References - Ethena documentation —– USDe backing, delta-neutral d…oundation.com) - The Block —– BlackRock's Aladdin adds deep…tnership-usde) - The Block —– USDtb, backed by BlackRock's …ken-goes-live) - CoinGecko —– Ethena (ENA) market data (htt…coingecko.com/en/coins/ethena)

How Caper approaches this Eth… voted away. And the decisive slicepart of voting weight can be earned but never transferred: the canonical weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) (verified in contracts/common/src/lib.rs, compute_vote_weight), where v is a soulbound proof-of-vote token – fractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, so the admin escape hatch can distribute it in any denomination)it rests on a soulbound proof-of-vote token, non-transferable, and minted one per ballot cast and by nothing else –, and exit (/wiki/dao-governan…-and-exit-rights) redemption reuses that same earned weight before burning the toke…g you accrue by participating.

Ethena issues USDe (https://e… dollar-like assets in crypto —– supply in the multiple billio…ngecko.com/en/coins/ethena) ) —– while ENA, the governance tok… interesting governance story.

How USDe holds its peg USDe i…ut introduces different risks —– funding rates can turn negati…t Ethena's governance decides.

sUSDe —– the savings asset and its yie…caps the downside for stakers —– "sUSDe can only accrue positi…e are not passed on to sUSDe" —– and pushes that cost onto the Reserve Fund instead.

The Reserve Fund Ethena's sol…reasury-management) 's runway —– but here it directly underwrites a live trading book.

Governance: ENA, sENA, and the…te pole to RAI's ungovernance —– here, who sits on the committ…s close to the whole ballgame.

How Caper approaches this Eth…lecoin" is not immutable code —– it is a governed trading book… movable by a governance vote —– governance acts only on a sep…soulbound proof-of-vote token —– fractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXI…llot cast and by nothing else —– and exit (/wiki/dao-governan…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…ght before burning the tokens.Holdings still count (t is a m…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…tional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, because a per-XRD rate cannot mint whole unitsso the admin escape hatch can distribute it in any denomination), non-transferable, minted one per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross value tradedby nothing else — and exit (/wiki/dao-govern…but a well-funded newcomer can onlynot mint its own influence at the published rateall until it starts voting – every v the existing member…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…ulbound proof-of-vote token — zero-divisibilityfractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, because a per-XRD rate cannot mint whole units), non-transferable, minted one…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…but a well-funded newcomer cannot simply buy a controlling share of the influence that steers the treasury only mint its own influence at the published rate – every v the existing members hold stays with them, because the token can never be transferred. Where Ethena concentrates co…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…gh typed PAYOUT/INVEST/DIVEST/VOTEUPGRADE/METADATA proposals, so the reserve tha…cisive slice of voting weight iscan be earned, not bought but never transferred: the canonical weight is w = …e, minted one per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross value traded — and exit (/wiki/dao-governa…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…V · T) (verified in contracts/logiccommon/src/lib.rs, compute_vote_weig…g you accrue by participating.

How Caper approaches this Eth…y through typed PAYOUT/INVEST/DIVEST/VOTE proposals, so the reserve…g you accrue by participating.

Ethena issues USDe (https://e…like Sky (Maker) (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/sky-dao) , Liquity (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/liquity) , or Aave's GHO (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/aave-gho) , and no…f Reflexer's RAI (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/reflexer-rai) , bu… interesting governance story.

How USDe holds its peg USDe i…staked ETH ( Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) 's stETH), B…t Ethena's governance decides.

The Reserve Fund Ethena's sol… or a DAO treasury (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasur…derwrites a live trading book.

How Caper approaches this Eth…V · T) (verified in contracts/src/caper_daologic/src/lib.rs, compute_vote_weight), whe…ot cast — and exit (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…g you accrue by participating.

The Reserve Fund Ethena's sol…treasury (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) 's ru…derwrites a live trading book.

How Caper approaches this Eth…allot cast — and exit (/wiki/governance/exitdaos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) redemption reuses that same…g you accrue by participating.

