it is the per-proposal settlement-gas budget, the allowance the caper'ir basis is zero and the trigger is free either way. Who pays it is the ballot's second question: every ballot also votes proposer-pays ownr treasury draws on to pay the network fee when a stranger calls resolve_proposal or execute_proposal_*, up to 5 XRD per call. A proposal funds its own settlement out of what it banked and cannot bleed the treasury past that, which is how a proposal still gets resolved and executed when nobody is paid to care-pays, settled by plain weight majority, and a tie is a treasury waiver. Treasury-pays nets to nothing, because the fee's sink is the caper's own treasury, so a treasury-pays trigger costs the caller nothing and stays fully permissionless. What can a proposal actually do? Five things, and the kindevery argument is frozen at creation along with every argument. PAYOUT transfers from the tr…logic for every caper at once. A slate may mix kinds across its options – the ballot picks one, and only the winner is ever executed. A sixth kind – VOTE, which le…nother – was retired with the escrow voting system and did not come back with the ballots; the contract nowstill rejects it by name.

What is the Caper Commons? The…of every caper's per-buy skim —– a small standing position in …treasury equal to (t·v)/(V·T) —– t = governance tokens redeeme…ly, T = tokens in circulation. It is the same expression that weights a ballot. It is not a flat pro-rata cla… rather than paying out zero. One caveat, and it is a live one. Vote tokens used to be minted to you when a ballot you cast was released – that was the only mint path, and it died with the voting system. The primitive that mints them survives on the immortal state tier, Where the v comes from. Two surfaces, one rate. Casting a ballot mints you vote_fee × vote_rate = 1 vote token; every buy and every sell mints 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value. The contract is explicit that this is deliberate – voting earns v at exactly the tradmin-g rated, and the contractso neither sourface records it as currently uncalled with the replacement distribution a pending redesign. So on this deployment there is at present no way to acquire the v that exit() requires. This is documented here because it is what the deployed code does, not because it is the intended end statout-farms the other. The practical consequence is that the exit opens once you have either voted or traded, and the redemption sell leg itself mints nothing, because it is a redemption rather than a membership trade. Does exit pay me anything b… What are the protocol fees? Two, not three – the 100 XRD vote fee went with the ballots. What remains is the 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell,hree, and each is paid at the point of use. The 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell; the 100 XRD vote fee, charged per ballot and deposited into the caper's treasury at the moment of the cast; and the proposal fees above – 500 XRD flat at creation and 10% of the winning action at the trigger. Where they land differs by leg: the proposal fee, the vote fee and the buy leg of the tra…ow each one moves the vaults. The other change is that the schedule no longerNone of them has a setter. The previousAn earlier logic component exposed an up…e protocol admin badge retune all fourthe levers in place; the deployed…her setter. trade_fee (0.005), vote_fee (100), vote_rate (0.01), collateralization_peak (0.15), proposal_fee_min (500) and proposal_fee_rate (…y to check this page. Can the proposal windows change? Only the same way the…y's current_main onto it. The voting period, the 48-hour proposal window and the seven-day TWAP window all sit on that component beside the fee fields, with no setters of their own, so the admin badge cannot shorten thea window a proposal sits open forthat is already open. One caveat on the first of those: the voting period on this Stokenet deployment reads 600 seconds, and the constant's own comment names that as drill tuning for the testnet rather than a product parameter – do not read ten minutes as the intended production figure. Thate upgrade path is open to the p…, so it is not a protocol fee —– it is the founder's compensat…mean the amount falls with it —– a smaller share of much large…sing-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in …cost is the mirror image, and the history at the top of this page is the evidence of it: one upgrade: one deployment retired every caper's voting system at once, and the next reinstated it, and neither asked a single caper to migrate. Whatever the logic component says today is what every caper does today – which is why this page tells you to read it off the ledger rather than to trust the copy. How do I know a page on this…ess (/wiki/policy/freshness) —– an article that has gone 180 … contract instead of the copy.

Type Reference Covers Tokens …Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cqz0ahmtt9nz… (https://dashboard.radixscan…/component/component_tdx_2_1cqz0ahmtlsq0amlrs4l307svs0vcu20qwufhzm895u7ud2mt3mguvltt9nzqg5qtgzwh5uj89rn4287f458wnh6gcqfw99k2uydl2wq5fr) , resolved from the CaperRe…o/component/component_tdx_2_1cqpmm0tnht3z72h92p8zfq6jm3xmt2hfhgwaf82y0ncnxjzy0lguzmpqacn370778ukah6zs08jyeunyu4t52hj8dnay8nmf5ny62yar3rv) ) and the contract source (c…rading (/wiki/markets/trading)

Type Reference Covers Tokens · selling · voting · proposals · exit · fees · Caper Commons · divesting · platform upgrades Verified against The contract source (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs) at 9da1498, 16 August 2026, and against the live CaperMain component on Stokenet Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) , Proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals)

Why can't I see the create-proposal button? You need to hold the caper's governance token in the connected account. Buy any amount on the curve and the button appears. What happens to the inventory vault when I sell? Your tokens go back into the inventory vault and your XRD comes out of the curve vault, priced along the same curve. The protocol does not burn anything on sell. Is there a minimum trade size? Yes, on the buy side: a buy must be at least 0.001 XRD. There is no upper limit other than the curve's own cap of 100,000,000,000 tokens, which no buy may push past. Can I withdraw governance tokens to another wallet? Yes. Governance tokens are normal fungibles. Vote tokens are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders, only withdrawn to your own worktop to feed exit().

