ETHFI: the governance token E…erfi-dao.eth) Snapshot space —– 8,6437 followers and 15 proposals wh… off Snapshot's public API on 1 Septem7 October 2026 —– though staking re-delegates a…previously made through Agora.

What the record shows Everyth…ing rather than decorative. Fourifteen proposals, and an elector…rsETH's backing 55 3,163,434 30 Aug 2026 Programmatic ETHFI Buybacks & Ecosystem Growth 80 1,141,999 The weight cast per proposal i…hly flat across two years – 1.21M to 5.1M ETHFI throughout – w…sting it fell from 3,556 to 55 in April 2026, a decline of 98.5%. The 55 addresses that voted in April 2026 areAugust 2026 vote drew 80, which is 0.6493% of the space's 8,6432 followers. This is the shape …r whether enough people did. The August 2026 vote and its largest voter The fifteenth proposal (https://snapshot.org/#/etherfi-dao.eth/proposal/0xed61adff5103b4e50be49b28fca8ecbbea9d685141d2d5a34d1d24232ac91891) , opened on 30 August 2026 by one of the space's two admin addresses, asked holders to confirm three things: that ether.fi Labs pays the Foundation a share of its monthly revenue from card interchange, swaps and staking (about never whether enough people did. .33m in the month before), which the Foundation spends on ETHFI every week through automated TWAP purchases rather than at its discretion; that every user reward on ether.fi is paid in ETHFI bought on the market; and that the Foundation may draw up to 20m ETHFI it already holds as a buffer when purchases fall short. It closed on 3 September with 1,141,999 ETHFI for and none against, cast by 80 addresses, 1.14 times the quorum. The holder who carried 58.9% of the April vote did not vote. The largest voter this time cast 341,591 ETHFI, and without it the remaining 79 addresses would have cast 800,408, short of the 1,000,000 quorum with no vote against. A weight quorum lets one holder validate a vote alone, and it lets one holder's absence sink a vote nobody opposed. As with April, the proposal has no thread on the forum: its /latest.json, read on 7 October 2026, still lists the October 2025 buy-back as the newest proposal topic. The forum stopped before the p…oth listed in the table above.

How Caper approaches this eth…hat-is-a-caper) narrows that trust gap in two places. First, v Vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) is a product of what a member holds and how they have participated – soearned through taking part as well as through holdings, still count, buto a large bag alone cannot decide an outcome without the participation term. Second, a proposal's on-chain execution is bound to a settled, clamped winner, so what a multisig could do is constrained by what the ledger tallied – the off-chain result and the on-chain accapture a vote. And the tally settles on-ledger, where execution (/wiki/governance/execution) can only carry out the winning option cannot diverge. It is a different point on the same design axid anyone can trigger it, so no multisig stands bether.fi is walking down in phasesween the result and the action.

ETHFI: the governance token E…. Holders can also stake ETHFI,(receiving sETHFI) to earn incentives and unlock membership tiers via the staking docs (https://etherfi.gitbook.io/etherfi/ethfi/ethfi-staking) . The staking documentation (https://etherfi.gitbook.io/gov/ethfi/ethfi-staking) describes a vault that restakes the deposit on Karak for loyalty and Karak points rather than paying a share of protocol revenue, and it is explicit that staking does not cost the holder their vote: staked ETHFI votes through the etherfi-dao.eth (https://snapshot.org/#/etherfi-dao.eth) Snapshot space — 8,637 followers and 15 proposals when the space was read off Snapshot's public API on 1 September 2026 — though staking re-delegates away from any delegation previously made through Agora.

Project ether.fi Category Liq… DAO Governance token ETHFI (fixed supplyannounced cap 1,000,000,000 · 998,535,999 live) Liquid restaking tokens eET…layer EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) Voting …poser + Multi-Sig Committee) Proposal rights Allowlisted – Snapshot onlyMembers, three authorized addresses Vote weight ETHFI + sETHFI on Ethereum and Arbitrum, as balance and as ERC20Votes Launched Protocol 2023 · ETHFI…fillama.com/protocol/ether.fi)

Overview ether.fi (https://e…rough EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) . Unlike c…ond only to Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) by total value locked —– live figures are tracked on …oken through the ether.fi DAO.

From staking to restaking eth…tocols like Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) (stETH) and Rocket Pool (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/rocket-pool) (rETH) i… into EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) , where th…in exchange for extra rewards —– and takes on the extra slashi…. Its EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) dependenc…tly coupled in this directory —– ether.fi is consistently amon…ingle sources of restaked ETH.

How governance works ether.fi…nal to ETHFI (and sETHFI) held; holders can delegate (https://vote.ether.fi/delegates) their voting power to others, counted across Ethereum and Arbitrum both as a raw balance and as on-chain ERC20Votes weight. Delegation happens by calling delegate() on the token; the space registers no Snapshot delegation portal, and the Foundation's own portal at vote.ether.fi/delegates is no longer publicly readable (HTTP 401, checked 13 August 2026). - Who may propose: not holders. The Snapshot space sets onlyMembers, so only three allowlisted addresses can open a vote (see below).

The Foundation-and-multisig mo…n-chain Governor (/wiki/daos/organizations/infrastructure/uma) -style DAO…ystem of active contributors" —– a candid progressive-decentra…s in how DAOs fail (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

Governance in practice Beyond…ion and token-value questions —– including proposals to deploy…reasury toward ETHFI buybacks —– have been brought to the DAO'…ecentralization promise above.

How Caper approaches this eth…nd how they have participated —– so holdings still count, but …ed by what the ledger tallied —– the off-chain result and the ….fi is walking down in phases.

What the record shows Everything the Foundation documents about this DAO is checkable at source. Snapshot's public GraphQL hub (https://hub.snapshot.org/graphql) returns the etherfi-dao.eth space's live configuration and its full proposal history, and the chains return the token state underneath it. The readings below were taken on 13 August 2026 – Ethereum block 25,742,725, Arbitrum block 493,948,614. The published numbers hold The space's voting.period is 345,600 seconds, which is exactly the four days the Foundation documents, and voting.quorum is 1,000,000, matching the “1M ETHFI” threshold quoted above. Both are settings on the voting venue rather than protocol code, so the space's admins could change either without a vote – but as configured they are what the DAO says they are. The space has 8,632 followers and 14 proposals. Proposal rights are an allowlist, not a threshold The space sets filters.onlyMembers: true, so a proposal can only be opened by an address on its authorized list, and that list holds three entries: two admins and one member. The Foundation's Proposer role is therefore not a convention the community observes, it is a permission at the voting venue, and no ETHFI balance confers it. A proposal threshold denominated in tokens can always be met by a large enough holder, and a refundable deposit only prices the attempt; an allowlist is the one gate a balance cannot pass. It is the strict end of the space the wiki surveys under proposal throttles and rate limits (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-throttles-and-rate-limits) , and it is what makes the progressive-decentralization (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization) framing above load-bearing rather than decorative. Fourteen proposals, and an electorate that emptied The complete history, read from the hub: Opened Proposal Voters ETHFI cast 19 Jun 2024 ETHFI Buyback and Liquidity Pool Seeding 1,372 2,007,327 25 Jun 2024 Season 3 and airdrop token allocation 3,556 2,616,009 2 Jul 2024 Staking Contract Implementation 2,212 2,063,589 7 Aug 2024 Increase to Buyback and LP Seeding Allocation 540 1,252,284 15 Sep 2024 Seasonal Rewards and LRT² 403 1,494,242 22 Oct 2024 Incentives on Centralized Exchanges 423 1,297,244 18 Nov 2024 Season 4 ETHFI allocation 414 1,211,834 16 Dec 2024 Enhancing ETHFI Utility and Liquidity 445 1,163,708 23 Dec 2024 Treasury diversification into real-world assets 379 1,752,648 28 Jan 2025 Season 5 370 2,552,463 25 Apr 2025 Withdrawal Revenue Buyback Program 134 1,254,739 29 May 2025 ether.fi Member Rewards 164 1,159,415 30 Oct 2025 Treasury Deployment for ETHFI Buy-Back Program 172 5,121,854 23 Apr 2026 Treasury Contribution to restore rsETH's backing 55 3,163,434 The weight cast per proposal is roughly flat across two years – 1.2M to 5.1M ETHFI throughout – while the number of addresses casting it fell from 3,556 to 55, a decline of 98.5%. The 55 addresses that voted in April 2026 are 0.64% of the space's 8,632 followers. This is the shape the wiki describes under voter apathy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) , but with a detail worth isolating: the collapse is in participants, not in participation weight. A weight quorum cannot detect the difference On the April 2026 proposal, 55 addresses cast 3,163,434 ETHFI between them. The largest single voter, 0x9E27…0bc5, cast 1,862,679 – 58.9% of everything cast, and on its own 1.86× the 1,000,000 quorum. The two largest together carried 79.5%. Because quorum here is a test of weight and not of headcount, an electorate can empty out entirely without the threshold ever registering it: one holder of that size clears quorum alone, and the vote is valid. That is the structural point behind quorum and threshold design (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) – a weight quorum measures whether enough tokens showed up, never whether enough people did. The forum stopped before the proposals did The documented process says proposals are posted on the Discourse forum (https://governance.ether.fi) “with context and discussion before and during the voting window.” The forum's newest topic, read from its own /latest.json on 13 August 2026, is the buy-back proposal of 30 October 2025. The April 2026 Snapshot vote has no thread there at all: a Discourse search for rsETH, the subject of that proposal, returns zero topics. The DAO's most recent decision was taken at the venue but not at the forum the process names, which is the durability problem the wiki tracks in on-chain vs off-chain governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) : the binding artifact and the deliberative record are held by two different systems, and only one of them was used. Weight is counted twice over, on two chains The space runs eight strategies, which read as duplicates until the network field is included. They are four token positions – ETHFI and sETHFI, on Ethereum and on Arbitrum (/wiki/daos/networks/arbitrum-dao) – each counted by two different accounting methods, erc20-balance-of for tokens sitting in a wallet and erc20-votes for weight that has been delegated on-chain. ETHFI is 0xfe0c…c0eb (https://etherscan.io/token/0xfe0c30065b384f05761f15d0cc899d4f9f9cc0eb) on Ethereum and 0x7189…dc27 on Arbitrum; sETHFI is 0x86B5…0161 on both. Aggregating an electorate across chains this way is the pattern covered under cross-chain governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/cross-chain-governance) . Reading both methods, rather than ERC20Votes alone, is what makes the tally work. The largest voter above holds 1,862,678.93 ETHFI on Ethereum, and its delegates() returns the zero address: it has never delegated, not even to itself, so its getVotes() reads zero. A space configured only on ERC20Votes would have scored its single largest participant at nothing. This is the activation gap the wiki documents under voting power activation (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/voting-power-activation) , and here it is answered at the venue rather than left for holders to fix. Supply, against the announcement The March 2024 announcement quoted above states a fixed 1,000,000,000 ETHFI with “no further issuance.” Read directly, totalSupply() on Ethereum is 998,535,999 ETHFI and on Arbitrum 7,506,364; sETHFI's Ethereum supply is 91,687,309. The announced figure is a cap and a no-issuance commitment, so the live Ethereum number can only fall below it, and it has – by 1,464,001 tokens. The DAO has passed two buyback programs in that window, in April and October 2025, both listed in the table above.

The Foundation-and-multisig mo…AOs fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

Project ether.fi Category Liquid restaking protocol · DAO Governance token ETHFI (fixed supply 1,000,000,000) Liquid restaking tokens eETH · weETH (wrapped) Restaking layer EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) Voting Snapshot (https://snapshot.org/#/etherfi-dao.eth) (etherfi-dao.eth) · 4-day window · 1M ETHFI quorum Stewardship ether.fi Foundation (Proposer + Multi-Sig Committee) Launched Protocol 2023 · ETHFI airdrop 18 March 2024 Status 🟢 Active Links ether.fi (https://ether.fi) · docs (https://etherfi.gitbook.io/etherfi) · governance forum (https://governance.ether.fi) · DeFiLlama (https://defillama.com/protocol/ether.fi)

Overview ether.fi (https://ether.fi) is a non-custodial liquid restaking protocol on Ethereum. A user deposits ETH and receives eETH (or its wrapped, DeFi-composable form weETH), a liquid token that represents a position which is staked on the beacon chain and simultaneously restaked through EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) . Unlike custodial staking services, node-operation keys stay with the staker rather than the protocol, which ether.fi frames as its core "non-custodial" design (see the protocol documentation (https://etherfi.gitbook.io/etherfi) ). By 2026 ether.fi had grown into the largest liquid restaking protocol and one of the largest liquid-staking protocols overall, second only to Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) by total value locked — live figures are tracked on DeFiLlama (https://defillama.com/protocol/ether.fi) . Governance and the protocol treasury are directed by holders of the ETHFI token through the ether.fi DAO.

