Name Curve DAO Type Protocol DAO (DeFi —– stablecoin exchange + lending…cepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics)

The Curve DAO governs Curve F…he arena for the "Curve Wars" —– the clearest real-world demon…nce/user/curve-tokens/vecrv) )

veCRV —– the vote-escrow model Curve …ts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) ) —– later protocols copied it directly —– Yearn's veYFI (/wiki/daos/le…ins/frax-finance) among them —– and its most prominent fork, …curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…s do more than pass proposals —– each week they vote on gauge … veCRV of a 776,158,764 total —– 53.93%, up from 53.68% a month earlier —– while holding only 49.88% of … be quoted as a standing fact —– this page previously gave it …s directly to steer emissions —– turning voting power into a r…their own strategies here too —– Frax (/wiki/daos/stablecoins…economics/numerical-pricing) .

crvUSD, and the 2023–2024 stre…risks in public: - July 2023 —– the Vyper exploit. A reentran…piler (0.2.15, 0.2.16, 0.3.0) —– not in Curve's own logic —– let attackers drain several C…ack-july-2023) ) - June 2024 —– the founder-liquidation casca…loss was passed to depositors —– but the episode is a standing…under-face-liquidation-risk) )

How Caper approaches this Cur…t out to solve a real problem —– transient token holders voting with no lasting stake —– by forcing a lock. It worked,…caper) pursues the same goal —– tying influence to genuine commitment —– without a lock to tokenise. I…foundations/leaving-a-caper) —– that same weight, not the pr…led to real economic exposure —– the property the lock was reaching for —– with nothing to unbundle and …verified against the contract.

References - Curve DAO: Voti…nce/user/curve-tokens/vecrv) —– the canonical vote-escrow ref…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) —– the DAO and gauge/escrow cont…(https://gov.curve.finance/) —– proposals and gauge-weight di…he-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023) —– Curve reentrancy post-mortem.…ace-liquidation-risk) (2024).

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa… and the share is drifting up.At Ethereum block 25,943,617 (…ad now returns 22 August 2030.All four figures are eth_call …g power into a rentable yield.Major protocols ran their own …economics/numerical-pricing) .

How Caper approaches this Cur…owed position buys little say.There is also no gauge system …verified against the contract.

Name Curve DAO Type Protocol …e (https://curve.finance/) , docs.curve.readthedocs.iofinance (https://docs.curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.htmlfinance/user/curve-tokens/vecrv) , gov.curve.fi (https://gov…cepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics)

The Curve DAO governs Curve F…ht. ( Curve DAO docs (https://docs.curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.htmlfinance/user/curve-tokens/vecrv) )

veCRV — the vote-escrow model …in the VotingEscrow (https://docs.curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.htmlfinance/developer/curve-dao/voting-escrow/) contract for a fixed term o…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

References - Curve DAO: Voting Escrow (veCRV) (https://docs.curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.htmlfinance/user/curve-tokens/vecrv) — the canonical vote-escrow…ace-liquidation-risk) (2024).

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa… Curve governance. It still is, and the share is drifting up. At Ethereum block 25,716,457 (9 August943,617 (10 September 2026) the Convex voter proxy held 419,428,8448,549,575 veCRV of a 781,351,81976,158,764 total — 53.68%93%, up from 53.68% a month earlier — while holding only 49.788% of the 849,681,279 CRV actually locked in the esc…ocked to the four-year maximum, currently 25 July 2030. That maximum is a rolling date rather than a fixed one, which is why it should not be quoted as a standing fact — this page previously gave it as 25 July 2030, and the same on-chain read now returns 22 August 2030. All four figures are eth_call reads of the VotingEscrow (https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f3b5DfEb7B28CDbD7FAba78963EE202a494e2A2) and CRV (https://etherscan.io/address/0xD533a949740bb3306d119CC777fa900bA034cd52) contracts and can be reproduced at any block. The full on-chain read, incl…economics/numerical-pricing) .

