References - THORChain Docs —– Network Security and Governan…vernance) - THORChain Docs —– Tokenomics of RUNE and TCY (h…rune-tcy) - THORChain Blog —– Exploit Report #1 (15 May 202…loit-report-1) - THORChain —– official site (https://thorchain.org)

How Caper approaches this THO…-right) . A member can redeem atheir fair share of the caper's reserve …n only selling into the pool, hand the share is w = (t · v) / (V · T) –ing in both their governance tokens handed in, multiplied by their soulbound v handed in, over the caper's whole v supply and circulating supply. v isote tokens. Vote tokens are minted on one surface only – … a caper gives every member a priced way out of the treasury itself…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

Project THORChain Token RUNE …ETH, BNB, SOL, DOGE, and more —– no wrapped or bridged assets …in.org (https://thorchain.org)

THORChain is a decentralized c…https://docs.thorchain.org/) —– real BTC for real ETH, ETH for native SOL —– without wrapping, bridging, o…or layer, not in a token vote.

Native cross-chain swaps Ever…dity Pool paired against RUNE —– a BTC–RUNE pool, an ETH–RUNE …network-security-governance) —– active nodes rotate in and out on a cycle —– so no fixed group can capture… there is no full key to hold.

Governance: Mimir, not a token…ly. - Operational parameters —– quick, low-stakes settings —– activate on a small number of…so on. - Economic parameters —– anything touching the money —– require supermajority consens… must bond RUNE as collateral —– currently over 300,000 RUNE p…sed to ordinary token holders —– a deliberate trade-off very d…ed elsewhere in the directory.

RUNE tokenomics & the Incentiv…ain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) —– the full supply is released, …m back toward that 2:1 target —– an automatic economic governo…g under the human Mimir votes.

The ThorFi debt crisis and TCY… the protocol could not cover —– roughly $200M+ of RUNE-denomi…d as a pure income instrument —– it does not grant governance… stayed with the bonded nodes.

2026 exploit and the governanc…tors coordinated over Discord —– stacking manual pauses and casting formal Mimir votes —– to bring the whole network to…multi-week pause once patched.

How Caper approaches this THO…s not the “do nothing” option.A ballot that carries then has…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this THO…rculating supply. v is minted at one rate on both surfaces – 0.01 per XRD of gross value onon one surface only – one per ballot cast, with buysing and sells alike, and one per ballot cast, since the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that same rateing minting none since the genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026 – so a bag that has neither traded nover voted redeems nothing. That …ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this THO…en has to be triggered, which freezelocks the caper's trailing seven-day average token price as a baseline and opens a forty-eight-hourthe market window; the action executes o…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

How Caper approaches this THO…or having no vote – it is the vote. Nobody casts asecond half of the vote. Governance runs in two phases. Members cast ranked ballots onver a caper proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) : raising one freezes a single typed action and lock's two to five options, and the leading option carries only if it takes 1.5 / option_count of the weight actually cast and is not the “do nothing” option. A ballot that carries then has to be triggered, which freezes the caper's trailing seven-d…rage token price as a baseline, the proposal stays and open fors a forty-eight-hours, and it passes only if the live price window; the action executes only if the token's time-weighted average price across that window is at or above thate baseline when anybody settles it. A holder who thinks the trea…price falls, and the proposal failsdies after its ballot has already passed. The lever THORChain leaves i…admission of powerlessness is the whola full half of the governance surface here. Th…rculating supply. v is minted by trading, a flatat one rate on both surfaces – 0.01 per XRD of gross value on buys and sells alike, so a bag that never tradand one per ballot cast, since the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that same rate – so a bag that has neither traded nor voted redeems nothing. That is th…ed (/wiki/governance/voting) .

THORChain is a decentralized c…hain AMMs ( Curve (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/curve-dao) , Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) ) and aggregators ( Jupiter (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/jupiter) ): its governanc…or layer, not in a token vote.

