What replaces the issuer's dis…collateralization skim applies and, as on any sell, no trade fee does. The treasury’s share of that skim lands after the exit share is paid, so a leaver is not paid a slice of their own skim. A leaver therefore takes the…ey could execute without Roll.

The personal caper The 2020 w…e — no bindingsay for holders.Optimistic proposals —Ranked ballots, then a marketwindow – holdingis consent,selling is the voteagainsteto.1997 · BOWIE BONDSThe first t…uance into self-incorporation.

What replaces the issuer's dis…ing a plain sell uses, so the trade fee and the collateralization skim both applyapplies and, as on any sell, no trade fee does. A leaver therefore takes the…tly the vote tokens handed in. The $XRD caper is the exception: it has no curve, so its exit pays the treasury share and hands the governance tokens back untouched. No sell leg mints vote tokens…ey could execute without Roll.

What replaces the issuer's dis…s priced by what you hold and whathow often you tradvoted A member's share of the tr…cause the numerator reads the buckeamounts actually surrenderedhanded in, redeeming part of a position…saction with two legs exit() requires both buckets non-emptytakes a vote-token amount and a governance-token amount, requires each to be above zero, withdraws both from the member's account, and pays out twice. The treas…/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) at its current price, less the trade feethrough the same pricing a plain sell uses, so the trade fee and the collateralization skim both apply. A leaver therefore takes the…supply shrinks by exactly the weight that leftvote tokens handed in. The $XRD caper is the exception: it has no curve, so its exit pays the treasury share and hands the governance tokens back untouched. No sell leg mints vote token…ey could execute without Roll.

A personal token is a tradeabl…a price. And a holder who has tradvoted has an exit right (/wiki/d…e soulbound vote tokens their trading earnballots minted, redeem a proportional shar…f back to the curve. A backer who has taken part in a decision is therefore never in the 2020…and the bonding-curve lineage.

The personal caper The 2020 w…he soulbound vote tokens your trading earnballots minted. CAPER PROTOCOLThe persona…uance into self-incorporation.

What replaces the issuer's dis…unobtainable: they are minted at one flat rate of 0.01 per XRD on three surfaces, the gross value of a buy, the gross value of a sell, and the 100 XRD fee on a ranked ballot, which therefore mints exactly 1on exactly one surface, a ranked ballot, which mints exactly 1 (VOTE_MINT in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs, fused into vote_apply), while a buy, a sell, a swap, a migration and a transfer each mint none. So the share prices the size… with how much of the caper's market and its governance that holder actuall…ary is worth stating plainly: tokens that reached a holder some other waya bag whose holder has never cast a ballot carryies no vote tokens with them, and a bag whose holder has neither traded nor voteat all, however it was acquired and however large it is, and redeems nothing from the treasury, – though the curve will still b…exactly the weight that left. The exit's ownNo sell leg mints no new vote tokens, the exit's own included – it is a redemption, not a m…ey could execute without Roll.

The personal caper The 2020 w…te tokens are earned by voting or trading, and spent only on the way ou…uance into self-incorporation.

The personal caper The 2020 w…a price and a sell button, andnothing behindthem. A personal caper adds th…e missing — a treasury you ownand an exit right that paysout — so self-incorporation be…t took a bank and $55M of songroyalties pledged ascollateral. A personal caper s…reasury and the exit natively;no bank required.Vote tokens a…uance into self-incorporation.

What replaces the issuer's dis… records the caper's trailing seven-day average token price as a basel…ey could execute without Roll.

What replaces the issuer's dis…stic-governance) . A proposal names one action amongoffers two to five ranked options, o…which is always a “Do nothing” no-op; holders cast full rankings a…cast clears 1.5 / option_count. A and the leader is not that no-op. Whether a pass then makreaches the proposalsecond phase depends on what won. Five of the six option kinds are executive – PAYOUT, INVEST, DIVEST, METADATA, and, on $CAPER, UPGRADE – and a pass makes those triggerable: the trigger reco…price as a baseline and opens a forty-eight-hourthe optimistic window, and when that window … is at or above the baseline. So a proposalThe sixth kind, DEBATE, is a position rather than an action. It is ranked like any other option and it can win, but it is terminal at the tally: there is nothing to execute, so there is nothing for the market to veto, and trigger_proposal refuses a DEBATE winner outright rather than opening a phase the proposal could never leave. So a proposal that would spend needs an active majority and …ey could execute without Roll.

