How Caper approaches this SPL Governance’s pluggable weight lets each DAO plug in its its strength and its exposure: VSR turns voting power into freely-tradeable capital plusown weight function, and the common choice, the voter stake registry, counts tradeable tokens with an optional lockup multiplierbonus, so a large enough bag – or a long enough lock – still buycarries the most say. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) answers the same question by weldingbuilds the weight functionrule into the contract instead of exposing it as a plug-in. A caper does tally: a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) carries up to four executable options plus a standing “do nothing”, holders rank all of them on one ballot, and a Borda fold picks a leader that must clear 1.5 / option_count of the weight cast – and a leading “do nmember's weight comes from the caper tokens they hold together with vote tokens they earn only by vothing” fails the proposal outright. Every ballot is weighed by the same rule, built on weight a member earns by voting, so there is no registrar to , so a big bag alone can't captureconfigure – not because there is no weight function, but because the one there is cannot be swapped without replacing the logic component. A legislative pass then earns a trigger, which opens the market window and locks the trailing TWAP as a baseline; the action executes only if the window’s own TWAP closes at or above that baseline. The tunable SPL Governance hands a DAO – which holdings count, and how much – is the one thing a caper does not expose. That weight, compute_vote_weight, prices two things at once: how far a member’s ballot moves the tally, and their claim on the treasury at exit. t is the caper tokens held; v is a soulbound token minted one per ballot cast andtrol, and a holder who has never voted has no weight at all. A proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) offers one or more actions beside a standing "do nothing", and members rank them all on one ballot; if "do nothing" leads, the proposal fails. A winning action must then hold up in the caper's own no other surface – buying and selling mint none, since the genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026 – and a zero in either input still yields zero, so a holder who has never voted has no exmarket: it runs only if the token's price over a set window holds at or above where it sto take however large their position. Those v tokens can never move peer-to-peer – deposit is restricted to the caper’s own immortal state component – but they are fully divisible (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM), so the admin-gated escape hatch mint_vote_to can distribute v in any denomination a future logic chooses. od before the window opened. See how a proposal executes (/wiki/governance/execution) . Where a Realms DAO’'s members can exitleave only by selling into a secondary market, exit() gives evany capery member who has voted a pro-rata claim on the treasury at exactly that weight, pre-burn – a built-in credible exit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) rather than a purely political oncan exit any time for their fair share (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) of the treasury, and the same weight that sets their say sets that share. The upgrade question above…structural answer too. A caper’'s state tier –, its treasury and proposal record –its record of proposals, is deployed once and never mi…isions do not depend on anyone’s continued keeping authority. The logic tierhat runs on that state can be replaced, but only by an UPGRADE proposal (/wiki/governance/execution) raised on the $CAPER caper itself, resolved the same way every other proposal is and routed through the protocol registry: therepassed on the $CAPER caper. Until the protocol operator retires its no separate council, and no key that shortcuts it. Same job as SPL Governance – own and move a treasury without a signer set – with the price of the thing being governed, rather than a configurable weight function, as the settlement rule. See Caper proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) admin badge, which Caper's deployment plan schedules for after mainnet launch, that badge can replace the logic too.

How Caper approaches this SPL…oposal outright. Every ballot carries the same canonical weight w = (t · v) / (V · T)is weighed by the same rule, built on weight a member earns by voting, so there is no registrar to …(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

In production SPL Governance …ich council setup they choose.What is not identical is the k…attached to it from the start.

How Caper approaches this SPL…” fails the proposal outright.Every ballot carries the same … however large their position.Those v tokens can never move …(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

SPL Governance is the on-chain…ana run on, and Realms is the open-source web app that fronts it. The pr…erything else composes around.

