How Caper approaches this Thi… a ballot mints the soulbound token: casting one mints exactly one v (VOTE_MINT, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), and buying, selling and transferring mint none – the trade-side mint was removed in the genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026vote token: buying, selling and transferring mint none. Holding some v is a precondition of exit (/w…/foundations/leaving-a-caper) –, so the call asserts a non-zero v amount, withdrawn from theexit opens only to member’s own account, and aborts otherwise – and the share it pays out is w = (t · v) / (V · T), the same expression that weighs a ballot. So the exit opens only to members who who have voted, and the same earned weight that decides a ballot sets the shavre voted, and the one formula prices boththe exit pays out. MetaDAO has no analogue: a d…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

What the numbers say, read 20 …ng it wrong. All three passed. Credible's, shown on the site…$2,000,000 is that conversion.So of the $4,037,173 this colu…eads at roughly half its book.The three projects with live m…d passed on $96,368 of volume.This page said no proposal had…are not twenty-three launches.Every launchpad token carries …identifier is named alongside.

When the mechanism said no Fo…ces the intellectual property.Holders redeem at a rate fixed… the platform's recent record.KIMIA-001 carried no team-spon…0406 below the August reading.A decrease is not something an…uthority could restore anyway.

What it does not solve The st… $387 from three participants.And two DAOs have shortened th…out the second, not the first.

How Caper approaches this Thi… is not the do-nothing option.The optimistic gate follows: t…from before the window opened.That is far cheaper – no condi…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

Type Futarchy governance proto…at all Token META – 22,684,691.070.91 supply, no hard cap; flat bet…en 2.39 lower on 17 September and 0.16 lower again on 20 September ( supply API (https://market-a… the Futarchy AMM holding $14.6800m in market-governed USDC treasuries (read 1720 September 2026; four tokens added and one liquidated). The $676,344 fall since 417 September, and the total still fell 3.7%) is three passed proposals converting USDC into USDv – a change of denomination, not a spend. The homepage (https://metad…mbership/dao-legal-structures)

The DAO industry's one working… from first principles. As of 1720 September 2026 the protocol's…okens whose treasuries hold $14,675,9133,999,569 in USDC, every dollar of whic… be spent by passing a market.

How a decision is made The li…he authority, not either page. The three-day window is a per-DAO parameter too, and shortening it shortens the only delay there is. BASKET-002 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/basket-002) set Basket's proposal duration to 24 hours and its TWAP start delay to 8 hours on 21 August 2026, and ACCRUE-001 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/accrue-001) and LFOWN-002 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/lfown-004) did the same for their own DAOs on 15 September. Where that is configured, a proposal is proposed, priced and executed inside a day. Read the duration off the DAO account alongside the thresholds; neither is a platform constant.