How does voting actually work — do I pick one option? No. A caper ballot is a ranked ballot (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/ranked-and-alternative-ballot-methods) : you submit an ordering of every option on the proposal. The contract rejects a ballot that omits an option, ranks one twice, or references an option that does not exist. When voting closes, the ballots are folded into per-option totals by a Borda-style count weighted by each voter's vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) , so a second preference is worth something rather than nothing. What does a proposal need to pass? Two conditions, both checked at settlement. The leading option's share of total weight must reach 1.5 ÷ (number of options), and the leader must not be an option flagged as a "no". The threshold therefore scales with how many choices are on the ballot: 75% for a two-option proposal, 50% for three, 37.5% for four, 30% for five. A crowded ballot is easier to win but splits the field — which is the point of ranking every option rather than picking one. Is there a quorum? No. Nothing requires a minimum share of the electorate to turn out. The share above is measured against the weight actually cast, not against the weight outstanding, so a proposal settled by three voters is judged on exactly the same rule as one settled by three hundred, and there is no absolute figure an attacker can price and go and buy. What that trade costs, and what other DAOs set instead, is covered on proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) and in quorum and threshold design (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) . Two things stand in for the missing floor, and neither is a turnout requirement. Every ballot carries a Do nothing option, appended automatically and flagged as a "no" – you author at most four options and vote on five – and settlement refuses any leader flagged that way, so an unconvinced turnout defeats a proposal outright rather than merely failing to carry it. And weight only arrives from members who have voted before (below), so a proposal whose entire turnout is voting for the first time settles on a total weight of zero and cannot pass at all. Why did my first vote seem to count for nothing? Because it did. Your weight is (t·v)/(V·T), and the contract snapshots v — the vote tokens you already hold — before minting the vote token that this ballot earns you. On your very first ballot v is zero, so the weight is zero. Voting is how you accumulate the participation factor; the first one buys you standing, not influence. This is the mechanical reason a large token balance alone cannot carry a proposal. What if I sell my tokens after voting? You cannot, with the tokens you voted with. Voting means staking governance tokens into the caper's ballot box first, and casting locks that stake: the contract refuses to return it while the ballot it backs is still unreleased, and the stake unlocks on its own once the ballot is released after voting closes. Anything you did not stake stays yours to trade throughout. Until 16 August 2026 the answer was different: the tally re-read your live balance and credited the lower of the two, and anyone could re-clamp a counted ballot downward during a challenge window. Escrow replaced that, so there is nothing left to re-read. What happens if I vote after voting has closed? The call does not fail; it returns without recording a ballot, and the vote fee — 100 XRD as configured today — is deposited to the caper's treasury rather than refunded. Check the window before submitting.

