Name ConstitutionDAO Type Sin…hereum) Active November 2021 —– roughly one week Goal Win a …d and refunded Token $PEOPLE —– a redeem-only refund token, "…iki/daos/investment/pleasrdao)

ConstitutionDAO was the canoni…days around one concrete goal —– buying a rare first-printing … U.S. Constitution at auction —– raised roughly $47 million in…aos) can assemble a treasury —– and a case study in the opera…ms that speed leaves unsolved.

The one-week raise In November…ew an estimated 17,000 people —– many making their first-ever …ance framework in place first.

The auction and the loss At th…display of a fragile document —– so it could not simply bid it…e well-capitalized competitor.

Dissolution, refunds, and the …s://www.constitutiondao.com) —– contributors could claim thei…reasury-management) problems —– gas, custody, coordination, wind-down —– that a purpose-built DAO has to solve, not assume away.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The … was never a governance share —– the official site is explicit…mecoin long after dissolution —– a reminder that a token can o…nto working, tradeable shares —– where ConstitutionDAO's token…ame a live claim on the asset.

How Caper approaches this Cons…gle goal at astonishing speed —– but its token was a pure refu…i/governance/proposals) , and —– verified in the contract —– every member who has voted ho…o group refund vote is needed —– each member simply takes their share.

How Caper approaches this Cons… — every member who has voted or traded holds a standing exit right (…mber simply takes their share.

How Caper approaches this Cons… — every member who has voted or traded holds a standing exit right (…mber simply takes their share.

How Caper approaches this Cons…n the contract — every member who has voted holds a standing exit right (…mber simply takes their share.

Name ConstitutionDAO Type Sin…ed $CAR (SHL0MS) (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/shl0ms-car) , Nouns DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/nouns-dao) , PleasrDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/investment/pleasrdao)

ConstitutionDAO was the canoni…e (or "flash") DAO (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is…a crowdfunding DAO (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/types-o…ms that speed leaves unsolved.

Dissolution, refunds, and the …sury and operations (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasur…has to solve, not assume away.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The …a DAO's tokenomics (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenom…ple to PleasrDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/investment/pleasrdao) , the co…ame a live claim on the asset.

How Caper approaches this Cons…tanding exit right (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit… they can redeem their tokens for a pro-rata share of the treasuryand vote record for a treasury share sized by their canonical vote weight at any time, individually, wi…mber simply takes their share.

ConstitutionDAO was the canoni…h") DAO (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao) : an organizati…ding DAO (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/types-of-daos) can assemble a…ms that speed leaves unsolved.

Dissolution, refunds, and the …erations (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) prob…has to solve, not assume away.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The …kenomics (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) has to answer…ple to PleasrDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/investment/pleasrdao) , the collector DAO…ame a live claim on the asset.

How Caper approaches this Cons…it right (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : t…mber simply takes their share.

Name ConstitutionDAO Type Sin…box.money/#/p/constitutiondao) Related $CAR (SHL0MS) (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/shl0ms-car) , Nouns DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/nouns-dao) , PleasrDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/investment/pleasrdao)

ConstitutionDAO was the canoni…e (or "flash") DAO (/wiki/daos/concepts/what-is-a-dao) : an …a crowdfunding DAO (/wiki/daos/concepts/types-of-daos) can …ms that speed leaves unsolved.

Dissolution, refunds, and the …sury and operations (/wiki/daos/concepts/dao-treasury-managem…has to solve, not assume away.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The …a DAO's tokenomics (/wiki/daos/concepts/dao-tokenomics) has…ample to PleasrDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/pleasrdao) , the collector DA…ame a live claim on the asset.

How Caper approaches this Cons…tanding exit right (/wiki/daos/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-r…mber simply takes their share.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The …ao-tokenomics) has to answer. It is the counterexample to Plea…ame a live claim on the asset.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The …ao-tokenomics) has to answer.is the counterexample to PleasrDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/pleasrdao) , the collector DAO that won its trophies and fractionalized them into working, tradeable shares — where ConstitutionDAO's token became a refund IOU, PleasrDAO's became a live claim on the asset.

