Category Prediction-market inf…n Reality.eth (https://reality.eth.limo/appio.github.io/docs/html/index.html) attest…/tooling/dao-tooling-overview)

Seer is the market layer under…m Reality.eth (https://reality.eth.limo/appio.github.io/docs/html/index.html) with …a dependency on this codebase.

How Caper approaches this Cap… exit. A member who has voted or traded can call exit() at any time an… needs no counterparty at all.

How Caper approaches this Cap… exit. A member who has voted or traded can call exit() at any time an… needs no counterparty at all.

How Caper approaches this Cap…ked ballot of between two and twelfive options (MAX_PROPOSAL_OPTIONS in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs), scored by Borda weight; the … needs no counterparty at all.

Category Prediction-market infrastructure · the market layer other governance tools build on What it does Permissionless prediction markets whose outcome tokens are ordinary ERC-20s, including the futarchy markets that price a DAO decision Built on Gnosis Conditional Tokens Framework (https://conditional-tokens-docs.netlify.app/docs/introduction1) · ERC-1155 positions wrapped to ERC-20 by Wrapped1155Factory Resolution Reality.eth (https://reality.eth.limo/app/docs/html/index.html) attestation, with Kleros (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/kleros) Court as the dispute layer Chains Gnosis, Ethereum, Optimism, Base – but futarchy contracts are deployed on Gnosis only Market types Categorical · multi-categorical · scalar · multi-scalar · futarchy, plus nested conditional markets Live markets 2,607 across all four chains, of which 395 are futarchy and all 395 are on Gnosis (read 16 August 2026) Code github.com/seer-pm/demo (https://github.com/seer-pm/demo) , MIT, opened January 2024 and still pushed to this month Surfaces app.seer.pm (https://app.seer.pm) · docs (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation) · launch post (https://blog.kleros.io/seer-crafting-smarter-prediction-markets-for-a-complex-world/) Related Futarchy Labs (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/futarchy-labs) · Futarchy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) · GnosisDAO (/wiki/daos/networks/gnosisdao) · DAO tooling stack (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview)

Seer is the market layer under most of the DAO futarchy running today. It is a permissionless prediction-market protocol: anyone can open a market on any question, the positions are ERC-20 tokens that trade on ordinary AMMs, and the answer comes from Reality.eth (https://reality.eth.limo/app/docs/html/index.html) with Kleros (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/kleros) arbitration behind it. It is not a governance product and does not try to be – it sells no process, holds no treasury, and has no opinion about whether a proposal is good. That distinction is the reason it belongs in a governance-tooling directory at all. Futarchy Labs (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/futarchy-labs) sells futarchy to DAOs as an integration; the contracts its markets are instantiated from are Seer's. A treasury evaluating decision markets is, whether or not the pitch says so, taking a dependency on this codebase.

The stack, in four pieces Seer composes existing primitives rather than inventing a market engine. The documentation (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/overview/what-is-seer) names all four: - Conditional Tokens. Each market prepares a condition on Gnosis' Conditional Tokens Framework (https://conditional-tokens-docs.netlify.app/docs/introduction1) , and outcomes exist as ERC-1155 positions. Collateral is split into a complete set of outcome tokens and merged back to recover it. - ERC-20 wrappers. Those ERC-1155 positions are wrapped into ERC-20s by a Wrapped1155Factory deployed at the same address on all four chains. This is the load-bearing usability choice: an outcome token is a normal token, so it routes through existing DEXs instead of a bespoke market maker. - Reality.eth. Markets resolve by escalated bonded attestation, not by an admin key. Questions carry an opening time, a timeout and a minimum bond. - Kleros Court. The final appeal on a contested Reality.eth answer goes to a randomly drawn, staked jury – the same dispute layer described on Kleros (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/kleros) . Nothing in that list is Seer's own trust assumption. What Seer contributes is the market factory, the routers, and the wrapping that makes the positions tradeable.

Five market types, and the one governance cares about Seer supports categorical (pick one), multi-categorical (pick several), scalar (a number in a range), multi-scalar (several numbers), and futarchy markets. Any market can also be made conditional on another market's outcome, and conditional markets can nest. A futarchy market is the one a DAO reads as a decision signal, and its shape is worth stating precisely. It takes two collateral tokens – in practice a DAO's governance token and a stablecoin – and mints four outcome tokens (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/developers/interact-with-seer/futarchy-market) : Yes/Token1, No/Token1, Yes/Token2, No/Token2. A trader who wants all four splits twice, once per collateral. Two conditional prices for the governance token then exist side by side, one in a world where the proposal passes and one where it does not, and the gap between them is the number a DAO is being invited to act on. Resolution is where the design is most honest about its limits. The Reality.eth question is not "was this proposal good"; it asks only which branch the world took, and proposal.resolve() then makes the winning side's tokens redeemable and the losing side's worthless. The market prices a counterfactual and the oracle records a fact. Neither one decides anything.