What replaces the issuer's dis…e tokens with them, and a bag thatwhose holder has nevither traded nor voted redeems nothing from the treas…ey could execute without Roll.

What replaces the issuer's dis…e, and on a governance design that has no ballot in it at allwhere a ballot decides what to do and the market decides whether it stands. There is a vote to cast, an…ey could execute without Roll.

What replaces the issuer's dis…s). Vote tokens are soulbound – non-in the transferable, unbuyable – and they are minted by trading: a flat 0.01 per XRD of gross trade sense – nobody can send you theirs, and you cannot sell yours – but they are not unobtainable: they are minted at one flat rate of 0.01 per XRD on three surfaces, the gross value, onf a buys and, the gross value of a sells, alike, credited straight to the trader's accountnd the 100 XRD fee on a ranked ballot, which therefore mints exactly 1. So the share prices both the size of a position andtogether with how much of the caper's market and its governance that holder actually madeturned up for. Because the numerator reads …ey could execute without Roll.

What replaces the issuer's dis…allot in it at all. There is noa vote to cast, and then a window to survive A caper's proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) arerun in two phases, the second of which is optimistic (/wiki/dao-govern… . A proposal names one action, among two to five ranked options, one of which is always a “Do nothing”; holders cast full rankings at 100 XRD a ballot, and a Borda tally passes the leader only if its share of the weight actually cast clears 1.5 / option_count. A pass then makes the proposal triggerable: the trigger records the caper's trailing …rage token price as a baseline, and stays open fors a forty-eight-hours; window, and when theat window closes anyone can settle it, and itresolve it, which passes iff the live curve priceTWAP over the window itself is at or above thate baseline. The deployed contract exposes no vote method and there is nothing to file. HoldingSo a proposal needs an active majority and then a market that does not object. Holding through the window is consent and selling is the late objection. That is the sharpes…ey could execute without Roll.

The personal caper The 2020 w…red.Vote tokens are earned by voting or trading, and spent only on the way out…uance into self-incorporation.

The personal caper The 2020 w… redeems a real share of it — the same weight,priced by (t·v) / (V·T), twhat decides a voteyou hold multiplied by the soulbound vote tokens your trading earned. CAPER PROTOCOLThe personal …it natively; no bank required.Exit share and vote weight are one formula, read from different balancesVote tokens are earned by trading and spent only on the way out.caper.networkThe 2020 persona…uance into self-incorporation.

A personal token is a tradeabl…n vanishing into a price. And every hola holder who has traderd has an exit right (/wiki/dao…p/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : in one transaction they chan burd in their vote and redeem a proportional share of that treasury – the same proportion that sets their weight in a vote (/wiki/governance/voting) tokens together with the soulbound vote tokens their trading earned, redeem a proportional share of that treasury, and sell the position itself back to the curve. A backer is therefore never …and the bonding-curve lineage.

The personal caper The 2020 w…e — no bindingsay for holders.Ranked (Borda) votes. Votes aresoulbound and earned; the weightthey carry scales with holdingsOptimistic proposals — holdingis consent, selling is the voteagainst.1997 · BOWIE BONDSThe first t…uance into self-incorporation.