What is the Caper Commons? The protocol-wide treasury that holds 1/31 of the token leg of every caper's per-buy skim — a small standing position in every caper on the platform. Its policy is set by $CAPER governance. How is my exit payout calculated? When you call exit() you redeem a slice of the caper's treasury equal to your canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T) — the exact figure that sets your voting power (t = governance tokens redeemed, v = your vote tokens, V = total vote-token supply, T = tokens in circulation). It is not a flat pro-rata claim on tokens alone: the contract requires both a non-empty governance-token bucket and a non-empty vote-token bucket, so a holder who never voted has no exit at all rather than a zero-valued one – exit() asserts on both buckets and aborts the call ("Exit requires vote tokens") instead of paying out zero. Your voting influence and your redeemable share are one and the same number: Caper's always-on take on the rage-quit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . Does exit pay me anything besides XRD? Yes, and it is worth checking before you confirm, because the vote burn is irreversible. The treasury share is paid in every resource the call names: XRD and the caper's own token always, plus any additional resources passed with it. The app fills that list with the caper tokens the treasury actually holds – positions an INVEST (/wiki/governance/proposals) proposal bought in other capers, and on $CAPER the Caper Commons tithe collected from every caper on the platform (above) – so you leave with your percentage of those holdings too, not only the XRD. Two limits are disclosed in the exit dialog rather than hidden: the sweep is capped at 20 holdings, ranked by what each is worth if sold back on its own curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , and the dialog names how many of the smallest were left out – value you forfeit by exiting now. What are the protocol fees? Three, and none of them is a constant. The 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell, the 500 XRD proposal fee to open a governance proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and the 100 XRD vote fee are all stored fields the protocol admin can change through a single update_fees call, so they are the configured schedule rather than a property of the contract. Configured is not the same as unconstrained, though: update_fees asserts on all four of its arguments, and three of those bounds bite. The trade fee must sit in [0, 10%], the collateralization ceiling in [0, 0.15], and the proposal fee must always cover the per-proposal settlement-gas budget – which is itself 500 XRD, so today's proposal fee sits exactly on its own floor and is the one fee the badge can raise but not cut. The vote fee alone is bounded only at zero. As for where they land: the proposal fee, the vote fee and the buy leg of the trade fee are all paid into the caper's own treasury, but the sell leg is not – it accrues to the root $XRD caper, which collects every sell, swap and exit fee on the platform. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how each one moves the vaults. The vote fee is charged on every ballot a member casts, not only when your caper votes in another DAO through a VOTE proposal — that execution simply carries the same fee. It is the one fee you pay whether or not it buys you anything: an out-of-window ballot still forfeits it (see above). Can the voting window change? Not the way the fees can. The ten-minute voting window and the ten-minute execution delay are stored on the same shared logic component as the four fee levers and read 600 seconds each live, but they are set once when that component is instantiated and never written again: update_fees is the component's only setter, and it takes the trade fee, the collateralization peak, the proposal fee and the vote fee, nothing else. The admin badge that can retune the whole fee schedule in place cannot shorten the window you get to vote in. Changing either period means deploying a new logic component and moving the registry's current_main onto it – the platform-upgrade path (/wiki/foundations/getting-started) , open to the protocol admin badge and to a settled $CAPER UPGRADE proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and carrying no delay of its own today because the registry's upgrade_delay_seconds reads 0. Read either number yourself the way you read the fees: resolve current_main on the registry, then read the fields off the component it names. Is the collateralization skim a fee? No, and it is worth separating. Every buy is also skimmed for the caper’s founder and the Caper Commons (above) in a 30:1 split, taken partly in XRD off the payment and partly as a slice of the tokens the buy mints. It never touches the caper’s treasury, so it is not a protocol fee — it is the founder’s compensation. Its rate, set by the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) ’s collateralization schedule, is front-loaded: highest on the first buys and tapering linearly to zero as circulation grows, with the peak bounded in the contract rather than left to configuration. The rate falling does not mean the amount falls with it — a smaller share of much larger buys can still be more money. Raising funds (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in another caper. Can it sell them? Yes, through a DIVEST proposal – the newest of the five executive action kinds (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and an INVEST run backwards. A winning DIVEST option withdraws a voted-on amount of the target caper's token from this treasury, sells it into that caper's own bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , and deposits the XRD proceeds straight back into this treasury. Two details matter in practice. The amount is frozen at settlement, so if the treasury's holding of that token has fallen below the voted figure by the time someone executes, the call aborts rather than quietly selling less – executing a smaller trade than the one that passed would break the frozen-winner rule the whole execution step (/wiki/governance/execution) rests on. And the sale is emitted as an ordinary sell on the target caper's trade feed (/wiki/markets/trading) , at the ordinary price convention, so a treasury divesting looks the same to the market as any other seller. The one token this cannot reach is $XRD, which has no curve of its own. Can a proposal change how the platform itself works? Only on $CAPER. An UPGRADE option names a candidate logic component, and if it wins, one call swaps the platform logic for every caper at once. The contract enforces both halves of that restriction rather than leaving it to convention: an UPGRADE option is rejected unless the proposal is executive, and rejected again unless the caper putting it up is $CAPER itself. Individual capers govern their own treasuries; they do not each run their own version of the protocol. The upside of that arrangement is reach. A change confined to the logic tier – DIVEST is one – arrives at every caper that already exists, with no per-caper migration and nothing for a founder to opt into. How do I know a page on this wiki is accurate? By checking it, which is the point of the format. Every article is held to five published standards, and each one is itself a page you can read and hold an editor to: verifiability (/wiki/policy/verifiability) (the test for including a claim is whether a reader can check it against a source, not whether an editor believes it), no original research (/wiki/policy/no-original-research) (reading a value off the ledger is description and is encouraged; extrapolating a prediction from it is not), neutral point of view (/wiki/policy/neutral-point-of-view) , notability (/wiki/policy/notability) (what earns a standalone article rather than a mention inside a broader one), and freshness (/wiki/policy/freshness) — an article that has gone 180 days without a re-verification renders a may be out of date notice at the top of itself until somebody checks its facts again. Neutrality is the one worth stating plainly rather than assuming. This wiki is published by Caper and covers organisations that compete with Caper, which is a conflict of interest at the level of the whole wiki and not just a page. The answer to it is citation rather than a claim of disinterest: articles about other organisations describe them on their own terms and cite their own sources, and where one is compared to a caper the comparison is marked as such and the Caper mechanic links to the page that documents it (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , so the claim can be checked against the contract instead of the copy.

Type Reference Covers Tokens · trading · proposals · price resolution · exit · fees · Caper Commons · platform upgrades Verified against The live CaperMain on Stokenet ( component_tdx_2_1cqz0ahm… (https://dashboard.radixscan.io/component/component_tdx_2_1cqz0ahmtlsq0amlrs4l307svs0vcu20qwufhzm895u7ud2mt3mguvl) , resolved from the CaperRegistry (https://dashboard.radixscan.io/component/component_tdx_2_1cqpmm0tnht3z72h92p8zfq6jm3xmt2hfhgwaf82y0ncnxjzy0lguzm) ) and the contract source (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, contracts/common/src/lib.rs) at 084d19d, 28 August 2026 Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) , Trading (/wiki/markets/trading)

