Name SushiSwap (Sushi) Type P… docs (https://docs.sushi.com) · Snapshot (https://snapshot.box/#/s:sushigov.eth)

How Caper approaches this Two…SushiSwap's recurring problems –, an insider entity controlling the treasury, and holders whose only recourse when they disagree is to sell into a thin market –is to sell, are the exact conditions a Ccaper (/wiki/foundations/what-i…caper) is built around. In a Ccaper the treasury is not held …labs entity's discretion: any holdmember who has voted can exit (/w…/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) and redeem their share of it directly from the contractt any time for their fair share ( the exit right (https://cap…t-right) ), so control cannot quietly migratedrift away from the people who funded it. AndvVote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) blends holdings with participation rather than letting a few large wallets settle every question. It is an outcome-level answer to the same failure modes Sushi has spent years patching by governance voteis earned by taking part, so a big bag alone cannot settle every question.

Votes since December 2025 Since December 2025 SUSHI holders have approved three changes on the Sushi Snapshot space (https://snapshot.box/#/s:sushigov.eth) , each through a signal vote followed by an implementation vote: - Emissions. The implementation vote (https://snapshot.box/#/s:sushigov.eth/proposal/0x9c4dd678c47020b2d308bb6876a9140f17f120c1b324727025703cb92186362e) that closed on 21 December 2025 raised the SUSHI Annual Emissions Rate from 1.5% to up to 5% of total supply a year, to pay for liquidity on Sushi's main networks, token listings and deals with outside liquidity providers. The proposal put Sushi Labs' 2024 revenue above $10m and set a target of $20m a year ( forum (https://forum.sushi.com/discussion/1312021-increase-sushi-annual-emissions-rate-aer-for-amm-liquidity-listings-private-capital-deals-implementation) ). - Legacy liquidity. The vote (https://snapshot.box/#/s:sushigov.eth/proposal/0x26fad0eda6e06d759a6a9f69d96b6ced97e8115f5ccaa7d2f96e32f9b0cec578) that closed on 29 January 2026 moved LP tokens, about $56m to $57m by the proposal's estimate, out of the old MasterChef and MiniChef reward contracts on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Gnosis and Polygon. LPs got a 30 to 60 day window to claim a withdrawal; the rest is redeployed as liquidity the protocol owns, in V3-style positions, with a claim kept open for LPs who return later ( forum (https://forum.sushi.com/discussion/1312123-masterchef-lp-migration-to-v3-protocoldeployed-liquidity-rfc) ). See protocol-owned liquidity (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/protocol-owned-liquidity) . - Fees. The vote (https://snapshot.box/#/s:sushigov.eth/proposal/0x2e6df9d02d40e05e9dede6ad50bac47a3e8e7cd3604f4caa63b3995eea7384b0) that closed on 3 September 2026 replaced a fee model that sent protocol revenue mainly to xSUSHI buybacks. 1% of protocol fees and 1% of perpetuals fees now fund monthly xSUSHI buybacks, 4% of protocol fees buy SUSHI weekly for a new SUSHI Reserve, and the rest goes to Sushi Ops for development, incentives and operations. The same vote moves part of the roughly $25m of protocol-deployed liquidity to Robinhood Chain, with a first target of $10m to $20m, starting with an ETH–USDG position ( forum (https://forum.sushi.com/discussion/1313076-sushi-tokenomics-restructure-sushi-reserve-revised-xsushi-buybacks-and-protocoldeployed-liquidity-deployment-to-robinhood-chain) ). The only votes against any of the three implementations were 1,071 SUSHI on the emissions change. On each, one address, 0xFf46…E492 (https://snapshot.box/#/profile/0xFf467361cC46dB493588cCd60733e391e856E492) , cast about 5.2m SUSHI, more than 99% of the total; the fee restructure drew five voters in all. Token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) covers how concentrated holdings decide votes elsewhere.

Origins: the vampire attack S…a competitor's liquidity with token liquidity-mining (/wiki/economics/liquidity-mining) incentives. The protocol was…ommunity" believed was theirs.