Name Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) Type Synthetic-dollar issuer · delta-neutral stablecoin protocol Token ENA (governance) · sENA (locked ENA) Products USDe (synthetic dollar), sUSDe (staked savings asset), USDtb (RWA-backed stablecoin) Governance Ethena Foundation · committee-delegated DAO (Risk Committee) Status 🟢 Active Founded 2024 (public mainnet Feb 2024; ENA launched Apr 2024) Website ethena.fi (https://ethena.fi) · docs.ethena.fi (https://docs.ethena.fi)

Ethena issues USDe (https://ethena.fi) , a dollar-denominated synthetic asset that reaches its peg not through fiat in a bank account but through a hedged portfolio of crypto collateral. Ethena's own documentation describes USDe as backed by "a portfolio of assets held by the protocol" and states that it "derives its relative peg stability from holding a diversified portfolio of backing assets and hedging the price-change risk of any volatile holdings" ( docs.ethena.fi (https://docs.ethena.fi) ). That design makes Ethena a distinct archetype in the stablecoin directory: not an over-collateralised CDP like Sky (Maker) (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/sky-dao) , Liquity (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/liquity) , or Aave's GHO (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/aave-gho) , and not the immutable, ungoverned float of Reflexer's RAI (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/reflexer-rai) , but a governed trading operation whose stability depends on a live basis trade. By mid-2026 USDe had grown into one of the largest dollar-like assets in crypto — supply in the multiple billions and cumulative protocol revenue past $250M ( CoinGecko (https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/ethena) ) — while ENA, the governance token, traded well below its 2024 launch high. That gap between a large, working product and a lightly-valued governance token is itself the interesting governance story.

How USDe holds its peg USDe is delta-neutral by construction. Per the protocol docs, "volatile assets, such as spot crypto and tokenised commodities, are paired with a corresponding short derivatives position so that the combined position is delta-neutral and its dollar value remains relatively stable" ( docs.ethena.fi (https://docs.ethena.fi) ). Each USDe is backed by a portfolio that has included staked ETH ( Lido (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/lido-dao) 's stETH), BTC, liquid stablecoins, and real-world assets; the price risk of the volatile leg is hedged with short perpetual-futures and futures positions held at centralised exchanges and off-exchange custodians. The mechanism is a classic cash-and-carry basis trade: long spot, short the perp, collect the funding the market pays to hold that short. It removes directional price exposure but introduces different risks — funding rates can turn negative, exchange counterparties can fail, and collateral must be custodied somewhere. Those are not background details: which exchanges, custodians, and collateral are permitted is exactly what Ethena's governance decides.

sUSDe — the savings asset and its yield Holders who stake USDe receive sUSDe, described by Ethena as "the protocol's autonomously and permissionlessly created globally accessible savings asset." sUSDe is a reward-accruing wrapper: "the USDe value of sUSDe grows on its own" as protocol revenue is added to the pool. Ethena lists the revenue sources as "funding and basis spread… lending revenue… real-world asset yield… liquid stablecoin rewards" ( docs.ethena.fi (https://docs.ethena.fi) ). Crucially, the yield is path-dependent on funding markets. When perpetual funding is richly positive, sUSDe has paid double-digit APYs; when funding compresses or turns negative, yield falls. Ethena's design caps the downside for stakers — "sUSDe can only accrue positive or flat rewards while staking USDe; periods of negative protocol revenue are not passed on to sUSDe" — and pushes that cost onto the Reserve Fund instead.

The Reserve Fund Ethena's solvency backstop is the Reserve Fund: "a pool of assets held by the protocol as an additional margin of safety for USDe." When "protocol revenue would otherwise be negative… the Reserve Fund is designed to bear that cost" ( docs.ethena.fi (https://docs.ethena.fi) ). It absorbs negative-funding regimes and other stress so that the peg and staker yields are insulated from short bursts of loss. The Reserve Fund is where product design and governance meet the balance sheet: its size, composition, and drawdown rules are governed decisions, and the market treats it as the number that says whether USDe can survive a sustained negative-funding stretch. It is the analogue of a CDP protocol's surplus buffer or a DAO treasury (/wiki/daos/concepts/dao-treasury-management) 's runway — but here it directly underwrites a live trading book.

