What is the founder's cut, and…is zero, half the peak once 1.0199% of the supply has sold, 1% of a trade by 10.821.4%, and half of what is left with every further tenfifth sold, so the founder is pai… × (1 − s) × x10) for x = 2−s/120%, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs… 5% and falls towards about 0.084165% as the whole supply sells. S…s founder dumping worth doing.

Where does the money go when s…on the curve’s own XRD: every token the buy releasXRD the curve takes pays 94.5% of the rate at its own point on the curve, times its curve pricewhere the buy started, and the treasury and the fou…he rest of this page rests on.

What is the founder's cut, and…of it. The skim is 94.5% XRD, priceda rate on the curve’s XRD for the stretch the trade moves, and 5.5% a sl… a buy, handed in on a sell). SinceEach trade reads one rate – a buy where it starts, a sell at the bottom it would reach if every token handed in retired – and the rate only falls, so a trade pays at least what the same trade cut into pieces would. (From the logic upgrade of 18 September 2026 to the one of 30 September 2026 every token paysid the rate at its own point on thate stretch, not one rate read before the trade instead, so a trade cut into pieces paysid what it paysid whole.; the later upgrade moved that integration from the contract to the trader.) The XRD part divides 11:10 be…s founder dumping worth doing.

Question What a caper's founde…n role exists Founder's take A capped sliceHalf of the skim ofn each buy and each sell, a capped slice shrinking as circulation grow… Written once at instantiation or compiled into the logic; the deployed contract has no…rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

Where does the money go when s…e/src/caper_dao.rs). - The trade feeeasury's share of the skim is taken off the gross payment and deposited into the…e pot its members vote on. It is 49.5% of the skim, in XRD, and it does not go to the founder. - The founder's XRD slice comes out of what the fee leaves,, 45% of the skim, is taken off the payment beside it and put into a separate founder_vault, with the amount recorded in founder_balance. Both XRD shares are priced on the curve’s own XRD…y token the buy releases pays two thirds94.5% of the rate at its own point …e, times its curve price, and is put into a separate founder_vault, with the amount recorded in founder_balancethe treasury and the founder divide that 11:10. - Everything left goes into…lds the entire supply. A slice, 5% of the skim, goes to the founder's token vault, a smaller slicetenth as much to the Commons, and the rest …pply, same file). A sell pays no trade feethe same skim, divided the same way. The token slice comes out of…ds in before anything retires, and the treasury’s and the founder’s XRD slice iss are a fraction of the XRD the cur…nds, then, is a question with threefour answers: the reserve holds the bulk, the caper's treasury holds the fee, and49.5% of the skim, the founder's two vaults hold the skim50%, and the $CAPER treasury holds the last 0.5%. They are separate vaults wit…he rest of this page rests on.

What is the founder's cut, and what caps it? The founder isEvery trade, buys and sells alike, paidys a collateralization fee on every trade, buys and sells alike. It is split in the curve's own composition: two thirds inskim, and the founder is paid half of it. The skim is 94.5% XRD, priced on the curve’s XR… stretch the trade moves, and one third as5.5% a slice of the tokens the tra… pays what it pays whole. The token slice is tithed 30:1 between the founder and the CommonsXRD part divides 11:10 between the caper’s own treasury and the founder, and the token part 10:1 between the founder and the Commons, so the founder takes 45% of the skim in XRD and 5% in tokens, the treasury 49.5% and the Commons 0.5% (TRESERVE_NUM, TITHE_NUMASURY_SHARE, COMMONS_SHARE, FOUNDER_XRD_SHARE and collateralization_rate in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). Until the redeploy of 25 September 2026 the founder took the whole XRD part, which was then two thirds of the skim, and 30/31 of the token part; the caper’s treasury was funded by a flat 0.5% trade fee instead. Two properties bound it. The…eak the founder takes at most 66.6745% of the curve XRD a trade moves (peak × 2/350% × 90%) and at most peak × 1/3 × 30/31 of the to5% of the tokens it moves (peak × 50% × 10%); the treasury takens iat moves, 32.26%st 49.5% of that XRD and the Commons 0.5% of those tokens. Those rates are the live val…e rate, though, not the total. Counted over buys alone, the founder’s share of every token ever sold stays under 5% and falls towards about 0.084% as the whole supply sells. Since the skim is charged on …s founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder change the fee…loyed CaperMain exposes twenty-one public methods alongside its … one of them is a setter. The trade fee (0.005), the collateralization peak (1), th…ated and never assigned again. How the skim divides between the treasury, the founder and the Commons is not a field at all: it is three constants compiled into the logic. There is no vote-accrual rate…mint role that does not exist.

What happens if the founder le… vaults. What becomes of the future feeounder’s future half of the skim depends on what they do with …the mechanism to keep working.

What is the founder's cut, and…is zero, half the peak once 1.301% of the supply has sold, 1% of a trade by 10.8%, and never below a floor of 0.5%half of what is left with every further tenth sold, so the founder is paid a sli…n_rate, which returns peak × (0.005 + 0.995 × (1 − s) × e−52s)2% × x + 98% × (1 − s) × x10) for x = 2−s/10%, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs).…s founder dumping worth doing.