How Caper approaches this THO…o sell into the open market. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) keeps holdings and voice on the same instrument, and adds a second lever THORChain's TCY holders neverOn a caper, selling is not the consolation prize for having no vote – it is the vote. Nobody casts a ballot on a caper proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) : raising one freezes a single typed action and locks the caper's trailing seven-day average token price as a baseline, the proposal stays open for forty-eight hours, and it passes only if the live price is at or above that baseline when anybody settles it. A holder who thinks the treasury is head — a canonical exit right (/blog/the-exit-right) . A caper's token holders both vote (/wiki/governance/voting) and, if they reject where the treasury is heading,ing somewhere bad sells, the price falls, and the proposal fails. The lever THORChain leaves its TCY holders as an admission of powerlessness is the whole governance surface here. The second lever is the one no THORChain instrument carries at all: a canonical exit right (/blog/the-exit-right) . A member can redeem theira share of the reserve. Voting power is the ccaper's reserve rather thanonical weight w = (t·v)/(V·T) — a holder's tokens times their own votes over total votes and circulating supply — so influence tracks both stake and participation, verified against the conly selling into the pool, and the share is w = (t · v) / (V · T) – governance tokens handed in, multiplied by the soulbound v handed in, over the caper's whole v supply and circulating supply. v is minted by trading, a flat 0.01 per XRD of gross value on buys and sells alike, so a bag that never traded redeems nothing. That is the mirror image of the ThorFi restrauct's compute_vote_weight. The point isn't that THORChain's model is wrong for a cross-chain settlement layer; it's that when a treasury restructures, giving holders a governed exit rather than only a revenue token changes who bears the downsideuring: instead of converting creditors into a revenue token with no governance, a caper gives every member a priced way out of the treasury itself. See leaving a caper (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) and how vote tokens are earned (/wiki/governance/voting) .

Project THORChain Token RUNE (settlement, bond & incentive asset); TCY (revenue-share, non-governance) Category Cross-chain native-asset DEX / node-operated protocol Chains Own Cosmos-SDK L1 settling native BTC, ETH, BNB, SOL, DOGE, and more — no wrapped or bridged assets Governance Node-operator-only via the Mimir (https://docs.thorchain.org/network-security-governance) parameter-voting system (no token-holder vote); ADRs for larger changes RUNE supply ~425M total (net-deflationary via fee burn); ~350M circulating, ~75M reserve Founded 2018 (multichain mainnet 2021) Website thorchain.org (https://thorchain.org)

THORChain is a decentralized cross-chain liquidity protocol that lets users swap native assets (https://docs.thorchain.org/) — real BTC for real ETH, ETH for native SOL — without wrapping, bridging, or trusting a custodian. It is not an app on someone else's chain: THORChain runs its own Cosmos-SDK (https://cosmos.network/) Layer-1 whose validators (THORNodes) watch external chains, hold assets in threshold-signed vaults, and settle every trade through pools paired against its native token, RUNE (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) . That architecture makes it a structurally distinct entry in the DEX directory alongside the on-chain AMMs ( Curve (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/curve-dao) , Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) ) and aggregators ( Jupiter (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/jupiter) ): its governance and its treasury risk both live at the node-operator layer, not in a token vote.

Native cross-chain swaps Every asset THORChain supports sits in a Continuous Liquidity Pool paired against RUNE — a BTC–RUNE pool, an ETH–RUNE pool, and so on. A BTC→ETH swap is really two hops through RUNE (BTC→RUNE→ETH), which is why RUNE is described as the network's settlement asset (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) : it is present in every pool and every trade, giving the token constant, activity-driven demand rather than a purely speculative one. Custody is handled by a Threshold Signature Scheme (TSS). No THORNode ever holds a complete vault key; each holds a fragment, and only a supermajority (≈⅔) of nodes combining fragments can sign an outbound transaction. Vaults are regularly churned (https://docs.thorchain.org/network-security-governance) — active nodes rotate in and out on a cycle — so no fixed group can capture the network or its funds. This is the same reason THORChain has no admin multisig that can move user assets: there is no full key to hold.

Governance: Mimir, not a token vote THORChain's governance is unusual and worth stating plainly: RUNE is not a governance token, and TCY explicitly confers no voting rights. Protocol decisions are made by active THORNode operators through Mimir (https://docs.thorchain.org/network-security-governance) , a system for voting network parameters directly. - Operational parameters — quick, low-stakes settings — activate on a small number of node votes (typically 3+), and can be flipped: 4 nodes overturn, 5 re-activate, and so on. - Economic parameters — anything touching the money — require supermajority consensus (~⅔ of validators), the same threshold that guards the vaults. To become a validator at all, an operator must bond RUNE as collateral — currently over 300,000 RUNE per node. Misbehaviour is slashed against that bond, so the right to vote is bought with capital genuinely at risk. Larger architectural changes go through Architecture Decision Records (ADRs) debated by node operators and contributors. The result is a governance body that is fast and Sybil-resistant, but also small, technical, and closed to ordinary token holders — a deliberate trade-off very different from the balance-weighted vote-escrow (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) models used elsewhere in the directory.

