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History – VitaRNA (VITARNA)

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v1.2.2 · currentSweep #514: Snapshot re-read 4 Oct 2026 – VRNAP5 (19 May 2025) still the newest vitarna.eth proposal and VDP-163 (16 Sep 2025) still the newest on vote.vitadao.eth; VITARNA 5,500,000 and lVITARNA 186,105.62 supplies unchanged by eth_call. Two re-read dates moved from 14 Sep.–Oct 4, 2026
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    Where the decisions went VRNA…s record was queried again on 14 SeptemOctober 2026. The gap is dated her…l true when it was re-read on 14 SeptemOctober 2026. Two 2026 financings…est form: an allowlist of one.

v1.2.1Sweep #417 (desci/ecosystem): Caper section said exit 'is open from genesis' - exit() asserts vote_amount > 0 ('Exit requires vote tokens', contracts/logic/src/lib.rs) and v mints only for a cast ballot (VOTE_MINT, :211), so the precondition is now stated; Snapshot readings for vitarna.eth and vote.vitadao.eth re-dated to 14 Sep 2026 (unchanged).–Sep 14, 2026
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    Where the decisions went VRNA…Snapshot's record was queried again on 214 September 2026. The gap is da…63 closed on 16 September 2025, which was still true when it was re-read on 14 September 2026. Two 2026 financings settle …est form: an allowlist of one.

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    How Caper approaches this Cap…foundations/leaving-a-caper) is open from genesis and pays out a share of the treasu… to pass or a majority to win. It has one precondition, and it is the one a VITARNA holder could never have met: exit spends the caper's vote tokens, which are minted only for a cast ballot, one per ballot, so a member who has never voted cannot exit at all. On a caper that ballot is always within reach, because anyone willing to pay the fee can open the proposal to cast it on; in a space where one address sets the agenda, it is not. The failure mode VitaRNA illu…n contracts/logic/src/lib.rs.)

v1.2.0Add the two 2026 Artan Bio financings (PR Newswire, 4 Jun and 1 Jul 2026), neither of which passed through the VITARNA space: the $1M seed is equity in the operating company, an axis the IP-NFT token confers no claim over. Replace the day-count with its anchor date.–Sep 2, 2026
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    Where the decisions went VRNA…, the space has opened nothing – 457 days as of 19 August 2026: VRNAP5 was still the newest proposal returned for vitarna.eth when Snapshot's record was queried on 2 September 2026. The gap is dated here from that close rather than published as an elapsed-day figure, which would be wrong the day after it was written. The asset, meanwhile, kept m…closed on 16 September 2025. Two 2026 financings settle what “kept moving” now means, and neither passed through the token's own space. On 4 June 2026 Artan Bio announced $200,000 raised through the VitaDAO IP-NFT route itself (https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/artan-bio-raises-200-000-in-decentralized-funding-to-advance-longevity-science-through-mutation-specific-codon-suppression-302789887.html) , to carry the ARTAN-102 suppressor-tRNA programme through animal-model validation, development-candidate advancement and IP filings. On 1 July 2026 it closed a $1,000,000 seed round (https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/artan-bio-closes-1-million-seed-round-to-advance-its-trna-platform-toward-human-studies-302814741.html) toward IND-enabling studies, manufacturing scale-up and regulatory preparation, funded personally by co-founder and chief scientific officer Michael Torres. The second round is the one worth reading closely, because it is a different instrument entirely. It is equity in the operating company; the release describes $VITARNA separately, as tokens that “represent fractions of governance rights over the Mutation-Specific Codon Suppression for Aging and Longevity IP-NFT”. A token that governs an asset does not thereby govern the company developing it, and the two can be funded, diluted and valued independently. Both raises landed inside a window in which the VITARNA space opened nothing, and the token supply recorded above was read on 19 August 2026, after both. Whatever holders were promised about “capital allocation”, the capital that arrived in 2026 was allocated somewhere they had no ballot. So the promise on the tin – to…est form: an allowlist of one.

v1.1.0gov.vitadao.com is live again (re-probed 2026-08-22): repoint the two archived VDP-164 citations at the live thread–Aug 22, 2026
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    Where the decisions went VRNA…tember 2025 VDP-164 (https://web.archive.org/web/20260421081428/https://gov.vitadao.com/t/vdp-164-vita…est form: an allowlist of one.

