Mechanic Exit right Contract method exit (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs) Approval needed None. No proposal, no ballot on your leaving, no council You hand over Vote tokens (burned) + governance tokens Precondition At least one vote token – so at least one ranked ballot cast; trading alone no longer qualifies Vote tokens Minted by voting – 1 per ranked ballot cast, and nothing on a trade since 11 September 2026 You receive Pro-rata treasury share + curve sell-back Waiting period None on the exit call itself

A caper is a group of people who raise a treasury together and govern it on-chain. The exit right is the part that decides what that membership is actually worth: at any point, a member who has taken part can take their share of the treasury and go, without asking anyone. This page answers what leaving involves, in the order people ask it.

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at any time, and nobody can stop you – provided you have voted in it at least once. Leaving is one transaction against the caper's contract, and it ends in a method named exit. It is not a proposal, so it is not voted on, not scheduled, and not subject to a council or a founder's approval. There is no motion to table and no quorum to reach. The contract checks two things: that the account being paid is yours, and that you hold the tokens you claim to hold. It asserts the receiving account's owner rule first (check_caller), so the payout can only go to an account whose owner signs the exit. It then asserts that your vote-token amount is greater than zero, that your governance-token amount is greater than zero, and that both are that specific caper's own resources rather than some other token. Since the redeploy of 21 September 2026 it also checks where the vote tokens came from. The transaction first calls exit_open, which reads your vote-token balance, and exit then requires the vote tokens handed in to equal the fall in that balance, aborting on Vote tokens must all come from the recipient otherwise. The vote tokens you burn must be your own. Governance tokens are not bound this way, because they transfer: another account that signs the same transaction can supply them. Your holdings and your account's signature are the credential. There is no membership list to be removed from. Those checks are the whole gate, and the vote-token one is the one to plan around. Vote tokens are minted by voting: one for each ranked ballot you cast, and that is the only source a member has. A holder whose position arrived any other way – bought on the curve (/wiki/markets/trading) , swapped into, transferred in – holds none, and the call aborts on Exit requires vote tokens rather than paying out zero. Plan around it: if you intend to redeem a treasury share, cast a ballot while a proposal is open, because there is no way to acquire v after the fact except by voting. Trading minted v until 11 September 2026, when the redeploy removed the trade-side mint so that one transaction could not buy a position and its exit claim together. Where they come from is covered below.

What do I get when I leave? Two separate payouts, and it is worth keeping them apart because they come from different places. - A weighted share of the treasury. Your share of the XRD the caper holds and of any of the caper's own tokens sitting in its treasury, plus a matching share of any other resource you name in the call. Those first two are a floor the contract applies whether you name them or not, because the vote burn is irreversible and an empty list must not cost you the two principal assets. Everything else, including the positions a caper holds in other capers, has to be named: a treasury's deposit surface is public, so walking an on-chain register of resources would let anyone pad the per-exit loop past the cost-unit ceiling and brick redemption for everybody. The exit the site builds for you names the full live set it reads off the Gateway. - The proceeds of selling your governance tokens back to the bonding curve. The contract prices the sale against the curve the way it prices any sale there: the skim comes off and is divided as on any trade, and nothing else does. Its treasury share lands in the treasury after your treasury share has been paid, so you are not paid a slice of your own skim. The sale emits an ordinary sell event on the caper's trade feed. Both legs settle in the same transaction. You do not exit and then separately go and find a buyer. The treasury share travels through the caper's account locker, which deposits it straight into your account; only if your account's deposit rules refuse a resource does that resource wait in the locker for you to claim.

How is my treasury share calculated? By multiplying what you hand in by the vote tokens you have accrued. The expression is called a vote weight in the contract because it is exactly that: the same formula weighs a ranked ballot while you stay and prices your share of the treasury when you go. That identity is the point of the design – you cannot vote with more force than you could walk out the door with. The contract computes: share = (tokens_redeemed × votes_burned) / (vote_supply × tokens_in_circulation) Read plainly: your share rises with how many governance tokens you redeem and with how many vote tokens you burn, measured against the caper's total vote supply and its circulating token supply. Both terms are multiplicative. Holding more tokens increases your share; so does having accumulated more vote tokens, which only voting mints (one per ballot cast). If either is zero the formula returns zero, and the contract rejects the exit before it gets that far. The function is compute_vote_weight in contracts/common/src/lib.rs, and the logic tier calls it in three places, all in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs: exit() prices the redemption, fold_ballot_batch weighs each ballot as the crystallize crank folds it, and vote() computes the preview shown at the cast. exit() was the sole caller for three days only – the 26–28 August 2026 interregnum, when the deployed logic component carried no vote method at all – and the 29 August reinstatement brought the other two back with the ballot. Because the numerator reads the buckets you actually hand in, redeeming part of a position redeems that part's share – there is no all-or-nothing exit. See vote tokens (/wiki/governance/voting) for where the v term comes from. Does it matter when I leave? Yes, and this page would be misleading if it left it out. The shares do not add up to one hundred per cent. Both denominators – the caper's vote supply and its circulating supply – are read live at the instant exit runs, and every exit before yours has already burned vote tokens and retired governance tokens out of them. So two members holding identical positions do not take identical shares. Take a caper whose entire vote supply and entire circulation sit with two members in equal halves: the formula gives each of them a quarter. The first to leave redeems that quarter. The second is then measured against a supply that is only their own, so their weight is one, and they redeem all of the three quarters still there. This is a property of the design rather than a fault in it. Nothing is stranded, the treasury cannot be over-drawn, and no member takes more than the weight they can prove. But a member deciding when to go should know that leaving first is the expensive option, and that the incentive runs the other way from the panic a redemption right is usually feared to cause. It is also the sharpest difference from the rage quit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) this right descends from, where a flat pro-rata slice of the treasury makes the order of departure worth nothing at all.