What happened to voting? It was removed. The logic component this platform runs today has no vote call, no ballots, no tally and no veto window: the whole ranked-ballot system was replaced by optimistic, price-resolved proposals, in which trading is the vote. Read the deployed blueprint yourself and the absence is the first thing you see – CaperMain's public surface is buy_token, sell_token, swap, migrate, create_caper, create_proposal, resolve_proposal, the five execute_proposal_* paths, exit, withdraw_founder and the two address reads. The component this replaced is still on the ledger and still readable, so the change is something you can diff rather than take on trust: the previous CaperMain (https://dashboard.radixscan.io/component/component_tdx_2_1cr0wpsnnfk3rkxzkn9e39n2su5sgd9nctfcxh4rmt9dtpre2ngalht) exposes vote, claim_vote_mint, finalize_proposal, release_ballots, veto_params, update_veto and update_fees, and not one of them survives into the deployed one. If you are reading older Caper material that describes ranked ballots, a Borda count, a vote fee or a ten-minute voting window, it is describing that component. The mechanics below are the live ones. Why can't I open a proposal? Most likely because the connected account holds none of that caper's token. create_proposal takes a proof of the caper's own governance token and asserts at least 1, so buying any meaningful amount on the curve clears the gate. Two other reasons are structural rather than about your balance: the $XRD caper cannot take proposals at all (it has no bonding curve, so there is no price signal to resolve against), and an UPGRADE proposal is rejected anywhere but $CAPER. The affordance itself is not a button called "create proposal". It is the GOVERN step in the lifecycle rail at the top of every page – labelled Propose an action — the market decides by trading – which takes you to a caper, and the form there submits with SUBMIT PROPOSAL. What happens to the inventory vault when I sell? Your tokens go back into the inventory vault and your XRD comes out of the curve vault, priced along the same curve. The protocol does not burn anything on sell. Is there a minimum trade size? Yes, on the buy side: a buy must be at least 0.001 XRD. There is no upper limit other than the curve's own cap of 100,000,000,000 tokens, which no buy may push past. Can I withdraw governance tokens to another wallet? Yes. Governance tokens are normal fungibles. Vote tokens are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders, only withdrawn to your own worktop to feed exit() – see the exit question below, which is the only thing they now do.

How does a proposal pass, if nobody votes? On price. When a proposal is created the contract locks a baseline: the time-weighted average price over the trailing seven days of the caper's sampled circulation, converted into price space. The proposal then sits open for a fixed 48-hour window. After the window closes, anyone may call resolve_proposal, and the rule is one comparison – the proposal passes if and only if the live spot price is at or above that baseline. Both windows are read straight off the live component as proposal_window_in_seconds = 172800 and twap_window_in_seconds = 604800. The consequence is the design: holding is consent. Doing nothing passes a proposal, and the only way to defeat one is to sell enough of the caper's token to push the price below where it has been trading. That is the optimistic (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance) shape applied to a market rather than to a veto window: no turnout to organise, no quorum to price, and a dissenter's cost is the position they give up. What it trades away is protection against a proposal nobody notices – silence is a yes here, where in a quorum system silence is a no. The wider design space is set out on quorum and threshold design (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) . So how do I vote against something? You sell. There is no other lever, and that is deliberate – the same act that expresses disapproval also removes the disapproving holder's exposure to the outcome. A caper's trade feed (/wiki/markets/trading) during an open proposal window is therefore the tally, and the price at the moment of resolution is the result. Is there a quorum? No, and there is no turnout at all – the concept does not apply. Nothing counts participants, so there is no minimum share of the electorate an attacker can price and go and buy. The corresponding attack here is on the price rather than on the ballot: an attacker who can hold the spot above a caper's own trailing average for 48 hours can pass a proposal, which makes a thin, easily-moved curve the risk to watch. See DAO security and governance attacks (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks) . What does it cost to open a proposal? max(500 XRD, 10% of the action's XRD-equivalent value), paid into the caper's own treasury. The rate applies to what the action actually moves: a PAYOUT is converted at the issuing caper's spot, an INVEST is XRD already, a DIVEST is priced at the target's spot. UPGRADE and METADATA name no amount, so they pay the 500 XRD floor. That floor is not arbitrary – it is the per-proposal settlement-gas budget, the allowance the caper's own treasury draws on to pay the network fee when a stranger calls resolve_proposal or execute_proposal_*, up to 5 XRD per call. A proposal funds its own settlement out of what it banked and cannot bleed the treasury past that, which is how a proposal still gets resolved and executed when nobody is paid to care. What can a proposal actually do? Five things, and the kind is frozen at creation along with every argument. PAYOUT transfers from the treasury to a named account; INVEST spends treasury XRD buying another caper's token; DIVEST is INVEST run backwards (below); METADATA rewrites the mutable metadata of the caper's own token; and UPGRADE, on $CAPER only, swaps the platform logic for every caper at once. A sixth kind – VOTE, which let one caper cast a ballot inside another – was retired with the voting system and the contract now rejects it by name.