What is the founder's cut, and…n is zero, half the peak once 6.751.3% of the supply has sold, and 0.74% with the whole supply sold. It never reaches zero1% of a trade by 10%, and never below a floor of 0.5%, so the founder is paid a small slice onf every trade for the life of t…tion_rate, which returns peak / √(1 + s / COLLATERALIZATION_SCALE× (0.005 + 0.995 × (1 − s) × e−52s), contracts/logic/src/lib.rs)…ralization_peak is written as 0.051 when the shared logic compone…he 15 September 2026 redeploy, and 0.075 from then until the logic upgrade of 18 September 2026, and 0.05 until the upgrade of 19 September 2026). At that peak the founder takes at most 3.3366.67% of the curve XRD a trade mov…30/31 of the tokens it moves, 1.6132.26%. Those rates are the live va…s founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder change the fee…loyed CaperMain exposes twenty-two public methods alongside its …aths, the proposal paths, exit, and withdraw_founder and two address reads – and not one of them is a set…, the collateralization peak (0.051), the flat proposal fee (500 …mint role that does not exist.

Where does the money go when s…r. - The founder's XRD slice is taken off the same gross payment as the fee, alongside it rather than after itcomes out of what the fee leaves, priced on the curve’s own XRD: every token the buy releases pays two thirds of the rate at its own point on the curve, times its curve price, and is put into a separate founder_va…this (sell_apply, same file). The fee and the founder’s XRDA sell pays no trade fee. The token slice both comes ofut of the gross payout, and the token slice comes out of the tokens the seller hands intokens the seller hands in before anything retires, and the founder’s XRD slice is a fraction of the XRD the curve pays for the rest. Those tokens change hands ra…he rest of this page rests on.

What is the founder's cut, and…mposition: two thirds in XRD, taken offpriced on the curve’s XRD for the stretch the trade's gros moves, and one third as a slice of the tokens the trade moves (the mintreleased on a buy, the tokens handed in on a sell). Since the logic upgrade of 18 September 2026 every token pays the rate at its own point on that stretch, not one rate read before the trade, so a trade cut into pieces pays what it pays whole. The token slice is tithed 30…ounder takes at most 3.33% of a trade’s gross in XRDthe curve XRD a trade moves (peak × 2/3) and at most peak…s founder dumping worth doing.

Question What a caper's founde…xists Founder's take A capped, tapering slice of each buy and each sell, shrinking as circulation grows, held in its own vaults Found…rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

What is the founder's cut, and…properties bound it. The rate tapers to zerofalls with circulation: it is at its peak when circulation is zero and falls linearly to nothing at 30% of the supply sold, after which the founder is paid nothing on any further trade (collateralization_rate against, half the peak once 6.75% of the supply has sold, and 0.74% with the whole supply sold. It never reaches zero, so the founder is paid a small slice on every trade for the life of the caper (collateralization_rate, which returns peak / √(1 + s / COLLATERALIZATION_TAPER_ENDSCALE), contracts/logic/src/lib.rs).…ization_peak is written as 0.075 when the shared logic compon…the 15 September 2026 redeploy, and 0.075 from then until the logic upgrade of 18 September 2026). At that peak the founder takes at most 53.33% of a trade’s gross in XRD (p…30/31 of the tokens it moves, just under 2.51.61%. Those rates are the live va…a founder can accumulate. The taper is whatfalling rate slows the accrual; only trading stopping ends it. Note what the taperfalling rate does to the incentive. A founder earns mosttakes the largest share where a caper is smallest and nothinga small one once it is established, which…s founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder change the fee…he collateralization peak (0.075), the flat proposal fee (500…mint role that does not exist.

What happens if the founder le… and be paid up front for the rest of the taperstream that follows. Its ResourceBuilder in Caper…the mechanism to keep working.

Question What a caper's founde…ed, tapering slice of each buy and each sell, held in its own vaults Founder's badge A single tra…rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

Where does the money go when s…'s XRD slice is taken off the post-fee paymentsame gross payment as the fee, alongside it rather than after it, and put into a separate found…, and the rest to the buyer. A sell mirrors this (sell_apply, same file). The fee and the founder’s XRD slice both come off the gross payout, and the token slice comes out of the tokens the seller hands in. Those tokens change hands rather than retiring. Who holds the funds, then, is …he rest of this page rests on.

What is the founder's cut, and…d a collateralization fee on each buy,very trade, buys and sells alike. It is split in the curve's own composition: two thirds in XRD, taken off the payment,trade's gross, and one third as a slice of the tokens that buy releases,e trade moves (the mint on a buy, the tokens handed in on a sell). The token slice is tithed 30:1 between the found…s paid nothing on any further buytrade (collateralization_rate again…lization_peak is written as 0.1075 when the shared logic compon… is no method that rewrites it. The ceiling on the token leg is (it was 0.15, charged on buys only, until the 15 September 2026 redeploy). At that peak the founder takes at most 5% of a trade’s gross in XRD (peak × 2/3) and at most peak × (1 − 21/3) × 30/31, which at 0.15 is slightly of the tokens it moves, just under 2.5%. That figure is therefoose rates are the live values and the ceilings at once – not a current setting that some later call could raise. No later call can raise them. They cap the rate, though, not the total. Since the skim is charged on sells too, and a sell’s token slice moves existing tokens instead of retiring them, tokens that trade back and forth on a young curve pay the founder each time they move. No fixed share of the supply bounds what a founder can accumulate. The taper is what ends it. Note what the taper does to…s founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder sell their tok…der's slice is ordinary supply, that came out of the same inventory at the same price as the buyer'e same token everyone else holds, taken off other people's trades, so it can be sold back alon…he curve reserve to a founder.

Can the founder change the fee…the collateralization peak (0.1075), the flat proposal fee (500…mint role that does not exist.

Can the founder change the fee…(0.10), the vote fee (100 XRD), the v-accrual rate (0.01) and all three governance wind…ated and never assigned again. There is no vote-accrual rate among them: since the 11 September 2026 redeployment each ballot mints a fixed 1 v, a constant compiled into the logic rather than a field. The component this replaced d…mint role that does not exist.

