How Caper approaches this Mar… participation-weighted figure – the canonical formula w = (t · v) / (V · T) multiplies: it grows with a member's holdings byand with the soulbound record v they have actually accrued – one per ranked ballo…ever voted captures no control (verified against compute_vote_weight in contracts/common/src/lib.rs). And any member who has voted…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

Project Marinade Finance Cate…overnance Marinade DAO (mDAO) —– locked-MNDE voting on Realms…nce (https://marinade.finance)

Marinade is a stake-automation…ace and by MNDE token-holders —– the delegation-strategy-as-g…ting-and-delegation) pattern.

What Marinade is Marinade off…2–3 days): - Marinade Native —– a non-custodial delegation sy…isk. - Liquid staking (mSOL) —– the user's SOL is pooled and …1 (https://marinade.finance) .

The Stake Auction Marketplace … ways: - Static bids (CPMPE) —– a fixed cost per 1,000 SOL de…d. - Dynamic commission bids —– a basis-point share of the re…ators are ranked by max_yield —– the total yield they can offe…erview/stake-auction-market) .

Governance: the Marinade DAO …cess to the token's utilities —– a vote-lock design in the sam…et the parameters that matter —– the SAM per-validator cap, bo…sury use, and product changes —– which keeps the delegation po…NDE has a 700M maximum supply.

Where Marinade fits Marinade …/wiki/daos/staking/ether-fi) —– and, one layer out, EigenLay…epts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

How Caper approaches this Mar…participation-weighted figure —– the canonical formula w = (t …(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this Mar… contracts/common/src/lib.rs).And any member who has voted c…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this Mar…n/src/lib.rs). And any member who has voted can always exit (/blog/the-exit-right) , redeeming a pro-rata slice of the treasury sized by…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this Mar…– one per ranked ballot cast, plus 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg of a trade – so a bag that arrived by transfer, never traded andwith trades and transfers accruing none – so a bag whose holder has never voted, captures no control (verified…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this Mar…iplies a member's holdings by how much they have actually voted, so a large passthe soulbound record v they have actually accrued – one per ranked ballot cast, plus 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg of a trade – so a bag that arrived bag aloney transfer, never traded and never voted, captures no control (verified…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

The Stake Auction Marketplace … (inflation, MEV (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) , and block rewa…erview/stake-auction-market) .

Where Marinade fits Marinade …ork sibling Jito (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) , which pairs it…alogues are Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) (dominant-s…et), Rocket Pool (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/rocket-pool) (permiss…s), and ether.fi (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/ether-fi) — and, one … out, EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) 's restaki…epts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

How Caper approaches this Mar…pute_vote_weight in contracts/logiccommon/src/lib.rs). And any member c…vote weight (the exit path in the same contractcontracts/logic/src/lib.rs requires both the governance …(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

Governance: the Marinade DAO … (https://realms.today/) and SPL-Governance (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/spl-governance) , so proposal rules are enforc…NDE has a 700M maximum supply.

Project Marinade Finance Category Liquid & native staking (Solana) Token MNDE (governance) · mSOL (liquid-staking receipt) Chain Solana Governance Marinade DAO (mDAO) — locked-MNDE voting on Realms / SPL Governance (https://realms.today/) Launched 2021 Status 🟢 Active Website marinade.finance (https://marinade.finance)

Marinade is a stake-automation protocol on Solana (https://solana.com) and one of the network's earliest and largest liquid-staking DAOs. It spreads a depositor's SOL across a competitively-selected set of validators and returns either a non-custodial native stake or the liquid receipt token mSOL. What makes Marinade a governance case study rather than just a staking product is that the delegation itself is the thing being governed: which validators receive stake, and on what terms, is decided by an on-chain marketplace and by MNDE token-holders — the delegation-strategy-as-governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/voting-and-delegation) pattern.

