Organization The LAO – a for-p…ibutelabs.xyz/) Sister DAOs Flamingo (/wiki/daos/investment/flamingo-dao) (NFTs), Neptune (DeFi), Neon (metaverse), Noise (music)

Accredited membership, the cap…er at a different asset class: Flamingo (/wiki/daos/investment/flamingo-dao) for NFTs (which grew an early…ng productive investment DAOs.

How Caper approaches this The…anges what a vote is made of. In the contract, a member's weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) – held tokens t multiplied by an earned vote factor v, over total vote supply V and circulating tokens T (compute_vote_weight, verified in contracts/common/src/lib.rs). Those vote tokens are soulbound – minted one per ballot cast and by nothing else, non-transferable and fractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM), so v is aA member's weight grows with an earned vote record, not with held tokens alone. Those vote tokens are soulbound – minted only by casting a ballot, non-transferable and fractional, so the record ofis participation nobody can sell…urely by capital. Caper's exit() pays a treasury share equal to the same w = (t · v) / (V · T)member who has voted their fair share of the treasury, governed by the same earned weight that determines voting power …slice on the way out reflects both your holdings and your earned participation, not capital alone. A big bagHoldings still counts (t is a multiplier), but a baig with no earned v can neither capture the vote nor claim a participant's exit sharebag alone can't capture the vote, and a holder who has never voted has no exit share to claim, though they can still sell. Same legal-wrapper problem T…reasury ultimately belongs to.

How Caper approaches this The…ose vote tokens are soulbound —– minted one per ballot cast an…reasury ultimately belongs to.

Organization The LAO —– a for-profit, member-directed… Legal structure Delaware LLC —– a real limited-liability comp…eon (metaverse), Noise (music)

The LAO is a member-directed v…o back, and split the returns —– while a Delaware limited-liab…l/constitutiondao) left open —– how does a pooled, on-chain t…ct point at the same decision.

The legal-wrapper model: a DAO… The LAO was built by OpenLaw —– a smart-contract-and-legal-ag…ization-9eae89c9669c) put it —– giving members "the backing o… hold the assets the DAO buys —– equity, tokens, SAFEs —– under agreements a counterpar…e LAO is its proof of concept.

How members invest: shares, we…imalist "guild bank" contract —– and it inherits Moloch's thre…, regardless of voting weight —– the exit right (/wiki/dao-go…ckstop and the membership cap.

Accredited membership, the cap…nvestor-bulletins/updated-3) —– a deliberate trade of open, p… dozens of early-stage rounds —– trackers count roughly four …tor/the-lao) across its life —– making it one of the longest-…ng productive investment DAOs.

How Caper approaches this The…quit-and-exit-rights) scales —– as the docs (https://medium.…ganization-9eae89c9669c) say —– with your "economic contribut…ight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) —– held tokens t multiplied by a… that determines voting power —– so your slice on the way out …reasury ultimately belongs to.

How Caper approaches this The…inted one per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value on each leg of a tradby nothing else, non-transferable and fracti…ticipation nobody can sell you, though capital can mint it directly by trading and no cheque can mint. The sharpest contrast is at…reasury ultimately belongs to.

How Caper approaches this The…re soulbound — minted one per vballote cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value on each leg of a trade, non-transferable and indivisiblefractional (DIVISIBILITY_NONEMAXIMUM), so v is a record of participation you accumulate by showing up, not a thing you can buynobody can sell you, though capital can mint it directly by trading. The sharpest contrast is at…reasury ultimately belongs to.

How Caper approaches this The…weight, verified in contracts/logiccommon/src/lib.rs). Those vote token…reasury ultimately belongs to.

Organization The LAO — a for-p…o the Tribute DAO Framework (https://github.com/openlawteam/tribute-contracts/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/tribute) Built by OpenLaw (Aaron Wr…eon (metaverse), Noise (music)

Organization The LAO — a for-p…ork of MolochDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) (v2),…eon (metaverse), Noise (music)

The LAO is a member-directed v…real legal wrapper (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal…estion MolochDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) and ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/constitutiondao) left …ct point at the same decision.