What is the Caper Commons? The protocol-wide treasury that holds 1/31 of the token leg of every caper's per-buy skim — a small standing position in every caper on the platform. Its policy is set by $CAPER governance. How is my exit payout calculated? When you call exit() you redeem a slice of the caper's treasury equal to (t·v)/(V·T) — t = governance tokens redeemed, v = your vote tokens, V = total vote-token supply, T = tokens in circulation. It is not a flat pro-rata claim on tokens alone: the contract requires both a non-empty governance-token bucket and a non-empty vote-token bucket, and aborts the call ("Exit requires vote tokens") rather than paying out zero. One caveat, and it is a live one. Vote tokens used to be minted to you when a ballot you cast was released – that was the only mint path, and it died with the voting system. The primitive that mints them survives on the immortal state tier, admin-gated, and the contract source records it as currently uncalled with the replacement distribution a pending redesign. So on this deployment there is at present no way to acquire the v that exit() requires. This is documented here because it is what the deployed code does, not because it is the intended end state. Does exit pay me anything besides XRD? Yes, and it is worth checking before you confirm, because the vote burn is irreversible. The treasury share is paid in every resource the call names: XRD and the caper's own token always, plus any additional resources passed with it. The app fills that list with the caper tokens the treasury actually holds – positions an INVEST (/wiki/governance/proposals) proposal bought in other capers, and on $CAPER the Caper Commons tithe collected from every caper on the platform (above) – so you leave with your percentage of those holdings too, not only the XRD. Two limits are disclosed in the exit dialog rather than hidden: the sweep is capped at 20 holdings, ranked by what each is worth if sold back on its own curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , and the dialog names how many of the smallest were left out – value you forfeit by exiting now. What are the protocol fees? Two, not three – the 100 XRD vote fee went with the ballots. What remains is the 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell, and the proposal fee above. Where they land differs by leg: the proposal fee and the buy leg of the trade fee are deposited into the caper's own treasury, while the sell leg is not – it accrues to the root $XRD caper, which collects every sell, swap and exit fee on the platform. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how each one moves the vaults. The other change is that the schedule no longer has a setter. The previous logic component exposed an update_fees call that let the protocol admin badge retune all four levers in place; the deployed one does not expose it, or any other setter. trade_fee (0.005), collateralization_peak (0.15), proposal_fee_min (500) and proposal_fee_rate (0.1) are written once when the component is instantiated and are then fixed for its lifetime. They are still readable off the component, and reading them yourself is still the right way to check this page. Can the proposal window change? Only the same way the fees can: by deploying a new logic component and moving the registry's current_main onto it. The 48-hour proposal window and the seven-day TWAP window sit on that component beside the fee fields, with no setter of their own, so the admin badge cannot shorten the window a proposal sits open for. That upgrade path is open to the protocol admin badge and to a settled $CAPER UPGRADE proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and carries no delay of its own today because the registry's upgrade_delay_seconds reads 0. Read any of these numbers yourself the way you would read the fees: resolve current_main on the registry, then read the fields off the component it names. Is the collateralization skim a fee? No, and it is worth separating. Every buy is also skimmed for the caper's founder and the Caper Commons (above) in a 30:1 split, taken partly in XRD off the payment and partly as a slice of the tokens the buy mints. It never touches the caper's treasury, so it is not a protocol fee — it is the founder's compensation. Its rate, set by the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) 's collateralization schedule, is front-loaded: it starts at the peak when circulation is zero and tapers linearly to zero at 30% of the curve cap, after which buys are not skimmed at all. The rate falling does not mean the amount falls with it — a smaller share of much larger buys can still be more money. Raising funds (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) works through it.

A caper I hold owns tokens in another caper. Can it sell them? Yes, through a DIVEST proposal – an INVEST run backwards. A passing DIVEST withdraws a proposed amount of the target caper's token from this treasury, sells it into that caper's own bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , and deposits the XRD proceeds straight back into this treasury. Two details matter in practice. The amount is frozen at creation, so if the treasury's holding of that token has fallen below the proposed figure by the time someone executes, the call aborts rather than quietly selling less – executing a smaller trade than the one that passed would break the frozen-action rule the whole execution step (/wiki/governance/execution) rests on. And the sale is emitted as an ordinary sell on the target caper's trade feed (/wiki/markets/trading) , at the ordinary price convention, so a treasury divesting looks the same to the market as any other seller. The one token this cannot reach is $XRD, which has no curve of its own. Can a proposal change how the platform itself works? Only on $CAPER. An UPGRADE action names a candidate logic component, and if it passes, one call swaps the platform logic for every caper at once. The contract enforces that restriction rather than leaving it to convention: an UPGRADE is rejected unless the caper putting it up is $CAPER itself, and rejected again unless the named candidate is a globalized component whose blueprint is called CaperMain. Individual capers govern their own treasuries; they do not each run their own version of the protocol. The upside of that arrangement is reach. A change confined to the logic tier arrives at every caper that already exists, with no per-caper migration and nothing for a founder to opt into. The cost is the mirror image, and this page is evidence of it: one upgrade retired every caper's voting system at once. How do I know a page on this wiki is accurate? By checking it, which is the point of the format. Every article is held to five published standards, and each one is itself a page you can read and hold an editor to: verifiability (/wiki/policy/verifiability) (the test for including a claim is whether a reader can check it against a source, not whether an editor believes it), no original research (/wiki/policy/no-original-research) (reading a value off the ledger is description and is encouraged; extrapolating a prediction from it is not), neutral point of view (/wiki/policy/neutral-point-of-view) , notability (/wiki/policy/notability) (what earns a standalone article rather than a mention inside a broader one), and freshness (/wiki/policy/freshness) — an article that has gone 180 days without a re-verification renders a may be out of date notice at the top of itself until somebody checks its facts again. Neutrality is the one worth stating plainly rather than assuming. This wiki is published by Caper and covers organisations that compete with Caper, which is a conflict of interest at the level of the whole wiki and not just a page. The answer to it is citation rather than a claim of disinterest: articles about other organisations describe them on their own terms and cite their own sources, and where one is compared to a caper the comparison is marked as such and the Caper mechanic links to the page that documents it (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , so the claim can be checked against the contract instead of the copy.