What the numbers say, read 1720 September 2026 Every figure …t what it raised, and, as the last paragraph of this section explains, not onlyfirst two findings below set out, not a measure of what it has left to spend. Project Treasury USDC Change since 17 Sep AMM liquidity Live since MetaDAO (META) $3,703,551 – $2,272,535494,989 2026-01-06 P2P Protocol (P2P) $3,308,997 – $1,965,66670,751 2026-04-01 Credible Finance (CRED) $2,70450,000 −$250,000 $1,9142,57386 2026-07-17 Avici (AVICI) $1,700,001 – $1,244,53132,512 2025-10-18 Umbra (UMBRA) $1,3018,978 $486,896−$300,000 $973,848 2025-10-10 Laso Finance (LASO) $725,453 $359,2898,788 +$3,335 $365,020 2026-07-04 Omnipair (OMFG) $64510,832 $261,645−$130,000 $540,956 2026-02-19 HiveBits (NECTAR) $102,000 – $40,2921 2026-09-14 Jurassic (RAWR) $101,000 $90,644– $88,012 2026-05-15 Solomon (SOLO) $100,000 – $3,190,48068,675 2025-11-18 All 23 tokens $14,675,9133,999,569 −$676,344 $113,6054,578643 – The distribution is the finding, and thirteen days have not softened it. Those ten hold 98.1% of the treasury total; the other thirteen hold $275,101 between them, and the two at the bottom – Loyal ($0.54) and Flash.Trade ($0.00) – are unchanged to the cent since 4 September. A launchpad's headline is its cumulative raise;confound this page warned about has fired, and it moved $680,000. Three days ago this section said that three live decision markets were about to convert treasury USDC into USDv without spending its, actual state is a shortnd that a reader who head and a long, empty tail. The head drains, and that is the second finding. Read on 15 August 2026 the twenty treasuries held $18,036,742; on 4 September, $15,235,886; on 17 September, $14,675,913 across twenty-three rows. The roster moved in that last window and the direction did not: Paystream was liquidatedlearned to read a fall in this column as a spend-down would be reading it wrong. All three passed. Credible's, shown on the site as CREDIBLE-001 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/paystreamcredible-0032) by its own decision market on 2 September and has left the feed, while four launches joined it – LFOWN (8 September), HiveBits (14 September), ACCRUE and Cloud (15 September) – holding $118,000 between them. So the total fell $559,973 despite $118,000 of new money arriving. The shape of the fall is worth more than its size. The two largest treasuries, MetaDAO's own and P2P's, did not move at a, settled at a pass TWAP of $0.5567 against $0.5407 in the fail market on $8,508 of volume; Umbra's, shown as UMBRA-006 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/umbra-008) , at $0.1945 against $0.1926 on $2,039; OMNIPAIR-006 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/omnipair-006) at $0.1589 against $0.1581 on $387. Each of the three treasuries then fell: both are unchanged to the dollar over thirteen days. What moved were round, discrete amounts in the middle of the table – Credible −$250,000, Umbra −$250,000, Avici −$100,000, Omnipair −$30,000, Rip Cars −$20,000 – which is what an authorized draw looks like and not what continuous spending looks like. Laso is the only row thaty exactly the amount its proposal authorised – $250,000, $300,000, $130,000 – and, in a table of twenty-three rows, no other treasury moved by as much as a dollar except Laso's, which rose, by $11,972. Note also that the two columns are not proxies for each other: Solomon holds $100,000 in treasury against $3,190,480 in AMM liquidity, the deepest book on the platform. And the column is about to stop meaning what this page has taken it to mean. Three of the largest projects have live decision markets to move treasury out of USDC without spending it: Credible, up to $250,000 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/credible-002) , Umbra, up to $300,000 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/umbra-008) and Omnipair, up to $130,000 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/omnipair-006) , each converting treasury USDC into USDv, Solomon's reward-bearing dollar, held in a company-controlled wallet at an expected 2.5–5%. Credible's proposal states the purpose plainly: the USDC “is idle and earns nothing”. The field this table reads is treasury_usdc_aum – a USDC balance, not a treasury valuation. If those three pass, up to $680,000 leaves it with nothing spent and no project any poorer, and every reader who has learned to read a fall 3,335. The column fell $676,344 and not one cent of it was spent. The drain this page reported in August was two thirds the same thing, which is the more useful correction. On 19 August METADAO-040, Convert $2,000,000 of MetaDAO Treasury USDC to USDv (https://metadao.fi/decisions/metadao-040) , passed on a pass TWAP of $5.4505 against $5.1580 – on $274,223 of volume, the deepest decision market the platform has run. MetaDAO's own row read $5,943,551.02 on 15 August and reads $3,703,551.02 today, a fall of $2,240,000, of which $2,000,000 is that conversion. So of the $4,037,173 this column has lost since 15 August, $2,680,000 is a change of denomination and about $1.36m is everything else – real spending, Paystream leaving this column as a spend-down will be reade feed on liquidation, and four new launches arriving wit wrongh money. A metric is safe to build a …to measure stay the same thing. The independent cross-check broke on 6 September and has stayed broken, which is the finding. On 4 September the AMM liquidity total of $13.83m matched DeFiLlama's TVL for the protocol (https://api.llama.fi/protocol/metadao) ($13,639,628, same day) to within 1.4%. Re-read on 6 September 2026, the two sources disagree by 11.7%: the market feed puts platform liquidity at $11,810,734 — down $2,023,667, or 14.6%, in two days — while DeFiLlama's most recent point, stamped 5 September 22:50 UTC, is still $13,376,451. Most of that drop was one book: Solomon's fell from $2,901,515 to $1,478,708, roughly halving. Re-, and this one stopped being safe in August rather than this week. The distribution is unchanged and is still the structural finding. The ten rows above hold 98.0% of the treasury total; the other thirteen hold $275,422 between them, sixteen of the twenty-three hold under $120,000, and the two at the bottom – Loyal ($0.54) and Flash.Trade ($0.00) – have not moved a cent since 4 September. A launchpad's headline is its cumulative raise; its actual state is a short head and a long, empty tail. The independent cross-check has closed, and the read son 17 September 2026 the gap has not closed and is slightly wider: $11,604,578 on the market feed against $13,264,607 on DeFiLlama, stamped 20:17 UTC the same day, 12.5% apart eleven days on. Eleven days is too long for a stale snapshot on either side, soit ever opened is mechanical. This page reported an unexplained 11-day divergence between the market feed's liquidity total and DeFiLlama's TVL for the protocol (https://api.llama.fi/protocol/metadao) – 11.7% apart on 6 September, 12.5% on 17 September – and concluded the two awere counting different things, and anyone quoting a liquidity figure for this protocol has to say which. Solomon's book went back the other way in the meantime – $1,478,708 on 6 September, $3,190,480 on 17 September – more than doubling with no proposal cast either way. Treasury USDC did not move at all over the same two days — the twenty treasuries went from $15,235,886 to $15,245,465, +0.06%, with the top nine unchanged to the dollar. So the two columns of the table above decay on completely different clocks: treasury AUM fall. They are not. They were being read at different points in a proposal cycle. MetaDAO's documentation states that once a proposal has enough stake “the project takes half of its liquidity from the spot … market and moves it into a proposal's conditional markets” (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/markets) , and liquidity_in_usd reads the spot pool. A project with a live decision market therefore reads at roughly half its book. The three projects with live markets on 17 September have each since roughly doubled – Credible $914,573 to $1,912,586, Umbra $486,896 to $973,848, Omnipair $261,645 to $540,956 – while every other row in the table sits within a tenth of its 17 September figure. The case this page had already recorded as inexplicable fits wthen a team spends, in steps; AMM liquidity is priced, and can move 15% in a weekend without anyone deciding anything. Reading either as “the size of the platform” will mislead in a different way. On 15 August 2026 MetaDAO's own tra same shape: Solomon's book halved from $2,901,515 to $1,478,708 between 4 and 6 September and was back at $3,190,480 by 17 September, and SOLOMON-004 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/solomon-004) was created on 4 September and passed on $96,368 of volume. This page said no proposal had been cast either way; that was wrong. As of this reading the site's decisionsparencyge reports no live markets (https://metadao.fi/transparencydecisions) , also gave its V6 Treasury as $5,943,551.02, matching that day's market-feed META row to the cent; the transparency page now returns a bot-block to automated requests, so only the DeFiLlama checknd the two sources agree to 0.8% – $13,654,643 on the feed against $13,546,870 on DeFiLlama, stamped 20 September 19:16 UTC. The lesson generalises past this protocol: a liquidity figure for a futarchy platform is only meaningful with the state of its re-runnable hereproposal queue attached. Fees moved with it. DeFiLlama puts protocol fees…/protocol/analytics) – at $3,185,544209,676 all-time, $148,38953,746 over 30 days, $21,80338,134 over the trailing week and $4,52113,697 over 24 hours, read 1720 September 2026. The decay this page reported a fortnight ago did not continue: the 30-day rate had fallen 41% to $139,129 by 4 September and has since risen 6.7%. All-time fees grew $54,194 over the thirteen daysAll-time grew $24,132 in the three days since this page last read it, about $4,28,000 a day against roughly $5,04,200 a day inover the twentyhirteen days before. Revenue here arrives in launch-shaped burst, and the trailing week is up 75% on the 17 September figure. Revenue here arrives in bursts shaped by launches and by decisions, so one 30-day reading of it is a level and not a trend. OneTwo counts needs care. MetaDAO's documentation…t moved while the protocol has. Its fourteen counts governance clients such as Jito, Sanctum and Flash.Trade, which came for decision markets and never ran an ICO; the market feed already carries twenty-three tokens. T; the homepage count of launches … used to sit beside it is gone –, since metadao.fi (https://metadao.…around per-company runway and valuation and a live decision feed, and now publishes neither a launch count nor a cumulative raise. Secondary write-ups that compounded the two fourteens into one statistic were wrong then; there is only one fourteen now, and it is frozen. And the feed's twenty-three rows are not twenty-three launches. Every launchpad token carries a vanity mint ending meta – METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta, omfgRBnxHsNJh6YeGbGAmWenNkenzsXyBXm3WDhmeta – and exactly two rows do not: Sanctum's CLOUD (CLoUDKc4Ane7HeQcPpE3YHnznRxhMimJ4MyaUqyHFzAu) and Flash.Trade's FAF (FAFxVxnkzZHMCodkWyoccgUNgVScqMw2mhhQBYDFjFAF), the two governance clients that came for decision markets and never ran an ICO. CLOUD is also the only row whose treasury_usdc_aum is null rather than zero. So the feed carries twenty-one launched tokens and two governance clients, and this page's earlier reading of Cloud as a 15 September launch was wrong. One citation hazard, because this section leans on the decision pages. A decision's URL slug does not always match the identifier the site prints on it: /decisions/credible-002 renders CREDIBLE-001, /decisions/umbra-008 renders UMBRA-006, and /decisions/lfown-004 renders LFOWN-002. The links above are the working URLs; where the two disagree, the printed identifier is named alongside.