How Caper approaches this Cur…weight is also each member's pro-rata exit claimclaim on the treasury at exit (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) — that same weight, not the pro-rata slice by balance (/wiki/dao-governance/concept…ip/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) a rage-quit pays, control stays coupled to rea…verified against the contract.

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…er broker of Curve governance. It still is. At Ethereum block 25,716,457 (9 August 2026) the Convex voter proxy held 419,428,844 veCRV of a 781,351,819 total — 53.68% — while holding only 49.78% of the CRV actually locked in the escrow. The gap is decay: every other lock runs down toward its unlock date, and Convex's is re-locked to the four-year maximum, currently 25 July 2030. The full on-chain read, including the CVX mint reaching its final cliff, is on the Convex Finance (/wiki/daos/lending/convex-finance) page. On top of that grew an open b…economics/numerical-pricing) .

Name Curve DAO Type Protocol … model Vote-escrow (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenom…curve.fi (https://gov.curve.finance/) , curve-dao-contracts (htt…ated Uniswap DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Aave DAO (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/aave-dao) , Token-weighted voting (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighte…) , DAO tokenomics (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics)

veCRV — the vote-escrow model …te-renting problems (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighte…category of its own (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) …see DAO tokenomics (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenom… — Yearn's veYFI (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/yearn-finance) and Frax's veFXS (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/frax-finance) amo… Balancer's veBAL (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/balancer-dao) , ran the s… entirely in 2026 (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/balancer-dao) . ( curve-d…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…eipt, and Convex (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/convex-finance) votes… here too — Frax (/wiki/daos/organizations/stablecoins/frax-finance) ama…nently Aerodrome (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/aerodrome-finance) on Ba…ken-weighted voting (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighte…ce forum (https://gov.curve.fi/) )nance/) ) The amplification coefficient those votes sit alongside is not only an economic parameter. Curve's ramp_A moves it over a rate-limited window because the invariant a trade is priced against is solved by iteration rather than by formula – see Numerical pricing in AMMs and bonding curves (/wiki/economics/numerical-pricing) .

How Caper approaches this Cur…pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…verified against the contract.

References - Curve DAO: Voti…ce forum (https://gov.curve.finance/) — proposals and gauge-weig…ace-liquidation-risk) (2024).

Name Curve DAO Type Protocol … model Vote-escrow (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) : lock CRV up …elated Uniswap DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Aave DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/lending/aave-dao) , Token-weighted voting (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) , DAO tokenomics (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics)

veCRV — the vote-escrow model …te-renting problems (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) of pla…category of its own (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) across DeFi (see DAO tokenomics (/wiki/daos/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) ) — later prot…ly — Yearn's veYFI (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/lending/yearn-finance) and Frax's veFXS (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/stablecoins/frax-finance) among them — a…, Balancer's veBAL (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/balancer-dao) , ran the same …it entirely in 2026 (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/balancer-dao) . ( curve-dao-c…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…eceipt, and Convex (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/lending/convex-finance) votes the ac…es here too — Frax (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/stablecoins/frax-finance) amassed one of…minently Aerodrome (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/aerodrome-finance) on Base. …ken-weighted voting (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) page: …orum (https://gov.curve.fi/) )

How Caper approaches this Cur…pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) , c…verified against the contract.

veCRV — the vote-escrow model …that "ve-tokenomics" became a category of its own (/wiki/dao/concepts/vote-escrow) across DeFi (see DAO tokenomi…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…missions toward its own pools. The template also travelled: the Solidly ve(3,3) fork of this gauge-and-bribe design became the dominant DEX on the OP-stack chains, most prominently Aerodrome (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/aerodrome-finance) on Base. The Curve Wars are the canoni…orum (https://gov.curve.fi/) )

