How Caper approaches this Ape… proposal or quorum, and that redemption share equals their exact canonicalslice rests on the same vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T)that governs their say – a blend of the governance s…d the participation they have actually shown, the latter earned as no… not a single well-timed vote.

Name ApeCoin DAO (dissolved 20…s orbit (Ethereum) Token APE —– 1,000,000,000 fixed supply, n…launching-apeco) (June 2025) —– treasury, IP, and contracts t…i/daos/social/the-sandbox-dao)

ApeCoin DAO was, for three yea…tched consumer DAOs in crypto —– the community that governed t…5 its own token-holders voted —– by a reported 99.66% —– to dissolve the DAO entirely… to be worth studying closely.

The APE token and the Yuga orb… supply of one billion tokens —– the smart contract permits ne… was read on 1 September 2026 —– positioned as the shared util…/apecoin.com/api/whitepaper) —– a PDF, and the only substanti…ment apecoin.com still serves —– 47% went to the treasury held…a protocol that produced fees —– the DAO's job was to steward …tics and its eventual undoing.

How the DAO governed itself O…e Foundation's administrators —– a legal-wrapper (/wiki/dao-g…and by 2025 core stakeholders —– Yuga included —– openly described governance a…t set up the dissolution vote.

AIP-596: the DAO votes itself …all DAO and Foundation assets —– reported at roughly 169 million APE (~$168M at the time) —– plus intellectual property an… forum has since gone offline —– a fitting epilogue for a gove…body that voted to end itself.

How Caper approaches this Ape…l share of the DAO's treasury —– so the rational move for diss…vernance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T) —– a blend of the governance sta…e treasury to whoever remains —– and because voice is particip… not a single well-timed vote.

The APE token and the Yuga orb…metaverse, and later ApeChain.Per the launch allocation, set…tics and its eventual undoing.

AIP-596: the DAO votes itself …m-in-assets-to-new-entity/) ).It committed to fund the APE s…body that voted to end itself.

How Caper approaches this Ape…caper) is built against both.Every caper's exit() lets a me… not a single well-timed vote.

How Caper approaches this Ape…member who has voted redeem a pro-rata slice of the treasury at any t… not a single well-timed vote.

How Caper approaches this Ape…) lets a member who has voted or traded redeem a pro-rata slice of the…inted one per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade valuby nothing else. A member who wants out leav… not a single well-timed vote.

ApeCoin DAO was, for three yea…at governed the APE (https://apecoin.com/etherscan.io/token/0x4d224452801ACEd8B2F0aebE155379bb5D594381) token and its share of the … to be worth studying closely.

The APE token and the Yuga orb…ts neither minting nor burning, and its totalSupply still returned exactly 1,000,000,000 APE when the contract was read on 1 September 2026 — positioned as the shared ut…NFTs, the Otherside (https://apecoin.comotherside.xyz/) metaverse, and later ApeCh…n. Per the launch allocation, roughly 47% went to the DAO ecosystem fund (its treasury), 15% was airdropped to BAYC/MAYC holders, 15% to Yuga Labs, 14% to launch contributors and investors, 8% to the four BAYC founders, andset out in ApeCoin's own whitepaper (https://apecoin.com/api/whitepaper) — a PDF, and the only substantive document apecoin.com still serves — 47% went to the treasury held by the ApeCoin Foundation, which is now controlled by ApeCo; 15% was distributed to BAYC, Mutant Ape and Bored Ape Kennel Club holders; 16% to Yuga Labs and the Jane Goodall Legacy Foundation ( apecoin.com (https://apecoin.com/) ), 15% and 1% respectively; 14% to early contributors on vesting schedules; and 8% to Yuga Labs' founders. Crucially, ApeCoin was launc…tics and its eventual undoing.

How Caper approaches this Ape…nance/voting) minted one per votballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value. A member who wants out leav… not a single well-timed vote.

How Caper approaches this Ape…) lets a member who has voted or traded redeem a pro-rata slice of the… not a single well-timed vote.

How Caper approaches this Ape… caper's exit() lets a member who has voted redeem a pro-rata slice of the… not a single well-timed vote.

Name ApeCoin DAO (dissolved 20…ated How DAOs fail (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) , Exit rights (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…Treasury management (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasur… ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/constitutiondao) , The Sandbox DAO (/wiki/daos/social/the-sandbox-dao)

ApeCoin DAO was, for three yea… quiet abandonment (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fa… to be worth studying closely.

How the DAO governed itself O… — a legal-wrapper (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal…t set up the dissolution vote.

How Caper approaches this Ape… our failure-modes (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fa… not a single well-timed vote.

Name ApeCoin DAO (dissolved 20…ated How DAOs fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) , Exit rights (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) , Treasury management (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) , ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/social/constitutiondao)

ApeCoin DAO was, for three yea… quiet abandonment (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) , in June 2025 … to be worth studying closely.

How the DAO governed itself O… — a legal-wrapper (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures) pattern…t set up the dissolution vote.

How Caper approaches this Ape… our failure-modes (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) page identifie… not a single well-timed vote.