The legal-wrapper model: a DAO…AO legal-structures (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal…e LAO is its proof of concept.

How members invest: shares, we…ork of MolochDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) (v2),…t — the exit right (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…e capital-weighted (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenom…s the largest vote (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/voting-and-de…ckstop and the membership cap.

How Caper approaches this The…nd your exit share (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…weight, verified in contracts/src/caper_daologic/src/lib.rs). Those vote tokens are so…reasury ultimately belongs to.

Organization The LAO — a for-p… fork of MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) (v2), later gener…eon (metaverse), Noise (music)

The LAO is a member-directed v…real legal wrapper (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures) . Member…question MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) and ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/social/constitutiondao) left open —…ct point at the same decision.

The legal-wrapper model: a DAO…AO legal-structures (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures) toolbox…e LAO is its proof of concept.

How members invest: shares, we… fork of MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) (v2), the minimal…t — the exit right (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) th…e capital-weighted (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) governance: t…s the largest vote (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/voting-and-delegation) , bounded onl…ckstop and the membership cap.

How Caper approaches this The…nd your exit share (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) sc…reasury ultimately belongs to.

Organization The LAO — a for-profit, member-directed venture DAO investing in early-stage crypto projects Category Investment / venture DAO (non-DeFi) with a legal wrapper Legal structure Delaware LLC — a real limited-liability company whose members are its DAO participants Membership Capped at ~100 members, limited to accredited investors (https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins/updated-3) Announced / launched September 2019 (https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/09/09/smart-contract-co-openlaw-launches-the-dao-mark-ii-the-lao/) · live April 2020 (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/04/28/openlaw-launches-first-legal-dao-for-distributed-vc-investments) Governance A fork of MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/molochdao) (v2), later generalized into the Tribute DAO Framework (https://github.com/openlawteam/tribute-contracts) Built by OpenLaw (Aaron Wright, Cardozo Law), now Tribute Labs (https://tributelabs.xyz/) Sister DAOs Flamingo (NFTs), Neptune (DeFi), Neon (metaverse), Noise (music)

The LAO is a member-directed venture fund that runs like a DAO but sits inside a real legal wrapper (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-legal-structures) . Members pool capital on-chain, vote on which startups and tokens to back, and split the returns — while a Delaware limited-liability company gives them the liability protection, tax treatment, and enforceable agreements that a bare smart contract cannot. When it went live in April 2020 (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/04/28/openlaw-launches-first-legal-dao-for-distributed-vc-investments) it was widely described as the first "legal DAO," and it remains the canonical example of the archetype: a for-profit investment club that is simultaneously a piece of software and a company the courts recognize. It matters because it answers a question MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/molochdao) and ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/constitutiondao) left open — how does a pooled, on-chain treasury actually hold equity in a startup, sign a SAFE, or return profits to members without every participant becoming personally liable as a general partner? The LAO's answer was to marry Moloch-style on-chain mechanics to auto-generated legal documents, so an on-chain vote and an off-chain contract point at the same decision.

The legal-wrapper model: a DAO the law can see The LAO was built by OpenLaw — a smart-contract-and-legal-agreement toolkit from Aaron Wright (https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/09/09/smart-contract-co-openlaw-launches-the-dao-mark-ii-the-lao/) , a Cardozo Law professor, and his co-founders (OpenLaw later became Tribute Labs (https://tributelabs.xyz/) ). Its core move is to organize the DAO as a Delaware LLC and then use software to generate "all relevant legal documents from entity formation documents to member subscription agreements," as the launch write-up (https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c) put it — giving members "the backing of the U.S. legal system." That wrapper does real work. It caps each member's liability at what they put in (no general-partnership exposure), it clarifies that members are LLC members rather than a securities-issuing partnership, and it lets the entity itself hold the assets the DAO buys — equity, tokens, SAFEs — under agreements a counterparty and a court will honor. The on-chain contract handles voting, funding, and allocation; the legal layer makes the outcome enforceable off-chain. This is the pattern later codified across the industry as the DAO legal-structures (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-legal-structures) toolbox (Wyoming DAO LLCs, the Marshall Islands wrapper, foundation companies), and The LAO is its proof of concept.