How does voting actually work …ion rather than picking one. Is there a quorum? No. Nothing requires a minimum share of the electorate to turn out. The share above is measured against the weight actually cast, not against the weight outstanding, so a proposal settled by three voters is judged on exactly the same rule as one settled by three hundred, and there is no absolute figure an attacker can price and go and buy. What that trade costs, and what other DAOs set instead, is covered on proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) and in quorum and threshold design (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) . Two things stand in for the missing floor, and neither is a turnout requirement. Every ballot carries a Do nothing option, appended automatically and flagged as a "no" – you author at most four options and vote on five – and settlement refuses any leader flagged that way, so an unconvinced turnout defeats a proposal outright rather than merely failing to carry it. And weight only arrives from members who have voted before (below), so a proposal whose entire turnout is voting for the first time settles on a total weight of zero and cannot pass at all. Why did my first vote seem to … the window before submitting.

A caper I hold owns tokens in …ing for a founder to opt into. How do I know a page on this wiki is accurate? By checking it, which is the point of the format. Every article is held to five published standards, and each one is itself a page you can read and hold an editor to: verifiability (/wiki/policy/verifiability) (the test for including a claim is whether a reader can check it against a source, not whether an editor believes it), no original research (/wiki/policy/no-original-research) (reading a value off the ledger is description and is encouraged; extrapolating a prediction from it is not), neutral point of view (/wiki/policy/neutral-point-of-view) , notability (/wiki/policy/notability) (what earns a standalone article rather than a mention inside a broader one), and freshness (/wiki/policy/freshness) — an article that has gone 180 days without a re-verification renders a may be out of date notice at the top of itself until somebody checks its facts again. Neutrality is the one worth stating plainly rather than assuming. This wiki is published by Caper and covers organisations that compete with Caper, which is a conflict of interest at the level of the whole wiki and not just a page. The answer to it is citation rather than a claim of disinterest: articles about other organisations describe them on their own terms and cite their own sources, and where one is compared to a caper the comparison is marked as such and the Caper mechanic links to the page that documents it (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , so the claim can be checked against the contract instead of the copy.

What is the Caper Commons? Th…ill forfeits it (see above). Can the voting window change? Not the way the fees can. The ten-minute voting window and the ten-minute execution delay are stored on the same shared logic component as the four fee levers and read 600 seconds each live, but they are set once when that component is instantiated and never written again: update_fees is the component's only setter, and it takes the trade fee, the collateralization peak, the proposal fee and the vote fee, nothing else. The admin badge that can retune the whole fee schedule in place cannot shorten the window you get to vote in. Changing either period means deploying a new logic component and moving the registry's current_main onto it – the platform-upgrade path (/wiki/foundations/getting-started) , open to the protocol admin badge and to a settled $CAPER UPGRADE proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and carrying no delay of its own today because the registry's upgrade_delay_seconds reads 0. Read either number yourself the way you read the fees: resolve current_main on the registry, then read the fields off the component it names. Is the collateralization skim …sing-funds) works through it.

How does voting actually work …l my tokens after voting? Your recorded weight falls. The tally re-reads your live balance and cannot, with the tokens you voted with. Voting means staking governance taokens the lower of it and the balance you held when you voted, so selling reduces your ballot's weight while buying more afterwards does not increase it. Anyone may call the re-clamp permissionlessly duringinto the caper's ballot box first, and casting locks that stake: the contract refuses to return it while the ballot it backs is still unreleased, and the stake unlocks on its own once the ballot is released after voting closes. Anything you did not stake stays yours to trade throughout. Until 16 August 2026 the answer was different: the chtallenge window before settlement — it can only ever ratchet a weight down, which is why it is safe to leave open to the publicy re-read your live balance and credited the lower of the two, and anyone could re-clamp a counted ballot downward during a challenge window. Escrow replaced that, so there is nothing left to re-read. What happens if I vote afte… the window before submitting.

Type Reference Covers Tokens …cts/core/src/caper_dao.rs) at 163e53e9da1498, 116 August 2026, and against the live CaperMain component on Stokenet Related What is a caper (/w…s (/wiki/governance/proposals)

What is the Caper Commons? Th…, so a holder who never voted redeems nothinghas no exit at all rather than a zero-valued one – exit() asserts on both buckets and aborts the call ("Exit requires vote tokens") instead of paying out zero. Your voting influence and yo…rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . Does exit pay me anything besides XRD? Yes, and it is worth checking before you confirm, because the vote burn is irreversible. The treasury share is paid in every resource the call names: XRD and the caper's own token always, plus any additional resources passed with it. The app fills that list with the caper tokens the treasury actually holds – positions an INVEST (/wiki/governance/proposals) proposal bought in other capers, and on $CAPER the Caper Commons tithe collected from every caper on the platform (above) – so you leave with your percentage of those holdings too, not only the XRD. Two limits are disclosed in the exit dialog rather than hidden: the sweep is capped at 20 holdings, ranked by what each is worth if sold back on its own curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , and the dialog names how many of the smallest were left out – value you forfeit by exiting now. What are the protocol fees? T…sing-funds) works through it.