Name ApeCoin DAO (dissolved 2025) Type NFT-ecosystem / community DAO governing the APE (https://apecoin.com/) token, tied to the Bored Ape Yacht Club and Yuga Labs orbit (Ethereum) Token APE — 1,000,000,000 fixed supply, non-mintable and non-burnable; launched March 2022 Administration The Ape Foundation, with an elected Special Council ("the Board") overseeing its administrators Governance Ape Improvement Proposals (AIPs) debated on the ApeCoin forum, then ratified by Snapshot (https://snapshot.org/#/apecoin.eth) token-weighted vote Status Dissolved by AIP-596 (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2025/06/06/yuga-labs-proposes-scrapping-apecoin-dao-launching-apeco) (June 2025) — treasury, IP, and contracts transferred to ApeCo, a Yuga Labs-controlled company Related How DAOs fail (/wiki/dao/concepts/how-daos-fail) , Exit rights (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) , Treasury management (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-treasury-management) , ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/constitutiondao)

ApeCoin DAO was, for three years, one of the largest and most-watched consumer DAOs in crypto — the community that governed the APE (https://apecoin.com/) token and its share of the Bored Ape Yacht Club ecosystem built by Yuga Labs (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuga_Labs) . It is also the clearest case study of a very 2025 ending: rather than being drained by an exploit or fading into quiet abandonment (/wiki/dao/concepts/how-daos-fail) , in June 2025 its own token-holders voted — by a reported 99.66% — to dissolve the DAO entirely (https://www.ainvest.com/news/apecoin-dao-dissolves-99-66-vote-apeco-transition-2506/) and hand its treasury, intellectual property, and operations to ApeCo, a centralized company run by Yuga Labs. A DAO voluntarily voting itself back into a corporation is rare enough to be worth studying closely.

The APE token and the Yuga orbit APE launched in March 2022 with a fixed supply of one billion tokens — the smart contract permits neither minting nor burning — positioned as the shared utility and governance token for the wider Bored Ape ecosystem: BAYC and Mutant Ape (MAYC) NFTs, the Otherside (https://apecoin.com/) metaverse, and later ApeChain. Per the launch allocation, roughly 47% went to the DAO ecosystem fund (its treasury), 15% was airdropped to BAYC/MAYC holders, 15% to Yuga Labs, 14% to launch contributors and investors, 8% to the four BAYC founders, and 1% to the Jane Goodall Legacy Foundation ( apecoin.com (https://apecoin.com/) ). Crucially, ApeCoin was launched as a token with a DAO attached rather than a protocol that produced fees — the DAO's job was to steward a treasury and fund ecosystem work, not to govern a revenue-generating machine, which shaped both its politics and its eventual undoing.

How the DAO governed itself Only APE holders were members. Ideas moved through the Ape Improvement Proposal (AIP) pipeline: drafted and debated on the ApeCoin forum, then put to a token-weighted Snapshot (https://snapshot.org/#/apecoin.eth) vote. Implementation was handled by the Ape Foundation, a Cayman-registered administrator, with a five-seat elected Special Council (the DAO's "Board") supervising the Foundation's administrators — a legal-wrapper (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-legal-structures) pattern common to large token DAOs. In January 2025 the DAO even passed AIP-582 (https://cryptoslate.com/yuga-moves-to-kill-apecoin-dao-transfer-168m-in-assets-to-new-entity/) (~93% in favor) to move governance on-chain via ApeChain, its Arbitrum-based layer. Yet turnout on most proposals stayed low, and by 2025 core stakeholders — Yuga included — openly described governance as stagnant, a critique that set up the dissolution vote.

AIP-596: the DAO votes itself out of existence On 5 June 2025, Yuga Labs CEO Greg Solano filed the proposal that became AIP-596, "Sunsetting the DAO and Launching ApeCo." His framing was blunt: what "started with promise has devolved into sluggish, noisy, and often unserious governance theater" that funded "vanity proposals and low-impact initiatives" (https://decrypt.co/323902/bored-ape-creator-yuga-labs-wants-kill-apecoin-dao) ( CoinDesk (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2025/06/06/yuga-labs-proposes-scrapping-apecoin-dao-launching-apeco) ). The proposal transferred all DAO and Foundation assets — reported at roughly 169 million APE (~$168M at the time) — plus intellectual property and administrative control to ApeCo, a new Yuga-controlled entity focused on three pillars: ApeChain, the Bored Ape Yacht Club, and Otherside ( CryptoSlate (https://cryptoslate.com/yuga-moves-to-kill-apecoin-dao-transfer-168m-in-assets-to-new-entity/) ). It committed to fund the APE staking contract through March 2026 and set aside 10 million APE for transition costs, but otherwise nullified every prior AIP not already executed, dissolved all working groups and elections, and shut down the forum. Voting closed on 26 June 2025 with a reported 99.66% in favor ( AInvest (https://www.ainvest.com/news/apecoin-dao-dissolves-99-66-vote-apeco-transition-2506/) ). The ApeCoin forum has since gone offline — a fitting epilogue for a governance body that voted to end itself.

How Caper approaches this ApeCoin DAO's ending exposes two structural gaps that made a near-unanimous self-dissolution the path of least resistance. First, there was no clean per-member exit: a holder who disliked the direction could sell APE on the open market, but had no way to redeem a proportional share of the DAO's treasury — so the rational move for dissenters was to disengage rather than fight, which is exactly the dynamic our failure-modes (/wiki/dao/concepts/how-daos-fail) page identifies. Second, low real engagement meant a founder-authored proposal could clear the bar with overwhelming numbers and thin participation. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) is built against both. Every caper's exit() lets a member redeem a pro-rata slice of the treasury at any time, with no proposal or quorum, and that redemption share equals their exact canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) (t·v)/(V·T) — a blend of the governance stake a member holds and the participation they have actually shown, the latter earned as non-transferable vote tokens (/wiki/governance/voting) minted one per vote. A member who wants out leaves with their fair share instead of quietly abandoning the treasury to whoever remains — and because voice is participation-weighted, capturing a caper takes sustained, earned involvement, not a single well-timed vote.