Hedgey is a set of token-distribution contracts and a free app that DAOs and token issuers use to lock tokens and release them on a schedule: vesting for contributors, lockups for investors and treasuries, grants, and claim campaigns for airdrops (Hedgey docs). Each schedule is an NFT held by its recipient. Hedgey plans can also carry voting power for tokens that have not vested, so a recipient can vote or delegate a whole grant years before they can sell it – the gap between voting and vesting set out in token unlocks and vesting. The payment side of the same job is covered on Sablier; this page covers how Hedgey differs, who uses it, and the 2024 exploit of its claims contract.

History

Hedgey's GitHub organisation dates from April 2021. Its first products were time-locked token NFTs and swaps between DAO treasuries, which its audit list still carries as V1 contracts. SperaxDAO said in an August 2023 forum thread that it had run a DAO-to-DAO token swap through Hedgey.

The contracts in use today live in Locked_VestingTokenPlans. Consensys Diligence audited them in June 2023, and the repository's audits folder holds that report and two later ones. OpenZeppelin, reviewing them for the Arbitrum DAO in May 2024, dated the deployment of the BatchPlanner and VotingTokenVestingPlans contracts to 8 August 2023 and found neither upgradeable (forum post). The README lists deployments on about 40 EVM networks, mostly at the same addresses, from Ethereum and Arbitrum to Celo, Gnosis Chain and Berachain. Hedgey has no governance token and charges nothing for the self-service app; in February 2025 a co-founder listed Wormhole, Puffer, ENS and Arbitrum among its users.

On 16 December 2025 the crypto bank Anchorage Digital announced that it had acquired Hedgey and launched HedgeyPro, a token cap-table and distribution product integrated with Anchorage's custody (Anchorage). Terms were not disclosed (The Block).

Plans as NFTs

A plan escrows ERC-20 tokens in a Hedgey contract and mints the recipient an NFT that records the schedule: an amount, a start date that can be back- or forward-dated, an optional cliff, and a release rate per period, where a period of one second gives a continuous stream and 2,628,000 seconds a monthly release (README; docs). The recipient redeems what has unlocked, and can redeem less than the full amount (TokenVestingPlans.sol).

• Vesting plans name a vesting admin, usually the issuing DAO or company. The admin can revoke a plan now or at a set future date; unvested tokens return to the admin and vested ones stay with the recipient. A vesting NFT cannot be transferred, except by the admin when the recipient has allowed it, which the code reserves for emergencies such as a lost multisig (TokenVestingPlans.sol).
• Lockup plans cannot be revoked. They are transferable by default, with separate “Bound” contracts for lockups that cannot move, and a lockup can be split into segments and recombined, to delegate parts to different addresses or sell part over the counter (README).
• BatchPlanner creates many plans in one transaction. Hedgey's docs give the calldata for doing this from a Tally proposal, so a DAO's governor can issue a set of grants directly when the vote executes (docs).
• Claim campaigns distribute unlocked or vesting tokens against a Merkle root. The issuer can require each claimant to delegate on claim, which the DelegatedTokenClaims README describes as a way for a newly launched DAO to reach quorum once recipients have claimed.

Voting with unvested tokens

Every plan type ships in two variants, and the issuer picks one when it creates the plans. Hedgey's governance docs say the choice can be changed later only by revoking and reissuing a vesting plan, and for a lockup not at all.

• Snapshot variant. Tokens stay pooled in the plan contract. Each plan NFT is delegated, to its owner by default, through an ERC-721 extension Hedgey wrote called ERC721Delegate, and Snapshot's hedgey-delegate strategy adds up the tokens in every plan delegated to a voter. A Snapshot space decides whether to include the strategy and at what weight: the setup guide uses 0.75 as its example, counting locked tokens at three quarters of a liquid one.
• On-chain variant. When the owner of a plan in VotingTokenVestingPlans first delegates it, the contract deploys a separate VotingVault for that plan, moves the plan's whole remaining balance into it, and has the vault call the governance token's own delegate function (VotingTokenVestingPlans.sol). The token records the delegation, so a Governor Alpha or Bravo governor counts it with no integration, and the docs state that recipients' ability to vote “cannot be turned off” (docs).

OpenZeppelin's review of a 42,500 ARB Arbitrum DAO grant paid this way stated the effect: the grantee's multisig could delegate the whole grant's voting power at once, so the proposal gave the grantees more voting power than their ownership at the time (forum post). For anyone measuring a DAO's electorate, tokens in an on-chain Hedgey plan usually count as locked rather than circulating, yet they appear in the governor's vote count, because they sit in a vault that cannot sell them and are delegated like any other balance. Revocation is the check. When a vesting admin revokes a plan with a vault, the contract withdraws the unvested tokens from the vault to the admin, and their voting power leaves with them (VotingTokenVestingPlans.sol). Lockups have no such check. The ballot-side mechanics are on voting and delegation.

Who uses it

Arbitrum DAO. The Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) paid its grants as revocable Hedgey vesting plans. The incentives multisig created the first 13 on 3 November 2023, backdated to 19 October, releasing every two weeks until 26 January 2024, and added further batches as recipients passed KYC (STIP stream updates). In a February 2025 post a Hedgey co-founder described these as “optimistic” rewards that the issuer could revoke if a recipient stopped reporting. Separately, a 2024 Tally proposal for WakeUp Labs routed 42,500 ARB through BatchPlanner into a VotingTokenVestingPlans plan whose vesting admin was the Arbitrum Security Council, so the council could cancel the unvested remainder (OpenZeppelin).

