Tally was, for most of the on-chain-governance era, twhe place are major DAO went to actually run as ran their binding votes. Where Snapshot (/wiki/dao-g… an executed transaction that actually moved the treasury. Launched i…) . What Tally standardized Tally didn't invent on-chain governance – it made it legible. A Governor DAO's state lives i…ipated in. Who ran on Tally The client list read like a census of on-chain governance:Its clients included Uniswap (/wiki/daos/dexs/uni…ndreds of smaller protocols. By its own account the platform processed over a billion dollars in on-chain governance transactions across those DAOs. That concentration is exactly why its wind-down mattered: a large slice of the industry's binding governance flowed through one hosted interfaceecause so many DAOs ran their binding votes through one hosted interface, its wind-down left each of them to find another. From interface to token inf…lected their contact details. The episode became a marker of a wider governance-CoinDesk set the closure beside Across Protocoling retrenchment in 2026, as the sector consolidated toward a handful of professional-governance vendors. Continued as Cactus The story didn't end at shutdown. ’s proposal to dissolve its DAO into a US C-corp and the 2025 decisions by Jupiter and Yuga Labs to abandon their DAO structures. Continued as Cactus Engineering studio ScopeLift …nning binding on-chain votes. The underlyingEach DAO’s OpenZeppelin Governor contracts were always the DAOs' own on-chain property, unaffected by any front-end changing hands; Tally was the interface, not the governance itself. That distinction is the useful lesson of the whole episode. One practical note for anyone chasing the rebrand: tbelong to the DAO and were unaffected when the interface changed hands. The rename did not come with a …n 20 August 2026 and again on 10 Septem24 October, tally.xyz (https://www.t…w Caper approaches this Tally'’s wind-down is a clean illustration of front-end risk: when a DAO's governance runs through a hosted third-party app, the app is a dependency that can be sold, rebranded,DAOs depended on a hosted interface that one company could sell, rename or shut down. CA caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) removes that layer by making governance native to the protocol. A caper's proposals are createdhas no separate governance vendor: members propose (/wiki/governance/proposals) , voted on (/wiki/governance/voting) , and executed (/wiki/governance/execution) by the cthrough Caper'’s own on-chain contract – there is no separate governance company whose survival the members depend on. If every interface to Caper disappeared tomorrow, the proposal and voting logic would still be sitting in the contract, executable directly. Governance you don't have to keep a vendor alive to use is the pocomponent on Radix from their own wallets, so a caper keeps governing itself if every website that shows Caper goes offlinte. References - Tally, “Tall…roject-log-12-live-on-tally) .

Tally was, for most of the on-…ting in DeFi and on exchanges.Arbitrum was the first DAO to …ments and speculation instead.In an interview the same day B…roject-log-12-live-on-tally) .

Tally was, for most of the on-…w-home-for-governor-daos) ). Arbitrum built its own. On 28 April 2026 the Arbitrum Foundation announced a governance interface (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/30837) made with Offchain Labs, which launched with Security Council elections and proposal voting, and paid Snapshot to integrate the DAO's Governor contracts as a backup. Read on 10 October 2026, Arbitrum's page on tally.xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum) is marked archived, with governance actions disabled ( Arbitrum DAO (/wiki/daos/networks/arbitrum-dao) ). How Caper approaches this Tal…roject-log-12-live-on-tally) .

Category On-chain governance ·…r OpenZeppelin Governor DAOs Later products Governance staking (2024) · airdrops, token sales and vesting (2025) · an ICO platform (2026) Scale Powered on-chain governa…mentals/dao-governance-models)