When the mechanism said no ThreeFour cases are on the record, and …n left the market feed with it, which is why the twenty rows read on 4 September are twenty-three rather than twenty-four now. Publishing a wind-down at th… standard almost nothing else on this page's subject matches. Kimia, August 2026 – the one the market refused. Two weeks before Paystream's DAO voted itself out of existence, Kimia's was asked to and declined. KIMIA-001, Authorizes the orderly liquidation of the Kimia treasury and the return of IP to the original owners (https://metadao.fi/decisions/kimia-001) , failed on a pass TWAP of $0.004575 against $0.004636 in the fail market: the market priced the project as worth more alive than wound up. It drew 28 participants and $44,794 of volume – 240 times what settled the Paystream liquidation – and it is the only failed decision in the platform's recent record. KIMIA-001 carried no team-sponsored flag, so under the threshold table above it needed to clear +3% rather than −3%, but the flag did not decide it; the pass market came in below the fail market outright. Kimia still holds $28,800 in treasury a monthis page’s subject matches on. The pair is what earns its place here: the same mechanism, asked the same question by two projects a fortnight apart, returned opposite answers, and the one that drew real trading is the one that said no. META's supply, continuously… proposed publicly, trade for three daysits configured window, and clear the threshold. Sup… market in those twenty days. Read againIt was 22,684,691.071575 on 17 September it isand 22,684,691.0715750.908316 on 20 September, still total-equals-circulating and 2.387147 lowernow 2.550406 below the August reading. A decrease is not something …le from here says what produceds it. W; what the threefour dated readings do establish is that the number is not frozendrifts downward in small amounts, so a no-issuance claim has t…uthority could restore anyway.

What it does not solve The st…hem. Thin markets price badly. T, and it is not only the tail. Sixteen of MetaDAO's twenty-three tokens hold under $120,000 in treasury between them and correspondingly little liquidity. A; a decision market on a project …k is a decision market in name; the mechanism's accuracy claim rests on liquidity that most of the tail does not have. But the volumes that settle real decisions are the sharper version of the objection. The Paystream liquidation above carried $186 of volume across both conditional books – a dissolution, a supply burn and a fixed redemption rate, settled on a. The three USDv conversions read above moved $680,000 of treasury on $10,934 between them, Omnipair's $130,000 settling on $387 from three participants. And two DAOs have shortened their own timelock this way: BASKET-002 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/basket-002) cut Basket's proposal duration from three days to twenty-four hours and its TWAP start delay to eight, on $97 of volume, and LFOWN-002 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/lfown-004) did the same on $54 and a margin of one hundredth of a cent. Shortening the window is the one change that makes every later decision cheaper to move, and it was made by markets almost nobody traded. This is…out the second, not the first.

Type Futarchy governance proto…at all Token META – 22,684,693.461.07 supply, no hard cap, unchanged; flat between 15 August and 4 September 2026, then 2.39 lower on 17 September ( supply API (https://market-…wGCafnZL38n3vYmeta) ) Scale 203 tokens on the Futarchy AMM holding $15.244.68m in market-governed USDC treasuries (read 417 September 2026, down 15.5% in twenty days); $45,404,486 cumulative raised (https://metadao.fi/) (homepage, 15 August 2026); four tokens added and one liquidated since 4 September, and the total still fell 3.7%). The homepage (https://metadao.fi/) no longer publishes a cumulative-raise total Related Futarchy (/wiki/dao…mbership/dao-legal-structures)

The DAO industry's one working… from first principles. As of 417 September 2026 the protocol's market feed lists 203 tokens whose treasuries hold $15,235,8864,675,913 in USDC, every dollar of whic… be spent by passing a market.

The launchpad, and the discret…'s own market feed can. As of 417 September 2026 the Rip Cars treasury holds $1190,000, down from $1610,000 twenty days earlieron 4 September and $160,000 on 15 August. For comparison, Avici raised… but nothing like Rip Cars'. Since September the launchpad also funds ideas that have no team. Two raises settled that way: LFOWN (https://metadao.fi/companies/lfown) took $10,000 from 28 owners on 8 September and ACCRUE (https://metadao.fi/companies/accrue) $10,000 from 39 owners on 15 September, each posted as an idea rather than a company – “No team yet: builders compete for the treasury and a decision market picks the winner. No winner? Full refund.” That inverts the usual order. A conventional raise prices a team’s plan; these price the idea first and then point the same mechanism at hiring against the money. Both are small, and whether a decision market can pick a founder is not a question either has answered – but it is the first time futarchy here has been aimed at an appointment rather than a spend. The Bid Wall (https://docs.me…most of this industry manages.