veCRV — the vote-escrow model …o/concepts/dao-tokenomics) ) — later protocols copied it directly — Yearn's veYFI (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/yearn-finance) and Frax's veFXS (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/frax-finance) among them — and its most prominent fork, Bal…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…g power into a rentable yield. Major protocols ran their own strategies here too — Frax (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/frax-finance) amassed one of the largest vlCVX positions to steer Curve emissions toward its own pools. The Curve Wars are the canoni…orum (https://gov.curve.fi/) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wa…ds back a liquid receipt, and Convex (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/convex-finance) votes the accumulated veCRV as…orum (https://gov.curve.fi/) )

veCRV — the vote-escrow model …dao/concepts/dao-tokenomics) ) — its most prominent fork, Balancer's veBAL (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/balancer-dao) , ran the same 80/20-lock playbook before deprecating it entirely in 2026 (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/balancer-dao) . ( curve-dao-contracts (https…curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

References - Curve DAO: Voti…ight discussion (primary). - CoinDesk, Curve pools drained following Vyper exploit (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/07/30/curve-finance-pools-drained-of-over-24m-following-exploit/) (2023)Halborn, Explained: The Vyper Bug Hack (July 2023) (https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023) — Curve reentrancy post-mortem. - CoinDesk, CRV slides as …ace-liquidation-risk) (2024).

crvUSD, and the 2023–2024 stre…hole Vyper-based ecosystem. ( CoinDesk (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/07/30/curve-finance-pools-drained-of-over-24m-following-exploit/Halborn post-mortem (https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023) ) - June 2024 — the founder…under-face-liquidation-risk) )

Name Curve DAO Type Protocol DAO (DeFi — stablecoin exchange + lending) Governance token CRV, vote-escrowed as veCRV (non-transferable) Governance model Vote-escrow (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-tokenomics) : lock CRV up to 4 years for time-decaying voting power; Aragon-based DAO; weekly gauge-weight votes set CRV emissions Products StableSwap AMM · crvUSD stablecoin (2023) · LlamaLend lending Notable for Pioneered vote-escrow (ve) tokenomics; the "Curve Wars"; one of the longest-lived Aragon DAOs Primary sources curve.finance (https://curve.finance/) , curve.readthedocs.io (https://curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.html) , gov.curve.fi (https://gov.curve.fi/) , curve-dao-contracts (https://github.com/curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) Related Uniswap DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/uniswap-dao) , Aave DAO (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/aave-dao) , Token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao/concepts/token-weighted-voting) , DAO tokenomics (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-tokenomics)

The Curve DAO governs Curve Finance (https://curve.finance/) , a decentralized exchange specialised in low-slippage swaps between like-priced assets (stablecoins, staked-ETH pairs) and, since 2023, an issuer of the crvUSD stablecoin. Curve matters to DAO governance out of all proportion to its size because of how it is governed: it introduced vote-escrowed tokenomics (veCRV), the design that most later DeFi protocols copied, and it became the arena for the "Curve Wars" — the clearest real-world demonstration of how token-based voting power becomes a market to be bought. ( Curve DAO docs (https://curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.html) )

veCRV — the vote-escrow model Curve does not let you vote with liquid CRV. To gain governance power you must lock CRV in the VotingEscrow (https://curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.html) contract for a fixed term of up to four years, receiving non-transferable veCRV in return. Voting power scales with lock length and decays linearly as the unlock date approaches, so influence must be continually renewed. Locking buys three things at once: governance votes, a share of protocol trading fees, and a boost of up to 2.5× on the CRV rewards your own liquidity positions earn. The point of the lock is to couple control to commitment: a veCRV holder cannot vote and immediately sell, so voting weight is tied to a multi-year stake rather than to whoever happens to hold tokens at a snapshot. This is the ve model's answer to the plutocracy and vote-renting problems (/wiki/dao/concepts/token-weighted-voting) of plain token voting, and it was influential enough that "ve-tokenomics" became a category of its own across DeFi (see DAO tokenomics (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-tokenomics) ). ( curve-dao-contracts (https://github.com/curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) )

