How Caper approaches this Cap…rees calls exit() and redeems a treasury share siztheir fair share of the treasury, governed by the same compute_vote_earned weight their ballot used, (t·v)/(V·T)carried – and that sale pushes the pr…ney decision on its own rails.

Kleros is a decentralized arbitration protocol on Ethereum —– a general-purpose “crypto su… code needs a human judgement —– did a freelancer deliver the …timate, is this a real person —– Kleros supplies a decentraliz… escrow, and identity systems.

Category Dispute resolution · … answer Token PNK (pinakion) —– staked for jury duty and used…curity-and-governance-attacks)

The gap Kleros fills: disputes…pless at subjective questions —– whether delivered work met a … analogue of an appeals court —– invoked when a smart-contract…ement rather than computation.

The court: staking PNK and ran…cs.kleros.io/court/overview) —– a specialization such as gene… the evidence and cast a vote —– typically Yes, No, or Refuse … for invalid or illegal cases —– and, in hidden-vote courts, f…l hard to bribe or intimidate.

The coherence incentive: a Sch…juror to prove they are right —– it rewards coherence with the…is economic, not reputational —– influence and risk both scale with money staked.

Appeals: escalating juries and…he case before a larger panel —– the number of jurors roughly …a bigger, more expensive jury.

Beyond the court: Curate, Escr…s.kleros.io/products/curate) —– token-curated registries: dec…s.kleros.io/products/escrow) —– a payment escrow where a disp…/products/proof-of-humanity) —– a Sybil-resistant registry of…cs.kleros.io/products/scout) —– a community-curated database …ugh to the court when they do.

The PNK token, governance, and…general-purpose payment token —– arbitration fees are paid in …tracts/deployment-addresses) .

Limits and failure modes Kler…peals escalate. P + ε bribery —– paying jurors a small premium… payoff to vote a certain way —– is the classic theoretical at…n quietly dominate a subcourt.