Can a caper be shut down? No.…'s approval. (exit requires a non-empty bucket of vpositive amount of v, withdrawn from the member's own account, and since the redeploy of 11…ever votes has no exit either.

Can a caper be shut down? No.…a-caper) : any member who has traded on the curvecast a ranked ballot can hand back their vote toke… a non-empty bucket of v, and v accrues at 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value on both legs – so having bought is enough; nobody has to have votedsince the redeploy of 11 September 2026 the only member-facing source of v is a cast ballot – trading mints none, so having bought is no longer enough. Until that date it was.) The founder holds that righ…e, and cannot revoke anybody's – which now also means a founder who never votes has no exit either.

Can a caper be shut down? No.…ernance tokens and take their pro-rataweighted share of the treasury plus th…, and cannot revoke anybody's.

Question What a caper's founde…h buy, held in its own vault Founder's badge A single transferable bearer token; whoever holds it collects the cut Founder's reach into the reser…rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

What happens if the founder le…as accrued in their two vaults and gives up any further collateralization fee. T. What becomes of the future fee depends on what they do with the badge: abandoning it forfeits the stream, but the badge is a single, freely transferable bearer token, so they can instead sell it and be paid up front for the rest of the taper. Its ResourceBuilder in CaperDao::new sets no withdraw or deposit restriction, unlike the vote token a few lines below it, and founder_take_pair authorises on presentation of the badge alone (contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs). Either way the caper carries on without th…the mechanism to keep working.

What this does not protect you… and no contract answers it. - They say nothing about who the founder is. The founder badge is a bearer instrument, and founder_take_pair authorises anyone presenting it, so the cut can change hands on a third-party venue with no proposal and no event on the platform. Nothing a holder owns is diluted by that sale – the skim is unchanged in size and in source – but the party collecting it need not be the person who launched the caper. - They are guarantees of this …nary risk, and it stays yours.

Who can spend the treasury? Ca…sal is triggered, which locks a seven-day TWAPthe trailing TWAP as a baseline at that moment – at …, not at creation – and opens a 48-hourthe market window, and the proposal pass…paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

Who can spend the treasury? Ca…as passed, and not otherwise. Under optimistic governanceSettlement is two-phase, and a proposal has to clear both halves. The legislative half comes first: ballots are cast over the voting window and folded by Borda count, and the leading option has to take at least 1.5 divided by the number of options of the weight actually cast, without being the "do nothing" option. Then the optimistic (/wiki/dao-governance/concept…oting/optimistic-governance) that settlement is a price test rather thanlf: a tallied proposal is triggered, which locks a seven-day TWAP baseline at tally: at the close ofhat moment – at the trigger, not at creation – and opens a 48-hour window, and the proposal passes uonlessy if the token's spot price has fallen below the seven-day TWAP baseline locked in at creationTWAP measured over that window itself comes in at or above the baseline (SettlementV4, contracts/common/src/lib.rs). The vote legislates and the market ratifies; neither alone moves the money. See proposals (/wiki/govern…paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

Can the founder change the fee…he deployed CaperMain exposes eighteen publictwenty-two public methods alongside its instantiation functions – the trade paths, the propos…teralization peak (0.15), the flat proposal-fee floor and rate, the v-accrual rate and both(500 XRD) and the separate execution-fee rate (0.10), the vote fee (100 XRD), the v-accrual rate (0.01) and all three governance windows are writte…mint role that does not exist.

Can the founder mint more toke…role and no burn role at all (the ResourceBuilder in CaperDao::new, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:307-337). The comment in the source s… can claw them back out of it.

Question What a caper's founde… settled proposal Fee levers Protocol-level and bounded, not the founder'Written once at instantiation; the deployed contract has tno setter, for anyone Shut-down method None exists…rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

What is the founder's cut, and…er buy (collateralization_rate, lib.rs:290-296). And the peak itself is capped by the contract, not chosen against COLLATERALIZATION_TAPER_END, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). And the peak is not a per-caper: update_fees rejects any peak above 0.15, asserting " setting at all: collateralization_peak must beis writhin [0, 0.15]" (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). The ceiling on the token leg is peak × (1 − 2/3) × 30/31, which at the maximum permitted peak is slightly under 5%. Because the cap is assertedten as 0.15 when the shared logic component is instantiated and there is no method that rewrites it. The ceiling on the token leg is peak × (1 − 2/3) × 30/31, which at 0.15 is slightly under 5%. That figure ins the contract rather than configured,refore the live value and thate ceiling is a property of the protocol rather than a current settingat once – not a current setting that some later call could raise. Note what the taper does to…s founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder sell their tok…uns through withdraw_founder (lib.rs:1210-1224contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), which requires the caper's …take and founder_take_tokens, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:579-601). Those two vaults are the fo…he curve reserve to a founder.