Where do vote tokens come from? From one place: casting a ranked ballot. A caper's vote token is created with no initial supply and minting it is gated to the caper's own admin badge, and the only member-facing path to that mint is vote, which banks the 100 XRD vote fee, appends the ballot and mints the caster one whole token in a single call. The admin badge keeps a second path, mint_vote_to, restricted to the admin role rather than offered to members. Trading minted it too until 11 September 2026, on every buy and every sell, at a flat rate the logic component held as vote_rate. The genesis redeploy of that date removed the trade-side mint and the field with it, so the deployed component's state now carries vote_fee, proposal_fee, proposal_fee_rate, collateralization_peak and the three windows, and no rate for v at all. The reason was that a buy minted its v in the same transaction that opened the position, so one transaction could acquire a stake, mint the record that prices the exit, and redeem on both – an exit right with a purchase price. The token cannot be sent, airdropped, or bought off the account that minted it – its depositor role is locked to the caper's own component, which is what “soulbound” means here in practice. The resource's own on-ledger description says as much: soulbound stake token … drives exit redemption. Two consequences follow, and neither is visible from the payout formula alone. - A holder who has never voted cannot exit at all. Not “exits for nothing” – the call aborts on Exit requires vote tokens before any share is computed. A position bought on the curve, swapped into, transferred in, or brought through migration (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) can still be sold back to the curve; only the treasury share is out of reach, and only a cast ballot opens it. There is no way to acquire v retrospectively, so a holder who intends to redeem should vote while a proposal is open rather than at the moment they want to leave. - The mint is lenient, and can be forfeited. An account with a strict deposit rule that has not whitelisted v refuses the deposit; the contract burns the refused mint rather than aborting the call that carried it. The ballot still counts, the accrual is lost, and there is no retry call – whitelist the resource before casting. The token has been paid for one thing or another at four different points, which is why third-party descriptions of it disagree. The pre-26-August design paid only for casting a ballot; for three days from 26 August it paid only for trading; from 29 August it paid for both at one rate; and since 11 September it pays only for the ballot again – this time because trade-side minting made the exit right purchasable, not because trading was thought unworthy. See vote tokens (/wiki/governance/voting) for the fuller account, and the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) for the short version.

What happens to my vote tokens? They are burned. The contract pays your treasury share first, then destroys the vote tokens you handed over, then runs the sell leg. Vote tokens are soulbound, so they were never transferable in the first place; burning them on exit is what stops a departing member's accumulated governance weight from outliving their stake in the caper. This is also why the treasury share is computed before the burn rather than after. The weight you leave with is the weight you had.

Is there a lock-up or a waiting period? No. The contract's exit path contains no epoch check, no notice period and no vesting gate. There is nothing in it that defers your payout to a later block, and nothing another member can do to delay it. Voting adds no qualification either, which was not always true. The retired escrow design required staking governance tokens into a ballot box, and a cast locked that stake until the proposal's ballots were released – so a voter's tokens were not in their account to hand to exit. The deployed vote is a plain wallet transaction with no escrow at all: your tokens stay liquid and stay yours the whole time. What keeps a voter honest instead is the crystallize crank's min-clamp, which credits each ballot min(held at cast, balance now) – selling down after casting shrinks the weight of the ballot you already cast, rather than being forbidden. Exiting mid-vote is therefore allowed and simply costs you the weight. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for how casting and crystallization work. This matters more than it sounds. A great many DAO exit provisions are real on paper and unreachable in practice, because the exit itself has to be approved by the people it inconveniences, or because it runs through a multisig that can simply not sign. An exit that somebody has to authorise is a request. See how DAOs fail (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) for the shapes that recur.

How does this compare to a DAO rage quit? The lineage is Moloch's rage quit, and the difference is what the right is attached to. A rage quit is usually scoped to a specific proposal and a specific window: you may leave because you object to something that just passed, during the grace period before it executes. Outside that window, there is nothing to exercise. In a caper the exit is not attached to a proposal at all. It is a standing property of holding the tokens, available on any day, whether or not anything is being voted on and whether or not you object to it. There is no window to miss. The essay The Exit Right (/blog/the-exit-right) works through why that difference changes how the rest of the governance behaves.

What if I want to reduce my stake without leaving? Selling governance tokens on the curve is a separate operation from exiting, and it does not burn your vote tokens or touch your treasury claim. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) . Exiting is the operation that settles everything at once and ends the membership.

Related - What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) – the object this right belongs to - Getting started (/wiki/foundations/getting-started) – joining, the cashtag fee ladder, and what a caper costs to start - Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) – the other half of the same weight formula - FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) – shorter answers, including divestment and upgrades

Action Exit: hand in your tokens and your vote tokens, leave with your share of the treasury Approval needed None – no proposal, no ballot, no council Who can exit A member holding vote tokens of their own, which only voting earns You hand in Your caper tokens (sold back to the curve) and your vote tokens (burned) You receive Your fair share of the treasury, plus the curve's price for your tokens less the skim Waiting period None Contract exit in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs Related Trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) , Rage quit and exit rights (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights)

Leaving a caper means using its exit right: a member who has voted hands in their tokens and their vote tokens, and receives their fair share of the caper's treasury plus the curve's price for the tokens, in one transaction nobody has to approve. A caper is a group of people who raise a treasury together and govern it on Radix, and the exit right decides what a stake in one is worth. This page answers what leaving involves, in the order people ask it.