How members invest: shares, weighted votes, and rage-quit Governance is a fork of MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/molochdao) (v2), the minimalist "guild bank" contract — and it inherits Moloch's three defining mechanics: - Capital buys shares. Members contribute ETH and receive voting shares in proportion to their economic contribution, so influence tracks the money at stake. - A member nominates, the majority allocates. To back a project, a member submits a proposal; funding proceeds only when a majority of members, weighted by their shares, approve the allocation (https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c) . Deal flow is member-sourced, not run by a GP. - Rage-quit. A member who dislikes a decision can exit immediately and reclaim their fair share of unallocated funds based on their economic contribution, regardless of voting weight — the exit right (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) that stops a majority from spending a dissenter's capital against their will. Because share weight and exit share both key off capital, The LAO is an honest instance of pure capital-weighted (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-tokenomics) governance: the largest cheque is the largest vote (/wiki/dao/concepts/voting-and-delegation) , bounded only by the rage-quit backstop and the membership cap.

Accredited membership, the cap, and the DAO family To stay inside U.S. securities law, The LAO keeps membership capped at roughly 100 and limits it to accredited investors (https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins/updated-3) — a deliberate trade of open, permissionless entry for legal defensibility. That constraint (a private placement to a small pool of qualified investors) is exactly what lets the fund invest in equity and tokens without registering as a public offering. The LAO has since become the template for a whole Tribute Labs (https://tributelabs.xyz/) family of member DAOs, each pointing the same wrapper at a different asset class: Flamingo for NFTs (which grew an early ~$10M pool into a collection valued near $1B (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2022/02/10/flamingodaos-nft-portfolio-is-now-worth-1b) at the 2022 peak), Neptune for DeFi, Neon for the metaverse, and Noise for music. The underlying tooling was generalized and open-sourced as the Tribute DAO Framework (https://github.com/openlawteam/tribute-contracts) . The LAO itself has kept deploying capital across dozens of early-stage rounds — trackers count roughly four dozen investments (https://www.cbinsights.com/investor/the-lao) across its life — making it one of the longest-running productive investment DAOs.

How Caper approaches this The LAO shows what a well-built capital-weighted investment DAO looks like: shares scale with the ETH you put in, your vote scales with your shares, and your exit share (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) scales — as the docs (https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c) say — with your "economic contribution, regardless of voting weight." That is the right design for an accredited-investor fund where capital is the contribution. It also means control is, straightforwardly, for sale: the biggest cheque is the biggest voice. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) keeps the same open exit right but changes what a vote is made of. In the contract, a member's weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T) — held tokens t multiplied by an earned vote factor v, over total vote supply V and circulating tokens T (compute_vote_weight, verified in contracts/src/caper_dao.rs). Those vote tokens are soulbound — minted one per vote cast, non-transferable and indivisible (DIVISIBILITY_NONE), so v is a record of participation you accumulate by showing up, not a thing you can buy. The sharpest contrast is at the exit. The LAO returns a dissenter's stake purely by capital. Caper's exit() pays a treasury share equal to the same w = (t · v) / (V · T) that determines voting power — so your slice on the way out reflects both your holdings and your earned participation, not capital alone. A big bag still counts (t is a multiplier), but a bag with no earned v can neither capture the vote nor claim a participant's exit share. Same legal-wrapper problem The LAO solved; a different answer to who the treasury ultimately belongs to.