ShapeShift DAO. The shapeshiftdao.eth Snapshot space counts FOX held in Hedgey vesting plans on Ethereum and Hedgey lockups on Arbitrum through two hedgey-delegate strategies at full weight. Both were in the strategy set of SCP-224, an engineering workstream renewal opened on 20 September 2026 (read through the Snapshot hub, 2 Oct 2026).

Token issuers. Hedgey's docs carry guides for Wormhole investors who received locked W through it, and on 2 October 2026 the Ethereum VotingTokenLockupPlans contract held about 259m W (Blockscout). Gitcoin, Index Coop, Celo and ShapeShift appear in Hedgey's own 2023 customer list; those are Hedgey's claims rather than independent records.

The April 2024 claims exploit

On 19 April 2024 attackers drained Hedgey's ClaimCampaigns contract, deployed at the same address on Ethereum and Arbitrum. Creating a locked campaign granted a token approval to a tokenLocker address the caller supplied. The attacker created a campaign with its own contract as the locker and cancelled it in the same transaction; cancelling returned the tokens but left the approval in place, and the attacker then used transferFrom to pull other users' tokens out of the contract (CertiK). Halborn traced the bug to missing validation of user-supplied parameters (Halborn).

The size of the loss depends on how it is counted. Cointelegraph, citing Cyvers, reported $44.7m, of which $42.8m on Arbitrum (Cointelegraph), and Immunefi ranked Hedgey first among April 2024 losses at $44.6m (Immunefi). CertiK found that the Arbitrum leg was 78m BONUS tokens priced at balance times market price, and that the liquidity behind them could not support that figure; it put the realised loss at about $2m, mostly 1.3m USDC plus NOBL and MASA tokens on Ethereum (CertiK).

The same day Hedgey told users to cancel active claims with the “End Token Claim” button (Cointelegraph), and it sent the attacker an on-chain message asking for the funds back as a white-hat return (Halborn). The vesting and lockup contracts were not involved; OpenZeppelin confirmed the compromised contract did not interact with them (forum post). Hedgey replaced ClaimCampaigns with DelegatedClaimCampaigns at a new address (deployments), marked the old code as unaudited and not in production (README), and its docs now describe a 50,000 USDC bug bounty covering the vesting, lockup and claims contracts (bug bounty). Other contract and governance exploits against DAOs are covered on DAO security and governance attacks.

Status after the acquisition

Hedgey's homepage now leads with HedgeyPro and its place inside Anchorage Digital, and the free app still runs. Code has slowed: the last push to any of Hedgey's 20 public repositories was to NFTLocks on 17 March 2025, and Locked_VestingTokenPlans last changed on 11 February 2025, when it added Filecoin-specific contracts (GitHub API, read 2 Oct 2026). The contracts do not need new code to keep working. They have no upgrade path, and the one contract-level admin role sets NFT metadata URIs (URIAdmin.sol), so existing plans run on their recorded terms whatever Anchorage does with the product. They are still in use: recipients redeemed vesting plans on Ethereum on 2 October 2026, and BatchPlanner created a run of new lockup plans on 7 September 2026 (vesting plans; BatchPlanner, both on Blockscout, read 2 Oct 2026).

How Caper approaches this

Hedgey makes it easy for a DAO to give a contributor a vote years before giving them the right to sell. A caper has no allocation to vest: the whole supply starts in the curve's inventory, and there is no upfront founder allocation. Its vote weight combines tokens a member holds now with vote tokens earned only by casting ballots, and a ballot counts no more stake than the member still holds when it is tallied. The same weight prices a member's exit, so nobody votes with more force than they could leave with. Hedgey does better at paying people over time. A DAO can stream a grant to a contributor for years and claw back the unvested part if the work stops, and a long-horizon grantee gets a say from the first day. A caper pays a contributor through a payout proposal that transfers a fixed amount when it executes, with no schedule and no clawback, so vesting a contributor means voting each tranche separately or paying into an outside vesting contract.

References

• Hedgey, community docs · Governance · Hedgey <> Snapshot strategy · On-chain governance · Bug bounty · Token Claims deployments · Wormhole investor lockups
• Hedgey, Locked_VestingTokenPlans repository: TokenVestingPlans.sol · VotingTokenVestingPlans.sol · VotingVault.sol · URIAdmin.sol · audit reports
• Hedgey, DelegatedTokenClaims repository
• Snapshot, hedgey-delegate strategy · ShapeShift DAO, SCP-224 (20 Sep 2026)
• OpenZeppelin, “Security Analysis of Using Hedgey for Proposal Payment Vesting” (Arbitrum forum, 13 May 2024)
• StableLab, “STIP Funding Stream Updates” (Arbitrum forum, 3 Nov 2023) · Hedgey, “Use Hedgey for Arbitrum Foundation’s Grants program” (14 Aug 2023)
• Hedgey co-founder, “Introducing Hedgey” (ZKsync forum, 10 Feb 2025)
• Anchorage Digital, full-stack token management announcement (16 Dec 2025) · The Block, “Anchorage jumps into full token lifecycle management” (16 Dec 2025)
• CertiK, “Hedgey Finance Incident Analysis” (6 May 2024) · Halborn, “Explained: The Hedgey Finance Hack” (24 Apr 2024) · Cointelegraph, Hedgey exploit report (19 Apr 2024) · Immunefi, Crypto Losses April 2024
• Blockscout: TokenVestingPlans · BatchPlanner · VotingTokenLockupPlans (Ethereum, read 2 Oct 2026)