How the vote weight and the exit actually workWhat replaces the issuer's discretion The two claims above – that a holder's exit is enforceable and that it redeems the same proportion as their vote – arepriced by a formula rather than by the issuer – is worth stating precisely, because the precision is what distinguishes themseparates it from the 2020 promises. Both come fromIt rests on one function in the protocol's logic package, and both are stated here against the live contract source rather than a pinned commit. That distinction is load-bearing: the ballot-era upgrade of 16 August 2026on a governance design that has no ballot in it at all. There is no vote to cast A caper's proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) are optimistic (/wiki/dao-governance/execution) changed where one of the formula's terms is read from without changing a character of the formula itself, so a verification note pinned to an earlier revision would still read as current. A member's weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) where t is the member's governance-token amount, v their vote tokens, V the caper's total vote supplyconcepts/voting/optimistic-governance) . A proposal names one action, records the caper's trailing seven-day average token price as a baseline, and stays open for forty-eight hours; when the window closes anyone can settle it, and T its circulating token supply. One expression, but the two paths feed it from different places: a ballot (/wiki/governance/voting) reads t as the stake escrowed in the caper's ballot box and v as the voter's whole vote-token balance, while exit() reads both off the buckets the member hands in – so an exit that surrenders part of a position redeems that part's share. Three properties follow, and each one answers something the 2020 wave left open. Votes are soulbound; the weight is not Vote tokens are minted directly to the voter's account each time they vote and cannot be transferred – they are earned by participating and there is no market in them. But holdings enter the formula as a multiplicative factor, so a larger position is strictly more weight at the same participation. It is worth being blunt about this, because it is the usual place these designs are oversold: a caper is not a one-person-one-vote system with a soulbound badge. Participation and stake both count, and neither substitutes for passes if the live curve price is at or above that baseline. The deployed contract exposes no vote method and there is nothing to file. Holding is consent and selling is the objection. That is the sharpest structural difference from the 2020 wave, where a holder's displeasure and a holder's sale were also the same act – but decided nothing, because there was no proposal for the price to decide. An exit is priced by what you hold and what you traded A member's share of the treasury is their canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) : the governance tokens they hand in, multiplied by the vother – a holder who never votes has v = 0 and therefore no weight at all, and a voter who holds nothing has t = 0 and likewise none. Selling before settlement cuts your own vote A ballot records the holdings behind it, but settlement does not trust that record. It reads each voter's live balance and clamps the weight to min(held at vote, balance now). So a holder who votee tokens they hand in, over the caper's whole vote supply and its circulating token supply. All four terms are read at the moment of exit, by a single function (compute_vote_weight, in contracts/common/src/lib.rs). Vote tokens are soulbound – non-transferable, unbuyable – and they are minted by trading: a flat 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value, on buys and then sells into the rise has their own ballot reduced to whatever they still hold when the proposal settles. The 2020 personal token's holder could extract on sentiment and leave the same afternoon with their say intact, because there was no settlement to be present for. Here the vote and the position have to survive together. An exit is one transaction with two legs Exiting requires both buckets – vote tokens and governance tokens, both non-zero – and pays out twice. That first condition is a gate rather thalike, credited straight to the trader's account. So the share prices both the size of a position and how much of the caper's market that holder actually made. Because the numerator reads the buckets actually surrendered, redeeming part of a position redeems that part's share; there is no all-or-nothing exit. The corollary is worth stating plainly: tokens that reached a holder some other way carry no vote tokens with them, and a formality: a holder who has never voted holds no vote tokens and so cannot exit at all. Tbag that has never traded redeems nothing from the treasury, though they can sturve will setill their position back along the curve like any other holder, but the claim on pooled collateral belongs to the members who took part in deciding what the collateral was forbuy it back. An exit is one transaction with two legs exit() requires both buckets non-empty and pays out twice. The treasury share is computed with the same w above, before the vote tokens are burned, so the proportion that decided a member's votes is the proportion of collateral they leave with. Iand in the same transaction the gov…fore takes their share of the treasurypooled collateral and the curve's standing bid, and the caper's own vote supply (/wiki/governance/voting) shrinks by exactly the weight that left. Nothing about thaThe exit's own sell leg mints no new vote tokens – it is a redemption, not a membership trade. None of it requires the issuer's cooper…le of the difference from 2020: what Roll's holders needed was an arrangement they could execute without Roll.

A personal token is a tradeabl…to the curve for ZAP. In 2020 a personal token issued in the name of Ben Gravis (https://etherscan.io.blockscout.com/token/0x45dD36456967e3881c5bba8aaBA8AA84bB4f7dD888afFea13) became one of the first people to tokenize himself this way; the contract has been silent since April 2021of these to run on a curve rather than a custodial ledger. What the ledger records is the artefact, not the act: the contract is typed ERC-721 rather than a fungible personal token, and it has been silent since April 2021 – read again on 25 August 2026 at a total supply of two, both held by one address. The curve gave holders somet…and the bonding-curve lineage.

The personal caper The 2020 w…; no bank required.Exit share equalsand vote weight — the same w that decides votes sets your treasury payoutare one formula, read from different balances.caper.networkThe 2020 persona…uance into self-incorporation.

