History – DeSci on Radix

Back
v1.3.2 · currentSweep #517: re-read against contracts at bbae12a (VOTE_FEE 100, VOTE_MINT 1, exit() asserts vote and governance tokens, no vote mint on buy/sell), all matching; em dashes replaced with spaced en dashes.–
5 blocks modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 1 → Block 1

    Topic Why the Radix (https://…foundations/what-is-a-caper) —– bonding-curve fundraising int…wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule)

  • Modified – Text at Block 3

    Native IP-NFTs, not contract s…-vs-token-approvals) pattern —– the same pattern behind the m…terial property, not a nicety.

  • Modified – Text at Block 4

    Engine-level DAO governance D…access-rules-and-auth-zones) —– multi-sig, role-based, and th…e-models) they actually want —– badge-gated peer review, stag…f an IP-NFT, or a member vote —– without trusting bespoke permission code.

  • Modified – Text at Block 5

    Atomic, composable funding De…ts in full or aborts entirely —– no partial failures, no funds…equence a user has to babysit.

  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) —– contributors mint tokens alon…and a standing right to leave —– the recurring asks of a DeSc…DAO (/wiki/desci/desci-daos) —– it is a concrete demonstratio…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.3.1Sweep #416 (markets, carried from backlog #413): exit takes amounts, not buckets. exit() takes vote_amount/governance_amount, asserts each > 0 and withdraws both from the recipient account (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs:2229-2246 at 68201ec; pen-test M-3, 11 Sep 2026 redeploy); src/radix/manifests.ts exitManifest passes amounts with no bucket withdrawals.–
1 block modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper … convention: exit() asserts a non-empty buckepositive amount of the caper's soulbound vote tokens as well as a non-empty buckepositive amount of its governance tokens, withdrawing both from the member's own account, and that record has exactly o…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.3.0Sweep #408 (desci): trading stopped minting vote tokens with the 11 September 2026 redeploy. A ranked ballot is the only member-facing source of v (VOTE_FEE/VOTE_MINT, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), so exit requires having voted; rewrote the exit-gate and capture arguments that rested on trade-minted v.–
1 block modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …nance tokens, and that record accrues on bothhas exactly one member-facing sourfaces at one flat rate – one vote token per ranked ballot (a 100 XRD vote fee at 0.01 v per XRD) and 0.01 v per XRD of gross value on every buy and every sell – so the standing exit opens as soon as a member has voted or tradedce: each ranked ballot mints one vote token against a sunk 100 XRD vote fee (VOTE_FEE and VOTE_MINT in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), while buys and sells have minted none since the 11 September 2026 redeploy. So the standing exit opens once a member has cast a ballot, and a backer who has only bought holds no exit at all. For a research collective th…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.2.1Sweep #372: window/baseline/verdict prose settled against the 7 Sep 2026 redeploy – exact price-time integral with minute checkpoints, trailing baseline as a logic constant, market window as drill tuning; no durations in prose–
1 block modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …er locks the caper's trailing seven-day time-weighted average price as a baseline and opens a 48-hourthe market window, and the resolve call …ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.2.0desci-and-radix: the Caper example describes the two-phase governance the chain now runs — ranked ballots legislate, the window TWAP ratifies; v accrues at cast and on both trade legs, not at a 'ballot release' that no longer exists–
1 block modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …ded projects are then steered byin two phases, and the second one belongs to the market. In the legislative phase, holders cast ranked ballots on an on-chain proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) whose, each weight combines token balance with earned participation (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) , and a member whose cast ballot has been releaseded (t · v) / (V · T) – token balance multiplied by the holder's share of an earned, non-transferable soulbound vote token – and a permissionless crank folds them into a Borda tally that passes only on a supermajority of the weight actually cast. A passing verdict is then triggered rather than executed: the trigger locks the caper's trailing seven-day time-weighted average price as a baseline and opens a 48-hour window, and the resolve call runs the action only if the window's own TWAP holds at or above that baseline. The vote legislates and the market ratifies; selling through the window is the veto. A member can exit (/wiki/dao-governan…dering their tokens and their participation record (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) together for a treasury share …of its governance tokens, and vote tokens are minted at ballot release, not at the moment a vote is cast — so the standing exit opens once a member's first ballot has been released, and until then there ithat record accrues on both surfaces at one flat rate – one vote token per ranked ballot (a 100 XRD vote fee at 0.01 v per XRD) and 0.01 v per XRD of gross value on every buy and every sell – so the standing exit opens as soon as a member has nvothing to surrendered or traded. For a research collective th…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.1.0desci-and-radix: the exit is gated on holding released vote tokens, not open to any member (exit() in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs asserts both buckets; vote tokens mint in vote_apply at release)–
1 block modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …nce/voting-mechanisms) , and any member whose cast ballot has been released can exit (/wiki/dao-governanc…r than by token balance alone. The precondition is worth stating plainly, because it is enforced in the contract rather than by convention: exit() asserts a non-empty bucket of the caper's soulbound vote tokens as well as a non-empty bucket of its governance tokens, and vote tokens are minted at ballot release, not at the moment a vote is cast — so the standing exit opens once a member's first ballot has been released, and until then there is nothing to surrender. For a research collective tha…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.0.0Accuracy: exit is not pro-rata by token balance — exit() sets the treasury share from the canonical vote weight and consumes both the governance and the soulbound vote tokens. Verified against exit() in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs.–
4 blocks modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 1 → Block 1

    Topic Why the Radix (https://…· engine-level DAO (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is…wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule)

  • Modified – Text at Block 4

    Engine-level DAO governance D…vernance-logic bugs (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-securit…e governance model (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-gov…sting bespoke permission code.