How Caper approaches this Cap… court, and its core decision —– how a caper’s (/wiki/foundat…s-a-caper) treasury is spent —– is settled in two phases rath…ajority of 1.5 / option_count —– 75% on a two-option ballot, 3… the ballot used, (t·v)/(V·T) —– and that sale pushes the pric…tly one member-facing surface —– casting a ranked ballot mints…, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs) —– and buying, selling and trans…tracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs) —– but it can certainly be acqui…inely subjective fact settled —– did a funded milestone actually ship —– could read an oracle like Kle…ney decision on its own rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap…ng voted, and of nothing else.It is soulbound only in the tr…ney decision on its own rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap… a “Do nothing”, and banks a flat 500 XRD fee at creation – 1% of the largest option's XRD value, at least 500 XRD – that the treasury keeps wheth… passes or fails (PROPOSAL_FEE and PROPOSAL_FEE_RATE, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs).…ney decision on its own rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap…orth stating plainly, because both of the obvious framingit reverses what this page said until the genesis are wrongdeploy of 11 September 2026: v, the soulbound half of that weight, is neither purely a voting record nor purely a trading record. It is minted at one rate on three. It is minted on exactly one member-facing surfaces — 0.01 v per XRD of gross value on the buy leg, the same on the sell leg, and exactly 1 v per ranked ballot, because the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that identical 0.01 rate. So v iscasting a ranked ballot mints one v (VOTE_MINT, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs) — and buying, selling and transferring mint none. Until that redeploy trades minted it too, at 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg, which made v a record of XRD put at risk, on whichever surface you chose; it is now a record of having voted, and of nothing else. It is soulbound only in the …d, by anyone, at a published per-XRD raterice: the flat 100 XRD a ballot costs (VOTE_FEE). The two protocols remain com…ney decision on its own rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap…al locks the caper’s trailing seven-day time-weighted average price as a baseline and starts a 48-houropens the market window, and when that window …e crank-second is deliberate: it prices manipulation at displacement multiplied by durationa displacement has to be held for a real share of the window, so an atomic buy→resolve→sel…ney decision on its own rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap…has no arbitration court, and for its core decision –— how a caper’s (/wiki/foundat…s-a-caper) treasury is spent –— it holds no vote eithers settled in two phases rather than by a jury. A proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) names one typed action, banks aup to five ranked options, one of which must be a “Do nothing”, and banks a flat 500 XRD fee, and locks a seven-day time-weighted average oft creation that the treasury keeps whether the proposal passes or fails (PROPOSAL_FEE, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). Token holders then caper’s token price as its baseline; when the 48-hour window closes, anyone may call resolve_proposal, which compares the live spot price to that baseline ast ranked ballots at 100 XRD each, and a permissionless crank folds them into a Borda tally that passes an option only if its share of the weight actually cast clears a supermajority of 1.5 / option_count — 75% on a two-option ballot, 30% on a five-option one. A legislative pass is not execution; it opens the second phasses. the rigger_proposal only if the price has held (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). There is no jury and no tally. The market is the adjudicator, and the ruling is a number the contract reads for itself before it executes (/wiki/governance/execution) locks the caper’s trailing seven-day time-weighted average price as a baseline and starts a 48-hour window, and when that window closes resolve_proposal compares the TWAP over the window itself against the baseline, executing only if the market held. Integrating the window rather than reading spot at the crank-second is deliberate: it prices manipulation at displacement multiplied by duration, so an atomic buy→resolve→sell round trip buys no verdict. That makes the two protocol…es calls exit() and redeems a share of the treasury sized at (t·v)/(V·T) – the canonical weight in compute_vote_weight –treasury share sized by the same compute_vote_weight the ballot used, (t·v)/(V·T) — and theat same selle pushes spotthe price down, which is precisely the quantity athe pending proposalwindow is measured againsting. The exit right (/wiki/dao-g…orth stating plainly, because the older framing is commboth of the obvious framings are wrong: v, the soulbound half of that weight, is not a record of having voted. It accrueither purely a voting record nor purely a trading record. It is minted at one rate on three surfaces at— 0.01 v per XRD on both legs of a trade – the buyer’s gross outlay, the seller’s gross curve payout – and the on-ledger resource describes itself as a “soulbound stake token… drives exit redemption” (contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs). It is the record of having taken price riskf gross value on the buy leg, the same on the sell leg, and exactly 1 v per ranked ballot, because the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that identical 0.01 rate. So v is a record of XRD put at risk, on whichever surface you chose. It is soulbound only in the transfer sense: its depositor role is bound to the caper’s own state component with the updater set to deny_all, so it cannot move between wallets (contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs) — but it can certainly be acquired, by anyone, at a published per-XRD rate. The two protocols remain com…han competitors: a caper that ever needed a genuinely subjective fact settled –— did a funded milestone actually ship –— could read an oracle like Kle…the money decision on its own binding rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap…rt, and for its core decision —– how a caper’s (/wiki/foundat…s-a-caper) treasury is spent —– it holds no vote either. A p…treasury sized at (t·v)/(V·T) —– the canonical weight in compute_vote_weight —– and the same sell pushes spot…r XRD on both legs of a trade —– the buyer’s gross outlay, the seller’s gross curve payout —– and the on-ledger resource de…inely subjective fact settled —– did a funded milestone actually ship —– could read an oracle like Kle…sion on its own binding rails.

