How Caper approaches this Inh…they have personally earned – 1 perminted only by casting ballot casts, with trades and transfers minting none – computed as (t × v) / (V × T), where t is their governance-token balance, v the vote tokens they have accumulated, V the vote-token supply, and T circulating supply. Holdings alone do not carry …pation alone does not either; the two multiplya member needs both. The pass rule differs in th…Cosmos reaches for delegation.

Treasury, and the Hub in July …cosmos/staking/v1beta1/pool) —– a bonded ratio of 63.9%. Beca…and #1048) in July 2026 alone.

How Caper approaches this Inh…y earned – 1 per ballot cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg of a tradwith trades and transfers minting none – computed as (t × v) / (V ×…Cosmos reaches for delegation.

How Caper approaches this Inh…y personally hold and the vote tokens they have personally cast,earned – 1 per ballot cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg of a trade – computed as (t × v) / (V × T)…Cosmos reaches for delegation.

Treasury, and the Hub in July …f the Hub's current position. ORead off the Hub's public REST endpoints on 1 September 2026: of 521.98.35M ATOM in supply, 328.0 (https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/bank/v1beta1/supply/by_denom?denom=uatom) , 337.53M is bonded (https://cosmos-…/cosmos/staking/v1beta1/pool) , — a bonded ratio near 62.8of 63.9%. Because that sits below the…protocol's goal_bonded of 67%, the inflation schedulebids for more stake, and it is no longer drifts uping toward its 10%the ceiling to bid for mobut sitting on it (https://cosmos-restake, which is exactly.publicnode.com/cosmos/mint/v1beta1/inflation) : the chain reports an inflation rate of exactly 0.10, its inflation_max. That is the dynamic Proposal 848 capp…and #1048) in July 2026 alone.

How Caper approaches this Inh…o”. Weight is also clamped at settlementthe tally to the smaller of what a vote…they voted and what they hold wthen the tally runs(a clamp anyone can re-apply downward until the result settles), so selling out of a position…Cosmos reaches for delegation.

Validator inheritance: the def…sts a 21-day unbonding period. The same default carries a credit risk. A double-sign by the validator you picked slashes 5% of your bonded ATOM whether or not you voted with them, and that 21-day queue means you cannot step out of the way once it happens; see staking and slashing (/wiki/economics/staking-and-slashing) for the Hub's live penalty parameters.

Type Layer-0 hub chain / sovereign-network DAO (chain cosmoshub-4) Governance token ATOM (staking, governance, fees) Governance mechanism Cosmos SDK x/gov: fully on-chain, stake-weighted, with delegator votes inherited from validators by default Mainnet Live since 2019; implementation is gaia (https://github.com/cosmos/gaia) Proposal deposit 500 ATOM minimum, 14-day deposit window (at least 10% of it up front) Voting period 7 days (expedited: 3 days) Quorum / threshold / veto 40% / 50% / 33.4% (expedited threshold 66.7%) Proposals to date 1,050+ on-chain votes as of July 2026 Website cosmos.network (https://cosmos.network) · Hub docs (https://docs.cosmos.network/hub/latest) · governance forum (https://forum.cosmos.network/)

What the Cosmos Hub governs The Cosmos Hub is the first chain built on the Cosmos SDK and the origin of the x/gov module that most Cosmos app-chains still run today. Its token, ATOM, is bonded to validators for consensus and is the same weight that votes. Governance here is not advisory: an approved proposal changes chain parameters, spends the community pool, or swaps the node software itself. Proposal #1049 (https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/1049) , in voting as this page was written, is simply titled “Gaia v27.6.0 Upgrade”: the chain's own binary is a ballot question. That makes the Hub one of the cleanest large-scale examples of on-chain governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) in production, and a useful contrast to the Snapshot-plus-multisig pattern that dominates Ethereum DAOs. It is also the template two of this directory's other entries inherited: dYdX (/wiki/daos/dexs/dydx) and Osmosis (/wiki/daos/dexs/osmosis) both govern through the same module on their own sovereign chains.

The pipeline: deposit, then vote Every proposal passes through two windows, both defined by on-chain gov parameters (https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/gov/v1/params/tallying) : - Deposit period, up to 14 days. A proposal only enters voting once its deposits reach 500 ATOM; the submitter must post at least 10% of that themselves, and anyone can top up the rest. Proposals that never reach the minimum expire. - Voting period, 7 days, fixed. There is no lead-in, no confirmation curve, and no per-topic track: a typo fix in a parameter and a full runtime upgrade get exactly the same week. An expedited proposal compresses voting to 3 days but raises the bar to 66.7% Yes. The interesting detail is the failure mode: per the x/gov specification (https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/x/gov/README.md) , an expedited proposal that misses its higher threshold is not rejected, it is converted into a regular proposal and restarts voting under normal rules. Urgency costs you a stricter bar, not the proposal.