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at any time, once you have voted in it at least once. Leaving is one transaction you sign from your own wallet. It is not a proposal, so nobody votes on it, schedules it or approves it, and no founder or council can block it. The contract checks three things: that the account receiving the payout signs the exit; that what you hand in is the caper's own token and its own vote token, not some other resource; and, since the redeploy of 21 September 2026, that the vote tokens come out of your own account. Caper tokens can come from another account that signs the same transaction, because they transfer; vote tokens cannot. There is no membership list to be removed from: your holdings and your signature are the credential. Read exit_open and exit in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs.

Why can't I exit without voting? Because the exit needs vote tokens, and casting a ballot is the only way a member earns them. A position bought on the curve (/wiki/markets/trading) , swapped into, transferred in or brought over by migration (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) carries none, and the exit is refused with "Exit requires vote tokens" rather than paying out nothing. The curve still buys those tokens back at any time; only the treasury share waits on a ballot. Vote tokens cannot be earned after the fact, so a holder who means to redeem a share should vote while a proposal is open, not at the moment they want to leave. Trading earned vote tokens too until the redeploy of 11 September 2026, which removed it so that one purchase could not buy a stake and a claim on the treasury at once.

What do I get when I leave? Two payouts from two places, settled in the same transaction: - Your share of the treasury. The exit always pays your share of the caper's $XRD and of its own tokens held in the treasury, and the same share of any other asset you name, including positions the caper holds in other capers. The exit the site builds for you names every asset the treasury holds. Other assets have to be named because anyone can deposit into a treasury, and an exit that walked every deposit could be made too costly to run for everyone. - The curve's price for your tokens. The tokens you hand in are sold back to the caper's bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) like any other sale, and the skim comes off as on any trade. The treasury's part of that skim lands after your share is paid, so you are never paid a slice of your own skim. The sale shows on the caper's trade feed as an ordinary sell. Your treasury share goes straight into your account. If your account's deposit rules refuse an asset, that asset waits in the caper's account locker for you to claim. Read exit_apply in contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs and exit in contracts/core/src/dao_treasury.rs.

How big is my share? It grows with the tokens you hand in and with the vote tokens you have earned, each measured against the caper's whole supply. Your exit share and your vote weight are the same measure: a ballot carries the weight of what its caster could take out of the treasury, so no member can vote with more force than they could leave with. Handing in part of a position redeems that part's share; there is no all-or-nothing exit. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for how the weight decides a ballot. Does it matter when I leave? Yes. Each exit is measured against the supply still outstanding when it runs, and every earlier exit has already retired its tokens and vote tokens from that supply. Two members with identical positions therefore take different amounts, and the one who leaves later takes more. Nothing is stranded and the treasury cannot be overdrawn, but the incentive is to stay rather than to be first out. A rage quit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) , which this right descends from, pays a flat slice, so there the order of departure makes no difference.

Where do vote tokens come from? From casting a ranked ballot, one per account per proposal. The ballot pays the caper's vote fee into its treasury and mints the caster's vote tokens in the same call. The caper's admin role can also mint them; members cannot call that path. Vote tokens are soulbound: only the caper's own component can deposit them into an account, so they cannot be sent, airdropped or bought. If your account's deposit rules refuse the vote token, the ballot still counts and its vote tokens are lost, with no second chance to claim them. Allow the resource before casting. What earns vote tokens changed several times in August and September 2026, which is why older third-party descriptions disagree; since 11 September only ballots have earned them. Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) has the fuller account.

What happens to my vote tokens? They are burned, after your treasury share is paid and before the sale runs. Your share is priced on the weight you held, and none of that weight outlives your stake.

Is there a lock-up or a waiting period? No. Nothing in the exit checks a date, a notice period or a vesting schedule, and no other member can delay it. Voting locks nothing either. A ballot is a plain wallet transaction and your tokens stay in your account. Tokens you sell or hand in after casting stop counting toward that ballot, so exiting while a vote is open is allowed and shrinks the weight of the ballot you cast. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for how ballots are counted. Many DAO exit provisions exist on paper and cannot be reached in practice, because the people the exit inconveniences have to approve it, or because it runs through a multisig that can decline to sign. See how DAOs fail (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) for the shapes that recur.

How does this compare to a DAO rage quit? The lineage is Moloch's rage quit, and the difference is what the right is attached to. A rage quit is usually tied to a specific proposal and window: you may leave because you object to something that just passed, during the grace period before it executes. Outside that window there is nothing to exercise. A caper's exit is not attached to a proposal. It is available on any day, whether or not anything is being voted on and whether or not you object to it. The essay The Exit Right (/blog/the-exit-right) works through how that changes the rest of a caper's governance.

What if I want to reduce my stake without leaving? Sell tokens on the curve. A sale is separate from an exit: it does not burn your vote tokens or touch your treasury claim. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) . The exit settles everything at once and ends the membership.

Related - What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) – the organization this right belongs to - Getting started (/wiki/foundations/getting-started) – joining and starting a caper - Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) – how ballots earn and use the same weight - FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) – shorter answers, including divestment and upgrades

Where do vote tokens come from… the exit, and redeem on both —– an exit right with a purchase…ff the account that minted it —– its depositor role is locked … all. Not “exits for nothing” —– the call aborts on Exit requi…ays only for the ballot again —– this time because trade-side …p/faq) for the short version.