Who can spend the treasury? Ca…– treasury_withdraw, treasury_transfer, treasury_exit – are all restricted to the admin role (exit and the transfer inside execute_payout – are all restricted to the admin role (the roles block at the top of contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:110-116). The badge that satisfies th…dropped at the end of the call (lib.rs:756-760). So the question becomes: wh… does. execute_proposal_payout (lib.rs:1674-1691) calls execute_payout, which binds the frozen winneraction of a settled proposal, asserts that ithe winning option is a payout, and transfers to…ecipient, currency and amount that were stored iwhen the option people voted on (caper_dao.rs:1090-1106)proposal was created. It is once-only. The caller …read from the settled proposal, which is why the source calls the transfer target "the STORED, proposed recipient". The practical answer is that treasury money moves only when a vote says so and not otherwiseproposal has settled as passed, and not otherwise. Under optimistic governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance) that settlement is a price test rather than a tally: at the close of a 48-hour window the proposal passes unless the token's spot price has fallen below the seven-day TWAP baseline locked in at creation. See proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) , votingexecution (/wiki/governance/votingexecution) and paying someone from a …paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

Can the founder change the fees or the rules? No, on both counts. update_fees is the only method that moves any fee, it is restricted to the protocol admin rather than to a caper's founder (update_fees => restrict_to: [admin], in – and the reason is stronger than a permission check. Nobody can change them, founder or protocol admin. The deployed CaperMain exposes eighteen public functions – the trade paths, the proles block of contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), and every value it accepts is bounded by an assertion in its own body: tposal paths, exit, withdraw_founder and two address reads – and not one of them is a setter. The trade fee to [0, 0.1](0.005), the collateralization peak to [0, (0.15]), the proposal-fee to at least the settlement-gas budget ("proposal_fee must cofloor and rate, the v-accrual rate and both governance windows are written into the component when it is instantiated and never assigned again. The component this replaced did have a setter, update_fees, restricted to the protocol admin; it did not surviver the settlement-gas budget"). A founder has no fee lever of their own to pull. Changing the logic itself runs through governance as an upgrade proposal, which is voted on like any otherAugust 2026 redeployment, and neither did the bounds it asserted, because there is no longer anything to bound. Changing any of them therefore means publishing a fresh logic component and moving the whole platform onto it through an UPGRADE proposal in the $CAPER caper – a governed, visible, all-capers-at-once event, not a lever an admin pulls. The state tier that holds th…e underneath it, which is why aneven that upgrade cannot reach the mint role that does not exist.

Can a caper be shut down? No.…-caper) : any member who has taken partraded on the curve can hand back their vote toke…and without anyone's approval. (exit requires a non-empty bucket of v, and v accrues at 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value on both legs – so having bought is enough; nobody has to have voted.) The founder holds that right …, and cannot revoke anybody's.

What this does not protect you…. A treasury spent badly by a real majority voteproposal nobody vetoed is spent as thoroughly as one…ects you from theft, not from being outvoteda decision going through because too few people were watching. - They say nothing about wh…nd no contract answers it. - Governance-settable levers move within their bounds. The fees quoted here are stated as the contract'They are guarantees of this logic component. The fee schedule cannot be edited, but the platform can be moved to a new logic component by an UPGRADE proposal in the $CAPER caper. What is limits, not as today's settings. Read the current values off the caper itselfmutable underneath any such move is the state tier: the fixed supply, the absent mint role and the vaults. What the contracts do settl… spend the treasury without a votesettled proposal, and cannot stop you leaving.…nary risk, and it stays yours.

Where does the money go when s… leg can be skipped (buy_apply, in contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:500-542). - The trade fee is taken o…he rest of this page rests on.

What is the founder's cut, and… the founder and the Commons (RESERVE_NUM, TITHE_NUM and collateralization_rate in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:262-286, :1038-1052). Two properties bound it. T…s founder dumping worth doing.

What is the founder's cut, and…es rejects any peak above 0.15 (lib.rs:2076-2086, asserting "collateralization_peak must be within [0, 0.15]" (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). The ceiling on the token le…s founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder change the fee…er than to a caper's founder (update_fees => restrict_to: [admin], in the roles block of contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:661), and every value it accepts is bounded by an assertion in its own body: the trade fee to [0, 0.1], t…fee to at least the settlement-gas budget (lib.rs:2076-2092"proposal_fee must cover the settlement-gas budget"). A founder has no fee lever …mint role that does not exist.

Question What a caper's founder can take, and what stops them Token supply Fixed at genesis, 100bn, no mint or burn role exists Founder's take A capped, tapering slice of each buy, held in its own vault Founder's reach into the reserve None — no method exists Founder's reach into the treasury None outside a settled proposal Fee levers Protocol-level and bounded, not the founder's to set Shut-down method None exists Source contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

Anyone deciding whether to put money into a caper asks the same question first, in one wording or another: can the founder run away with the money? This page answers it from the contracts rather than from a promise. It goes through what a founder can take, what they cannot reach, and, at the end, what none of this protects you from.

Can a founder rug a caper? A rug pull has a specific shape. The team holds a large allocation or a mint key, waits for buyers to arrive, then sells into them or issues themselves more supply until the price collapses and the pool is drained. It needs two things: supply the team can create or hold back, and a pot of buyer money the team can reach. A caper is built so that neither exists. The token supply is minted once and can never grow. The money buyers pay is held in a reserve vault that no method can withdraw from except a sale back along the curve. What stops the founder is not a vesting schedule or a multisig convention. It is that the code contains no function that would do it.

Where does the money go when someone buys? A buy splits four ways, and the split is performed in one call so no leg can be skipped (buy_apply, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:500-542). - The trade fee is taken off the gross payment and deposited into the caper's own treasury — the pot its members vote on. It does not go to the founder. - The founder's XRD slice is taken off the post-fee payment and put into a separate founder_vault, with the amount recorded in founder_balance. - Everything left goes into the curve vault. That is the reserve that pays out when somebody sells. - The tokens come out of an inventory vault that already holds the entire supply. A slice goes to the founder's token vault, a smaller slice to the Commons, and the rest to the buyer. Who holds the funds, then, is a question with three answers: the reserve holds the bulk, the treasury holds the fee, and the founder's two vaults hold the skim. They are separate vaults with separate access rules, and that separation is what the rest of this page rests on.