What the numbers say, read 417 September 2026 Every figure …ich is public and needs no key, though since 4 September it refuses a bare script and wants a browser user-agent. treasury_usdc_aum is the USD…sury – not what it raised, and it falls as the team, as the last paragraph of this section explains, not only what it has left to spends. Project Treasury USDC AMM l… MetaDAO (META) $3,703,551 $2,643,426272,535 2026-01-06 P2P Protocol (P2P) $3,308,997 $2,031,0681,965,666 2026-04-01 Credible Finance (CRED) $2,95700,000 $2,165,184914,573 2026-07-17 Avici (AVICI) $1,8700,001 $1,407,848244,531 2025-10-18 Umbra (UMBRA) $1,56318,978 $979,397486,896 2025-10-10 Laso Finance (LASO) $713,481 $40725,453 $359,2819 2026-07-04 Omnipair (OMFG) $6740,832 $544,078261,645 2026-02-19 Rip Cars (CHiveBits (NECTARS) $1102,000 $81,39040,921 2026-07-259-14 Jurassic (RAWR) $1091,000 $85,96090,644 2026-05-15 Solomon (SOLO) $100,000 $2,901,5153,190,480 2025-11-18 All 203 tokens $15,235,886 $13,834,4014,675,913 $11,604,578 – The distribution is the finding, and thirteen days have not softened it. Those ten hold 98.71% of the treasury total; the other thirteen hold $201,04675,101 between them, and twohe two at the bottom – Loyal ($0.54) and Flash.Trade ($0.00) – hold essentially nothingare unchanged to the cent since 4 September. A launchpad's headline is it…d that is the second finding. The same feed, read twenty days earlierRead on 15 August 2026, put the twenty treasuries atheld $18,036,742. They are now $15,235,886 – down $2,800,856, or 15.5%, in twenty days, with no token added or removed. Nineteen of the twenty fell or held flat; only Avici was unchanged, to the dollar. Most of the fall is one row: MetaDAO's own treasury went from $5,943,551 to $3,703,551, −37.7%, while its AMM liquidity rose from $2,268,427 to $2,643,426. Rip Cars spent 31% of its remaining balance in the same window, and ORDR 14%. Treasury AUM; on 4 September, $15,235,886; on 17 September, $14,675,913 across twenty-three rows. The roster moved in that last window and the direction did not: Paystream was liquidated (https://metadao.fi/decisions/paystream-003) by its own decision market on 2 September and has left the feed, while four launches joined it – LFOWN (8 September), HiveBits (14 September), ACCRUE and Cloud (15 September) – holding $118,000 between them. So the total fell $559,973 despite $118,000 of new money arriving. The shape of the fall is worth more than its size. The two largest treasuries, MetaDAO's own and P2P's, did not move at all: both are unchanged to the dollar over thirteen days. What moved were round, discrete amounts in the middle of the table – Credible −$250,000, Umbra −$250,000, Avici −$100,000, Omnipair −$30,000, Rip Cars −$20,000 – which is what an authorized draw looks like and not what continuous spending looks like. Laso is the only row that rose, by $11,972. Note also that the two columns are not proxies for each other: Solomon holds $100,000 in treasury against $3,190,480 in AMM liquidity, the deepest book on thise platform is a spend-down figure, not a scale figure, and a reader who takes a launchpad's treasury total as a proxy for its size is reading a number that halves on a two-month timescale. Note also that the two columns are not proxies for each other: Solomon holds $100,000 in treasury against $2,901,515 in AMM liquidity, the second-deepest book on the platform. And the column is about to stop meaning what this page has taken it to mean. Three of the largest projects have live decision markets to move treasury out of USDC without spending it: Credible, up to $250,000 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/credible-002) , Umbra, up to $300,000 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/umbra-008) and Omnipair, up to $130,000 (https://metadao.fi/decisions/omnipair-006) , each converting treasury USDC into USDv, Solomon's reward-bearing dollar, held in a company-controlled wallet at an expected 2.5–5%. Credible's proposal states the purpose plainly: the USDC “is idle and earns nothing”. The field this table reads is treasury_usdc_aum – a USDC balance, not a treasury valuation. If those three pass, up to $680,000 leaves it with nothing spent and no project any poorer, and every reader who has learned to read a fall in this column as a spend-down will be reading it wrong. A metric is safe to build a finding on only while the thing it measures and the thing it is taken to measure stay the same thing. The independent cross-check heldbroke on 46 September and stopped holding two days laterhas stayed broken, which is itself the finding. On 4 September th… still $13,376,451. Most of theat drop iwas one book: Solomon's fell fro…o $1,478,708, roughly halving. Re-read on 17 September 2026 the gap has not closed and is slightly wider: $11,604,578 on the market feed against $13,264,607 on DeFiLlama, stamped 20:17 UTC the same day, 12.5% apart eleven days on. Eleven days is too long for a stale snapshot on either side, so the two are counting different things, and anyone quoting a liquidity figure for this protocol has to say which. Solomon's book went back the other way in the meantime – $1,478,708 on 6 September, $3,190,480 on 17 September – more than doubling with no proposal cast either way. Treasury USDC did not move at…protocol/analytics) – at $3,131,35085,544 all-time, $139,1248,389 over 30 days, $281,82603 over the trailing week and $3,2384,521 over 24 hours. The all-time figure has grown $99,965 in the twenty days since the last reading, but the 30-day rate has fallen 41% (from $234,549) – r, read 17 September 2026. The decay this page reported a fortnight ago did not continue: the 30-day rate had fallen 41% to $139,129 by 4 September and has since risen 6.7%. All-time fees grew $54,194 over the thirteen days, about $4,200 a day against roughly $5,000 a day in the twenty days before. Revenue thathere arrives in launch-shaped bursts rather than a run rate, which is exactly what a burst decaying looks like, so one 30-day reading of it is a level and not a trend. One count needs care. MetaDAO's documentation still states it has “run 96 proposa…ew) since November 2023, and its homepage separately counts 14 launches to date (https://metadao.fi/) . The two fourteens are not the same set – the first counts governance clients such as Jito, Sanctum and Flash.Trade, which came for decision markets and never ran an ICO; the second counts raises. They should not be compounded into a single statistic, which is a thing secondary write-ups of this protocol dothat sentence has not moved while the protocol has. Its fourteen counts governance clients such as Jito, Sanctum and Flash.Trade, which came for decision markets and never ran an ICO; the market feed already carries twenty-three tokens. The homepage count of launches that used to sit beside it is gone – metadao.fi (https://metadao.fi/) was rebuilt between 15 August and 17 September 2026 around per-company runway and valuation and a live decision feed, and now publishes neither a launch count nor a cumulative raise. Secondary write-ups that compounded the two fourteens into one statistic were wrong then; there is only one fourteen now, and it is frozen.

When the mechanism said no Two refusalhree cases are on the record, and between them they test both halves of the desigthe launch, the wind-down and the token. Hurupay, February 2026. Th…listed at a lower valuation. Paystream, September 2026. The first wind-down settled the same way a spend does. PAYSTREAM-003, Liquidate Paystream (https://metadao.fi/decisions/paystream-003) , passed on a final TWAP of $0.02582 in the pass market against $0.02495 in the fail market, and it is a dissolution rather than a pause: the DAO withdraws all protocol-controlled liquidity, permanently revokes the PAYS mint and freeze authorities, burns the 94.28% of supply under protocol control, moves the recovered USDC into a liquidation vault, terminates the Paystream DAO LLC and open-sources the intellectual property. Holders redeem at a rate fixed once at execution – a reference 0.0267 USDC per PAYS, a 35.62% recovery against the 0.075 ICO price – for three years, with the redeemed tokens held in the vault so the ratio does not move as people claim: “There is no first-mover advantage and no last-holder penalty.” The token left the market feed with it, which is why the twenty rows read on 4 September are twenty-three rather than twenty-four now. Publishing a wind-down at the same address, in the same format and through the same mechanism as a raise is a disclosure standard almost nothing else on this page’s subject matches. META's supply, continuously. M…hold. Supply read on-chain on 15 August and again on 4 September 2026 was 22,684,69…458722 against an initial 10m, with total and circulating supply identical – and identical to the 15 August reading, so no issuance passed a market in those twenty days. A no-issuance claim is an absence, so it is stat, so no issuance passed a market in those twenty days. Read again on 17 September it is 22,684,691.071575, still total-equals-circulating and 2.387147 lower. A decrease is not something an issuance proposal can produce, and nothing readable from here says what produced it. What the three dated readings do establish is that the number is not frozen, so a no-issuance claim has to be re-checked against two dateda fresh readings rather than left openinherited from this page. Whether that is reassuring d…uthority could restore anyway.

What it does not solve The st…ost of the tail does not have. The Paystream liquidation above carried $186 of volume across both conditional books – a dissolution, a supply burn and a fixed redemption rate, settled on a market almost nobody traded. This is the same objection Gn…out the second, not the first.