See also - Uniswap DAO (/wik…arget of its vampire attack. - Liquidity mining and mercenary capital (/wiki/economics/liquidity-mining) – the mechanism the vampire attack ran on, and what happened when Uniswap's counter-programme stopped paying. - Curve DAO (/wiki/daos/dexs/…/voting/token-weighted-voting)

How Caper approaches this Two…ion: any holder who has voted or traded can exit (/wiki/dao-governanc…s patching by governance vote.

How Caper approaches this Two…ion: any holder who has voted or traded can exit (/wiki/dao-governanc…s patching by governance vote.

SushiSwap is a multi-chain dec…clone of Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , than for t…ance layer comes under strain.

Governance structure SUSHI is…off-chain Snapshot (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) pol…ted-execution split (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chai…ough everything that followed.

The treasury runway crisis and…ken-weighted voting (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighte…ctually get managed (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) under pressure.

Sushi Labs and the recentraliz…ve-decentralization (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progres…s in how DAOs fail (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

How Caper approaches this Two…tity's discretion: any holder who has voted can exit (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…s patching by governance vote.

See also - Uniswap DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) – the DEX S…ck. - Curve DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/curve-dao) – the other A…. - How DAOs fail (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fa…treasury management (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasur…ken-weighted voting (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting)

Name SushiSwap (Sushi) Type Protocol DAO – decentralized exchange / AMM Governance token SUSHI (staked as xSUSHI) Launched August 2020, as a fork of Uniswap (https://uniswap.org) Governance Off-chain Snapshot (https://snapshot.org) voting + on-chain multisig execution; an elected "Head Chef" Status 🟢 Active Links sushi.com (https://www.sushi.com) · forum (https://forum.sushi.com) · docs (https://docs.sushi.com)

SushiSwap is a multi-chain decentralized exchange (DEX) governed by the holders of its SUSHI token. It is one of the most-studied DAOs in DeFi – less for its technology, which began as a near-verbatim clone of Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , than for the string of governance crises it has worked through: an anonymous founder who controlled the treasury, a funding shortfall that forced the DAO to switch off holder rewards, an SEC subpoena, and a 2024 restructuring that critics read as a nominally-decentralized protocol handing its treasury back to insiders. For a wiki about how DAOs succeed and fail, Sushi is a case study in most of the ways the governance layer comes under strain.

Origins: the vampire attack SushiSwap launched in August 2020 as a fork of Uniswap V2's contracts, adding the one thing Uniswap then lacked: a governance-and-reward token. Its go-to-market was the canonical vampire attack (https://finematics.com/vampire-attack-sushiswap-explained/) – it paid SUSHI emissions to users who deposited their Uniswap LP tokens into SushiSwap, then migrated that liquidity, on the order of a billion dollars (https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/sushiswaps-vampire-scheme-hours-away-and-with-1-3b-at-stake) , across to its own pools. It remains the textbook example of bootstrapping a protocol by draining a competitor's liquidity with token incentives. The protocol was built by a pseudonymous developer known only as Chef Nomi. Days after the migration, Chef Nomi sold the entire development-fund allocation (https://finematics.com/vampire-attack-sushiswap-explained/) – roughly 10% of emissions, about $14 million in ETH, a pool the founder unilaterally controlled – and the SUSHI price collapsed. After a community backlash the founder returned the funds and handed control to others, notably co-founder 0xMaki. The episode is the archetypal DAO custody failure: a single anonymous key holding money the "community" believed was theirs.