Tally was, for most of the on-…'t invent on-chain governance —– it made it legible. A Governo…-lifecycle) in one interface —– draft a proposal as executabl…/daos/networks/arbitrum-dao) —– one of the largest DAO treasuries anywhere —– ENS (/wiki/daos/infrastructu…hrough one hosted interface. The March 2026 wind-down On 17 March 2026 Tally announced it would shut the hosted product down (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/tally-is-shutting-down) after six years, having scrapped a nearly-complete ICO first. Bertram's reasoning was pointedly counter-intuitive: the reguFrom interface to token infrastructure From 2024 Tally built products that held value rather than displaying it. The first was governance staking. The Tally Protocol, announced in June 2024, proposed liquid staked governance tokens: a holder stakes and delegates and receives a transferable token, while the staking contract keeps the voting power and passes undelegated power to active delegates ( Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/introducing-the-tally-protocol) ). Its case was that holders had to choose between voting and earning yield elsewhere, and it claimed that Uniswap had 158% of its quorum sitting in DeFi and on exchanges. Arbitrum was the first DAO to vote for it. A proposal by Frisson, Tally's chief revenue officer and an Arbitrum delegate, to fund ARB staking passed on 9 September 2024 with 134.45m ARB for, 4.5m against and 7.42m abstaining, most of the abstentions his own ( Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/arb-staking) ). Tally's staking contracts later ran ZKsync's delegation incentive and Obol's staked token (see delegate incentive programs (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/delegate-incentive-programs) ). In 2025 Tally repositioned itself as a platform for launching tokens: airdrops, token sales and vesting. It ran Hyperlane's HYPER airdrop to more than 235,000 addresses on five chains at once, and built the sale interface for Hyperwave's Balancer liquidity bootstrapping pool ( Tally (https://blog.tally.xyz/launch-and-scale-tokens-with-tally) ). Its last project was its own token. On 3 February 2026 Tally announced an ICO and began a 60-day public log of the process ( Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/were-launching-an-ico) ). It chose Uniswap's continuous clearing auction as the sale mechanism ( Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/ico-project-log-10-why-we-chose-cca) ; see liquidity bootstrapping pools (/wiki/economics/liquidity-bootstrapping-pools) ), and on 26 February its token-sale platfory pressure that had made on-chain governance a near-necessity had eased. He argued that the Gensler-era SEC effectively forced decentralization through legal rim ran its first external sale, for idOS, a privacy-first identity network ( Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/ico-project-log-12-live-on-tally) ). On 3 March the log described a soft market and said Tally was building tools for AI agents to run their own auctions ( Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/ico-project-log-13-the-next-wave) ). The March 2026 wind-down On 17 March 2026 Bertram announced that Tally would not go ahead with the ICO and was shutting down (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/tally-is-shutting-down) after more than five years. The notice gives the reasons in order. The sale no longer made sense in that market, and the team was not confident it could keep the promises it would be making to buyers. Behind that, it said, there was not yet a venture-backed business in governance tooling: the thousands of protocols and millions of active participants Tally had been built for had not arrived, and crypto had found product-market fit in payments and speculation instead. In an interview the same day Bertram added a regulatory argument: the Gensler-era SEC had forced decentralization through legal risk, and the new administration's signal that projects were not in trouble made it optional ( CoinDesk (https://www.coindesk.com/m…vernance-platform-shuts-down) , and that). The notice put Tally's record at more permissive stance — alongside the 2025 Clarity and stablecoin frameworks — gave projects compliant, centralized paths that no longer required DAO governance as legal cover. Demand for ththan $1bn in payments through its infrastructure, over a million users, hundreds of organisations and no major security incident, and warned that many smaller teams could not be tooling, in his telling, fell with the pressure that had created itd directly because Tally had never collected their contact details. The episode became a marker …caper's own on-chain contract —– there is no separate governan…vernor-daos) (19 March 2026). - Tally, Introducing the Tally Protocol (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/introducing-the-tally-protocol) (June 2024) and ARB Staking (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/arb-staking) (September 2024). - Tally, Launch and scale tokens with Tally (https://blog.tally.xyz/launch-and-scale-tokens-with-tally) (October 2025). - Tally, We're launching an ICO (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/were-launching-an-ico) (3 February 2026) and the ICO project log, including log 10: why we chose CCA (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/ico-project-log-10-why-we-chose-cca) and log 12: live on Tally (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/ico-project-log-12-live-on-tally) .