Can the founder mint more tokens? No. The full supply — 100 billion, the same for every caper (CURVE_CAP, contracts/common/src/lib.rs:22) — is minted once at creation into the inventory vault, and the resource is built with no mint role and no burn role at all (caper_dao.rs:307-337). The comment in the source states the reason plainly: it is the load-bearing guarantee, and it holds even against a future version of the protocol's own logic. The same construction closes two adjacent doors. The resource is created with OwnerRole::None, and the builder sets no freeze role and no recall role, so there is no owner who could add either later. Nobody can freeze your tokens in your account, and nobody can claw them back out of it.

What is the founder's cut, and what caps it? The founder is paid a collateralization fee on each buy, split in the curve's own composition: two thirds in XRD taken off the payment, one third as a slice of the tokens that buy releases, tithed 30:1 between the founder and the Commons (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:262-286, :1038-1052). Two properties bound it. The rate tapers to zero: it is at its peak when circulation is zero and falls linearly to nothing at 30% of the supply sold, after which the founder is paid nothing on any further buy (collateralization_rate, lib.rs:290-296). And the peak itself is capped by the contract, not chosen per caper: update_fees rejects any peak above 0.15 (lib.rs:2076-2086). The ceiling on the token leg is peak × (1 − 2/3) × 30/31, which at the maximum permitted peak is just under 5%. Because the cap is asserted in the contract rather than configured, that ceiling is a property of the protocol rather than a current setting. Note what the taper does to the incentive. A founder earns most where a caper is smallest and nothing once it is established, which is the reverse of the schedule that makes founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder sell their tokens? Yes, and this is deliberate. The founder's slice is ordinary supply that came out of the same inventory at the same price as the buyer's, so it can be sold back along the same curve on the same terms as anybody else's. There is no privileged exit and no privileged price. What the founder cannot do is take more than has accrued. Withdrawal runs through withdraw_founder (lib.rs:1210-1224), which requires the caper's own founder badge and asserts the requested amount against the recorded balance on each leg (founder_take and founder_take_tokens, caper_dao.rs:579-601). Those two vaults are the founder's entire reach. There is no method anywhere on the component that moves XRD out of the curve reserve to a founder.

Who can spend the treasury? Can the team steal it? The treasury's movement methods — treasury_withdraw, treasury_transfer, treasury_exit — are all restricted to the admin role (caper_dao.rs:110-116). The badge that satisfies that role is not held by the founder or by any member. It lives with the registry, which vends a transient proof only when the protocol's logic component calls authorize, and the proof is dropped at the end of the call (lib.rs:756-760). So the question becomes: which of logic's methods spends the treasury on somebody's instruction? One does. execute_proposal_payout (lib.rs:1674-1691) calls execute_payout, which binds the frozen winner of a settled proposal, asserts that the winning option is a payout, and transfers to the recipient, currency and amount that were stored in the option people actually voted on (caper_dao.rs:1090-1106). It is once-only. The caller cannot substitute a recipient or an amount, because neither is a parameter — both are read from the settled proposal. The practical answer is that treasury money moves when a vote says so and not otherwise. See proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) , voting (/wiki/governance/voting) and paying someone from a caper's treasury (/wiki/foundations/paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

Can the founder change the fees or the rules? No, on both counts. update_fees is the only method that moves any fee, it is restricted to the protocol admin rather than to a caper's founder (lib.rs:661), and every value it accepts is bounded: the trade fee to [0, 0.1], the collateralization peak to [0, 0.15], the proposal fee to at least the settlement gas budget (lib.rs:2076-2092). A founder has no fee lever of their own to pull. Changing the logic itself runs through governance as an upgrade proposal, which is voted on like any other. The state tier that holds the vaults and the fixed supply is a separate, immutable package underneath it, which is why an upgrade cannot reach the mint role that does not exist.

Can a caper be shut down? No. Across the logic package's public surface there is no dissolve, delete or wind-up method, and none of the executive proposal kinds does it either. A caper has no off switch, so there is no version of this where a founder closes the thing and everyone else discovers the door is locked. The way out is the exit right (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) : any member who has taken part can hand back their vote tokens and governance tokens and take their pro-rata share of the treasury plus their sell-back along the curve, without a proposal and without anyone's approval. The founder holds that right on exactly the same terms as everybody else, and cannot revoke anybody's.

What happens if the founder leaves? Nothing stops. The curve keeps quoting both sides, the treasury keeps paying out what proposals decide, and the exit right keeps working, because none of those paths passes through the founder. A founder who walks away takes whatever has accrued in their two vaults and gives up any further collateralization fee. The caper carries on without them. This is the structural difference from a project where the team is a dependency. There is nothing here that a founder has to keep doing for the mechanism to keep working.

What this does not protect you from The guarantees above are narrow on purpose, and it is worth being exact about their edges. - They say nothing about price. The curve will always quote a sell, but what it quotes depends on where circulation stands. You can exit at a loss. - They say nothing about judgement. A treasury spent badly by a genuine majority vote is spent just as thoroughly as one taken. Governance protects you from theft, not from being outvoted. - They say nothing about what the caper is for. Whether the group does anything worth backing is a question about the people, and no contract answers it. - Governance-settable levers move within their bounds. The fees quoted here are stated as the contract's limits, not as today's settings. Read the current values off the caper itself. What the contracts do settle is the narrower thing: the founder cannot create supply, cannot reach the reserve, cannot spend the treasury without a vote, and cannot stop you leaving. Everything else is ordinary risk, and it stays yours.