How Caper approaches this Cap…aper) treasury is spent — it does not need one: aholds no vote either. A proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is voted and executed (/wiki/governance/execution) in one binding on-chain flow, with no subjective step for a jury to adjudicate. Wherenames one typed action, banks a fee, and locks a seven-day time-weighted average of the caper’s token price as its baseline; when the 48-hour window closes, anyone may call resolve_proposal, which compares the live spot price to that baseline and passes the proposal only if the price has held (contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). There is no jury and no tally. The market is the adjudicator, and the ruling is a menumber simply disagrees with where the collective is heading, Caper’s answthe contract reads for itself before it executes (/wiki/governance/execution) . That makes the two protocols closer than they look, and sharpens the contrast where is not litigation but the exit right (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : you redeem your canonicalt survives. Kleros prices honest adjudication by putting purchasable PNK stake at risk; Caper prices dissent by making the objection an actual sale. A member who disagrees calls exit() and redeems a share of the treasury — vote weighsized at (t·v)/(V·T), verified in the contract’s compute_vote_weight — and leave, rather than — the canonical weight in compute_vote_weight — and the same sell pushes spot down, which is precisely the quantity appealnding to a paid panel. The two protocols also make opposite bets on whether adjudication power should be for sale. A Kleros juror’s influence scales with purchasable PNK stake; Caper’s governing weight is a soulbound, non-transferable proof-of-vote token that must be earned by participating and cannot be bought or sold. Kproposal is measured against. The exit right (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) is not an alternative to the verdict here; it is an input to it. One correction worth stating plainly, because the older framing is common: v, the soulbound half of that weight, is not a record of having voted. It accrues at 0.01 per XRD on both legs of a trade — the buyer’s gross outlay, the sellero’s makegross jcuror honesty a market (stake, risk, reward); Caper removes the market from voting power entirely. They are complements, notve payout — and the on-ledger resource describes itself as a “soulbound stake token… drives exit redemption” (contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs). It is the record of having taken price risk. The two protocols remain complements rather than competitors: a caper that ever needed to settle a genuinely subjective conditionfact settled — did a funded milestone actually ship — could callread an oracle like Kleros for tha…sion on its own binding rails.

Category Dispute resolution · …esses (https://docs.kleros.io/developerreference/contracts/deployment-addresses) ) Site…curity-and-governance-attacks)

The gap Kleros fills: disputes…tocol (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faqcourt/overview) that any contract can call …ement rather than computation.

The court: staking PNK and ran…court (https://docs.kleros.io/products/courtcourt/overview) — a specialization such as …l hard to bribe or intimidate.

The coherence incentive: a Sch…ently (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faqconcepts/tokenomics) . Jurors on the losing side … both scale with money staked.

Appeals: escalating juries and…unded (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faqcourt/appeals) , third parties who believe …a bigger, more expensive jury.

Beyond the court: Curate, Escr…tps://docs.kleros.io/products/curate/kleros-scout) — a community-curated …ugh to the court when they do.

The PNK token, governance, and… PNK (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faqconcepts/pnk-token) does double duty: it is the… docs (https://docs.kleros.io/developerreference/contracts/deployment-addresses) .

References - Kleros, kleros.…//docs.kleros.io/) . - Kleros, Kleros FAQ (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq) (court mechanism, docs, Court: how it works (https://docs.kleros.io/court/how-it-works) , Appeals (https://docs.kleros.io/court/appeals) and Tokenomics (https://docs.kleros.io/concepts/tokenomics) (dispute lifecycle, appeal-fee crowdfunding, the coherence incentive, appeals, PNK). - Kleros, Court (https://docs.kleros.io/products/courtcourt/overview) , Curate (https://docs.kler…esses (https://docs.kleros.io/developerreference/contracts/deployment-addresses) (V2 ch…og (https://blog.kleros.io/) .

Beyond the court: Curate, Escr…ts. - Kleros Scout (https://docs.klerosscout.eth.limo/.io/products/curate/kleros-scout) — a community-curated datab…ugh to the court when they do.

Kleros is a decentralized arbitration protocol on Ethereum — a general-purpose “crypto supreme court” (https://kleros.io/) that renders binding rulings on subjective disputes that a smart contract cannot decide by itself. When code needs a human judgement — did a freelancer deliver the work, is this token listing legitimate, is this a real person — Kleros supplies a decentralized, game-theoretic answer instead of a trusted human moderator. It is the most widely deployed of the DAO-tooling category's dispute-resolution primitives, and a common building block behind curated registries, escrow, and identity systems.