Related - What is a caper (/…foundations/what-is-a-caper) —– the object this right belongs…foundations/getting-started) —– joining, the cashtag fee ladd…ng (/wiki/governance/voting) —– the other half of the same we…ula - FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) —– shorter answers, including divestment and upgrades

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at …ere the vote tokens came from.The transaction first calls ex…ey come from is covered below.

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at … and no quorum to reach. The conly thingtract checks two things: that the accountract checks is being paid is yours, and that you hold the tokens you claim to hold. It asserts the receiving account's owner rule first (check_caller), so the payout can only go to an account whose owner signs the exit. It then asserts that your vote-token amount is…an supply them. Your holdings and your account's signature are the credential. There is n…ey come from is covered below.

What do I get when I leave? T…eparately go and find a buyer. The treasury share travels through the caper's account locker, which deposits it straight into your account; only if your account's deposit rules refuse a resource does that resource wait in the locker for you to claim.

What do I get when I leave? T…it prices any sale there: the founder's skim comes off, and there is no trade fee and is divided as on any trade, and nothing else does. Its treasury share lands in the treasury after your treasury share has been paid, so you are not paid a slice of your own skim. The sale emits an ordinary s…eparately go and find a buyer.

Where do vote tokens come from… component's state now carries trade_fee, vote_fee, proposal_fee, propo…p/faq) for the short version.

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at … stop you – provided you have taken parvoted in it at least once, by trading the caper's token or by voting in it. Leaving is a single method call on the caper's contract,. Leaving is one transaction against the caper's contract, and it ends in a method named exit. It is not a propo… rather than some other token. Since the redeploy of 21 September 2026 it also checks where the vote tokens came from. The transaction first calls exit_open, which reads your vote-token balance, and exit then requires the vote tokens handed in to equal the fall in that balance, aborting on Vote tokens must all come from the recipient otherwise. The vote tokens you burn must be your own. Governance tokens are not bound this way, because they transfer: another account that signs the same transaction can supply them. Your holdings are the credent…st to be removed from. Those two assertionchecks are the whole gate, and the firstvote-token one is the one to plan around. Vo…ey come from is covered below.

What do I get when I leave? T…es the sale against the curve and takes the caper's standard trade fee, the same fee any sale on that curve paysthe way it prices any sale there: the founder's skim comes off, and there is no trade fee. The sale emits an ordinary s…eparately go and find a buyer.

What is different about the $XRD caper? One caper is a special case. $XRD has no bonding curve, so it has no sell leg: exiting it pays the treasury share and returns your governance tokens to you untouched, rather than selling them. Everything else about the exit is identical. The reason is that its members hold native XRD, whose total supply cannot be read on-ledger at all: Radix creates XRD with supply tracking switched off, so the resource's total_supply() is empty on every network. The contract therefore substitutes a fixed 24 billion — the 12bn minted at genesis plus the roughly 12bn released as emissions over about forty years — for the circulating-supply term. The invariant that constant has to satisfy is that it never understates what members hold between them, which is what keeps the sum of every member's share inside the treasury; erring high only makes exits conservative. It cannot distort governance either, because the same term cancels out of the ratio a proposal is settled on.

How is my treasury share calcu…cumulated more vote tokens, whether by trading or by votingich only voting mints (one per ballot cast). If either is zero the formul…eparture worth nothing at all.

Where do vote tokens come from? From twoone places, and both are ways of taking par: casting a ranked ballot. A caper's vote token is created with no initial supply, and minting it is gated to the caper's own admin badge. Trading mints it on every buy and every sell, at a flat 0.01 per XRD of gross trad, and the only member-facing path to that mint is vote, which banks the 100 XRD vote fee, appends the vbalue – a rate held on the platform's logic component as vote_rate, readable on-ledger rather than taken on trust. Votlot and mints the caster one whole token in a single call. The admin badge keeps a second path, mint_vote_to, restricted to the admin role rather than offered to members. Trading mintsed it too, and at the very same rate: casting a ranked ballot costs a flat 100 XRD vote fee, and the contract mints vot until 11 September 2026, on every buy and every sell, at a flat rate the logic component held as vote_rate. The genesis redeploy of that date removed the trade-side mint and the field with it, so the deployed component's state now carries trade_fee ×, vote_rate – one whole vote token per ballot. Neither surface is privileged over the other. Both directions earn it symmetrically: a buy on the XRD you paid before the fee and the founder skim, a sell on the XRD the curve paid out before the fee. A swap earns on both of its legs. It is fractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, because a per-XRD rate cannot mint whole units), and itfee, proposal_fee, proposal_fee_rate, collateralization_peak and the three windows, and no rate for v at all. The reason was that a buy minted its v in the same transaction that opened the position, so one transaction could acquire a stake, mint the record that prices the exit, and redeem on both — an exit right with a purchase price. The token cannot be sent, airdropped, o…n … drives exit redemption. Threewo consequences follow, and noneeither is visible from the payout fo… alone. - A holder who has neither traded nover voted cannot exit at all. No…before any share is computed. Tokens that reached an account by transfer or byA position bought on the curve, swapped into, transferred in, or brought through migration (/wiki/markets/rai…ry share is out of reach, and either a trade or a ballot opens it. - Three trades mint nothing, and all three are the protocol trading rather than a member: a passed INVEST (/wiki/governance/proposals) buying a target caper's token, a passed DIVEST selling one, and the sell leg inside exit() itself. Minting fresh v to somebody on their way out would be perverse, and a treasury is not a memberonly a cast ballot opens it. There is no way to acquire v retrospectively, so a holder who intends to redeem should vote while a proposal is open rather than at the moment they want to leave. - The mint is lenient, and …mint rather than aborting the tradecall that carried it. The trade settleballot still counts, the accrual is lost, and th…call – whitelist the resource and trade agabefore casting. The token has been paid for one thing or the another at four different points, which is why third-party descriptions of it disagree. The pre-26-August design paid it only for casting a ballot, which made the exit a reward for governing; for three days from 26 August it paid only for trading, which made the exit a reward for having been the market. The deployed design pays for both, at on; from 29 August it paid for both at one rate; and since 11 September it pays only for the ballot again — this time because trate, so the exit belongs to anyone who has done eitherde-side minting made the exit right purchasable, not because trading was thought unworthy. See vote tokens (/wiki/gove…p/faq) for the short version.