How Caper approaches this Thi…er) – the call asserts a non-empty v bucketzero v amount, withdrawn from the member’s own account, and aborts otherwise – and th…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this Thi…mbership as well as a market. Voting and trading bOnly a balloth mints the same soulbound token at the same rate: one v per ballot (the 100 XRD vote fee at a 0.01 rate) and 0.01 v per XRD of gross trade value on every buy and every sell: casting one mints exactly one v (VOTE_MINT, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), and buying, selling and transferring mint none – the trade-side mint was removed in the genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026. Holding some v is a precondition of exit (/w…s a ballot. So the exit opens to whoever has voted or tradonly to members who have voted, and the one formula prices…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this Thi…on locks the caper’s trailing seven-day TWAP as a baseline and opens a forty-eight-hourthe market window, and the action execut…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

What the numbers say, read 4 S… The independent cross-check still holds. Theld on 4 September and stopped holding two days later, which is itself the finding. On 4 September the AMM liquidity total of $13.83m matchesd DeFiLlama's TVL for the prot…628, same day) to within 1.4%. Re-read on 6 September 2026, the two sources disagree by 11.7%: the market feed puts platform liquidity at $11,810,734 — down $2,023,667, or 14.6%, in two days — while DeFiLlama's most recent point, stamped 5 September 22:50 UTC, is still $13,376,451. Most of the drop is one book: Solomon's fell from $2,901,515 to $1,478,708, roughly halving. Treasury USDC did not move at all over the same two days — the twenty treasuries went from $15,235,886 to $15,245,465, +0.06%, with the top nine unchanged to the dollar. So the two columns of the table above decay on completely different clocks: treasury AUM falls when a team spends, in steps; AMM liquidity is priced, and can move 15% in a weekend without anyone deciding anything. Reading either as “the size of the platform” will mislead in a different way. On 15 August 2026 MetaDAO's o…write-ups of this protocol do.

How Caper approaches this Thi…two-option ballot, 30% on five, both of which are three quarters of what a unanimous first place could take at that width, since a full-permutation Borda fold caps any single option at 2 / option_count – and is not the do-nothing o…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this Thi…at least one of which must be executablean answer other than it (executable, or since 5 September 2026 a non-executing debate position); a full-permutation ranked vo…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How a decision is made The li…nnot spike the recorded price. What a system inherits by settling on a price at all – the manipulation cost that becomes its real quorum, and the retention bound that shortens a nominal window – is set out under price oracles in governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/price-oracles-in-governance) . Execution is immediate on res…he authority, not either page.

Type Futarchy governance proto…all Token META – 22,684,693.496 supply, no hard cap, read on-chain 15 Augustunchanged between 15 August and 4 September 2026 ( supply API (https://ma…on the Futarchy AMM holding $18.05.24m in market-governed USDC treasuries (read 4 September 2026, down 15.5% in twenty days); $45,404,486 cumulative raised (https://metadao.fi/) (homepage, 15 August 2026) Related Futarchy (/wiki/dao…mbership/dao-legal-structures)

The DAO industry's one working… from first principles. As of 15 August4 September 2026 the protocol's market fe…okens whose treasuries hold $18,036,7425,235,886 in USDC, every dollar of whic… be spent by passing a market.

The launchpad, and the discret…'s own market feed can. As of 15 August4 September 2026 the Rip Cars treasury holds $160,00010,000, down from $160,000 twenty days earlier. For comparison, Avici raised…most of this industry manages.

What the numbers say, read 15 August4 September 2026 Every figure below come…y Live since MetaDAO (META) $5,943,703,551 $2,268643,4276 2026-01-06 P2P Protocol (P2P) $3,475,627 $2,079,194308,997 $2,031,068 2026-04-01 Credible Finance (CRED) $3,202,950,000 $1,939,3352,165,184 2026-07-17 Avici (AVICI) $1,800,001 $1,600,533407,848 2025-10-18 Umbra (UMBRA) $1,6568,978 $1,015,181979,397 2025-10-10 Laso Finance (LASO) $7413,664 $459,87481 $407,281 2026-07-04 Omnipair (OMFG) $6704,301 $555,871,832 $544,078 2026-02-19 Rip Cars (CARS) $1610,000 $70,70681,390 2026-07-25 Jurassic (RAWR) $11709,000 $1485,92960 2026-05-15 ORDRSolomon (SOLO) $1050,000 $40,540 2026-07-31 All 20 tokens $18,036,742 $13,501,9932,901,515 2025-11-18 All 20 tokens $15,235,886 $13,834,401 – The distribution is the finding. Those ten hold 99.38.7% of the treasury total; the other ten hold $118,620201,046 between them, and threewo – Loyal, Solomon ($0.54) and Flash.Trade ($0.00) – hold essentially nothing. A…ead and a long, empty tail. Two independent cross-checkshe head drains, and that is the second finding. The same feed, read twenty days earlier on 15 August 2026, put the twenty treasuries at $18,036,742. They are now $15,235,886 – down $2,800,856, or 15.5%, in twenty days, with no token added or removed. Nineteen of the twenty fell or held flat; only Avici was unchanged, to the dollar. Most of the fall is one row: MetaDAO's own treasury went from $5,943,551 to $3,703,551, −37.7%, while its AMM liquidity rose from $2,268,427 to $2,643,426. Rip Cars spent 31% of its remaining balance in the same window, and ORDR 14%. Treasury AUM on this platform is a spend-down figure, not a scale figure, and a reader who takes a launchpad's treasury total as a proxy for its size is reading a number that halves on a two-month timescale. Note also that the two columns are not proxies for each other: Solomon holds $100,000 in treasury against $2,901,515 in AMM liquidity, the second-deepest book on the platform. The independent cross-check still holds. The AMM liquidity total of $13.5083m matches DeFiLlama's TVL for…ama.fi/protocol/metadao) ($13.54m,639,628, same day) to within 0.3%; and1.4%. On 15 August 2026 MetaDAO's own transparency r…s://metadao.fi/transparency) gialso gaves its V6 Treasury as $5,943,551.02, matching theat day's market-feed's META row to the cent; the transparency page now returns a bot-block to automated requests, so only the DeFiLlama check is re-runnable here. DeFiLlama also puts protocol fees – a 0.25%…/protocol/analytics) – at $3,0131,3850 all-time, $234,54139,129 over 30 days, $28,826 over the trailing week and $23,831238 over the trailing week:24 hours. The all-time figure has grown $99,965 in the twenty days since the last reading, but the 30-day rate has fallen 41% (from $234,549) – revenue that arrives in launc… bursts rather than a run rate, which is exactly what a burst decaying looks like. One count needs care. MetaD…write-ups of this protocol do.

When the mechanism said no Tw…hold. Supply read on-chain on 15 August4 September 2026 was 22,684,693.4958722 against an initial 10m, with …d circulating supply identical – and identical to the 15 August reading, so no issuance passed a market in those twenty days. A no-issuance claim is an absence, so it is stated against two dated readings rather than left open. Whether that is reassuring d…uthority could restore anyway.

What it does not solve The st…ion market on a project with $4,703,050 in the bank is a decision ma…out the second, not the first.

References - MetaDAO docs – …ply figure on this page, read 15 August 20264 September 2026 (and previously 15 August 2026, cited above for the twenty-day comparison). - MetaDAO transparency rep…ments are not settled capital.