Tally was, for most of the on-… and relaunched it as Cactus —– “new name, same platform” —– keeping the Governor-indexing…thing to do with governance. Tally's DAOs also had a second destination. On 19 March 2026, two days after the announcement, Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) added native support for Governor and Governor Bravo and offered migration that keeps a DAO's proposals, votes, activity history and delegate statements, free for six months to DAOs that got in touch before April. ENS and Uniswap were running their on-chain governance through it at launch ( Snapshot (https://blog.snapshot.box/snapshot-is-now-home-for-governor-daos) ). How Caper approaches this Tal…xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) . - Snapshot, Snapshot is now home for Governor DAOs (https://blog.snapshot.box/snapshot-is-now-home-for-governor-daos) (19 March 2026).

Tally was, for most of the on-…ain. Checked on 20 August 2026 and again on 10 September, tally.xyz (https://www.tall…y, at 200 and with no redirect, while the unrelated cactus.build belongs to a different company entirely – the page it returns is titled “Cactus – Explore DAOs” – while the unrelated cactus.build, read the same day, is a design-template company for coding agents and has nothing to do with governance. How Caper approaches this …xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) .

Category On-chain governance · Governor (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-gov…ance for Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/daos/organizations/networks/arbitrum-dao) , ENS (/wiki/daos/organizations/infrastructure/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/aave-dao) and 500+ DA… Related Snapshot (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) · Proposal lifecycle (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-life… Governance models (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models)

Tally was, for most of the on-…te. Where Snapshot (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) han…ance for Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/daos/organizations/networks/arbitrum-dao) , ENS (/wiki/daos/organizations/infrastructure/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/aave-dao) and more th… proposal lifecycle (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-life…ken-weighted voting (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighte…ernance: Uniswap (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/daos/organizations/networks/arbitrum-dao) — one …s anywhere — ENS (/wiki/daos/organizations/infrastructure/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/aave-dao) , ZKsync, an…l lesson of the whole episode. One practical note for anyone chasing the rebrand: the rename did not come with a new domain. Checked on 20 August 2026, tally.xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) serves the Cactus product directly, at 200 and with no redirect, while the unrelated cactus.build belongs to a different company entirely. How Caper approaches this T…xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) .

Category On-chain governance · Governor (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models) toolin…rnance for Uniswap (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/networks/arbitrum-dao) , ENS (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/infrastructure/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/lending/aave-dao) and 500+ DAOs Sta… Related Snapshot (/wiki/daos/tooling/voting/snapshot) · Proposal lifecycle (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/proposal-lifecycle) · Governance models (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models)

Tally was, for most of the on-…te. Where Snapshot (/wiki/daos/tooling/voting/snapshot) handled gasless off…rnance for Uniswap (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/networks/arbitrum-dao) , ENS (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/infrastructure/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/lending/aave-dao) and more than 500 … proposal lifecycle (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/proposal-lifecycle) in one in…ken-weighted voting (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) , watch…overnance: Uniswap (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/dexs/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/networks/arbitrum-dao) — one of the l…ies anywhere — ENS (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/infrastructure/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/dao/ecosystems/organizations/lending/aave-dao) , ZKsync, and hundr…xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) .

Category On-chain governance · Governor (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-governance-models) tooling Launched 2020, by Tally (CEO Dennison Bertram) What it did Hosted read / propose / vote / queue / execute interface for OpenZeppelin Governor DAOs Scale Powered on-chain governance for Uniswap (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/arbitrum-dao) , ENS (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/aave-dao) and 500+ DAOs Status Hosted product wound down March 2026; platform continued as Cactus under ScopeLift (https://scopelift.co/blog/tally-is-now-cactus) Site tally.xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) (now Cactus) · shutdown notice (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/tally-is-shutting-down) Related Snapshot (/wiki/dao/tooling/snapshot) · Proposal lifecycle (/wiki/dao/concepts/proposal-lifecycle) · Governance models (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-governance-models)