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    External links - VitaRNA – o…n to advance VITARNA (https://web.archive.org/web/20260421081428/https://gov.vitadao.com/t/vdp-164-vita…ard-2026-ind-submission/2052) – archived - VITARNA token contract on…aDAO (https://www.vitadao.com)

v1.0.1Repoint the Snapshot strategies citation at the live docs path.–Aug 19, 2026
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    What the token represents The…docs.snapshot.box/user-guides/spaces/voting-strategies) to compute voting…aking and capital allocation."

v1.0.0New page: VitaRNA (vitarna.eth) — the fractionalised Artan Bio IP-NFT governance space, its complete five-proposal record, on-chain token supplies, and where the asset's decisions actually moved.–Aug 19, 2026
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    Type Fractionalised IP-NFT (/wiki/desci/ip-nfts) governance space, not a standalone DAO Asset Artan Bio mutation-specific codon-suppression gene-therapy IP, held by the Vital Artan HoldCo (Ireland) Parent VitaDAO (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/vitadao) , via VDP-140 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vote.vitadao.eth/proposal/0x7a61cb669342ac3df3ef52b0f401a8fc0a372c988de6bf7f265cbb48c72d3c55) (closed 2 February 2024) Launched June 2024 (first vote 24–26 June 2024) Token VITARNA (https://etherscan.io/token/0x7b66E84Be78772a3afaf5bA8c1993a1B5D05f9C2) on Ethereum – IP Tokens of IPNFT #28, supply 5,500,000 Locked tranche lVITARNA (https://etherscan.io/token/0xaF11fF2f56Ee3bF46ba9661Ee3aE52983594b0b2) – Locked IP Tokens of IPNFT #28, supply 186,105.62 Governance Snapshot vitarna.eth (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth) ; 5 proposals, all passed; proposal creation restricted to one address; 11 followers Quorum 50,000 VITARNA – 0.91% of supply Status Asset intact and legally re-housed; the token's own governance space has been silent since 19 May 2025 Website vitarna.xyz (https://vitarna.xyz/)

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    Overview VitaRNA is the governance space attached to a single tokenised research asset: the Artan Bio IP-NFT (/wiki/desci/ip-nfts) covering a mutation-specific codon-suppression approach to gene therapy, funded through VitaDAO (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/vitadao) . It is not an organisation with staff, a treasury and a roadmap in the way Molecule (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule) 's larger BioDAOs are. It is the thinner and much more common thing underneath them: one asset, fractionalised into a token, with a Snapshot space bolted on so the holders of that token can be said to govern it. That makes it a useful control case for the whole DeSci (/wiki/desci/what-is-desci) thesis. The pitch for tokenising an IP-NFT is that ownership and decision rights travel together: buy the token, get a vote on the science. VitaRNA ran that experiment on a clean asset with a real clinical programme behind it, and the record of what the token actually decided is short, complete and readable in full.

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    What the token represents The underlying instrument is Molecule (https://molecule.xyz) 's IP-NFT: a transferable NFT that wraps the legal rights to a research programme, with the fractional tokens minted against it giving holders economic exposure and a governance claim. VitaRNA's two ERC-20 contracts name themselves after their parent NFT. The freely-held tranche, 0x7b66…f9C2 (https://etherscan.io/token/0x7b66E84Be78772a3afaf5bA8c1993a1B5D05f9C2) , reports a name of IP Tokens of IPNFT #28 and a totalSupply of exactly 5,500,000; a second contract, 0xaF11…b0b2 (https://etherscan.io/token/0xaF11fF2f56Ee3bF46ba9661Ee3aE52983594b0b2) , is Locked IP Tokens of IPNFT #28 with 186,105.62 outstanding. Both figures were read on Ethereum mainnet by eth_call on 19 August 2026. The Snapshot space sums a holder's balance across both contracts (https://docs.snapshot.box/user-guides/spaces/strategies) to compute voting power, so the locked tranche votes alongside the liquid one. The legal wrapper sits under an Irish company, the Vital Artan HoldCo, which owns the IP-NFT and is the issuer of record for the tokens. The project's own site (https://vitarna.xyz/) describes the arrangement plainly: the community funded the research, "in exchange, the community is granted voting power to govern the IP, and participate in R&D decision-making and capital allocation."