How the vote weight and the ex…col's logic package, and both weare re-verifiedstated here against the live contract source rat commit 76d7bf5her than a pinned commit. That distinction is load-bearing: the ballot-era upgrade of 16 August 2026 (/wiki/governance/execution) changed where one of the formula's terms is read from without changing a character of the formula itself, so a verification note pinned to an earlier revision would still read as current. A member's weight is w = (… v) / (V · T) where t is the member's governance-tokens they hold amount, v their vote tokens they have accumulated, V the caper's total vote sup… its circulating token supply. One expression, but the two paths feed it from different places: a ballot (/wiki/governance/voting) reads t as the stake escrowed in the caper's ballot box and v as the voter's whole vote-token balance, while exit() reads both off the buckets the member hands in – so an exit that surrenders part of a position redeems that part's share. Three properties follow, and …e of the difference from 2020.

A personal token is a tradeabl…olver. The Internet Archive's CDX index (http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=tryroll.com&output=json&fl=timestamp,statuscode) records its last successful capture on 9 November 2025 (https://web.archive.org/web/20251109081830/https://tryroll.com/) and its last capture attempt o…and the bonding-curve lineage.

Also called Self-tokenization,…wave (Roll, Zap, and others) Where it ended Roll, the largest custodial issuer, served a frozen homepage through 2025 and its domain no longer resolves at all Common failure mode Holders ow…eable exit, custodial key risk

A personal token is a tradeabl…s, let anyone mint a personal ERC-20token whose price rose and fell alo…okenize himself this way; the token is now inactivecontract has been silent since April 2021. The curve gave holders somet… because there was no share. What the record shows in 2026 The 2020 wave is usually described in the past tense but rarely checked. Three of its landmarks were re-verified first-hand for this page on 10 August 2026, and the results sharpen the argument above rather than soften it. - Roll, the largest custodial issuer, is gone. The domain tryroll.com has no A record on the apex, www, or app at either Google's (8.8.8.8) or Cloudflare's (1.1.1.1) resolver. The Internet Archive's CDX index (http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=tryroll.com&output=json&fl=timestamp,statuscode) records its last successful capture on 9 November 2025 and its last capture attempt of any kind on 17 November 2025; every capture from 22 July 2025 onward returned a byte-identical homepage (the same CDX digest), so the site was frozen for months before the domain lapsed. The custody problem the hack exposed did not end with the hack – it ended with the platform, and with it any token page a holder might still have wanted to read. - The bonding-curve personal token has twelve events in its entire history. The Ben Gravis contract (https://eth.blockscout.com/token/0x45D36456967e3881c5bBA8AA84B4f7D888aFea13) has recorded exactly twelve token transfers since deployment, the first on 3 May 2020 and the last on 8 April 2021 at block 12,197,817 – read from Blockscout's keyless decoded-transfer API. Every one of the twelve is either a mint from the zero address or a burn back to it. Not one is a transfer between two holders. A handful of backers bonded, the same handful un-bonded, and the token has been silent for over five years: the curve worked exactly as designed and there was never a secondary life for it to protect. - The pre-blockchain experiment outlived the tokens. kmikeym.com (https://www.kmikeym.com/) still resolves and still serves Mike Merrill's shareholder record, eighteen years after he incorporated himself. The oldest version of the idea – a person, a share register, and a standing obligation to the holders – is the one still running. Taken together these are not three separate failures. Custodial issuance died with its custodian, curve-only issuance died of having nothing to hold, and the arrangement that survived is the one where the claim was defined and the issuer stayed answerable for it. How a caper differs A caper … has an exit right (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit… - How DAOs Fail (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fa…and the bonding-curve lineage.

The personal caper The 2020 w…bindingsay for holders.Ranked votes; power i(Borda) votes. Votes earnedand esoulbound, not bought and earned; the weightthey carry scales with holdings.1997 · BOWIE BONDSThe first t…uance into self-incorporation.