Tally was, for most of the on-chain-governance era, the place a major DAO went to actually run a vote. Where Snapshot (/wiki/dao/tooling/snapshot) handled gasless off-chain signaling, Tally was the binding on-chain layer: a hosted interface sitting on top of the OpenZeppelin Governor (https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/5.x/governance) contracts, where a proposal moved from draft to an executed transaction that actually moved the treasury. Launched in 2020 by CEO Dennison Bertram, it powered governance for Uniswap (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/arbitrum-dao) , ENS (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/aave-dao) and more than 500 other DAOs. In March 2026 the hosted product announced it was winding down (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/03/17/gensler-and-biden-were-just-better-for-crypto-says-tally-ceo-as-dao-governance-platform-shuts-down) ; the platform has since been taken over by ScopeLift and rebranded Cactus (https://scopelift.co/blog/tally-is-now-cactus) . What Tally standardized Tally didn't invent on-chain governance — it made it legible. A Governor DAO's state lives in a contract: who can propose, the voting delay and period, quorum, and a timelock that queues a passed proposal before it can execute. Tally read that state directly from chain and wrapped the whole proposal lifecycle (/wiki/dao/concepts/proposal-lifecycle) in one interface — draft a proposal as executable calldata, open it for token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao/concepts/token-weighted-voting) , watch it reach quorum, queue it in the timelock, then trigger the on-chain execution. Because it indexed every OZ-Governor (https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/5.x/api/governance) deployment the same way, any DAO using the standard contracts got a working governance front-end for free, and delegates got one dashboard across every protocol they participated in. Who ran on Tally The client list read like a census of on-chain governance: Uniswap (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/uniswap-dao) , Arbitrum (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/arbitrum-dao) — one of the largest DAO treasuries anywhere — ENS (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/ens-dao) , Aave (/wiki/dao/ecosystem/aave-dao) , ZKsync, and hundreds of smaller protocols. By its own account the platform processed over a billion dollars in on-chain governance transactions across those DAOs. That concentration is exactly why its wind-down mattered: a large slice of the industry's binding governance flowed through one hosted interface. The March 2026 wind-down On 17 March 2026 Tally announced it would shut the hosted product down (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/tally-is-shutting-down) after six years, having scrapped a nearly-complete ICO first. Bertram's reasoning was pointedly counter-intuitive: the regulatory pressure that had made on-chain governance a near-necessity had eased. He argued that the Gensler-era SEC effectively forced decentralization through legal risk (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/03/17/gensler-and-biden-were-just-better-for-crypto-says-tally-ceo-as-dao-governance-platform-shuts-down) , and that a more permissive stance — alongside the 2025 Clarity and stablecoin frameworks — gave projects compliant, centralized paths that no longer required DAO governance as legal cover. Demand for the tooling, in his telling, fell with the pressure that had created it. The episode became a marker of a wider governance-tooling retrenchment in 2026, as the sector consolidated toward a handful of professional-governance vendors. Continued as Cactus The story didn't end at shutdown. Engineering studio ScopeLift took over the platform (https://scopelift.co/blog/tally-is-now-cactus) and relaunched it as Cactus — “new name, same platform” — keeping the Governor-indexing interface alive for the DAOs still running binding on-chain votes. The underlying OpenZeppelin Governor contracts were always the DAOs' own on-chain property, unaffected by any front-end changing hands; Tally was the interface, not the governance itself. That distinction is the useful lesson of the whole episode. How Caper approaches this Tally's wind-down is a clean illustration of front-end risk: when a DAO's governance runs through a hosted third-party app, the app is a dependency that can be sold, rebranded, or shut down. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) removes that layer by making governance native to the protocol. A caper's proposals are created (/wiki/governance/proposals) , voted on (/wiki/governance/voting) , and executed (/wiki/governance/execution) by the caper's own on-chain contract — there is no separate governance company whose survival the members depend on. If every interface to Caper disappeared tomorrow, the proposal and voting logic would still be sitting in the contract, executable directly. Governance you don't have to keep a vendor alive to use is the point. References - Tally, “Tally Is Shutting Down” (https://newsletter.tally.xyz/p/tally-is-shutting-down) (shutdown announcement). - CoinDesk, ‘Gensler and Biden were just better for crypto,’ says Tally CEO as DAO governance platform shuts down (https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/03/17/gensler-and-biden-were-just-better-for-crypto-says-tally-ceo-as-dao-governance-platform-shuts-down) (17 March 2026). - ScopeLift, “Goodbye Tally, Hello Cactus” (https://scopelift.co/blog/tally-is-now-cactus) (platform continuation). - OpenZeppelin, Governor documentation (https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/5.x/governance) . - Tally / Cactus, tally.xyz (https://www.tally.xyz/) .