Related - Buying into a caper (/wiki/foundations/buying-into-a-caper) — what you get, how the price is set, how to sell. - Leaving a caper: the exit right (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) — the full mechanic and its preconditions. - Starting a personal caper (/wiki/foundations/starting-a-personal-caper) — the same questions from the founder's side. - Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) — the reserve and the pricing function. - Principal–agent problem (/wiki/economics/principal-agent) — the general form of the problem this page is about. - Token unlocks and vesting schedules (/wiki/economics/token-unlocks-and-vesting) — how the rest of the industry addresses it.

Question What a caper's founder can take, and what stops them Token supply Fixed at genesis, 100bn, no mint or burn role exists Founder's take A capped, tapering slice of each buy, held in its own vault Founder's reach into the reserve None – no method exists Founder's reach into the treasury None outside a settled proposal Fee levers Protocol-level and bounded, not the founder's to set Shut-down method None exists Source contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

Anyone deciding whether to put money into a caper asks the same question first, in one wording or another: can the founder run away with the money? This page answers it from the contracts rather than from a promise. It goes through what a founder can take, what they cannot reach, and, at the end, what none of this protects you from.

Can a founder rug a caper? A rug pull has a specific shape. The team holds a large allocation or a mint key, waits for buyers to arrive, then sells into them or issues themselves more supply until the price collapses and the pool is drained. It needs two things: supply the team can create or hold back, and a pot of buyer money the team can reach. A caper is built so that neither exists. The token supply is minted once and can never grow. The money buyers pay is held in a reserve vault that no method can withdraw from except a sale back along the curve. What stops the founder is not a vesting schedule or a multisig convention. It is that the code contains no function that would do it.

Where does the money go when someone buys? A buy splits four ways, and the split is performed in one call so no leg can be skipped (buy_apply, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:500-542). - The trade fee is taken off the gross payment and deposited into the caper's own treasury – the pot its members vote on. It does not go to the founder. - The founder's XRD slice is taken off the post-fee payment and put into a separate founder_vault, with the amount recorded in founder_balance. - Everything left goes into the curve vault. That is the reserve that pays out when somebody sells. - The tokens come out of an inventory vault that already holds the entire supply. A slice goes to the founder's token vault, a smaller slice to the Commons, and the rest to the buyer. Who holds the funds, then, is a question with three answers: the reserve holds the bulk, the treasury holds the fee, and the founder's two vaults hold the skim. They are separate vaults with separate access rules, and that separation is what the rest of this page rests on.

Can the founder mint more tokens? No. The full supply – 100 billion, the same for every caper (CURVE_CAP, contracts/common/src/lib.rs:22) – is minted once at creation into the inventory vault, and the resource is built with no mint role and no burn role at all (caper_dao.rs:307-337). The comment in the source states the reason plainly: it is the load-bearing guarantee, and it holds even against a future version of the protocol's own logic. The same construction closes two adjacent doors. The resource is created with OwnerRole::None, and the builder sets no freeze role and no recall role, so there is no owner who could add either later. Nobody can freeze your tokens in your account, and nobody can claw them back out of it.

What is the founder's cut, and what caps it? The founder is paid a collateralization fee on each buy, split in the curve's own composition: two thirds in XRD taken off the payment, one third as a slice of the tokens that buy releases, tithed 30:1 between the founder and the Commons (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:262-286, :1038-1052). Two properties bound it. The rate tapers to zero: it is at its peak when circulation is zero and falls linearly to nothing at 30% of the supply sold, after which the founder is paid nothing on any further buy (collateralization_rate, lib.rs:290-296). And the peak itself is capped by the contract, not chosen per caper: update_fees rejects any peak above 0.15 (lib.rs:2076-2086). The ceiling on the token leg is peak × (1 − 2/3) × 30/31, which at the maximum permitted peak is slightly under 5%. Because the cap is asserted in the contract rather than configured, that ceiling is a property of the protocol rather than a current setting. Note what the taper does to the incentive. A founder earns most where a caper is smallest and nothing once it is established, which is the reverse of the schedule that makes founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder sell their tokens? Yes, and this is deliberate. The founder's slice is ordinary supply that came out of the same inventory at the same price as the buyer's, so it can be sold back along the same curve on the same terms as anybody else's. There is no privileged exit and no privileged price. What the founder cannot do is take more than has accrued. Withdrawal runs through withdraw_founder (lib.rs:1210-1224), which requires the caper's own founder badge and asserts the requested amount against the recorded balance on each leg (founder_take and founder_take_tokens, caper_dao.rs:579-601). Those two vaults are the founder's entire reach. There is no method anywhere on the component that moves XRD out of the curve reserve to a founder.