How Caper approaches this This section used to draw a clean contrast – MetaDAO removes the electorate, a caper keeps one and changes what a vote weighs – and that contrast no longer holds. Sincehas been rewritten twice in a month, and the dates matter, because a reader who saw it last week is holding a different model. Until 26 August 2026 Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) settled proposals on a ranked ballot alone. Between 26 and 28 August it settled them on a price alone, and this page said so – that MetaDAO and Caper had converged on the same answer. Since the redeploy of 29 August 2026 Ca caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) settles its does both, in sequence, and the convergence claim is retired. A caper proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) the same way MetaDAO settles its own: on a price rather than a tally. Raising a proposal freezes one typed action andnow passes two gates. The legislative gate is a ballot: two to five typed options, one of which must be “do nothing” and at least one of which must be executable; a full-permutation ranked vote for a flat 100 XRD fee banked to the caper’s own treasury; a Borda tally; and the leader passes only if its share of the weight actually cast clears 1.5 ÷ the option count – 75% on a two-option ballot, 30% on five – and is not the do-nothing option. The optimistic gate follows: triggering the winning action locks the caper'’s trailing seven-day time-weighted average price as a baseline; the proposal sitsTWAP as a baseline and open fors a forty-eight-hours, and it passes if and only if the live price window, and the action executes if and only if the TWAP measured across that window is at or above thate baseline when anybody resolves it. There is no ballot, no quorum and no vote method on the deployed contract. Trading is the whole mechanism, wh. Holding is consent; only selling hard enough to hold the price below the baseline for a real share of the window blocks it. That makes the contrast with MetaDAO sharper than the convergence it replaced, because the two protocols now put the priche is the sentence MetaDAO's own documentation opens with. What still separates them is what the market is asked to price. MetaDAO runs conditional markets –n different places. MetaDAO puts it instead of a vote: a decision market prices two conditional worlds against each other, and there is no electorate that could overrule the result. Caper puts it after a vote: the ballot decides what the proposal is and whether it has a mandate, and the market is handed a veto over that verdict rather than the decision itself. A caper can therefore fail in a way MetaDAO structurally cannot – a proposal that wins its ballot outright and is then sold down through its own baseline – and that failure is the design, not a defect in it. The mechanical differences run the other way. MetaDAO’s markets are conditional: two books, one per world, with positions that unwind if their world does not happen –, so the comparison is between …eous prices for the same token, and the proposal is what diff…e book, and compares the token'’s price nduring the window against its own price from before the proposal existwindow opened. That is far cheaper: – no conditional liquidity to s…honest, and any passer-by can settle it. It alsocrank the settlement – but it cannot separate the market li… and the −3% / +3% thresholds described above are MetaDAO'’s answers to that same problem inside a single proposal; a caper'’s answer is that the baseline is a seven-day average, which resists a spikeboth sides of the comparison are integrals rather than spot reads, which defeats an atomic buy-resolve-sell round trip but not a genuine trend. The second difference is that a caper still has a membership even though it no longer has an electorate. Trading mints a soulbound token – a flatas well as a market. Voting and trading both mint the same soulbound token at the same rate: one v per ballot (the 100 XRD vote fee at a 0.01 rate) and 0.01 v per XRD of gross trade value, on the buy leg and the sell leg alike – and hevery buy and every sell. Holding some is a precondition …/foundations/leaving-a-caper) : – the call asserts a non-empty v bucket and aborts otherwise, – and the share it pays out is w = (t · v) / (V · T). That is, the same expression that used to weighs a ballot, still live and now pricing a redemption ins. So the exit opens to whoever has votead – worth naming, because the notation survived a change of system unchangedor traded, and the one formula prices both. MetaDAO has no analogue: a d…and holding META is a position, not rather than a claim. See how vote tokens…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this MetaDAO and Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) agree on the diagnosis – that a token balance on its own is a poor proxy for who should decide – and split on the remedy. MetaDAO removes the electorate: nobody votes, and a price stands in for collective judgement. A caper keeps the electorate and changes what a vote weighs. Voting power on a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is w = (t · v) / (V · T), where t is the member's governance-token balance and v their accumulated participation – one voteThis section used to draw a clean contrast – MetaDAO removes the electorate, a caper keeps one and changes what a vote weighs – and that contrast no longer holds. Since August 2026 Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) settles its proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) the same way MetaDAO settles its own: on a price rather than a tally. Raising a proposal freezes one typed action and locks the caper's trailing seven-day time-weighted average price as a baseline; the proposal sits open for forty-eight hours, and it passes if and only if the live price is at or above that baseline when anybody resolves it. There is no ballot, no quorum and no vote method on the deployed contract. Trading is the whole mechanism, which is the sentence MetaDAO's own documentation opens with. What still separates them is what the market is asked to price. MetaDAO runs conditional markets – two books, one per world, positions that unwind if their world does not happen – so the comparison is between two simultaneous prices for the same token, and the proposal is what differs between them. A caper has one book, and compares the token's price now against its own price from before the proposal existed. That is far cheaper: no conditional liquidity to seed, no pass and fail AMMs token minted per accepted ballot, non-transferable, so it can be earned but not bought in a block the way a market position can. The sharper contrastep honest, and any passer-by can settle it. It also cannot separate the market likes this proposal from the market moved this week. The 24-hour recording delay and the −3% / +3% thresholds above are MetaDAO's answers to that same problem inside a single proposal; a caper's answer is that the baseline is a seven-day average, which resists a spike but not a trend. The second difference is wthat participation is worth. On a caper, holding at least one vote tokena caper still has a membership even though it no longer has an electorate. Trading mints a soulbound token – a flat 0.01 v per XRD of gross trade value, on the buy leg and the sell leg alike – and holding some is a precondition of exit (/…the call asserts a non-empty vote-token bucket and aborts otherwise, so a holder who never voted cannot withdraw their pro-rata share at alland the share it pays out is w = (t · v) / (V · T). That bindis the decision right to the exit right, which is a differentsame expression that used to weigh a ballot, still leiver from anything a decision market provides – MetaDAO's answer to a bad proposal is to trade against it, Caper's is that the people who never show and now pricing a redemption instead – worth naming, because the notation survived upa channot take the treasury with them. Neither addresses the other's problem: Caper has no mechanism for pricing a decision's expected effect, and futarchy has no notion of membership to gate. See votingge of system unchanged. MetaDAO has no analogue: a decision market has no members to redeem, and holding META is a position, not a claim. See how vote tokens are earned (/wiki/governance/voting) .