Category Dispute resolution · arbitration · oracle for subjective facts Founded 2017 (France, as Coopérative Kleros); court & token live from 2018 Founders Federico Ast, Clément Lesaege What it does Crowdsourced jurors, drawn by staked PNK, rule on disputes; incentives converge on the honest answer Token PNK (pinakion) — staked for jury duty and used for protocol governance Built on Ethereum; Kleros V2 extends to further chains ( deployment addresses (https://docs.kleros.io/developer/deployment-addresses) ) Site kleros.io (https://kleros.io/) · docs (https://docs.kleros.io/) · GitHub (https://github.com/kleros) Related DAO tooling stack (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview) , Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) , Hats Protocol (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/membership/hats-protocol) , Governance attacks (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks)

The gap Kleros fills: disputes code can’t settle On-chain governance is good at questions with objective, verifiable answers: did a proposal reach quorum, did a transfer execute. It is helpless at subjective questions — whether delivered work met a spec, whether a submitted photo is really the claimed person, whether an insurance condition was met. Traditionally these route to a trusted moderator, an admin multisig, or an off-chain court, each of which reintroduces exactly the centralized chokepoint a DAO is trying to remove. Kleros positions itself as a neutral third party for these cases: an arbitration protocol (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq) that any contract can call to obtain a ruling, and whose jurors are anonymous, self-selected, and economically motivated to answer honestly. It is the decentralized analogue of an appeals court — invoked when a smart-contract relationship needs judgement rather than computation.

The court: staking PNK and random selection Jurors opt in by staking PNK (pinakion) in a subcourt (https://docs.kleros.io/products/court) — a specialization such as general, software development, or curation. Courts form a tree with the General Court at the root; staking in a subcourt automatically stakes you in every court above it. When a dispute arises, jurors are drawn at random with probability proportional to the PNK they have staked: the more you stake, the more often you are selected, which also puts more of your own capital at risk on each case. Drawn jurors review the evidence and cast a vote — typically Yes, No, or Refuse to Arbitrate for invalid or illegal cases — and, in hidden-vote courts, first commit a hashed vote and reveal it later so jurors cannot copy one another. Jurors are expected to justify their vote in writing. Neither party knows who the jurors are, which is what makes the panel hard to bribe or intimidate.

The coherence incentive: a Schelling point for truth Kleros never asks a juror to prove they are right — it rewards coherence with the eventual majority. Jurors who vote with the majority are paid the arbitration fees the parties deposited, plus PNK redistributed from jurors who voted incoherently (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq) . Jurors on the losing side forfeit part of the PNK they staked to be drawn. This turns the honest answer into a focal (Schelling) point (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focal_point_(game_theory)) : absent collusion, a rational juror’s best guess of what other jurors will conclude is the true, evidenced answer, so voting honestly is the profit-maximizing strategy. A juror who votes randomly without reading the evidence is more likely to land incoherently and lose their stake, so over time careless or dishonest jurors bleed capital and leave. The security model is economic, not reputational — influence and risk both scale with money staked.

Appeals: escalating juries and crowdfunded fees Any party who disagrees with a ruling can appeal, which re-tries the case before a larger panel — the number of jurors roughly doubles each round, raising both the cost of capturing a majority and the fees at stake. Because appeal fees can be crowdfunded (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq) , third parties who believe a ruling is wrong can chip in toward the correct side’s appeal, and crowdfunders backing the side that ultimately wins are financially rewarded. The escalating cost is deliberate: it makes frivolous appeals expensive while giving an obviously-wrong first-round result a path to be overturned by a bigger, more expensive jury.