Who can spend the treasury? Can the team steal it? The treasury's movement methods – treasury_withdraw, treasury_transfer, treasury_exit – are all restricted to the admin role (caper_dao.rs:110-116). The badge that satisfies that role is not held by the founder or by any member. It lives with the registry, which vends a transient proof only when the protocol's logic component calls authorize, and the proof is dropped at the end of the call (lib.rs:756-760). So the question becomes: which of logic's methods spends the treasury on somebody's instruction? One does. execute_proposal_payout (lib.rs:1674-1691) calls execute_payout, which binds the frozen winner of a settled proposal, asserts that the winning option is a payout, and transfers to the recipient, currency and amount that were stored in the option people voted on (caper_dao.rs:1090-1106). It is once-only. The caller cannot substitute a recipient or an amount, because neither is a parameter – both are read from the settled proposal. The practical answer is that treasury money moves when a vote says so and not otherwise. See proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) , voting (/wiki/governance/voting) and paying someone from a caper's treasury (/wiki/foundations/paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

Can the founder change the fees or the rules? No, on both counts. update_fees is the only method that moves any fee, it is restricted to the protocol admin rather than to a caper's founder (lib.rs:661), and every value it accepts is bounded: the trade fee to [0, 0.1], the collateralization peak to [0, 0.15], the proposal fee to at least the settlement gas budget (lib.rs:2076-2092). A founder has no fee lever of their own to pull. Changing the logic itself runs through governance as an upgrade proposal, which is voted on like any other. The state tier that holds the vaults and the fixed supply is a separate, immutable package underneath it, which is why an upgrade cannot reach the mint role that does not exist.

Can a caper be shut down? No. Across the logic package's public surface there is no dissolve, delete or wind-up method, and none of the executive proposal kinds does it either. A caper has no off switch, so there is no version of this where a founder closes the thing and everyone else discovers the door is locked. The way out is the exit right (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) : any member who has taken part can hand back their vote tokens and governance tokens and take their pro-rata share of the treasury plus their sell-back along the curve, without a proposal and without anyone's approval. The founder holds that right on exactly the same terms as everybody else, and cannot revoke anybody's.

What happens if the founder leaves? Nothing stops. The curve keeps quoting both sides, the treasury keeps paying out what proposals decide, and the exit right keeps working, because none of those paths passes through the founder. A founder who walks away takes whatever has accrued in their two vaults and gives up any further collateralization fee. The caper carries on without them. This is the structural difference from a project where the team is a dependency. There is nothing here that a founder has to keep doing for the mechanism to keep working.

What this does not protect you from The guarantees above are narrow on purpose, and it is worth being exact about their edges. - They say nothing about price. The curve will always quote a sell, but what it quotes depends on where circulation stands. You can exit at a loss. - They say nothing about judgement. A treasury spent badly by a real majority vote is spent as thoroughly as one taken. Governance protects you from theft, not from being outvoted. - They say nothing about what the caper is for. Whether the group does anything worth backing is a question about the people, and no contract answers it. - Governance-settable levers move within their bounds. The fees quoted here are stated as the contract's limits, not as today's settings. Read the current values off the caper itself. What the contracts do settle is the narrower thing: the founder cannot create supply, cannot reach the reserve, cannot spend the treasury without a vote, and cannot stop you leaving. Everything else is ordinary risk, and it stays yours.

Related - Buying into a caper (/wiki/foundations/buying-into-a-caper) – what you get, how the price is set, how to sell. - Leaving a caper: the exit right (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) – the full mechanic and its preconditions. - Starting a personal caper (/wiki/foundations/starting-a-personal-caper) – the same questions from the founder's side. - Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) – the reserve and the pricing function. - Principal–agent problem (/wiki/economics/principal-agent) – the general form of the problem this page is about. - Token unlocks and vesting schedules (/wiki/economics/token-unlocks-and-vesting) – how the rest of the industry addresses it.

Question What a caper's founder can take, and what stops them Token supply Fixed at genesis, 100bn, no mint or burn role exists Founder's take A capped, tapering slice of each buy, held in its own vault Founder's reach into the reserve None — no method exists Founder's reach into the treasury None outside a settled proposal Fee levers Protocol-level and bounded, not the founder's to set Shut-down method None exists Source contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs

Anyone deciding whether to put money into a caper asks the same question first, in one wording or another: can the founder run away with the money? This page answers it from the contracts rather than from a promise. It goes through what a founder can take, what they cannot reach, and, at the end, what none of this protects you from.

Can a founder rug a caper? A rug pull has a specific shape. The team holds a large allocation or a mint key, waits for buyers to arrive, then sells into them or issues themselves more supply until the price collapses and the pool is drained. It needs two things: supply the team can create or hold back, and a pot of buyer money the team can reach. A caper is built so that neither exists. The token supply is minted once and can never grow. The money buyers pay is held in a reserve vault that no method can withdraw from except a sale back along the curve. What stops the founder is not a vesting schedule or a multisig convention. It is that the code contains no function that would do it.

Where does the money go when someone buys? A buy splits four ways, and the split is performed in one call so no leg can be skipped (buy_apply, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs:500-542). - The trade fee is taken off the gross payment and deposited into the caper's own treasury — the pot its members vote on. It does not go to the founder. - The founder's XRD slice is taken off the post-fee payment and put into a separate founder_vault, with the amount recorded in founder_balance. - Everything left goes into the curve vault. That is the reserve that pays out when somebody sells. - The tokens come out of an inventory vault that already holds the entire supply. A slice goes to the founder's token vault, a smaller slice to the Commons, and the rest to the buyer. Who holds the funds, then, is a question with three answers: the reserve holds the bulk, the treasury holds the fee, and the founder's two vaults hold the skim. They are separate vaults with separate access rules, and that separation is what the rest of this page rests on.

Can the founder mint more tokens? No. The full supply — 100 billion, the same for every caper (CURVE_CAP, contracts/common/src/lib.rs:22) — is minted once at creation into the inventory vault, and the resource is built with no mint role and no burn role at all (caper_dao.rs:307-337). The comment in the source states the reason plainly: it is the load-bearing guarantee, and it holds even against a future version of the protocol's own logic. The same construction closes two adjacent doors. The resource is created with OwnerRole::None, and the builder sets no freeze role and no recall role, so there is no owner who could add either later. Nobody can freeze your tokens in your account, and nobody can claw them back out of it.