Name ConstitutionDAO Type Single-purpose ("flash") crowdfunding DAO (Ethereum) Active November 2021 — roughly one week Goal Win a first-printing copy of the U.S. Constitution at Sotheby's (https://www.sothebys.com/) Raised ~$47M in ETH from ~17,000 contributors (median ~$217) Crowdfunding rail Juicebox protocol (https://juicebox.money/#/p/constitutiondao) Outcome Outbid by Ken Griffin (~$43.2M); dissolved and refunded Token $PEOPLE — a redeem-only refund token, "no rights, governance, or utility" Site constitutiondao.com (https://www.constitutiondao.com) · Juicebox project (https://juicebox.money/#/p/constitutiondao)

ConstitutionDAO was the canonical single-purpose (or "flash") DAO (/wiki/dao/concepts/what-is-a-dao) : an organization that formed in days around one concrete goal — buying a rare first-printing copy of the U.S. Constitution at auction — raised roughly $47 million in ETH from about 17,000 contributors, lost the sale, and then dissolved and refunded its backers. Its founders called it "a beautiful experiment in a single-purpose DAO." (https://www.constitutiondao.com) It remains the industry's most-cited example of how fast a crowdfunding DAO (/wiki/dao/concepts/types-of-daos) can assemble a treasury — and a case study in the operational problems that speed leaves unsolved.

The one-week raise In November 2021 an ad-hoc group crowdfunded the bid entirely through the Juicebox protocol (https://juicebox.money/#/p/constitutiondao) , a no-code Ethereum funding rail: contributors sent ETH to the project's Juicebox contract and received $PEOPLE tokens in return. In under a week it took in roughly $47 million worth of ETH; the median contribution was about $217 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ConstitutionDAO) , and the campaign drew an estimated 17,000 people — many making their first-ever on-chain transaction. The speed was the point: a single, legible goal plus an open funding contract let a leaderless crowd out-raise most professionally organized funds in days, without a legal entity, a token sale roadmap, or a governance framework in place first.

The auction and the loss At the Sotheby's (https://www.sothebys.com/) auction on 18 November 2021 ConstitutionDAO was outbid by Citadel founder Ken Griffin, whose winning bid totaled about $43.2 million (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ConstitutionDAO) . A structural handicap shaped the loss: because the DAO's treasury sat in a fully public on-chain wallet, rival bidders could see exactly how much it held, and it had to hold funds back for insurance, storage, and display of a fragile document — so it could not simply bid its entire balance. The transparency that made the raise trustless also made its bidding strategy legible to a single well-capitalized competitor.

Dissolution, refunds, and the gas problem Having lost, the organizers made full refunds available (https://www.constitutiondao.com) — contributors could claim their $PEOPLE or redeem it back to ETH. But the refund exposed a hard limit of naïve on-chain crowdfunding: at 2021 gas prices the fixed cost of a transaction did not scale with contribution size, so some backers paid more in Ethereum fees to donate and then reclaim than they had given (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ConstitutionDAO) , and weeks later a large share of the funds still sat unredeemed. The episode became a standard reference for the treasury and operations (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-treasury-management) problems — gas, custody, coordination, wind-down — that a purpose-built DAO has to solve, not assume away.

$PEOPLE and the afterlife The $PEOPLE token was never a governance share — the official site is explicit that it carries "no rights, governance, or utility other than redeeming them for ethereum," (https://www.constitutiondao.com) at a fixed 1 ETH : 1,000,000 $PEOPLE ratio, and that the DAO "cannot and will not endorse any future plans for the token." In other words, it was a refund IOU, not a claim on an ongoing organization. Even so, a community kept it trading as a memecoin long after dissolution — a reminder that a token can outlive the entity that issued it, and that "what does this token actually entitle you to?" is the first question a DAO's tokenomics (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-tokenomics) has to answer.

How Caper approaches this ConstitutionDAO proved a DAO can crowdfund a treasury around a single goal at astonishing speed — but its token was a pure refund IOU with no standing rights, and the only "exit" was a one-time, all-or-nothing dissolution vote after the mission failed. A caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) keeps the fast, single-transaction raise but makes the token a durable claim rather than a receipt. Funding flows through a continuous bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) into a treasury (/wiki/markets/raising-funds) the holders govern by proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) , and — verified in the contract — every member holds a standing exit right (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : they can redeem their tokens for a pro-rata share of the treasury at any time, individually, without waiting for the whole organization to wind down. If a caper's mission stalls, no group refund vote is needed — each member simply takes their share.