What is the Caper Commons? Th…n a property of the contract. Only the collateralization ceiling below is bounded in code. All three land in a caper's own treasury; sConfigured is not the same as unconstrained, though: update_fees asserts on all four of its arguments, and three of those bounds bite. The trade fee must sit in [0, 10%], the collateralization ceiling in [0, 0.15], and the proposal fee must always cover the per-proposal settlement-gas budget – which is itself 500 XRD, so today's proposal fee sits exactly on its own floor and is the one fee the badge can raise but not cut. The vote fee alone is bounded only at zero. As for where they land: the proposal fee, the vote fee and the buy leg of the trade fee are all paid into the caper's own treasury, but the sell leg is not – it accrues to the root $XRD caper, which collects every sell, swap and exit fee on the platform. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how the trade feeach one moves the vaults. The vote …sing-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens · selling · voting · proposals · exit · fees · Caper Commons Verified against The deployed contract source (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), 2 August 2026 Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) , Proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals)

Type Reference Covers Tokens · selling · voting · proposals · exit · fees · Caper Commons · divesting · platform upgrades Verified against The contract source (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs) at 163e53e, 11 August 2026 Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) , Proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals)

A caper I hold owns tokens in another caper. Can it sell them? Yes, through a DIVEST proposal – the newest of the five executive action kinds (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and an INVEST run backwards. A winning DIVEST option withdraws a voted-on amount of the target caper's token from this treasury, sells it into that caper's own bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , and deposits the XRD proceeds straight back into this treasury. Two details matter in practice. The amount is frozen at settlement, so if the treasury's holding of that token has fallen below the voted figure by the time someone executes, the call aborts rather than quietly selling less – executing a smaller trade than the one that passed would break the frozen-winner rule the whole execution step (/wiki/governance/execution) rests on. And the sale is emitted as an ordinary sell on the target caper's trade feed (/wiki/markets/trading) , at the ordinary price convention, so a treasury divesting looks the same to the market as any other seller. The one token this cannot reach is $XRD, which has no curve of its own. Can a proposal change how the platform itself works? Only on $CAPER. An UPGRADE option names a candidate logic component, and if it wins, one call swaps the platform logic for every caper at once. The contract enforces both halves of that restriction rather than leaving it to convention: an UPGRADE option is rejected unless the proposal is executive, and rejected again unless the caper putting it up is $CAPER itself. Individual capers govern their own treasuries; they do not each run their own version of the protocol. The upside of that arrangement is reach. A change confined to the logic tier – DIVEST is one – arrives at every caper that already exists, with no per-caper migration and nothing for a founder to opt into.

How does voting actually work …t recording a ballot, and the 100 XRD vote fee — 100 XRD as configured today — is deposited to the caper's t… the window before submitting.

What is the Caper Commons? Th… are the protocol fees? Three fixed fees apply: a, and none of them is a constant. The 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell, athe 500 XRD proposal fee to open …i/governance/proposals) , and athe 100 XRD vote fee when your caper casts a ballot in another DAO via a VOTE proposal. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how the trade fee moves the vaultsare all stored fields the protocol admin can change through a single update_fees call, so they are the configured schedule rather than a property of the contract. Only the collateralization ceiling below is bounded in code. All three land in a caper's own treasury; see trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how the trade fee moves the vaults. The vote fee is charged on every ballot a member casts, not only when your caper votes in another DAO through a VOTE proposal — that execution simply carries the same fee. It is the one fee you pay whether or not it buys you anything: an out-of-window ballot still forfeits it (see above). Is the collateralization skim a fee? No, and it is worth separating. Every buy is also skimmed for the caper’s founder and the Caper Commons (above) in a 30:1 split, taken partly in XRD off the payment and partly as a slice of the tokens the buy mints. It never touches the caper’s treasury, so it is not a protocol fee — it is the founder’s compensation. Its rate, set by the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) ’s collateralization schedule, is front-loaded: highest on the first buys and tapering linearly to zero as circulation grows, with the peak bounded in the contract rather than left to configuration. The rate falling does not mean the amount falls with it — a smaller share of much larger buys can still be more money. Raising funds (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) works through it.

Type Reference Covers Tokens · selling · exit · fees · Caper Commons Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting)

Why can't I see the create-proposal button? You need to hold the caper's governance token in the connected account. Buy any amount on the curve and the button appears. What happens to the inventory vault when I sell? Your tokens go back into the inventory vault and your XRD comes out of the curve vault, priced along the same curve. The protocol does not burn anything on sell. Can I withdraw governance tokens to another wallet? Yes. Governance tokens are normal fungibles. Vote tokens are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders, only withdrawn to your own worktop to feed exit(). What is the Caper Commons? The protocol-wide treasury that holds 1/31 of the token leg of every caper's per-buy skim — a small standing position in every caper on the platform. Its policy is set by $CAPER governance. How is my exit payout calculated? When you call exit() you redeem a pro-rata slice of the caper's treasury equal to your canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T) — the exact figure that sets your voting power (t = governance tokens redeemed, v = your vote tokens, V = total vote-token supply, T = tokens in circulation). Your voting influence and your redeemable share are one and the same number: Caper's always-on take on the rage-quit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . What are the protocol fees? Three fixed fees apply: a 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell, a 500 XRD proposal fee to open a governance proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and a 100 XRD vote fee when your caper casts a ballot in another DAO via a VOTE proposal. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how the trade fee moves the vaults.