Four options, and what each one actually does Voters choose Yes, No, NoWithVeto, or Abstain, and the three tally rules each count a different denominator. Getting these apart is the whole skill of reading a Cosmos vote: - Quorum, 40%: the share of bonded voting power that cast anything at all. Abstain counts here. It is the turnout test. - Threshold, 50%: Yes as a share of Yes + No + NoWithVeto. Abstain is excluded. It is the majority test. - Veto, 33.4%: NoWithVeto as a share of all votes, abstain included. Clear it and the proposal fails no matter how large the Yes majority was. Abstain is therefore not a null vote. It helps a proposal reach quorum while refusing to help it reach a majority, which is how large validators signal “this should be decided, but not by me”. NoWithVeto is the sharp one: on the Hub, burn_vote_veto is set to true while burn_vote_quorum and burn_proposal_deposit_prevote are both false. A vetoed proposal's 500 ATOM deposit is destroyed; one that simply fails, or never reaches quorum at all, is refunded in full. The Hub charges you for being objectionable, not for being ignored, which is a deliberate spam filter aimed at bad-faith proposals rather than unpopular ones.

Validator inheritance: the default that decides most votes The Hub's most consequential design choice is not a threshold, it is a default. Per the module spec (https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/x/gov/README.md) : “If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.” A delegator who votes after their validator overrides it; one who never votes has still voted, through whoever they staked with. This is why Cosmos turnout numbers look healthy next to the single-digit participation documented on voter apathy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) pages elsewhere in this wiki, and why that comparison is misleading. Turnout measures bonded stake represented, not people who formed a view. With max_validators set to 200 and a 5% minimum commission, the practical electorate is a couple of hundred operators whose delegators mostly never override them. Cosmos did not solve apathy; it made apathy vote. The trade is real in both directions. Inheritance guarantees a decisive result within seven days and removes the quorum-failure mode that stalls token-weighted (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) DAOs. It also means delegation (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/voting-and-delegation) chosen for yield, uptime, and commission silently becomes delegation of political authority, and unstaking to escape it costs a 21-day unbonding period.

Proposal 848, and the fork that followed The clearest case study in Hub governance is Proposal 848 (https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/848) , “ATOM Halving: Set the max. Inflation Rate to 10%”, submitted 11 November 2023. Its final on-chain tally, in ATOM: - Yes: 73,165,204 · No: 56,667,012 · NoWithVeto: 11,669,550 · Abstain: 36,323,836 Run the three tests separately and the result is a lesson in denominators. Yes took 51.7% of the non-abstain vote, clearing the 50% threshold by under two points, while amounting to only 41.1% of everything cast. NoWithVeto reached 6.6%, nowhere near the 33.4% needed to burn it. The proposal passed, and it is still in force: the Hub's live mint parameters (https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/mint/v1beta1/params) read inflation_max: 0.10 today, against an inflation_min of 7% that a later reduction attempt failed to move. What happened next is the part DAO designers should sit with. The losing 48% did not accept the outcome and did not keep arguing. They left, and took the state with them: AtomOne (https://atom.one/) launched as a self-described minimal fork of the Hub, airdropped ATONE to over a million ATOM addresses, and rebuilt governance around the specific things its founders objected to, including a live on-chain constitution and the removal of delegation-based voting. A two-point margin on one parameter produced a chain split, which is exit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) in its rawest form: when a governance system offers no way out short of forking, forking is the way out. See also how DAOs fail (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

Treasury, and the Hub in July 2026 The Hub's treasury (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) is the community pool, funded by a 2% community tax skimmed from staking rewards and spent only by passing proposal. It is a protocol-native fund with no multisig standing between a vote and a disbursement, and, like most on-chain treasuries, it is easier to fill than to deploy well. Live chain state gives a fair picture of the Hub's current position. Of 521.95M ATOM in supply, 328.03M is bonded (https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/staking/v1beta1/pool) , a bonded ratio near 62.8%. Because that sits below the protocol's goal_bonded of 67%, the inflation schedule drifts up toward its 10% ceiling to bid for more stake, which is exactly the dynamic Proposal 848 capped rather than removed. Governance has kept widening what the chain does: Proposal 1007 (https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/1007) (August 2025) enabled permissionless CosmWasm contract deployment, passing with 97.4M ATOM Yes against 1.4M No. It has also kept saying no, rejecting two IBC client-recovery proposals (#1047 and #1048) in July 2026 alone.

How Caper approaches this Inheritance is the assumption Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) declines. There is no delegation layer in the contract and no validator standing in for you: if you do not vote, nothing votes your balance. A member's weight comes from what they personally hold and the votes they personally cast, computed as (t × v) / (V × T), where t is their governance-token balance, v the vote tokens they have accumulated, V the vote-token supply, and T circulating supply. Holdings alone do not carry a vote, and participation alone does not either; the two multiply. The pass rule differs in the same direction. Rather than testing turnout against total bonded stake, settlement (/wiki/governance/execution) compares the leading option's share of the weight actually cast against a threshold of 1.5 / number of options, and refuses to pass a proposal whose leading option is a “no”. Weight is also clamped at settlement to the smaller of what a voter held when they voted and what they hold when the tally runs, so selling out of a position after voting shrinks the vote it bought. See proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) and voting (/wiki/governance/voting) for the full mechanism, and the networks directory (/wiki/daos/networks) for sibling chains, including Polkadot (/wiki/daos/networks/polkadot) , which reaches for conviction locks where Cosmos reaches for delegation.