Mechanic Exit right Contract … vote token – so at least one trade, or at least one ballot castnked ballot cast; trading alone no longer qualifies Vote tokens Minted by takvoting part – 1 per ranked ballot cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value on buys and sells alikenothing on a trade since 11 September 2026 You receive Pro-rata treasur…d None on the exit call itself

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at …nd. Vote tokens are minted by taking partvoting: one for each ranked ballot you cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value for trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , on buys and sells alikethat is the only source a member has. A holder whose position arrived someany other way – a transfer in, never traded, never votedbought on the curve (/wiki/markets/trading) , swapped into, transferred in – holds none, and the call ab… rather than paying out zero. Between 26 and 28 August 2026 the ballot half was briefly gone, and trading was the only source; voting was reinstated on 29 August (/wiki/governance/voting) and mints at the same rate it always didPlan around it: if you intend to redeem a treasury share, cast a ballot while a proposal is open, because there is no way to acquire v after the fact except by voting. Trading minted v until 11 September 2026, when the redeploy removed the trade-side mint so that one transaction could not buy a position and its exit claim together. Where they come from is covered below.

How is my treasury share calcu… tier calls it in three places: exit() prices the redemptio, all in (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:2363) exit() prices the redemption, fold_ballot_batch weighs eac…the crystallize crank folds it (:402), and vote() computes the preview shown at the cast (:1707). exit() was the sole caller f…r where the v term comes from. Does it matter when I leave? Yes, and this page would be misleading if it left it out. The shares do not add up to one hundred per cent. Both denominators – the caper's vote supply and its circulating supply – are read live at the instant exit runs, and every exit before yours has already burned vote tokens and retired governance tokens out of them. So two members holding identical positions do not take identical shares. Take a caper whose entire vote supply and entire circulation sit with two members in equal halves: the formula gives each of them a quarter. The first to leave redeems that quarter. The second is then measured against a supply that is only their own, so their weight is one, and they redeem all of the three quarters still there. This is a property of the design rather than a fault in it. Nothing is stranded, the treasury cannot be over-drawn, and no member takes more than the weight they can prove. But a member deciding when to go should know that leaving first is the expensive option, and that the incentive runs the other way from the panic a redemption right is usually feared to cause. It is also the sharpest difference from the rage quit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) this right descends from, where a flat pro-rata slice of the treasury makes the order of departure worth nothing at all.

What do I get when I leave? T…e from different places. - A pro-rataweighted share of the treasury. Your s…eparately go and find a buyer.

How is my treasury share calcu…nd the logic tier calls it in exactly one place: exit()three places: exit() prices the redemption (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:2363), fold_ballot_batch weighs each ballot as the crystallize crank folds it (:402), and vote() computes the preview shown at the cast (:1707). exit() was the sole caller for three days only – the 26–28 August 2026 interregnum, when the deployed logic component carried no vote method at all – and the 29 August reinstatement brought the other two back with the ballot. Because the numerator reads …r where the v term comes from.

Where do vote tokens come from…whole units), and it cannot be bought, sent or, airdropped, or bought off the account that minted it — its depositor role is locke…p/faq) for the short version.

Mechanic Exit right Contract … token – so at least one trade through the protocol, or at least one ballot cast Vote tokens Minted by tradaking –part – 1 per ranked ballot cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value, on buys and sells alike You …d None on the exit call itself

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at …stop you – provided you have tradedaken part at least once, by trading the caper's token at least onceor by voting in it. Leaving is a single method c…nd. Vote tokens are minted by taking part: one for each ranked ballot you cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value for trading (/wiki/markets/trading) – 0.01 per XRD of gross value, on buys and sells alike – so a. A holder whose position arrived some other way – a transfer in, never traded, never voted – holds none, and the call abor… rather than paying out zero. Until August 2026 they were minted for casting a ballot instead; the ballots are gone and the token stayeBetween 26 and 28 August 2026 the ballot half was briefly gone, and trading was the only source; voting was reinstated on 29 August (/wiki/governance/voting) and mints at the same rate it always did. Where they come from now is covered below.

How is my treasury share calcu…ltiplying what you hand in by whatthe vote tokens you have tradaccrued. The expression is still called a vote weight in the contract, because it is the one the retired ballot system used to weigh a vote; since August 2026 it has exactly one job, and this is exactly that: the same formula weighs a ranked ballot while you stay and prices your share of the treasury when you go. That identity is the point of the design – you cannot vote with more force than you could walk out the door with. The contract computes: sha…g accumulated more vote tokens, whether by trading or by voting. If either is zero the formul…r where the v term comes from.