Gauge weights and the Curve Wars veCRV holders do more than pass proposals — each week they vote on gauge weights, which decide how Curve's ongoing CRV emissions are split across liquidity pools. Directing emissions to a pool deepens its liquidity, so any protocol that wants cheap, deep liquidity for its own token has a direct incentive to control veCRV. That incentive produced the "Curve Wars." Rather than each protocol locking CRV itself, Convex Finance (https://www.convexfinance.com/) emerged as an aggregation layer: deposit CRV with Convex, it locks the maximum term on your behalf and hands back a liquid receipt, and Convex votes the accumulated veCRV as a bloc. Within months Convex controlled more than half of all veCRV, becoming the effective power broker of Curve governance. On top of that grew an open bribe market (Votium and others) where projects pay veCRV/vlCVX voters directly to steer emissions — turning voting power into a rentable yield. The Curve Wars are the canonical case study for the lesson on the token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao/concepts/token-weighted-voting) page: even a lock-based system can have its votes bought, the leak just moves to a new place. ( Curve governance forum (https://gov.curve.fi/) )

crvUSD, and the 2023–2024 stress tests In 2023 Curve launched crvUSD, an over-collateralized stablecoin with a novel "soft liquidation" mechanism (LLAMMA) that partially converts collateral instead of liquidating it all at once, plus the LlamaLend lending markets built on the same engine. The same period exposed Curve's risks in public: - July 2023 — the Vyper exploit. A reentrancy-lock bug in specific versions of the Vyper (https://vyper.readthedocs.io/) compiler (0.2.15, 0.2.16, 0.3.0) — not in Curve's own logic — let attackers drain several Curve pools for a cumulative $60M+. A large share was ultimately returned by white-hats and the attackers, but it was a systemic scare for the whole Vyper-based ecosystem. ( CoinDesk (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/07/30/curve-finance-pools-drained-of-over-24m-following-exploit/) ) - June 2024 — the founder-liquidation cascade. Founder Michael Egorov had borrowed roughly $95M in stablecoins against about $141M of CRV spread across five lending venues. A ~24% CRV drop on 13 June triggered cascading liquidations that wiped out most of that collateral and briefly left ~$10M of bad debt in Curve's own LlamaLend market. Egorov repaid the bad debt within days, so no permanent loss was passed to depositors — but the episode is a standing lesson about founder over-leverage against a governance token. ( CoinDesk (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk) )

How Caper approaches this Curve's veCRV set out to solve a real problem — transient token holders voting with no lasting stake — by forcing a lock. It worked, and then the lock itself became a tradable asset: Convex tokenised it and a bribe market rented it out, so control drifted back toward whoever could pay. A caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) pursues the same goal — tying influence to genuine commitment — without a lock to tokenise. Its voting weight (/wiki/governance/voting) combines the stake a member holds with the participation they have actually shown, so weight is earned rather than rented, and a one-off borrowed position buys little say. There is also no gauge system and no emissions to direct: a caper's tokens come from a bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) , not a weekly inflation vote, so there is simply no emission stream for a "war" to capture. And because that same earned weight is also each member's pro-rata exit claim (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) , control stays coupled to real economic exposure — the property the lock was reaching for — with nothing to unbundle and sell. This is a design contrast, not a claim of superiority; the mechanics are on the linked pages and verified against the contract.

References - Curve DAO: Voting Escrow (veCRV) (https://curve.readthedocs.io/dao-vecrv.html) — the canonical vote-escrow reference (primary). - curvefi/curve-dao-contracts (https://github.com/curvefi/curve-dao-contracts) — the DAO and gauge/escrow contracts (primary). - Curve governance forum (https://gov.curve.fi/) — proposals and gauge-weight discussion (primary). - CoinDesk, Curve pools drained following Vyper exploit (https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/07/30/curve-finance-pools-drained-of-over-24m-following-exploit/) (2023). - CoinDesk, CRV slides as founder loans face liquidation (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk) (2024).