From staking to restaking ether.fi sits one layer beyond classic liquid staking. Protocols like Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) (stETH) and Rocket Pool (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/rocket-pool) (rETH) issue a liquid receipt for ETH that is only validating Ethereum. ether.fi's eETH is additionally restaked into EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) , where the same ETH secures actively validated services (AVSs) in exchange for extra rewards — and takes on the extra slashing surface that restaking introduces. This makes ether.fi the reference example of the liquid restaking token (LRT) archetype: a governance-bearing DAO wrapped around a staking position whose risk and reward are a function of a separate restaking market it does not itself control. Its EigenLayer (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/eigenlayer) dependency is why the two projects are tightly coupled in this directory — ether.fi is consistently among EigenLayer's largest single sources of restaked ETH.

ETHFI: the governance token ETHFI is the ether.fi DAO's governance and coordination token, announced in March 2024 (https://etherfi.medium.com/announcing-ethfi-the-ether-fi-governance-token-8cae7327763a) . Key parameters from ether.fi's own announcement: - Fixed supply: 1,000,000,000 ETHFI, with "no further issuance." - Initial circulating supply: 115,200,000 ETHFI (11.52% of max supply) at launch. - Airdrops: Season 1 distributed 6% of supply, claimable from 18 March 2024 over a 90-day window; Season 2 distributed a further 5% (snapshot 15 March 2024), with unclaimed Season 1 tokens rolling into Season 2. Whale wallets were subject to a 3-month vest. - Full distribution is scheduled to complete by the end of 2030. The announcement scopes what ETHFI actually decides: the Grants Program, "protocol longevity, vision, and key economic parameters, such as protocol fees," greenlighting of node operators and contributor permissions, and treasury-diversification activities. Holders can also stake ETHFI (receiving sETHFI) to earn incentives and unlock membership tiers via the staking docs (https://etherfi.gitbook.io/etherfi/ethfi/ethfi-staking) .

How governance works ether.fi's process is documented in the official governance resources (https://governance.ether.fi/t/ether-fi-governance-official-resources/2140) : - Discussion: proposals are posted on the Discourse forum (https://governance.ether.fi) "with context and discussion before and during the voting window." - Voting: votes are cast on Snapshot (etherfi-dao.eth) (https://snapshot.org/#/etherfi-dao.eth) with a 4-day window. A vote can be opened at the same time a proposal is submitted. - Quorum & threshold: "1M ETHFI is required for quorum in order for a vote to be valid," and a proposal "passes if it receives at least 1M ETHFI in approval votes." - Weight & delegation: voting power is proportional to ETHFI (and sETHFI) held; holders can delegate (https://vote.ether.fi/delegates) their voting power to others.

The Foundation-and-multisig model ether.fi separates deciding from executing through the ether.fi Foundation (https://etherfi.gitbook.io/gov/ether.fi-foundation) . A Proposer "submits proposals for the protocol changes and governance decisions, including treasury spend, initiating community votes for token holder approval." A Multi-Sig Committee then "implements these decisions, handles emergency actions, and ensures proposals align with the Foundation's objectives." This is a distinct archetype from the fully on-chain Governor (/wiki/daos/organizations/infrastructure/uma) -style DAOs elsewhere in this directory: the binding tally is an off-chain Snapshot vote, and a trusted multisig carries out the result. The Foundation states that "further governance mechanisms will be rolled out in phases," aiming toward "full decentralization with an ecosystem of active contributors" — a candid progressive-decentralization posture rather than a claim of already-trustless execution. That gap between an off-chain vote and a multisig that executes it is exactly the failure mode this wiki catalogues in how DAOs fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/how-daos-fail) .

Governance in practice Beyond parameter changes, the ether.fi treasury and its product surface (Stake, Liquid, and the Cash card) give holders real economic levers. Treasury-diversification and token-value questions — including proposals to deploy treasury toward ETHFI buybacks — have been brought to the DAO's Snapshot (https://snapshot.org/#/etherfi-dao.eth) , exercising the "key economic parameters" and "treasury diversification" mandate the token was given. Because these are Foundation-executed multisig actions rather than trustless on-chain execution, they are a live test of the phased-decentralization promise above.

How Caper approaches this ether.fi shows the standard shape of a large DeFi DAO: an off-chain Snapshot vote sets intent, and a Foundation multisig is trusted to carry it out. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) narrows that trust gap in two places. First, vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) is a product of what a member holds and how they have participated — so holdings still count, but a large bag alone cannot decide an outcome without the participation term. Second, a proposal's on-chain execution is bound to a settled, clamped winner, so what a multisig could do is constrained by what the ledger tallied — the off-chain result and the on-chain action cannot diverge. It is a different point on the same design axis ether.fi is walking down in phases.