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    The governance record, in full Five proposals, all passed, spread over eleven months. The space uses Snapshot's authors only setting with a single administrator address and no additional members, so exactly one address on earth could open a vote (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-throttles-and-rate-limits) – and that address opened all five. Voting ran 48 hours per proposal against a quorum of 50,000 VITARNA, which is 0.91% of supply. Proposal Closed Voters Weight cast Result VRNAP-1 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth/proposal/0x30ff1e836f32a394438a89d104ac2c67d012078d60a08e820d3e4e460c52255b) – Governance Framework Setup 26 Jun 2024 5 67,099 Unanimous VRNAP-2 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth/proposal/0xee35d995ca6ceaf3de9670d79cc9a9f3005e816482cf0f2184211ca625bf598f) – Allocate $100k of ETH for experiments 26 Jun 2024 6 334,081 Unanimous VRNAP-3 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth/proposal/0x62edd19bf6617b9560edc7cf80c6ad98f44f5c41234e1986e1ce166145109685) – Allocate remaining ETH for experiments 21 Sep 2024 6 64,918 Unanimous VRNAP-4 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth/proposal/0x91a3b1f7fcd13bac3784bb71faaac46c7fa2e4ac648bfca1c855f6690b1c7178) – Mint tokens for $1M research funding 8 Dec 2024 8 61,418 60,671 for / 747 against VRNAP5 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth/proposal/0xec82db7df4bd6ac080d81393740cddfcdf909022557c048e077d3f75e686bf36) – Transfer the Vital Artan HoldCo to Vitality Now 19 May 2025 5 2,768,273 Unanimous Two numbers are worth sitting with. VRNAP-4, the only proposal that diluted holders – a token mint to raise a further $1M – cleared on 61,418 VITARNA, or 1.1% of supply, with eight people voting and 747 tokens against. The largest turnout the space ever recorded, 2,768,273 tokens or roughly half the supply, was cast on the last proposal, which moved the asset's holding company out of one legal entity and into another. As at AthenaDAO (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/athenadao) , the peak of participation and the end of it are the same event.

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    Where the decisions went VRNAP5 is the key to reading the rest. It asked holders to authorise a share transfer moving the Vital Artan HoldCo from VitaDAO Global Services to the Vitality Now Association (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth/proposal/0xec82db7df4bd6ac080d81393740cddfcdf909022557c048e077d3f75e686bf36) , a Swiss Verein that VitaDAO had adopted as its single legal steward under VDP-160. The proposal is explicit that this changes nothing about who decides: "Governance over the IP-NFT and VITARNA tokens remains exactly as before: Vitality Now may act only when instructed by Snapshot." It was submitted by the VitaDAO Guardians, not by a VITARNA holder. Since that vote closed on 19 May 2025, the space has opened nothing – 457 days as of 19 August 2026. The asset, meanwhile, kept moving. In September 2025 VDP-164 (https://web.archive.org/web/20260421081428/https://gov.vitadao.com/t/vdp-164-vitadao-funding-proposal-500k-loan-to-advance-vitarna-through-non-glp-toxicology-toward-2026-ind-submission/2052) asked VitaDAO for a $500,000 loan to carry VITARNA through non-GLP toxicology toward an IND submission, and that proposal was argued out on VitaDAO's forum rather than in the VITARNA space, where it stalled at a scored expert review gate (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/scoring-and-review-gates) and, as of the last archived capture, had never reached a token vote at all. VitaDAO's own Snapshot space (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vote.vitadao.eth) has itself opened nothing since VDP-163 closed on 16 September 2025. So the promise on the tin – token holders govern the IP – survived contact with reality in a specific and narrow way. The rights are real and the space is still open. What is missing is anyone entitled to use it: with proposal creation locked to one address, a VITARNA holder who wants a say on the toxicology spend has no route to put the question, and the question moved to a forum one level up where their token confers nothing. This is the proposal-throttle (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-throttles-and-rate-limits) pattern in its purest form: an allowlist of one.

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    How Caper approaches this Caper does not tokenise intellectual property and has no IP-NFT primitive, so the comparison is about the governance shell rather than the asset. Two differences bear directly on what happened here. First, there is no proposer allowlist. Opening a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) on a caper is a public method priced in an XRD fee, so the right to put a question to the treasury is not an editable setting that can be narrowed to one address and then left there. Second, a member who cannot get a hearing is not stuck holding a claim on an asset they no longer influence: exit (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) is open from genesis and pays out a share of the treasury sized by the same participation-weighted formula that sizes a vote, without a proposal to pass or a majority to win. The failure mode VitaRNA illustrates – the decision migrates to a venue where your token is not the currency, and there is nothing you can do from inside – is the one an always-open exit right (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) is meant to price. (Weight and exit share are the same quantity (/wiki/governance/voting) , compute_vote_weight in contracts/common/src/lib.rs; the redemption is exit in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs.)

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    External links - VitaRNA – official site (https://vitarna.xyz/) - vitarna.eth – Snapshot space (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vitarna.eth) - VDP-140 – Tokenization of the ArtanBio IP-NFT (VitaDAO, February 2024) (https://snapshot.box/#/s:vote.vitadao.eth/proposal/0x7a61cb669342ac3df3ef52b0f401a8fc0a372c988de6bf7f265cbb48c72d3c55) - VDP-164 – $500K loan to advance VITARNA (https://web.archive.org/web/20260421081428/https://gov.vitadao.com/t/vdp-164-vitadao-funding-proposal-500k-loan-to-advance-vitarna-through-non-glp-toxicology-toward-2026-ind-submission/2052) – archived - VITARNA token contract on Etherscan (https://etherscan.io/token/0x7b66E84Be78772a3afaf5bA8c1993a1B5D05f9C2) - VitaDAO (https://www.vitadao.com)