What Marinade is Marinade offers two ways to stake, both driven by the same validator-selection logic and paying rewards each Solana epoch (~2–3 days): - Marinade Native — a non-custodial delegation system where the SOL never leaves the user's own stake accounts; Marinade only sets the delegation. There is no receipt token and no smart-contract custody risk. - Liquid staking (mSOL) — the user's SOL is pooled and they receive mSOL, a value-accruing token that can be redeployed across Solana DeFi ( Kamino (https://kamino.finance) , Orca (https://www.orca.so) , Raydium (https://raydium.io) ) while continuing to earn staking rewards. Around these sit Marinade Select (a curated, verified validator set aimed at institutions), instant unstake (a liquidity pool that lets stakers exit without waiting for the epoch cooldown, for a fee), and protected staking-reward mechanisms. Marinade reports 150,000+ holders and has operated since 2021 (https://marinade.finance) .

The Stake Auction Marketplace (SAM) SAM is Marinade's distinctive mechanism and the clearest example of turning validator selection into an open market. Instead of a hand-tuned scoring formula deciding who gets stake, validators bid for it in two ways: - Static bids (CPMPE) — a fixed cost per 1,000 SOL delegated per epoch, paid out of the validator's on-chain bond. - Dynamic commission bids — a basis-point share of the rewards the validator earns (inflation, MEV (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) , and block rewards) passed back to stakers, without changing the validator's public commission rate. Validators are ranked by max_yield — the total yield they can offer stakers at a given stake level (commission plus bid). Marinade runs a last-price (uniform-clearing) auction: stake is allocated top-down until it runs out, and the realized_yield paid to everyone is set by the lowest-ranked winning validator. Validators who bid above that clearing price only pay enough to match it, not their full bid. A single validator is capped at 15% of Marinade's total stake (set by MIP-19 (https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-protocol/protocol-overview/stake-auction-market) ) to preserve decentralization. The full mechanism is documented in the SAM overview (https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-protocol/protocol-overview/stake-auction-market) .

Governance: the Marinade DAO The Marinade DAO (mDAO) is constituted of MNDE holders who lock their MNDE in governance; locked MNDE confers voting power and access to the token's utilities — a vote-lock design in the same family as vote-escrow tokenomics (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) , layered on top of token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) . Voting runs on-chain through Realms (https://realms.today/) and SPL-Governance, so proposal rules are enforced by smart contracts and the record is public. Marinade Improvement Proposals (MIPs) set the parameters that matter — the SAM per-validator cap, bond and commission rules, treasury use, and product changes — which keeps the delegation policy accountable to token-holders rather than to a closed operator. MNDE has a 700M maximum supply.

Where Marinade fits Marinade is the pure liquid-staking-DAO archetype on Solana, distinct from its network sibling Jito (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) , which pairs its JitoSOL LST with an MEV block-engine and tip market. On Ethereum the closest analogues are Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) (dominant-share LST with an off-chain operator set), Rocket Pool (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/rocket-pool) (permissionless node operators), and ether.fi (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/ether-fi) — and, one layer out, EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) 's restaking. Marinade's contribution to the design space is the auction: it replaces a governed scoring formula with a market that lets validators compete on yield, which is a cleaner answer to the "who decides where the stake goes, and can they be captured" question that sinks many DAOs (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

How Caper approaches this Marinade's design answers a question Caper answers differently: how do you keep the people steering a pool of value honest? Marinade uses an open auction plus locked-MNDE voting; a caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) instead makes leaving the discipline. Governance weight is not raw token balance but a participation-weighted figure — the canonical formula w = (t · v) / (V · T) multiplies a member's holdings by how much they have actually voted, so a large passive bag alone captures no control (verified against compute_vote_weight in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). And any member can always exit (/blog/the-exit-right) , redeeming a pro-rata slice of the treasury sized by that same vote weight (the exit path in the same contract requires both the governance and the soulbound vote token, and computes the share pre-burn). Where Marinade leans on markets and vote-locks to align a delegation strategy, Caper leans on a credible, always-open exit to keep a treasury's stewards accountable. See how Caper proposals work (/wiki/governance/proposals) .