What is the founder's cut, and what caps it? The founder is paid a collateralization fee on each buy, split in the curve's own composition: two thirds in XRD taken off the payment, one third as a slice of the tokens that buy releases, tithed 30:1 between the founder and the Commons (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:262-286, :1038-1052). Two properties bound it. The rate tapers to zero: it is at its peak when circulation is zero and falls linearly to nothing at 30% of the supply sold, after which the founder is paid nothing on any further buy (collateralization_rate, lib.rs:290-296). And the peak itself is capped by the contract, not chosen per caper: update_fees rejects any peak above 0.15 (lib.rs:2076-2086). The ceiling on the token leg is peak × (1 − 2/3) × 30/31, which at the maximum permitted peak is just under 5%. Because the cap is asserted in the contract rather than configured, that ceiling is a property of the protocol rather than a current setting. Note what the taper does to the incentive. A founder earns most where a caper is smallest and nothing once it is established, which is the reverse of the schedule that makes founder dumping worth doing.

Can the founder sell their tokens? Yes, and this is deliberate. The founder's slice is ordinary supply that came out of the same inventory at the same price as the buyer's, so it can be sold back along the same curve on the same terms as anybody else's. There is no privileged exit and no privileged price. What the founder cannot do is take more than has accrued. Withdrawal runs through withdraw_founder (lib.rs:1210-1224), which requires the caper's own founder badge and asserts the requested amount against the recorded balance on each leg (founder_take and founder_take_tokens, caper_dao.rs:579-601). Those two vaults are the founder's entire reach. There is no method anywhere on the component that moves XRD out of the curve reserve to a founder.

Who can spend the treasury? Can the team steal it? The treasury's movement methods — treasury_withdraw, treasury_transfer, treasury_exit — are all restricted to the admin role (caper_dao.rs:110-116). The badge that satisfies that role is not held by the founder or by any member. It lives with the registry, which vends a transient proof only when the protocol's logic component calls authorize, and the proof is dropped at the end of the call (lib.rs:756-760). So the question becomes: which of logic's methods spends the treasury on somebody's instruction? One does. execute_proposal_payout (lib.rs:1674-1691) calls execute_payout, which binds the frozen winner of a settled proposal, asserts that the winning option is a payout, and transfers to the recipient, currency and amount that were stored in the option people actually voted on (caper_dao.rs:1090-1106). It is once-only. The caller cannot substitute a recipient or an amount, because neither is a parameter — both are read from the settled proposal. The practical answer is that treasury money moves when a vote says so and not otherwise. See proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) , voting (/wiki/governance/voting) and paying someone from a caper's treasury (/wiki/foundations/paying-someone-from-a-caper) .

Can the founder change the fees or the rules? No, on both counts. update_fees is the only method that moves any fee, it is restricted to the protocol admin rather than to a caper's founder (lib.rs:661), and every value it accepts is bounded: the trade fee to [0, 0.1], the collateralization peak to [0, 0.15], the proposal fee to at least the settlement gas budget (lib.rs:2076-2092). A founder has no fee lever of their own to pull. Changing the logic itself runs through governance as an upgrade proposal, which is voted on like any other. The state tier that holds the vaults and the fixed supply is a separate, immutable package underneath it, which is why an upgrade cannot reach the mint role that does not exist.

Can a caper be shut down? No. Across the logic package's public surface there is no dissolve, delete or wind-up method, and none of the executive proposal kinds does it either. A caper has no off switch, so there is no version of this where a founder closes the thing and everyone else discovers the door is locked. The way out is the exit right (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) : any member who has taken part can hand back their vote tokens and governance tokens and take their pro-rata share of the treasury plus their sell-back along the curve, without a proposal and without anyone's approval. The founder holds that right on exactly the same terms as everybody else, and cannot revoke anybody's.

What happens if the founder leaves? Nothing stops. The curve keeps quoting both sides, the treasury keeps paying out what proposals decide, and the exit right keeps working, because none of those paths passes through the founder. A founder who walks away takes whatever has accrued in their two vaults and gives up any further collateralization fee. The caper carries on without them. This is the structural difference from a project where the team is a dependency. There is nothing here that a founder has to keep doing for the mechanism to keep working.

What this does not protect you from The guarantees above are narrow on purpose, and it is worth being exact about their edges. - They say nothing about price. The curve will always quote a sell, but what it quotes depends on where circulation stands. You can exit at a loss. - They say nothing about judgement. A treasury spent badly by a genuine majority vote is spent just as thoroughly as one taken. Governance protects you from theft, not from being outvoted. - They say nothing about what the caper is for. Whether the group does anything worth backing is a question about the people, and no contract answers it. - Governance-settable levers move within their bounds. The fees quoted here are stated as the contract's limits, not as today's settings. Read the current values off the caper itself. What the contracts do settle is the narrower thing: the founder cannot create supply, cannot reach the reserve, cannot spend the treasury without a vote, and cannot stop you leaving. Everything else is ordinary risk, and it stays yours.

Related - Buying into a caper (/wiki/foundations/buying-into-a-caper) — what you get, how the price is set, how to sell. - Leaving a caper: the exit right (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) — the full mechanic and its preconditions. - Starting a personal caper (/wiki/foundations/starting-a-personal-caper) — the same questions from the founder's side. - Bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) — the reserve and the pricing function. - Principal–agent problem (/wiki/economics/principal-agent) — the general form of the problem this page is about. - Token unlocks and vesting schedules (/wiki/economics/token-unlocks-and-vesting) — how the rest of the industry addresses it.