Governance structure SUSHI is the governance token; staking it mints xSUSHI, which historically carried both a share of protocol fees and voting weight (https://www.sushi.com/blog/breaking-down-the-sushi-tokenomics) . Day-to-day decisions run through off-chain Snapshot (/wiki/daos/tooling/voting/snapshot) polls debated on the Sushi forum (https://forum.sushi.com) , with execution carried out by a core multisig – the same off-chain-vote / trusted-execution split (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) most large DAOs use. The protocol is nominally led by an elected Head Chef. In a Snapshot election that closed on 3 October 2022, Jared Grey won the role with roughly 83% of the vote (https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/10/03/sushiswap-community-votes-in-head-chef-to-oversee-decentralized-crypto-exchange) – over 11 million SUSHI – after months of leadership turmoil. Electing a de-facto CEO is itself a telling move for a "decentralized" exchange, and the tension between that role and token-holder control runs through everything that followed.

The treasury runway crisis and Kanpai By late 2022 the DAO's finances were a live problem: Grey warned holders the treasury had roughly 1.5 years of runway (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/01/24/defi-protocol-sushi-passes-two-governance-votes-to-strengthen-treasury) at the prevailing burn rate. The DAO's lever for this is Kanpai – a switch that diverts a share of xSUSHI fee revenue to the treasury instead of to stakers. Across December 2022 and January 2023 votes it was cranked from 10% to 100% (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/01/24/defi-protocol-sushi-passes-two-governance-votes-to-strengthen-treasury) , cutting off xSUSHI holder rewards for a year to refill the war chest. A later fees-to-treasury vote passed, but The Block described the outcome bluntly as “a fight between whales” (https://www.theblock.co/post/196213/sushi-dao-votes-to-send-all-fees-to-treasury-but-it-was-a-fight-between-whales) – a handful of large holders decided it. That is the recurring failure mode of token-weighted voting (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) , and a core input into how DAO treasuries actually get managed (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) under pressure.

Regulatory pressure In March 2023 the U.S. SEC served SushiSwap and Head Chef Jared Grey with a subpoena (https://decrypt.co/124133/sushiswap-dao-subpoena-sec-legal-defense-fund) . Grey proposed a DAO-funded legal defense fund (https://blockworks.co/news/sushiswap-served-by-sec) – $3 million in USDT, with a further $1 million contingency – drawn straight from the treasury. It surfaced an uncomfortable question that most token-governed protocols eventually face: should a "decentralized" DAO's holders collectively bankroll the legal defense of its de-facto leadership, and do they have any real say if the whales vote yes?

Sushi Labs and the recentralization debate Through 2024 Sushi restructured. A new operating entity, Sushi Labs, was created to run product and operations, governed by non-transferable shares (https://www.theblock.co/post/178658/sushiswap-weighs-new-dao-structure-that-uses-non-transferable-shares) rather than open token votes, and the DAO moved tens of millions in treasury assets under its control (https://invezz.com/news/2024/04/10/sushiswap-sushi-dao-treasury-proposal-passes-amid-wallets-creation-controversy/) . Supporters framed it as an escape from governance paralysis; critics saw a protocol that markets itself as community-owned handing its treasury and its decisions to an insider entity – the progressive-decentralization (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization) arc running in reverse. Operationally the protocol kept shipping: Grey has said Sushi reached profitability in 2024 and is building out a multi-product line, including the Blade AMM and an integration with the Katana DeFi chain. Whether that product momentum is worth the governance concessions is exactly the trade the wiki tracks in how DAOs fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) .

How Caper approaches this Two of SushiSwap's recurring problems – an insider entity controlling the treasury, and holders whose only recourse when they disagree is to sell into a thin market – are the exact conditions a Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) is built around. In a Caper the treasury is not held at a foundation's or a labs entity's discretion: any holder can exit (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) and redeem their share of it directly from the contract ( the exit right (https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right) ), so control cannot quietly migrate away from the people who funded it. And vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) blends holdings with participation rather than letting a few large wallets settle every question. It is an outcome-level answer to the same failure modes Sushi has spent years patching by governance vote.

See also - Uniswap DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) – the DEX SushiSwap forked, and the target of its vampire attack. - Curve DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/curve-dao) – the other AMM whose token-weighted governance is dominated by large holders. - How DAOs fail (/wiki/daos/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) · DAO treasury management (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) · Token-weighted voting (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting)