Organization PleasrDAO – a col…ke <5%) Website pleasr.org (2 July 2026 capture) (https://web.archive.org/web/20260702172551/https://pleasr.org/) – the origin returninged a Cloudflare 522 (connection …ed out) on 17 and 20 September, 2026, confirmed to a real browser as well as to a script; last healthy capture is the 2 July 2026 snapshot (https://web.archive.org/web/20260702172551/https://pleasr.org/) October and 24 October 2026 Status 🟢 Active

PleasrDAO is a collector DAO …p of digital culture (https://web.archive.org/web/20260702172551/https://pleasr.org/) (the site's own framing, read from the its 2 July 2026 capture (https://web.archive.org/web/20260702172551/https://pleasr.org/) while the origin times out). I…/wiki/daos/social/nouns-dao) .

How Caper approaches this Ple…s the reach of a collector DAO –, and the sharp edgerisk of making ownership a freely …kens and you steer the asset, no matter whatever you contributed or who you are. A trophy meant to be a shared commons can be quietly bought into a single pair of hands. A Ccaper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) keeps thea tradeable parttoken and adds onea record that, once minted, canearned, never changes hands. Voting power and treasury exit share (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) rest on the same earned weight. Your stake isA member's vote weight comes from the caper's tokens they hold, read live from youtheir wallet when youthey cast a ballot (/wiki/governance/voting) – a caper ballot is a plain wallet transaction and escrows nothing – but , together weight grows with your soulbound proof-of-vote tokenith the soulbound (/wiki/dao-governance/concept…/membership/soulbound-tokens) , which only voting earns, not with the size of the stake alone. The vote token is minted one per ballot cast and by nothing else, has DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM (fractional, so the admin escape hatch can distribute it in any denomination a future logic chooses), and cannot leave the wallet that earned it (its only depositor is the component itself) – so the record of participation is earned and untransferable: no amount of capital mints it, and no one can hand theirs over. The effect: a large bag of tokens votes they have earned by voting. A ballot is a plain wallet transaction that locks nothing. Buying tokens earns no votes, and no member can sell or hand over theirs, so a big bag alone can't capture a Ccaper the way a largebig bag of $DOG can capturesteer the Doge NFT, because half of the weight (v) is a soulbound history you can't buy off anyone – you can only mint your own, one unit per ranked ballot you actually cast, and the bag alone mints none. Stake still counts – t is a real multiplier, so this is not a "your bag doesn't matter" system – but the decisive factor is the participation record minted to you, which nobody can sell you and you cannot sell on, and when you exit, your. Holdings still count. When a member exits (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) , their fair share of the treasury slice ifollows thate same earned weight rather than a share you could have simply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…p/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) arest on the same expression – Caper computes both from (t·v) / (V·T) (compute_vote_weight in contracts/common/src/lib.rs): t is your caper-token amount – the stakearned weight. Your stake is read live from your wallet wh…saction and escrows nothing – andbut the tokens you hand in when you exit – v isweight grows with your soulbound proof-of-vote…embership/soulbound-tokens) , and V/T are the totalswhich only voting earns, not with the size of the stake alone. The vote token is minted one…ply bought on the open market.

Organization PleasrDAO —– a collector DAO that acquires…in Fractionalized token $DOG —– shares in the Doge NFT sold t…leasr.org/) Status 🟢 Active

PleasrDAO is a collector DAO …iki/daos/investment/the-lao) —– a group that pools money on-c…single NFT, and it kept going —– turning "a few strangers chip…/wiki/daos/social/nouns-dao) .

The collector-DAO thesis: own …asury and vote on what to buy —– the same "guild bank" pattern…s become governance questions —– not one owner's whim. - Owne… move was to fractionalize it —– mint fungible shares so anyon…slice and the value can trade.

The trophies: from a Uniswap a…nft-heres-why) for ~$525,000 —– she donated the proceeds to c…ion (https://freedom.press/) —– roughly doubling the non-prof…he U.S. Department of Justice —– the album was forfeited to th… what started as a group chat.

Fractionalized ownership: the … and sold them to the public —– so the world's most famous me… collector DAO's core tension —– a trophy is indivisible and i…e shares can direct the asset —– the market decides who "owns"…r's design is built to resist.

How Caper approaches this Ple… the reach of a collector DAO —– and the sharp edge of making …hts) are the same expression —– Caper computes both from (t·v…ot (/wiki/governance/voting) —– a caper ballot is a plain wal…ansaction and escrows nothing —– and the tokens you hand in wh…itor is the component itself) —– so the record of participatio…ints none. Stake still counts —– t is a real multiplier, so th…ur bag doesn't matter" system —– but the decisive factor is th…ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…ens) , and V/T are the totals.The vote token is minted one p…ply bought on the open market.

Organization PleasrDAO — a col…asr.org (https://pleasr.org/) – origin returning a Cloudflare 522 (connection timed out) on 17 and 20 September 2026, confirmed to a real browser as well as to a script; last healthy capture is the 2 July 2026 snapshot (https://web.archive.org/web/20260702172551/https://pleasr.org/) Status 🟢 Active

PleasrDAO is a collector DAO …culture (https://pleasr.org/) (the site's own framing, read from the 2 July 2026 capture (https://web.archive.org/web/20260702172551/https://pleasr.org/) while the origin times out). It is the clearest example o…/wiki/daos/social/nouns-dao) .

How Caper approaches this Ple…inted one per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade valuby nothing else, has DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM (fractional, because a per-XRD rate cannot mint whole unitso the admin escape hatch can distribute it in any denomination a future logic chooses), and cannot leave the walle… is earned and untransferable: no amount of capital can mints it, butand no one can hand theirs over. …– you can only mint your own, which the bag itself does, at 0.01 v per XRD of gross valuone unit per ranked ballot you actually cast, and the bag alone mints none. Stake still counts — t is a…ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…adeable part and adds one that is not for sale, once minted, can never change hands. Voting power and treasury e…tory you can't buy off anyone and can't purchase off anyon– you can only mint your own, which the bag itself does, at 0.01 v per XRD of gross value. Stake still counts — t is a…ter" system — but the decisive, unbuyable factor is the participation you earnedrecord minted to you, which nobody can sell you and you cannot sell on, and when you exit, your trea…ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…trade value, has DIVISIBILITY_NONEMAXIMUM (fractional, because a per-XRD rate cannot mint whole units), and cannot leave the wallet …ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…. The vote token is minted one-per-vot per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value, has DIVISIBILITY_NONE, and …participation is earned and unbuyabletransferable: capital can mint it, but no one can hand theirs over. The effect: a large bag of …a soulbound history you can't buy off anyone and can't purchase off anyone. Stake sti…ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…aper-token amount – the stake you have escrowed in the caper's read live from your wallet when you cast a ballot box (/wiki/governance/voting) when you vote,— a caper ballot is a plain wallet transaction and escrows nothing — and the tokens you hand in wh…ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…nd-exit-rights) are the same quantityexpression — Caper computes both from (t…acts/common/src/lib.rs): t is the caper tokens you hold,your caper-token amount – the stake you have escrowed in the caper's ballot box (/wiki/governance/voting) when you vote, and the tokens you hand in when you exit – v is your soulbound proof-of…ply bought on the open market.

How Caper approaches this Ple…pute_vote_weight in contracts/logiccommon/src/lib.rs): t is the caper t…ply bought on the open market.

PleasrDAO is a collector DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/investment/the-lao) — a group…re a venture DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/investment/the-lao) buys equi… ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/constitutiondao) and t…reasury of Nouns (/wiki/daos/organizations/social/nouns-dao) .

The collector-DAO thesis: own …attern MolochDAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) pione…slice and the value can trade.

Fractionalized ownership: the …, exit and control (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…r's design is built to resist.

How Caper approaches this Ple…reasury exit share (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…pute_vote_weight in contracts/src/caper_daologic/src/lib.rs): t is the caper tokens yo…proof-of-vote token (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound…ply bought on the open market.

PleasrDAO is a collector DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/investment/the-lao) — a group that pool…here a venture DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/investment/the-lao) buys equity and tok…of ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/social/constitutiondao) and the cre… treasury of Nouns (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/social/nouns-dao) .

The collector-DAO thesis: own … pattern MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/public-goods/molochdao) pioneered, pointe…slice and the value can trade.

Fractionalized ownership: the …, exit and control (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) ac…r's design is built to resist.

How Caper approaches this Ple…reasury exit share (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) ar…proof-of-vote token (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) , and V/T ar…ply bought on the open market.

Organization PleasrDAO — a collector DAO that acquires and collectively stewards culturally significant digital and physical artifacts Category Collector / cultural-asset DAO (non-DeFi) Founded March–April 2021, organized on Twitter to buy a single NFT Members A few dozen artists, collectors and crypto investors, coordinating purchases by on-chain vote Notable holdings pplpleasr's Uniswap V3 "x*y=k" NFT; Edward Snowden's Stay Free; the original Doge meme NFT; Wu-Tang Clan's Once Upon a Time in Shaolin Fractionalized token $DOG — shares in the Doge NFT sold to the public Backers a16z-led governance-token round, December 2021 (a16z stake <5%) Website pleasr.org (https://pleasr.org/) Status 🟢 Active

PleasrDAO is a collector DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/the-lao) — a group that pools money on-chain to buy things, then owns and stewards them together. Where a venture DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/the-lao) buys equity and tokens for returns, PleasrDAO buys cultural artifacts: a viral meme, a whistleblower's artwork, a one-of-one album. It began in March 2021 (https://thedefiant.io/i-thought-i-was-living-in-a-simulation-the-story-behind-the-500k-uniswap-nft) when a handful of people coordinated on Twitter to buy a single NFT, and it kept going — turning "a few strangers chipping in for an internet artifact" into a recurring pattern of collective ownership of digital culture (https://pleasr.org/) . It is the clearest example of the collector-DAO archetype, distinct from the failed one-shot crowdfund of ConstitutionDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/constitutiondao) and the creative treasury of Nouns (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/nouns-dao) .

The collector-DAO thesis: own the artifact together The collector DAO answers a simple question: what if the buyer of a trophy asset were a crowd instead of a whale? A single billionaire can buy a Wu-Tang album and lock it in a vault. A DAO can buy the same album, then argue in public about how to steward it, who gets to hear it, and whether to fractionalize the upside. The asset becomes a shared commons rather than private property. That reframes three things every DAO has to handle: - Acquisition. Members contribute capital to a pooled treasury and vote on what to buy — the same "guild bank" pattern MolochDAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/molochdao) pioneered, pointed at cultural assets instead of startups. - Stewardship. Once you own a culturally loaded object, custody, display, and legal restrictions become governance questions — not one owner's whim. - Ownership of the upside. A trophy asset is illiquid and indivisible. PleasrDAO's signature move was to fractionalize it — mint fungible shares so anyone can own a slice and the value can trade.