How the vote weight and the exit actually work The two claims above – that a holder's exit is enforceable and that it redeems the same proportion as their vote – are worth stating precisely, because the precision is what distinguishes them from the 2020 promises. Both come from one function in the protocol's logic package, and both were re-verified against the contract source at commit 76d7bf5. A member's weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) where t is the governance tokens they hold, v the vote tokens they have accumulated, V the caper's total vote supply, and T its circulating token supply. Three properties follow, and each one answers something the 2020 wave left open. Votes are soulbound; the weight is not Vote tokens are minted directly to the voter's account each time they vote and cannot be transferred – they are earned by participating and there is no market in them. But holdings enter the formula as a multiplicative factor, so a larger position is strictly more weight at the same participation. It is worth being blunt about this, because it is the usual place these designs are oversold: a caper is not a one-person-one-vote system with a soulbound badge. Participation and stake both count, and neither substitutes for the other – a holder who never votes has v = 0 and therefore no weight at all, and a voter who holds nothing has t = 0 and likewise none. Selling before settlement cuts your own vote A ballot records the holdings behind it, but settlement does not trust that record. It reads each voter's live balance and clamps the weight to min(held at vote, balance now). So a holder who votes and then sells into the rise has their own ballot reduced to whatever they still hold when the proposal settles. The 2020 personal token's holder could extract on sentiment and leave the same afternoon with their say intact, because there was no settlement to be present for. Here the vote and the position have to survive together. An exit is one transaction with two legs Exiting requires both buckets – vote tokens and governance tokens, both non-zero – and pays out twice. That first condition is a gate rather than a formality: a holder who has never voted holds no vote tokens and so cannot exit at all. They can still sell their position back along the curve like any other holder, but the claim on pooled collateral belongs to the members who took part in deciding what the collateral was for. The treasury share is computed with the same w above, before the vote tokens are burned, so the proportion that decided a member's votes is the proportion of collateral they leave with. In the same transaction the governance tokens are sold back along the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) at its current price, less the trade fee. A leaver therefore takes their share of the treasury and the curve's standing bid, and the caper's own vote supply (/wiki/governance/voting) shrinks by exactly the weight that left. Nothing about that requires the issuer's cooperation, which is the whole of the difference from 2020.

The personal caper The 2020 wave gave a person issuance and a market price but nothing they owned behind it, so when trust broke the claim broke with it. A personal caper closes that gap with the two primitives that wave lacked: a treasury the token actually holds, and a binding exit that redeems a real share of it — the same weight, (t·v) / (V·T), that decides a vote. CAPER PROTOCOLThe personal caperSELF-INCORPORATIONIssuing a token for yourself is not new. The 2020 wave gave you a price and a sell button, and nothing behindthem. A personal caper adds the two things that were missing — a treasury you own and an exit right that paysout — so self-incorporation becomes a real claim, not a mood.THE 2020 PERSONAL TOKENTHE PERSONAL CAPERWhat you issueA token priced on whatevermarket will trade it.A token on a bonding curve —always priced, alwaysredeemable.Treasury behind itNone. A claim on sentiment, noton any assets.An owned treasury — XRDcollateral held in the caper’svault.Exit rightSell into whatever bid happensto exist that day.Redeem a real share of thetreasury:pct = ( t · v ) / ( V · T )When trust breaksDisowned; the price falls towhatever sentiment is left.You can still withdraw yourtreasury share and leave.GovernanceInformal, or none — no bindingsay for holders.Ranked votes; power is earnedand soulbound, not bought.1997 · BOWIE BONDSThe first time a person incorporated their future income — and it took a bank and $55M of song royalties pledged ascollateral. A personal caper supplies the treasury and the exit natively; no bank required.Exit share equals vote weight — the same w that decides votes sets your treasury payout.caper.networkThe 2020 personal token vs a personal caper · an owned treasury and a binding exit right (pct = (t·v)/(V·T)) are what turn issuance into self-incorporation.

A personal token is a tradeabl…it right (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : t…AOs Fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) and Curation …and the bonding-curve lineage.

A personal token is a tradeabl…artist Mike Merrill (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mike_Merrillwww.kmikeym.com/) incorporated himself and so… has an exit right (/wiki/daos/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-r… - How DAOs Fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/how-daos-fail) and …and the bonding-curve lineage.