Type Reference Covers Tokens · selling · voting · proposals · exit · fees · Caper Commons Verified against The deployed contract source (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), 2 August 2026 Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) , Proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals)

Why can't I see the create-proposal button? You need to hold the caper's governance token in the connected account. Buy any amount on the curve and the button appears. What happens to the inventory vault when I sell? Your tokens go back into the inventory vault and your XRD comes out of the curve vault, priced along the same curve. The protocol does not burn anything on sell. Is there a minimum trade size? Yes, on the buy side: a buy must be at least 0.001 XRD. There is no upper limit other than the curve's own cap of 100,000,000,000 tokens, which no buy may push past. Can I withdraw governance tokens to another wallet? Yes. Governance tokens are normal fungibles. Vote tokens are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders, only withdrawn to your own worktop to feed exit().

How does voting actually work — do I pick one option? No. A caper ballot is a ranked ballot (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/ranked-and-alternative-ballot-methods) : you submit an ordering of every option on the proposal. The contract rejects a ballot that omits an option, ranks one twice, or references an option that does not exist. When voting closes, the ballots are folded into per-option totals by a Borda-style count weighted by each voter's vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) , so a second preference is worth something rather than nothing. What does a proposal need to pass? Two conditions, both checked at settlement. The leading option's share of total weight must reach 1.5 ÷ (number of options), and the leader must not be an option flagged as a "no". The threshold therefore scales with how many choices are on the ballot: 75% for a two-option proposal, 50% for three, 37.5% for four, 30% for five. A crowded ballot is easier to win but splits the field — which is the point of ranking every option rather than picking one. Why did my first vote seem to count for nothing? Because it did. Your weight is (t·v)/(V·T), and the contract snapshots v — the vote tokens you already hold — before minting the vote token that this ballot earns you. On your very first ballot v is zero, so the weight is zero. Voting is how you accumulate the participation factor; the first one buys you standing, not influence. This is the mechanical reason a large token balance alone cannot carry a proposal. What if I sell my tokens after voting? Your recorded weight falls. The tally re-reads your live balance and takes the lower of it and the balance you held when you voted, so selling reduces your ballot's weight while buying more afterwards does not increase it. Anyone may call the re-clamp permissionlessly during the challenge window before settlement — it can only ever ratchet a weight down, which is why it is safe to leave open to the public. What happens if I vote after voting has closed? The call does not fail; it returns without recording a ballot, and the 100 XRD vote fee is deposited to the caper's treasury rather than refunded. Check the window before submitting.

What is the Caper Commons? The protocol-wide treasury that holds 1/31 of the token leg of every caper's per-buy skim — a small standing position in every caper on the platform. Its policy is set by $CAPER governance. How is my exit payout calculated? When you call exit() you redeem a slice of the caper's treasury equal to your canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T) — the exact figure that sets your voting power (t = governance tokens redeemed, v = your vote tokens, V = total vote-token supply, T = tokens in circulation). It is not a flat pro-rata claim on tokens alone: the contract requires both a non-empty governance-token bucket and a non-empty vote-token bucket, so a holder who never voted redeems nothing. Your voting influence and your redeemable share are one and the same number: Caper's always-on take on the rage-quit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . What are the protocol fees? Three fixed fees apply: a 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell, a 500 XRD proposal fee to open a governance proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and a 100 XRD vote fee when your caper casts a ballot in another DAO via a VOTE proposal. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how the trade fee moves the vaults.

Why can't I see the create-pro…ocol-wide treasury that holds the 1/31 slice of every per-buy founder/Commons allocation across all capers1/31 of the token leg of every caper's per-buy skim — a small standing position in every caper on the platform. Its policy is set by $CAPER …e on the rage-quit (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…he trade fee moves the vaults.

Why can't I see the create-pro…e on the rage-quit (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . …he trade fee moves the vaults.

Type Reference Covers Tokens · selling · exit · fees · Caper Commons Related What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) , Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting)

Why can't I see the create-proposal button? You need to hold the caper's governance token in the connected account. Buy any amount on the curve and the button appears. What happens to the inventory vault when I sell? Your tokens go back into the inventory vault and your XRD comes out of the curve vault, priced along the same curve. The protocol does not burn anything on sell. Can I withdraw governance tokens to another wallet? Yes. Governance tokens are normal fungibles. Vote tokens are soulbound and cannot be transferred between holders, only withdrawn to your own worktop to feed exit(). What is the Caper Commons? The protocol-wide treasury that holds the 1/31 slice of every per-buy founder/Commons allocation across all capers. Its policy is set by $CAPER governance. How is my exit payout calculated? When you call exit() you redeem a pro-rata slice of the caper's treasury equal to your canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T) — the exact figure that sets your voting power (t = governance tokens redeemed, v = your vote tokens, V = total vote-token supply, T = tokens in circulation). Your voting influence and your redeemable share are one and the same number: Caper's always-on take on the rage-quit (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . What are the protocol fees? Three fixed fees apply: a 0.5% trade fee on every buy and sell, a 500 XRD proposal fee to open a governance proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and a 100 XRD vote fee when your caper casts a ballot in another DAO via a VOTE proposal. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) for how the trade fee moves the vaults.