Type Futarchy governance protocol & token launchpad – METADAO LLC Chain Solana – open-source programs (https://github.com/metaDAOproject/programs) , Futarchy v0.6.0 / Launchpad v0.7.0 Live since November 2023 (governance); launchpad from 2025 Decides by Futarchy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) – conditional markets and a lagging TWAP, no voting at all Token META – 22,684,693.49 supply, no hard cap, read on-chain 15 August 2026 ( supply API (https://market-api.metadao.fi/api/supply/METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta) ) Scale 20 tokens on the Futarchy AMM holding $18.04m in market-governed USDC treasuries; $45,404,486 cumulative raised (https://metadao.fi/) Related Futarchy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) · Aragon DAO (/wiki/daos/infrastructure/aragon-dao) · Kleros (/wiki/daos/infrastructure/kleros) · DAO legal structures (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures)

The DAO industry's one working counter-example MetaDAO is the reference implementation of futarchy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) on a public chain, and the only organisation of consequence that has removed voting from its governance entirely. Its own documentation puts the claim plainly: “The difference between governance on MetaDAO and elsewhere is that there isn't any voting, only trading.” (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/overview) Every material decision – spending treasury USDC, issuing new tokens, changing token metadata, moving protocol liquidity – is settled by comparing the price of the token in two conditional markets, one priced on the proposal passing and one on it failing. It matters to this wiki for a reason separate from the mechanism. Most alternatives to token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) exist as forum posts, pilots or advisory widgets. MetaDAO has run its own treasury this way since November 2023, and has since become the machinery under a working Solana launchpad, so the design is observable against real balances rather than argued from first principles. As of 15 August 2026 the protocol's market feed lists 20 tokens whose treasuries hold $18,036,742 in USDC, every dollar of which can only be spent by passing a market.

How a decision is made The lifecycle has four stages, all documented and all on-chain. - Anyone proposes. A proposal can spend treasury USDC, issue new tokens, update token metadata, or change treasury-provided liquidity (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/proposals) . There is no proposer whitelist. - Stake, not quorum. Tokens must be staked on a proposal before it goes live – a default of 200,000 to 1,500,000 tokens, 1–15% of an ICO's 10m supply (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/proposals) , tuned per DAO. Staking is anti-spam only: no lockup, no slashing (https://docs.metadao.fi/token/mechanics) , stakes returned once trading opens. Only one proposal can be live at a time. - Three days of conditional trading. The project moves half its spot liquidity into the pass and fail markets (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/markets) , so neither starts empty, and traders take positions that revert if their world does not happen – buy in the pass market, watch the proposal fail, and the trade unwinds as though it never occurred. TWAP recording does not start immediately: a 24-hour delay (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/twaps) gives traders time to price the proposal first. - A lagged average decides. Settlement compares a lagging-price TWAP (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/twaps) in each market – an observation series that can only move a bounded amount per update, so a validator controlling a slice of slots cannot spike the recorded price. Execution is immediate on resolution; the three-day window is itself the timelock (https://docs.metadao.fi/token/mechanics) . The pass condition is not a simple comparison, and the difference is worth reading precisely. MetaDAO's threshold table sets −3% for team-sponsored proposals and +3% for everything else – teams are given the benefit of the doubt, external proposers must clear a margin – and the docs add that “we're actively tuning these parameters. Check the DAO structure onchain to understand exactly what thresholds have been configured for any specific organization.” (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/twaps) A second documentation page still describes settlement as the plain inequality “Pass market TWAP > Fail market TWAP” (https://docs.metadao.fi/token/mechanics) ; where the two disagree, the on-chain DAO account is the authority, not either page.

The launchpad, and the discretionary cap Since 2025 the same programs sit under a token launchpad, and it is the launchpad that made MetaDAO visible outside governance circles. Investors get four days to commit USDC (https://docs.metadao.fi/how-launches-work/sale) ; 10m tokens are distributed proportionally; everyone pays the same price. Allocation is by an accumulator – committed_amount × elapsed_seconds – with a fill boost for people who commit while the pool is still sparse, so discovering a raise early is rewarded as well as arriving early. The unusual clause is the discretionary cap: the founder chooses how much of the committed USDC the project actually takes. MetaDAO's stated purpose is “to allow believers to participate while preventing projects from over-raising” (https://docs.metadao.fi/how-launches-work/sale) . On success the USDC goes to a market-governed treasury, mint authority transfers to that treasury, and 20% of the USDC plus 2.9m tokens seed the liquidity pools; the team then draws a configured monthly budget and must pass a proposal for anything larger. Rip Cars is the extreme case, and it is the clearest number on this page. The Hot Wheels gacha project's raise closed with $32.0m committed against a $250,000 minimum – and $250,000 raised (https://metadao.fi/projects) . A 128× oversubscription was refused in full. Contemporary coverage reported the sale at $20.9m in commitments mid-flight (https://cryptobriefing.com/rip-cars-21m-metadao-solana-ico/) and correctly cautioned that “commitments are not the same as capital settled” without being able to say what settled; the protocol's own market feed can. As of 15 August 2026 the Rip Cars treasury holds $160,000. For comparison, Avici raised $3.5m against a $2.0m goal and Umbra $3.0m against $750,000 – caps exercised, but nothing like Rip Cars'. The Bid Wall (https://docs.metadao.fi/how-launches-work/bid-wall) – a NAV-priced buyback that burned tokens sold into it – is worth noting mainly as a retirement. MetaDAO's own docs now head the page “The Bid Wall is deprecated. It was used in one raise and has not been used since.” A mechanism designed, shipped, used once and openly marked dead is a better disclosure standard than most of this industry manages.

What the numbers say, read 15 August 2026 Every figure below comes from MetaDAO's own CoinGecko-compatible market API (https://market-api.metadao.fi/api/tickers) , which is public and needs no key. treasury_usdc_aum is the USDC currently sitting in each project's market-governed treasury – not what it raised, and it falls as the team spends. Project Treasury USDC AMM liquidity Live since MetaDAO (META) $5,943,551 $2,268,427 2026-01-06 P2P Protocol (P2P) $3,475,627 $2,079,194 2026-04-01 Credible Finance (CRED) $3,200,000 $1,939,335 2026-07-17 Avici (AVICI) $1,800,001 $1,600,533 2025-10-18 Umbra (UMBRA) $1,668,978 $1,015,181 2025-10-10 Laso Finance (LASO) $743,664 $459,871 2026-07-04 Omnipair (OMFG) $704,301 $555,871 2026-02-19 Rip Cars (CARS) $160,000 $70,706 2026-07-25 Jurassic (RAWR) $117,000 $145,929 2026-05-15 ORDR $105,000 $40,540 2026-07-31 All 20 tokens $18,036,742 $13,501,993 – The distribution is the finding. Those ten hold 99.3% of the treasury total; the other ten hold $118,620 between them, and three – Loyal, Solomon and Flash.Trade – hold essentially nothing. A launchpad's headline is its cumulative raise; its actual state is a short head and a long, empty tail. Two independent cross-checks hold. The AMM liquidity total of $13.50m matches DeFiLlama's TVL for the protocol (https://api.llama.fi/protocol/metadao) ($13.54m, same day) to within 0.3%; and MetaDAO's own transparency report (https://metadao.fi/transparency) gives its V6 Treasury as $5,943,551.02, matching the market feed's META row to the cent. DeFiLlama also puts protocol fees – a 0.25% trade fee on all Futarchy AMM trades (https://docs.metadao.fi/protocol/analytics) – at $3,031,385 all-time, $234,549 over 30 days and $23,831 over the trailing week: revenue that arrives in launch-shaped bursts rather than a run rate. One count needs care. MetaDAO's documentation states it has “run 96 proposals for 14 organizations” (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/overview) since November 2023, and its homepage separately counts 14 launches to date (https://metadao.fi/) . The two fourteens are not the same set – the first counts governance clients such as Jito, Sanctum and Flash.Trade, which came for decision markets and never ran an ICO; the second counts raises. They should not be compounded into a single statistic, which is a thing secondary write-ups of this protocol do.