What is actually running on it Read from Seer's own markets-search endpoint on 16 August 2026, across every chain it supports: - 2,607 markets in total – 1,961 on Gnosis, 478 on Optimism, 154 on Base, 14 on Ethereum. - 395 of those are futarchy markets, and all 395 are on Gnosis. Ethereum, Optimism and Base return zero. The concentration is not an accident of demand. The deployed-contracts table (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/developers/contracts/deployed-contracts) lists FutarchyFactory, FutarchyProposal, FutarchyRouter and FutarchyRealityProxy under Gnosis and under no other chain. Futarchy on Seer is a Gnosis Chain feature that has not been shipped elsewhere, which matters to any DAO whose token and treasury live on a different network: adopting decision markets today means moving liquidity to Gnosis, not installing a module at home.

The word the documentation still uses Seer's contract reference groups the futarchy contracts under a heading that reads, verbatim, “Futarchy (test)”. The core prediction-market contracts carry no such qualifier. That label sits underneath real money and real governance mandates. GnosisDAO (/wiki/daos/networks/gnosisdao) authorised a nine-month advisory futarchy pilot with $100k of temporary liquidity in GIP-145 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:gnosis.eth/proposal/0x09cb43353c0ece5544919bf70a9810908098c728f27f9ca3e211871f7ad6bf1c) , which closed on 14 February 2026 with 117,291.24 GNO for, 5.99 against and 265.06 abstaining on 67 votes – six tokens of opposition, and a turnout that a mechanism sold as an answer to voter apathy had to appeal for publicly. Kleros (KIP-76) and Velora (PIP-72) adopted the same integration earlier. Nothing here says the contracts are unsound; a maintainer's directory heading is not a security finding. It says something narrower and more useful to a treasury: the layer is young, its own authors have not retired the word, and the diligence question – what audit, what value at risk, what happens if a futarchy market resolves wrongly – has to be asked of Seer rather than of the DAO-facing product that fronts it.

Permissionless creation, curated credibility, and the zero Anyone can create a market about any DAO. Seer's answer to the resulting noise is not gatekeeping but a second tier: a market can be added to a Kleros Curate list of verified markets (https://cdn.kleros.link/ipfs/QmfGcodBzG53DBxS2Uxu5jug9YiHUpJ5tKFqhP6Z2HjscU/Seer%20-%20Verified%20Markets.pdf) against a published policy, backed by an xDAI deposit that is returned when the listing survives. Verification buys display and credibility; it does not gate creation, and an unverified market on your treasury is not something your DAO can stop being created. The sharper trap is in nesting. Seer's own documentation warns that if a parent market resolves to an outcome other than the one a child market assumed, the child – and everything nested under it – becomes obsolete and its tokens redeem for zero. Conditional depth is what makes decision markets expressive, and it is also the thing that quietly converts a hedge into a total loss. A DAO providing protocol-owned liquidity into conditional positions is exposed to that, not merely to impermanent loss.

How Caper approaches this Caper does not price decisions in a market, and the contrast is a design choice rather than a gap. A caper's proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is a ranked ballot of between two and twelve options, scored by Borda weight; the leading option executes only if it clears a threshold of 1.5 divided by the option count and is not the automatic “do nothing” option. The alternatives a futarchy market would price against each other are instead put on the same ballot and ranked, and the settlement is the count itself – there is no advisory number a DAO then has to decide how much to trust. What a caper substitutes for the market's discipline is the exit. A member who has voted can call exit() at any time and redeem a share of the treasury equal to their canonical vote weight (/wiki/governance/voting) , without a proposal, a quorum or anyone's approval. A futarchy market tells a DAO that a decision is expected to destroy value; a caper lets the members who believe that leave with their share instead. Both are answers to the same problem – that a vote can be right about preferences and wrong about consequences – and they price it in opposite directions, one before the decision and one after. Seer's approach is the more general one and works on any DAO that will fund the liquidity; a caper's is narrower and needs no counterparty at all.

References - Seer documentation, What is Seer? (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/overview/what-is-seer) – the five market types and the Reality.eth / Conditional Tokens / Kleros / ERC-20-wrapper stack, in the project's own words. - Seer documentation, Deployed contracts (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/developers/contracts/deployed-contracts) – the per-chain address tables; the futarchy set appears only under Gnosis. - Seer documentation, Futarchy market (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/developers/interact-with-seer/futarchy-market) – four outcome tokens, splitting twice, and proposal.resolve(). - Seer documentation, Conditional Markets (https://seer-3.gitbook.io/seer-documentation/getting-started/navigate-our-site/conditional-markets) – nesting, and the warning that an obsolete child market redeems for zero. - app.seer.pm (https://app.seer.pm) markets-search – market counts by chain and type, read 16 August 2026. - GnosisDAO, GIP-145 (https://snapshot.box/#/s:gnosis.eth/proposal/0x09cb43353c0ece5544919bf70a9810908098c728f27f9ca3e211871f7ad6bf1c) – the nine-month advisory futarchy pilot and its $100k of temporary liquidity; tallies read via the Snapshot GraphQL hub, 16 August 2026. - Kleros blog, Seer: Crafting Smarter Prediction Markets for a Complex World (https://blog.kleros.io/seer-crafting-smarter-prediction-markets-for-a-complex-world/) (11 October 2024) – the launch framing and the Kleros relationship. - github.com/seer-pm/demo (https://github.com/seer-pm/demo) – MIT, created 22 January 2024, last pushed 14 August 2026.