Where do vote tokens come from? From trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , and from nowhere elsetwo places, and both are ways of taking part. A caper's vote token is crea…to the caper's own admin badge; the contract. Trading mints it on every buy and eve…er rather than taken on trust. Voting mints it too, and at the very same rate: casting a ranked ballot costs a flat 100 XRD vote fee, and the contract mints vote_fee × vote_rate – one whole vote token per ballot. Neither surface is privileged over the other. Both directions earn it symme… alone. - A holder who has nevither traded nor voted cannot exit at all. Not “exits…treasury share is out of reach until that holder trades, and either a trade or a ballot opens it. - Three trades mint nothing…esource and trade again. The oldertoken has been paid for one thing or the other at different points. The pre-26-August design paid vit only for casting a ballot, which m…he exit a reward for governing. The deployed one pays it; for three days from 26 August it paid only for trading, which makesde the exit a reward for having been the market. The deployed design pays for both, at one rate, so the exit belongs to anyone who has done either. See vote tokens (/wiki/gover…oting) for the fuller account of the change, and the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) for the short version.

Is there a lock-up or a waitin…r member can do to delay it. There is one qualification, and it belongs to voting rather than to leaving. Casting a ballotVoting adds no qualification either, which was not always true. The retired escrow design requiresd staking governance tokens into the caper'sa ballot box, and a cast refcount-locksed that stake: the contract refuses an unstake while any ballot it backs is unreleased, on Stake locked while a cast b until the proposal's ballots were released – so a voter's tokens were not in their account to hand to exit. The deployed vote is a plain walloet awaits release. Staked tokens are therefore not in your account to hand to exit until that proposal's ballots are released, which anyone can do once voting closes. Tokens you never staked are untouched throughout, and the exit call itself still waits for nothingtransaction with no escrow at all: your tokens stay liquid and stay yours the whole time. What keeps a voter honest instead is the crystallize crank's min-clamp, which credits each ballot min(held at cast, balance now) – selling down after casting shrinks the weight of the ballot you already cast, rather than being forbidden. Exiting mid-vote is therefore allowed and simply costs you the weight. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for how castaking and releasecrystallization work. This matters more than…l) for the shapes that recur.

Mechanic Exit right Contract … vote token – so at least one ballot cast and released Stake lock Tokens staked behind an unreleased ballot cannot be unstaked, so cannot be exitedtrade through the protocol Vote tokens Minted by trading – 0.01 per XRD of gross value, on buys and sells alike You receive Pro-rata treasur…d None on the exit call itself

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at …obody can stop you – provided a ballot you cast has been releasedyou have traded the caper's token at least once. Leaving is a single method c…round. Vote tokens are minted only by voting, and since the ballot-era upgrade of 16 August 2026 (/wiki/governance/execution) they are minted at release rather than at cast. A holder who has never cast a ballot holds none; a holder whose only ballot is still waiting to be released holds none yet. Bothby trading (/wiki/markets/trading) – 0.01 per XRD of gross value, on buys and sells alike – so a holder whose position arrived some other way holds none, and the call aborts on Exit requires vote tokens rather than paying out zero. Where vote tokensUntil August 2026 they were minted for casting a ballot instead; the ballots are gone and the token stayed. Where they come from now is covered below.

How is my treasury share calculated? By the same formula that decides how much your vote counts. Caper does not run one arithmetic for governance and a different one for money, which is the whole point of the design: the number that gives you influence is the number that gives you your sharemultiplying what you hand in by what you have traded. The expression is still called a vote weight in the contract, because it is the one the retired ballot system used to weigh a vote; since August 2026 it has exactly one job, and this is it. The contract computes: sha…before it gets that far. The same function is used when you cast a vote, though the two calls feed it different bacompute_vote_weight in contracts/common/src/lib.rs, and the logic tier calls it in exactly one plances: a ballot weighs the governance toexit(). Because the numerator reads the buckents you have staked in the caper's ballot box, while an exit weighs the ones you hand over in the call itself. See how voting workactually hand in, redeeming part of a position redeems that part's share – there is no all-or-nothing exit. See vote tokens (/wiki/governance/voting) for the governance side of itwhere the v term comes from.

Where do vote tokens come from? From voting, and effectively trading (/wiki/markets/trading) , and from nowhere else. A caper's …created with no initial supply at all, and minting it is gated to the caper's own admin badge; it is issuethe contract mints it on every buy and every sell, at a flat 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value – a rate held one token per accepted ballot, at release rather than at cast – strictly after the last ballot on a proposal has landed, which is what keeps every voter's reading of the vote supply consistent across one electorate. The token is indivisible (DIVISIBILITY_NONE, so there is no fraction of a votehe platform's logic component as vote_rate, readable on-ledger rather than taken on trust. Both directions earn it symmetrically: a buy on the XRD you paid before the fee and the founder skim, a sell on the XRD the curve paid out before the fee. A swap earns on both of its legs. It is fractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, because a per-XRD rate cannot mint whole units), and it cannot be bought, se…ption says as much: soulbound proof-of-votstake token … drives exit redemption. Twohree consequences follow, and neitherone is visible from the payout fo…ne. - A holder who has never vottraded cannot exit at all. Not “ex…before any share is computed. Buying in does not by itselfTokens that reached an account by transfer or buy a claim on the treasury; taking part does. A holder whose first ballot has been cast but not yet released is in the same position until it is, because the token that ballot earns does not exist before then. If the release skipped the mint because the account was refusing deposits, claim_vote_mint is the retry. - Your first ballot carries zero weight. A cast reads your vote-token balance before the token that ballot earns you exists, so on a first vote that term is zero and the weight is zero. Deferring every mint to release is what makes that true by construction rather than by ordering luck. The first vote is what buys you into the participation factor rather than what exercises it. This is the design rather than a rough edge: the treasury pays out to the people who decided what it was for migration (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) can still be sold back to the curve; only the treasury share is out of reach until that holder trades. - Three trades mint nothing, and all three are the protocol trading rather than a member: a passed INVEST (/wiki/governance/proposals) buying a target caper's token, a passed DIVEST selling one, and the sell leg inside exit() itself. Minting fresh v to somebody on their way out would be perverse, and a treasury is not a member. - The mint is lenient, and can be forfeited. An account with a strict deposit rule that has not whitelisted v refuses the deposit; the contract burns the refused mint rather than aborting the trade that carried it. The trade settles, the accrual is lost, and there is no retry call – whitelist the resource and trade again. The older design paid v for casting a ballot, which made the exit a reward for governing. The deployed one pays it for trading, which makes the exit a reward for having been the market. See votinge tokens (/wiki/governance/voting) for the ballot sidfuller account of the change, and the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) for the short version.