When the mechanism said no Two refusals are on the record, and between them they test both halves of the design. Hurupay, February 2026. The payments project's ICO opened on 3 February 2026 and closed at roughly $2,003,593 against a $3,000,000 minimum (https://phemex.com/news/article/metadaos-hurupay-ico-fails-to-meet-3m-target-raises-203m-59219) . Under the documented rule – “when a project fails to reach its minimum, everyone is refunded their USDC back” (https://docs.metadao.fi/how-launches-work/sale) – every participant was refunded and no token listed. It was the launchpad's first failure, and the interesting part is that the failure mode was the specified one: a raise that could not clear its own floor did not get quietly relisted at a lower valuation. META's supply, continuously. META has no hard cap at the token-program level (https://docs.metadao.fi/token/mechanics) – mint authority was never burned. What replaces the cap is that the authority is the governance program itself, not a human operator, so every new token must be proposed publicly, trade for three days, and clear the threshold. Supply read on-chain on 15 August 2026 was 22,684,693.49 against an initial 10m, with total and circulating supply identical. Whether that is reassuring depends entirely on whether you believe the markets are thick enough to reject a bad issuance – which is exactly the bet the protocol is asking you to make, stated honestly rather than hidden behind a cap that mint authority could restore anyway.

The legal shell MetaDAO is not a pseudonymous protocol wearing a DAO label. It operates as METADAO LLC, and its transparency page (https://metadao.fi/transparency) publishes an operating agreement, a certificate of formation, and unaudited quarterly reports running from Q1 2025 to Q1 2026, alongside a daily balance breakdown – $9.51m total, $8,219,832.59 of it USDC across named accounts. In July 2026 it went further than nearly any DAO has. MetaDAO LLC filed a MiCA Title II crypto-asset white paper (https://docs.metadao.fi/mica) for META – notification dated 2 July 2026, Digital Token Identifier BQ53DH590, legal entity identifier 254900XHQIYLONV5P484 – published as both a PDF (https://mica.metadao.fi/META-Token-White-Paper.pdf) and an Inline XBRL filing. The filing carries the standard Article 6(3) disclaimer that no competent authority has approved it and that the offeror is solely responsible for its content. The combination is unusual and worth stating for what it is: an organisation that has removed human discretion from its spending decisions has simultaneously accepted the disclosure obligations of a named legal entity in a regulated market. Those are not in tension – a registered offeror still needs somewhere for authority to live, and here it lives in a market rather than a board. Set beside the survey in DAO legal structures (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures) , it is a different answer from the foundation and the DUNA: an ordinary LLC whose treasury it cannot unilaterally spend.

What it does not solve The strongest objections to futarchy apply here undiminished, and the treasury table above sharpens two of them. Thin markets price badly. Ten of MetaDAO's twenty tokens hold under $120,000 in treasury between them and correspondingly little liquidity. A decision market on a project with $4,700 in the bank is a decision market in name; the mechanism's accuracy claim rests on liquidity that most of the tail does not have. This is the same objection GnosisDAO's delegates raised against the advisory pilot (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) – who supplies informed capital when the upside is a fraction of a percent – arriving from the opposite direction. Goodhart's law does not care that you removed the ballot. The welfare metric is the token price. Optimising hard for the token price can reward decisions that pump it and hollow out whatever the price was meant to proxy, and no amount of market depth fixes a badly chosen metric. Futarchy relocates politics to the choice of metric; it does not abolish it. Nothing here is a claim on the entity. Holding META buys governance influence through trading and nothing else. The tokenomics (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) question of what a governance token entitles a holder to is left exactly where every other DAO leaves it. And a fourth, particular to this protocol: the launchpad and the governance layer are being judged as one thing. Decision markets are a governance claim; the discretionary cap, the four-day sale and the refund floor are a fundraising claim. Rip Cars refusing $31.75m is evidence about the second, not the first.

How Caper approaches this MetaDAO and Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) agree on the diagnosis – that a token balance on its own is a poor proxy for who should decide – and split on the remedy. MetaDAO removes the electorate: nobody votes, and a price stands in for collective judgement. A caper keeps the electorate and changes what a vote weighs. Voting power on a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is w = (t · v) / (V · T), where t is the member's governance-token balance and v their accumulated participation – one vote token minted per accepted ballot, non-transferable, so it can be earned but not bought in a block the way a market position can. The sharper contrast is what participation is worth. On a caper, holding at least one vote token is a precondition of exit (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) : the call asserts a non-empty vote-token bucket and aborts otherwise, so a holder who never voted cannot withdraw their pro-rata share at all. That binds the decision right to the exit right, which is a different lever from anything a decision market provides – MetaDAO's answer to a bad proposal is to trade against it, Caper's is that the people who never showed up cannot take the treasury with them. Neither addresses the other's problem: Caper has no mechanism for pricing a decision's expected effect, and futarchy has no notion of membership to gate. See voting (/wiki/governance/voting) .

References - MetaDAO docs – Introduction to Decision Markets (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/overview) . The “no voting, only trading” framing, and the 96-proposals / 14-organisations count since November 2023. - MetaDAO docs – Finalizing Proposals (https://docs.metadao.fi/governance/twaps) . The lagging-price TWAP, the 24-hour recording delay, and the −3% / +3% pass thresholds. - MetaDAO docs – The ICO (https://docs.metadao.fi/how-launches-work/sale) . Four-day commitment window, the accumulator and fill boost, the discretionary cap, and the refund rule. - MetaDAO docs – Token Mechanics (https://docs.metadao.fi/token/mechanics) . Proposal lifecycle, the absence of a hard cap, and mint authority held by the governance program. - Futarchy AMM market API – tickers (https://market-api.metadao.fi/api/tickers) and META supply (https://market-api.metadao.fi/api/supply/METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta) . Keyless, first-party; the source of every treasury and supply figure on this page, read 15 August 2026. - MetaDAO transparency report (https://metadao.fi/transparency) . Incorporation documents, quarterly unaudited reports, and the daily account-level balance breakdown. - META Token MiCA white paper (https://docs.metadao.fi/mica) (notified 2 July 2026) – PDF (https://mica.metadao.fi/META-Token-White-Paper.pdf) . - metaDAOproject/programs (https://github.com/metaDAOproject/programs) . The Solana programs, with every deployed version and address listed in the analytics page (https://docs.metadao.fi/protocol/analytics) . - Kevin Heavey, “Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership” (https://www.umbraresearch.xyz/writings/futarchy) , Umbra Research. The essay MetaDAO's own documentation quotes at length. - Crypto Briefing on the Rip Cars ICO (https://cryptobriefing.com/rip-cars-21m-metadao-solana-ico/) , July 2026 – commitments mid-flight, and the caveat that commitments are not settled capital.