Also called Self-tokenization, creator tokens, social tokens (overlapping) What it is An individual issues a tradeable token that represents a claim on, or access to, their future work, attention, or success Antecedents Mike Merrill (2008, sold shares in himself); Bowie Bonds (1997, securitized future royalties) Peak 2020 "personal / social token" wave (Roll, Zap, and others) Common failure mode Holders own a claim on nothing they control – no shared treasury, no enforceable exit, custodial key risk

A personal token is a tradeable token issued by an individual against themselves – a claim on, or access to, their future output, attention, or success. The practice is often called self-tokenization, and it overlaps with the broader categories of creator tokens and social tokens. The recurring promise is the same: let a person be capitalized the way a company is, so that people who believe in someone can back them early and share in what follows. Antecedents The idea predates blockchains. In 2008 the artist Mike Merrill (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mike_Merrill) incorporated himself and sold shares in his own person, letting shareholders vote on decisions in his life – an early, deliberately literal experiment in treating an individual as a joint-stock enterprise. A decade earlier, in 1997, the banker David Pullman securitized David Bowie's back-catalogue royalties into Bowie Bonds (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Celebrity_bond) , a bond that let investors buy a stream of one person's future income. Neither was a token, but both established the underlying move: an individual issuing a claim on their own future and selling it to backers. The 2020 wave Cheap on-chain issuance turned a rare, bank-intermediated act into something anyone could do in an afternoon, and in 2020 a wave of personal and social tokens followed. Contemporary coverage (https://www.forbes.com/sites/colinharper/2020/05/06/people-are-tokenizing-themselves-on-ethereum-why-personal-tokens-raise-red-flags/) was already flagging the risks. That June, the entrepreneur Alex Masmej sold $ALEX (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/06/30/the-man-who-tokenized-himself-gives-holders-power-over-his-life) , raising roughly $20,000 and letting holders vote on his personal choices. Many such tokens were issued and traded through custodial platforms, the largest of which was Roll. A parallel strand used bonding curves (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) rather than a custodial order book. Zap (https://medium.com/the-zap-project/the-bonding-curve-revolution-4b5aa0e5f2cd) , a protocol built around bonding curves, let anyone mint a personal ERC-20 whose price rose and fell along a curve: backers bonded the ZAP token to mint the personal token and could un-bond to sell it back to the curve for ZAP. In 2020 Ben Gravis (https://etherscan.io/token/0x45d36456967e3881c5bba8aa84b4f7d888afea13) became one of the first people to tokenize himself this way; the token is now inactive. The curve gave holders something the custodial tokens lacked – a standing counterparty to sell back into – but it attached no shared treasury and no governance to the token, and the curve remained the issuer's own arrangement. Why most failed The 2020 tokens are usually written off as a speculative bubble, but the more durable lesson is structural. Three things were typically missing: - No treasury the holders owned. Buying a personal token generally funded a price, not a pooled balance sheet the backers had a claim on. The token was a bet on the issuer's trajectory, backed by nothing the holders controlled. - No enforceable exit. Leaving meant selling into whatever bid existed. On custodial platforms that could evaporate; even the bonding-curve versions redeemed only against the issuer's own curve, which the issuer could stop maintaining. - Custodial and key risk. Where a platform held the keys, its failure was the holders' failure. In early 2021 an attacker drained roughly $5.7 million from Roll's hot wallet (https://protos.com/social-token-ethereum-crypto-roll-hack-million-tokens-uniswap/) , and personal tokens minted on it fell sharply in a single week. The through-line is that holders held upside and a sell button, and nothing in between. When trust in the creator or the custodian wavered, there was no owned collateral to fall back on and no defined way to redeem a share, because there was no share. How a caper differs A caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) applies the same "individual as an institution" idea but supplies the two things the 2020 wave omitted. Buys along the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) fill a shared treasury (/wiki/governance/execution) that every holder has an enforceable claim on, rather than vanishing into a price. And every holder has an exit right (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : they can burn their vote and redeem a proportional share of that treasury – the same proportion that sets their weight in a vote (/wiki/governance/voting) . A backer is therefore never in the 2020 position of holding a claim on nothing; at any moment they can name their portion of the collateral and leave with it. This is what separates a personal token that is a bet on someone's mood from one that behaves like a small institution. Further reading - The Personal Caper (/blog/the-personal-caper) – from Bowie Bonds to self-incorporation, and what a personal token needs to be credible. - The Exit Right (/blog/the-exit-right) – why a redeemable, vote-weighted claim on a treasury is the load-bearing primitive. - How DAOs Fail (/wiki/dao/concepts/how-daos-fail) and Curation Markets (/wiki/economics/curation-markets) – adjacent failure modes and the bonding-curve lineage.