Governance: ENA, sENA, and the committee model ENA is Ethena's governance token; locking it mints sENA, a liquid receipt that earns rewards and remains usable across DeFi. Rather than voting line-by-line on operations, Ethena runs a committee-delegated DAO: "the vast majority of decisions (other than those which the committees deem outside the scope of their remit) are delegated by the DAO to the relevant committees" ( docs.ethena.fi (https://docs.ethena.fi) ). The central body is the Risk Committee, whose "mandate is to generally identify, evaluate, and manage risk within the ecosystem," staffed by rotating members on fixed terms, with proposals subject to a multi-day deliberation window before they take effect ( gov.ethenafoundation.com (https://gov.ethenafoundation.com) ). In practice the committee steers the levers that make or break a delta-neutral dollar: the whitelist of exchanges and custodians, the collateral mix, hedge venues, and Reserve Fund policy. This makes Ethena a near-opposite pole to RAI's ungovernance — here, who sits on the committee governing where billions of collateral rests is close to the whole ballgame.

USDtb, BUIDL, and institutional distribution Alongside USDe, Ethena issues USDtb, a more conservative stablecoin backed primarily by BlackRock's tokenised money-market fund BUIDL (https://www.theblock.co/post/331013/ethenas-much-anticipated-usdtb-stablecoin-backed-by-blackrocks-buidl-token-goes-live) and issued via Anchorage Digital, with 24/7 atomic swaps into BUIDL built with Securitize (https://www.theblock.co/post/358799/ethena-labs-securitize-enable-24-7-atomic-swaps-between-usdtb-and-blackrocks-tokenized-fund) . In June 2026 BlackRock and Ethena deepened that collaboration (https://www.theblock.co/post/405670/blackrock-ethena-partnership-usde) , giving institutions on BlackRock's Aladdin platform greater access to Ethena's products and adding a $100M liquidity facility through Securitize. The two-product split is itself a governance statement: USDe carries the basis-trade yield and its risks; USDtb is the RWA-backed, distribution-friendly instrument for institutions that want a tokenised dollar without the hedge. Both live under the same DAO and committee structure.

How Caper approaches this Ethena is the clearest case for why who holds decisive influence matters. Its "stablecoin" is not immutable code — it is a governed trading book, and the committee that sets the exchange whitelist, collateral mix, and Reserve Fund policy effectively directs where billions of dollars of backing sit. Capture that committee and you capture the protocol. A caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) draws the line differently. The bonding-curve collateral that backs a caper's token is held in a protocol-controlled vault and is never movable by a governance vote — governance acts only on a separate treasury, and only through typed PAYOUT/INVEST/VOTE proposals, so the reserve that underwrites redemptions can't be voted away. And the decisive slice of voting weight is earned, not bought: the canonical weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) (verified in contracts/src/caper_dao.rs, compute_vote_weight), where v is a soulbound proof-of-vote token — zero-divisibility, non-transferable, minted one per ballot cast — and exit (/wiki/governance/exit) redemption reuses that same weight before burning the tokens. Holdings still count (t is a multiplier, so this is not "bagless"), but a well-funded newcomer cannot simply buy a controlling share of the influence that steers the treasury. Where Ethena concentrates consequential control in an elected committee over a live book, a caper keeps its collateral untouchable and makes control something you accrue by participating.

References - Ethena documentation — USDe backing, delta-neutral design, sUSDe, Reserve Fund, governance (https://docs.ethena.fi) - Ethena Foundation governance forum (https://gov.ethenafoundation.com) - The Block — BlackRock's Aladdin adds deeper support for Ethena's stablecoin products (June 2026) (https://www.theblock.co/post/405670/blackrock-ethena-partnership-usde) - The Block — USDtb, backed by BlackRock's BUIDL, goes live (https://www.theblock.co/post/331013/ethenas-much-anticipated-usdtb-stablecoin-backed-by-blackrocks-buidl-token-goes-live) - CoinGecko — Ethena (ENA) market data (https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/ethena)