Mechanic Exit right Contract …ition At least one vote token —– so at least one ballot cast and released Stake lock Tokens staked behind an unreleased ballot cannot be unstaked, so cannot be exited You receive Pro-rata treasur…ell-back Waiting period None ion the contractexit call itself

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at …time, and nobody can stop you —– provided you have voted at least oncea ballot you cast has been released. Leaving is a single method c…ns are minted only by voting, so aand since the ballot-era upgrade of 16 August 2026 (/wiki/governance/execution) they are minted at release rather than at cast. A holder who has never cast a ballot holds none,; and the call holder whose only ballot is still waiting to be released holds none yet. Both aborts on Exit requires vote tokens …ns come from is covered below.

What do I get when I leave? T…are of the XRD the caper holds, plus a matching share of any other resources in the treasury and of any of the caper's own tokens sitting in its treasury, plus a matching share of any other resource you name in the call. Those first two are a floor the contract applies whether you name wthen you exit. Members whosem or not, because the vote burn is irreversible and an empty list must not cost you the two principal assets. Everything else, including the positions a caper haolds invested in other assets get those too, not only the XRD other capers, has to be named: a treasury's deposit surface is public, so walking an on-chain register of resources would let anyone pad the per-exit loop past the cost-unit ceiling and brick redemption for everybody. The exit the site builds for you names the full live set it reads off the Gateway. - The proceeds of selling y…eparately go and find a buyer.

How is my treasury share calcu…n is used when you cast a vote, though the two calls feed it different balances: a ballot weighs the governance tokens you have staked in the caper's ballot box, while an exit weighs the ones you hand over in the call itself. See how voting works (/wiki…for the governance side of it.

Where do vote tokens come from…d to the caper's admin badge; the single call to that mint inside the protocol rides in the vote path, issuing exactit is issued one token per accepted ballot, at release rather than at cast – strictly after the last ballot on a proposal has landed, which is what keeps every voter's reading of the vote supply cone token per accepted ballotsistent across one electorate. The token is indivisible (DI…he treasury; taking part does. A holder whose first ballot has been cast but not yet released is in the same position until it is, because the token that ballot earns does not exist before then. If the release skipped the mint because the account was refusing deposits, claim_vote_mint is the retry. - Your first ballot carries zero weight. The contract snapshotA cast reads your vote-token balance before minting the token that ballot earns you exists, so on a first vote that term…s zero and the weight is zero. Deferring every mint to release is what makes that true by construction rather than by ordering luck. The first vote is what buys y…p/faq) for the short version.

Is there a lock-up or a waitin…r member can do to delay it. There is one qualification, and it belongs to voting rather than to leaving. Casting a ballot requires staking governance tokens into the caper's ballot box, and a cast refcount-locks that stake: the contract refuses an unstake while any ballot it backs is unreleased, on Stake locked while a cast ballot awaits release. Staked tokens are therefore not in your account to hand to exit until that proposal's ballots are released, which anyone can do once voting closes. Tokens you never staked are untouched throughout, and the exit call itself still waits for nothing. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for how staking and release work. This matters more than it soun…l) for the shapes that recur.

Mechanic Exit right Contract … needed None. No proposal, no voteballot on your leaving, no council You hand over Vo…(burned) + governance tokens Precondition At least one vote token — so at least one ballot cast You receive Pro-rata treasury …ng period None in the contract

A caper is a group of people w…worth: at any point, a member who has taken part can take their share of the tr…s, in the order people ask it.

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at … time, and nobody can stop you — provided you have voted at least once. Leaving is a single method c…rship list to be removed from. Those two assertions are the whole gate, and the first is the one to plan around. Vote tokens are minted only by voting, so a holder who has never cast a ballot holds none, and the call aborts on Exit requires vote tokens rather than paying out zero. Where vote tokens come from is covered below.

What is different about the $X…annot be read on-ledger at all.: Radix creates XRD without supply tracking, so the contract substitutes a fixed constant for the circulating-supply term. Erring high there only makes exits conservative, which keeps the sum of every member's share inside the treasury switched off, so the resource's total_supply() is empty on every network. The contract therefore substitutes a fixed 24 billion — the 12bn minted at genesis plus the roughly 12bn released as emissions over about forty years — for the circulating-supply term. The invariant that constant has to satisfy is that it never understates what members hold between them, which is what keeps the sum of every member's share inside the treasury; erring high only makes exits conservative. It cannot distort governance either, because the same term cancels out of the ratio a proposal is settled on.