  • Modified – Text at Block 5

    Atomic, composable funding De… quadratic-funding (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/quadratic-vot…equence a user has to babysit.

  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …ber-owned treasury (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasur…hanisms) , and any member can take a pro-rata exit (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) from the treasury at any timat any time, surrendering their tokens and their participation record together for a treasury share set by that same combined weight rather than by token balance alone. For a research collective t…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.0.0Repoint in-content DAO links to canonical typed taxonomy paths (2026-07-17 split carryover)–
4 blocks modified
  • Modified – Text at Block 1 → Block 1

    Topic Why the Radix (https://…· engine-level DAO (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao) governance · a…wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule)

  • Modified – Text at Block 4

    Engine-level DAO governance D…vernance-logic bugs (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-at…e governance model (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models) they a…sting bespoke permission code.

  • Modified – Text at Block 5

    Atomic, composable funding De… quadratic-funding (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/quadratic-voting-and-funding) …equence a user has to babysit.

  • Modified – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper …ber-owned treasury (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) rath…ke a pro-rata exit (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) fr…ve rather than a hypothetical.

v1.0.0Deepen stale (10-day) desci-and-radix from 2 blocks to 6: dedicated IP-NFT / engine-governance / atomic-funding sections with cross-links to desci + dao/concepts pillars, and a contract-consistent live-example section on Caper (bonding-curve raise -> member treasury -> participation-weighted proposals -> pro-rata exit).–
6 blocks added
  • Added – Text at Block 1 → Block 1

    Topic Why the Radix (https://www.radixdlt.com/) asset model fits decentralized science (/wiki/desci/what-is-desci) Core advantages Native IP-NFTs (/wiki/desci/ip-nfts) as first-class resources · engine-level DAO (/wiki/dao/concepts/what-is-a-dao) governance · atomically composable funding Programming model Asset-oriented programming (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-concepts/asset-oriented-programming) (assets are engine primitives, not contract balances) Live example Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) — bonding-curve fundraising into a member-owned treasury Related DeSci DAOs (/wiki/desci/desci-daos) , DeSci funding (/wiki/desci/desci-funding) , Molecule (/wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule)

  • Added – Text at Block 2

    Decentralized science (DeSci) (/wiki/desci/what-is-desci) runs into the same technical walls everywhere: research intellectual property has to be tokenized without becoming drainable smart-contract state, funding flows (matching rounds, milestone releases, IP fractionalization) have to execute without half-completing, and the DAOs (/wiki/desci/desci-daos) that coordinate it need governance that can't be gamed at the application layer. Radix (https://www.radixdlt.com/) , a layer-1 built around asset-oriented programming (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-concepts/asset-oriented-programming) , addresses those three problems at the protocol level rather than leaving each project to re-solve them in Solidity. This page maps the concrete synergies and points to a live example.

  • Added – Text at Block 3

    Native IP-NFTs, not contract state On most chains an IP-NFT (/wiki/desci/ip-nfts) is a balance recorded inside a smart contract, reachable through the token-approval (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-concepts/native-assets-vs-token-approvals) pattern — the same pattern behind the majority of DeFi drains, where a malicious or buggy approve lets an attacker move assets the owner never meant to release. On Radix an IP-NFT is a native resource held in a vault, the same kind of first-class object as the network's own token. It cannot be moved without an explicit, visible instruction in the transaction manifest (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-protocols/transaction-manifests) the owner signs, it shows up directly in the Radix Wallet (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-protocols/radix-wallet) , and it composes with any protocol without granting a standing approval. For research IP whose provenance and custody are the whole point, "assets can't be drained via approval exploits" is a material property, not a nicety.

  • Added – Text at Block 4

    Engine-level DAO governance DeSci DAOs on Radix express governance through access rules and auth zones (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-concepts/access-rules-and-auth-zones) — multi-sig, role-based, and threshold controls enforced by the Radix Engine (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-protocols/radix-engine) itself, not re-implemented in each application's code. Because the rule that "only the review committee's badge can release these funds" is checked by the engine on every call, a whole class of governance-logic bugs (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-security-and-governance-attacks) simply cannot be written. The same mechanism gives DeSci projects a clean way to run the governance model (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-governance-models) they actually want — badge-gated peer review, staged custody of an IP-NFT, or a member vote — without trusting bespoke permission code.

  • Added – Text at Block 5

    Atomic, composable funding DeSci funding mechanisms (/wiki/desci/desci-funding) are often multi-step: match a quadratic-funding (/wiki/dao/concepts/quadratic-voting-and-funding) round, release a milestone tranche, split royalties across IP-token holders. On Radix these run inside a single transaction manifest (https://radix.wiki/contents/tech/core-protocols/transaction-manifests) that either commits in full or aborts entirely — no partial failures, no funds stuck between steps. That atomicity is what lets a raise, a treasury deposit, and a governance-badge mint happen as one indivisible action rather than a fragile sequence a user has to babysit.

  • Added – Text at Block 6

    A live example: Caper Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) is a Radix-native protocol that puts these properties to work for exactly the DeSci pattern of "raise money for a venture, then let the people who funded it govern and exit." A caper raises through a bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) — contributors mint tokens along a deterministic price curve, and the proceeds accrue into a member-owned treasury (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-treasury-management) rather than a founder's wallet. Funded projects are then steered by on-chain proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) whose weight combines token balance with earned participation (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) , and any member can take a pro-rata exit (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) from the treasury at any time. For a research collective that wants a fair on-chain raise, member governance, and a standing right to leave — the recurring asks of a DeSci DAO (/wiki/desci/desci-daos) — it is a concrete demonstration of the Radix synergies above rather than a hypothetical.