The trophies: from a Uniswap ad to a Wu-Tang album PleasrDAO's holdings read like a timeline of 2021 crypto culture, each bought at public auction with a verifiable price: - pplpleasr's "x*y=k" (March 2021). The DAO formed to buy the Taiwanese artist pplpleasr's animated Uniswap V3 teaser (https://decrypt.co/63080/an-ad-for-uniswap-just-sold-for-525000-as-an-nft-heres-why) for ~$525,000 — she donated the proceeds to charity. The purchase created the DAO; the name is a pun on "pleaser." - Edward Snowden's Stay Free (April 16, 2021). Bought for 2,224 ETH (~$5.4 million) (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/04/16/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-sells-nft-for-54m) , with proceeds going to the Freedom of the Press Foundation (https://freedom.press/) — roughly doubling the non-profit's budget overnight. - The Doge NFT (June 2021). The original "doge" meme image, bought for 1,696.9 ETH (~$4 million) (https://techcrunch.com/2021/12/14/andreessen-horowitz-backs-nft-investor-group-behind-one-of-a-kind-wu-tang-clan-album-purchase/) and then fractionalized (below). - Wu-Tang Clan's Once Upon a Time in Shaolin (2021). The single-copy album, bought for $4 million (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Once_Upon_a_Time_in_Shaolin) from an entity that had itself bought it from the U.S. Department of Justice — the album was forfeited to the government after Martin Shkreli's 2018 securities-fraud conviction. Under the original terms the recording cannot be commercially exploited until 2103 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Once_Upon_a_Time_in_Shaolin) . In December 2021 (https://techcrunch.com/2021/12/14/andreessen-horowitz-backs-nft-investor-group-behind-one-of-a-kind-wu-tang-clan-album-purchase/) an a16z-led round bought governance tokens in the collective (a16z's stake reportedly under 5%), putting institutional capital behind what started as a group chat.

Fractionalized ownership: the $DOG experiment PleasrDAO's most-copied idea is fractionalization. Having bought the ~$4M Doge NFT, the DAO split it into billions of fungible $DOG tokens (https://www.thearmchairtrader.com/pleasrdao-amber-group-nft-doge-huobi/) and sold them to the public — so the world's most famous meme became an asset anyone could own a sliver of, and its implied value could trade to a nine-figure market cap (https://techcrunch.com/2021/12/14/andreessen-horowitz-backs-nft-investor-group-behind-one-of-a-kind-wu-tang-clan-album-purchase/) . The Wu-Tang album got a gentler version: from June 2024 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Once_Upon_a_Time_in_Shaolin) PleasrDAO began selling $1 NFTs, each one accelerating the album's eventual public release by 88 seconds and granting the buyer a five-minute sampler. Fractionalization solves the collector DAO's core tension — a trophy is indivisible and illiquid, but a crowd needs divisible, tradeable ownership. It also exposes a hard governance problem the wiki treats as a first-class topic: once ownership is a freely tradeable token, exit and control (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) acquire a spot price. Whoever accumulates the shares can direct the asset — the market decides who "owns" the culture, and a well-funded buyer can simply purchase a controlling stake. That is precisely the pressure Caper's design is built to resist.

How Caper approaches this PleasrDAO shows the reach of a collector DAO — and the sharp edge of making ownership a freely tradeable share. Once the Doge NFT is 16.9 billion $DOG tokens, control has a market price: accumulate enough tokens and you steer the asset, no matter what you contributed or who you are. A trophy meant to be a shared commons can be quietly bought into a single pair of hands. A Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) keeps the tradeable part and adds one that is not for sale. Voting power and treasury exit share (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) are the same quantity — Caper computes both from (t·v) / (V·T) (compute_vote_weight in contracts/src/caper_dao.rs): t is the caper tokens you hold, v is your soulbound proof-of-vote token (/wiki/dao/concepts/soulbound-tokens) , and V/T are the totals. The vote token is minted one-per-vote, has DIVISIBILITY_NONE, and cannot leave the wallet that earned it (its only depositor is the component itself) — so the record of participation is earned and unbuyable. The effect: a large bag of tokens alone can't capture a Caper the way a large bag of $DOG can capture the Doge NFT, because half of the weight (v) is a soulbound history you can't purchase off anyone. Stake still counts — t is a real multiplier, so this is not a "your bag doesn't matter" system — but the decisive, unbuyable factor is the participation you earned, and when you exit, your treasury slice is that same earned weight rather than a share you could have simply bought on the open market.