RUNE tokenomics & the Incentive Pendulum RUNE has no vesting schedules or locked allocations (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) — the full supply is released, and a portion of fees is burned, so circulating supply trends down over time (~425M total, ~350M circulating, ~75M reserve). Rewards to nodes and liquidity providers come from real fee revenue (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) (on the order of $50,000–$100,000/day), not new emissions. Security is anchored by a target ratio: total bonded RUNE ≈ 2× the value of all non-RUNE assets in the pools. If liquidity outgrows security the network becomes attackable; if bonded RUNE dwarfs liquidity it is capital-inefficient. The Incentive Pendulum (https://docs.thorchain.org/network-security-governance) continuously re-weights rewards between nodes and LPs to steer the system back toward that 2:1 target — an automatic economic governor sitting under the human Mimir votes.

The ThorFi debt crisis and TCY THORChain is also one of DeFi's most instructive case studies in governance under stress (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) . Its lending and savers products (“ThorFi”) accrued liabilities the protocol could not cover — roughly $200M+ of RUNE-denominated debt. In early 2025 node operators paused the network and voted on a restructuring rather than papering over the hole by inflating RUNE. The resolution was a debt-to-equity conversion: a new token, TCY (THORChain Yield), was issued at 1 TCY per $1 of debt (fixed supply 210M), turning creditors into revenue-share holders instead of writing them to zero. TCY holders receive 10% of all network revenue (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) paid in RUNE, with a RUNE/TCY pool for liquidity. Crucially, TCY was designed as a pure income instrument — it does not grant governance rights (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) . Creditors got a claim on cash flow; the votes stayed with the bonded nodes.

2026 exploit and the governance response On 15 May 2026 a newly-churned node operator exploited a vulnerability in the GG20 signature scheme (https://blog.thorchain.org/thorchain-exploit-report-1) and drained roughly $10.7M from one of five vaults. The response is a clean illustration of how a node-operated protocol governs an emergency: automatic solvency checks halted signing and trading within minutes without human intervention, then operators coordinated over Discord — stacking manual pauses and casting formal Mimir votes — to bring the whole network to a controlled halt within about two hours. The other four vaults were untouched, and the network absorbed the loss from protocol-owned reserves rather than minting fresh RUNE. Recovery of the lost funds was routed to community governance via ADR-028 (https://blog.thorchain.org/thorchain-exploit-report-1) . Trading resumed after a multi-week pause once patched.

How Caper approaches this THORChain draws a hard line most DAOs blur: the people who provide the capital (RUNE bonders) hold the votes, while the people owed money (TCY holders) get a cash-flow claim and no say at all. It is clean, but it means an ordinary holder's only real lever if they disagree with the operators is to sell into the open market. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) keeps holdings and voice on the same instrument, and adds a second lever THORChain's TCY holders never had — a canonical exit right (/blog/the-exit-right) . A caper's token holders both vote (/wiki/governance/voting) and, if they reject where the treasury is heading, can redeem their share of the reserve. Voting power is the canonical weight w = (t·v)/(V·T) — a holder's tokens times their own votes over total votes and circulating supply — so influence tracks both stake and participation, verified against the contract's compute_vote_weight. The point isn't that THORChain's model is wrong for a cross-chain settlement layer; it's that when a treasury restructures, giving holders a governed exit rather than only a revenue token changes who bears the downside.

References - THORChain Docs — Network Security and Governance (Mimir, bonding, TSS, churn, Incentive Pendulum) (https://docs.thorchain.org/network-security-governance) - THORChain Docs — Tokenomics of RUNE and TCY (https://docs.thorchain.org/tokenomics-rune-tcy) - THORChain Blog — Exploit Report #1 (15 May 2026) (https://blog.thorchain.org/thorchain-exploit-report-1) - THORChain — official site (https://thorchain.org)