Where do vote tokens come from? From voting, and effectively from nowhere else. A caper's vote token is created with no initial supply at all, and minting it is gated to the caper's admin badge; the single call to that mint inside the protocol rides in the vote path, issuing exactly one token per accepted ballot. The token is indivisible (DIVISIBILITY_NONE, so there is no fraction of a vote), and it cannot be bought, sent or airdropped — its depositor role is locked to the caper's own component, which is what “soulbound” means here in practice. The resource's own on-ledger description says as much: soulbound proof-of-vote token … drives exit redemption. Two consequences follow, and neither is visible from the payout formula alone. - A holder who has never voted cannot exit at all. Not “exits for nothing” — the call aborts on Exit requires vote tokens before any share is computed. Buying in does not by itself buy a claim on the treasury; taking part does. - Your first ballot carries zero weight. The contract snapshots your vote-token balance before minting the token that ballot earns you, so on a first vote that term is zero and the weight is zero. The first vote is what buys you into the participation factor rather than what exercises it. This is the design rather than a rough edge: the treasury pays out to the people who decided what it was for. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for the ballot side, and the FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) for the short version.

Mechanic Exit right Contract method exit (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs) Approval needed None. No proposal, no vote, no council You hand over Vote tokens (burned) + governance tokens You receive Pro-rata treasury share + curve sell-back Waiting period None in the contract

A caper is a group of people who raise a treasury together and govern it on-chain. The exit right is the part that decides what that membership is actually worth: at any point, a member can take their share of the treasury and go, without asking anyone. This page answers what leaving involves, in the order people ask it.

Can I leave a caper? Yes, at any time, and nobody can stop you. Leaving is a single method call on the caper's contract, named exit. It is not a proposal, so it is not voted on, not scheduled, and not subject to a council or a founder's approval. There is no motion to table and no quorum to reach. The only thing the contract checks is that you hold the tokens you claim to hold. It asserts that your vote-token amount is greater than zero, that your governance-token amount is greater than zero, and that both are that specific caper's own resources rather than some other token. Your holdings are the credential. There is no membership list to be removed from.

What do I get when I leave? Two separate payouts, and it is worth keeping them apart because they come from different places. - A pro-rata share of the treasury. Your share of the XRD the caper holds, plus a matching share of any other resources in the treasury you name when you exit. Members whose caper has invested in other assets get those too, not only the XRD. - The proceeds of selling your governance tokens back to the bonding curve. The contract prices the sale against the curve and takes the caper's standard trade fee, the same fee any sale on that curve pays. The sale emits an ordinary sell event on the caper's trade feed. Both legs settle in the same transaction. You do not exit and then separately go and find a buyer.

How is my treasury share calculated? By the same formula that decides how much your vote counts. Caper does not run one arithmetic for governance and a different one for money, which is the whole point of the design: the number that gives you influence is the number that gives you your share. The contract computes: share = (tokens_redeemed × votes_burned) / (vote_supply × tokens_in_circulation) Read plainly: your share rises with how many governance tokens you redeem and with how many vote tokens you burn, measured against the caper's total vote supply and its circulating token supply. Both terms are multiplicative. Holding more tokens increases your share; so does having accumulated more vote tokens. If either is zero the formula returns zero, and the contract rejects the exit before it gets that far. The same function is used when you cast a vote. See how voting works (/wiki/governance/voting) for the governance side of it.

What happens to my vote tokens? They are burned. The contract pays your treasury share first, then destroys the vote tokens you handed over, then runs the sell leg. Vote tokens are soulbound, so they were never transferable in the first place; burning them on exit is what stops a departing member's accumulated governance weight from outliving their stake in the caper. This is also why the treasury share is computed before the burn rather than after. The weight you leave with is the weight you had.

Is there a lock-up or a waiting period? No. The contract's exit path contains no epoch check, no notice period and no vesting gate. There is nothing in it that defers your payout to a later block, and nothing another member can do to delay it. This matters more than it sounds. A great many DAO exit provisions are real on paper and unreachable in practice, because the exit itself has to be approved by the people it inconveniences, or because it runs through a multisig that can simply not sign. An exit that somebody has to authorise is a request. See how DAOs fail (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) for the shapes that recur.

What is different about the $XRD caper? One caper is a special case. $XRD has no bonding curve, so it has no sell leg: exiting it pays the treasury share and returns your governance tokens to you untouched, rather than selling them. Everything else about the exit is identical. The reason is that its members hold native XRD, whose total supply cannot be read on-ledger at all. Radix creates XRD without supply tracking, so the contract substitutes a fixed constant for the circulating-supply term. Erring high there only makes exits conservative, which keeps the sum of every member's share inside the treasury.

How does this compare to a DAO rage quit? The lineage is Moloch's rage quit, and the difference is what the right is attached to. A rage quit is usually scoped to a specific proposal and a specific window: you may leave because you object to something that just passed, during the grace period before it executes. Outside that window, there is nothing to exercise. In a caper the exit is not attached to a proposal at all. It is a standing property of holding the tokens, available on any day, whether or not anything is being voted on and whether or not you object to it. There is no window to miss. The essay The Exit Right (/blog/the-exit-right) works through why that difference changes how the rest of the governance behaves.

What if I want to reduce my stake without leaving? Selling governance tokens on the curve is a separate operation from exiting, and it does not burn your vote tokens or touch your treasury claim. See trading (/wiki/markets/trading) . Exiting is the operation that settles everything at once and ends the membership.

Related - What is a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) — the object this right belongs to - Getting started (/wiki/foundations/getting-started) — joining, the cashtag fee ladder, and what a caper costs to start - Voting (/wiki/governance/voting) — the other half of the same weight formula - FAQ (/wiki/help/faq) — shorter answers, including divestment and upgrades