Beyond the court: Curate, Escrow, Proof of Humanity, Scout Kleros Court is the engine; most people meet Kleros through the products built on it: - Kleros Curate (https://docs.kleros.io/products/curate) — token-curated registries: decentralized lists (of tokens, addresses, content) where entries are challenged and disputes settle in court. This is the modern descendant of the token-curated-registry idea. - Kleros Escrow (https://docs.kleros.io/products/escrow) — a payment escrow where a disputed release is arbitrated by the court rather than a platform. - Proof of Humanity (https://docs.kleros.io/products/proof-of-humanity) — a Sybil-resistant registry of unique humans (video submission plus social vouching, issuing soulbound IDs), with challenges adjudicated by Kleros. It underpins UBI-style (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_basic_income) distribution and one-person-one-vote experiments. - Kleros Scout (https://klerosscout.eth.limo/) — a community-curated database of contract and token metadata used to flag scams inside wallets and explorers. Each product is really the same pattern: put a subjective claim on-chain, let anyone challenge it, and fall through to the court when they do.

The PNK token, governance, and V2 PNK (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq) does double duty: it is the stake that gates jury selection (and the collateral slashed for incoherence) and the governance token of the Kleros DAO, which votes on protocol parameters, court creation, and treasury. Notably, PNK is deliberately not a general-purpose payment token — arbitration fees are paid in ETH or stablecoins, while PNK is the skin-in-the-game that secures juror honesty, an intentional separation so that buying influence over rulings is distinct from paying for them. Kleros V2 re-architects the court and extends it beyond Ethereum mainnet to additional chains, lowering the gas cost of participating; current deployments are listed in the developer docs (https://docs.kleros.io/developer/deployment-addresses) .

Limits and failure modes Kleros’s guarantees are probabilistic and economic, and they have edges. A 51% attack is possible in principle: an actor holding a majority of the PNK staked in a small subcourt can force coherent-but-wrong verdicts, which is why high-value disputes belong in deep, well-staked courts and why appeals escalate. P + ε bribery — paying jurors a small premium above the honest payoff to vote a certain way — is the classic theoretical attack on Schelling-point schemes, mitigated but not eliminated by appeals and stake redistribution. Rulings are only as good as the evidence and policy the parties and subcourt supply, so a poorly specified dispute yields a poorly reasoned verdict. And because influence tracks staked PNK, the court’s neutrality rests on token distribution being wide enough that no single party can quietly dominate a subcourt.

How Caper approaches this Caper has no arbitration court, and for its core decision — how a caper’s (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) treasury is spent — it does not need one: a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is voted and executed (/wiki/governance/execution) in one binding on-chain flow, with no subjective step for a jury to adjudicate. Where a member simply disagrees with where the collective is heading, Caper’s answer is not litigation but the exit right (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) : you redeem your canonical share of the treasury — vote weight (t·v)/(V·T), verified in the contract’s compute_vote_weight — and leave, rather than appealing to a paid panel. The two protocols also make opposite bets on whether adjudication power should be for sale. A Kleros juror’s influence scales with purchasable PNK stake; Caper’s governing weight is a soulbound, non-transferable proof-of-vote token that must be earned by participating and cannot be bought or sold. Kleros makes juror honesty a market (stake, risk, reward); Caper removes the market from voting power entirely. They are complements, not competitors: a caper that ever needed to settle a genuinely subjective condition — did a funded milestone actually ship — could call an oracle like Kleros for that fact while keeping the money decision on its own binding rails.

References - Kleros, kleros.io (https://kleros.io/) and documentation (https://docs.kleros.io/) . - Kleros, Kleros FAQ (https://docs.kleros.io/kleros-faq) (court mechanism, coherence incentive, appeals, PNK). - Kleros, Court (https://docs.kleros.io/products/court) , Curate (https://docs.kleros.io/products/curate) , Escrow (https://docs.kleros.io/products/escrow) , Proof of Humanity (https://docs.kleros.io/products/proof-of-humanity) . - Kleros, Deployment addresses (https://docs.kleros.io/developer/deployment-addresses) (V2 chains). - Kleros, GitHub organization (https://github.com/kleros) and blog (https://blog.kleros.io/) .