Category On-chain governance f…s://app.realms.today/) – the open-source governance UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) used by most Solana DAOs to create and run a realmapp most Solana DAOs run a realm through. The V1 app (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) is open source; the V2 app (https://v2.realms.today/) the documentation now points to is a private repository (https://docs.realms.today/developer-resources/custom-ui.md) Mainnet program IDs GovER5Lt…d by proposal on 8 July 2026 Deployed version The default program logs VERSION:"3.1.6". The highest published source is v3.1.3 (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/spl-governance-v3.1.3) , and the Solana verified-build service (https://verify.osec.io/status/GovER5Lthms3bLBqWub97yVrMmEogzX7xNjdXpPPCVZw) reports the on-chain program as not verified (read 19 September 2026) Vote model Token-weighted – a …y (https://docs.realms.today/)

Realms: the shared front-end …://app.realms.today/) is the open-source UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) UI – "a sophisticated, fully on…ecause the front-end is shared and open source, a new Solana DAO gets a work…rary/tree/master/governance) . One half of that sentence stopped being true. The repository (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) behind the V1 app is still open, but the documentation now sends users to v2.realms.today (https://v2.realms.today/) , and its own developer page states that the Realms UI is a private repository and that access is by request ( Realms (https://docs.realms.today/developer-resources/custom-ui.md) ). The program and the SDKs remain open source. What a DAO can no longer do is read, fork or self-host the interface its members actually vote in – a distinction worth keeping separate from the program’s own licence, because the two are now on different terms.

In production SPL Governance …SR after migrating to Solana. Because the program and UI are shared, these DAOs differ mainly in which addin and which council setup they choose – the kernel underneath is identicalThey differ mainly in which addin and which council setup they choose. What is not identical is the kernel: several of the largest run their own deployment of the program rather than the shared one – Jito at jtogv…, Drift at dgov7…, Pyth at pytGY… among them, all separate upgradeable programs, and Realms’ own treasury tooling (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mythic-Project/treasury-tvl/main/utils.ts) carries a long list of such program IDs. That matters for the section below: a DAO on its own deployment is not exposed to the council that upgrades the default program, and has instead its own upgrade-authority question to answer. The stack also has a market layer now. Sowellian Governance, which the documentation introduces as drawing on Robin Hanson’s futarchy, splits a decision in two: holders vote on the objectives, and a betting market decides the method, with payouts settled on the outcome and the treasury taking a bond or a 1% rake from losing bets ( Realms (https://docs.realms.today/sowellian/sowellian-governance.md) ). Its program was deployed to mainnet on 26 August 2026. Its own agent documentation also records a known bug: cancel a proposal before the vote is registered and the bet tokens are permanently locked, because no refund instruction exists ( Mythic Project (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/realms-agent-docs/blob/main/sowellian/SKILL.md) ). That is the futarchy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) idea shipped as a plugin, with the plugin-trust caveat below attached to it from the start.

Who can upgrade the kernel Ev…ates in its own documentation. There is a second half to the question, and it is newer. Reading the program’s own logs on 19 September 2026, the deployed default program identifies itself as VERSION:"3.1.6". The highest version published as source anywhere is v3.1.3 (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/spl-governance-v3.1.3) , and the Solana verified-build service (https://verify.osec.io/status/GovER5Lthms3bLBqWub97yVrMmEogzX7xNjdXpPPCVZw) reports the on-chain program as not verified, with no executable hash recorded, while naming that same v3.1.3 commit as its declared source. So the binary now executing every Realms DAO’s treasury decisions cannot be reproduced from anything published. The council arrangement above is a good answer to who may replace the program; it is not an answer to what the program currently is. For a page that argues the trust assumption is at least publicly readable, this is the caveat that has to travel with it.

Limits and failure modes - Co…run on a thin active minority. - A passed proposal is final. On 6 July 2026 a proposal executed against the shared program moved 4,426,104,450,305 BONK out of BonkDAO’s treasury in a single instruction – transaction 5tPU1s… at slot 431,127,240, 08:26 UTC, no error, the program logging GOVERNANCE-INSTRUCTION: ExecuteTransaction (read from mainnet on 19 September 2026). Nothing was exploited. rekt.news (https://rekt.news/bonkdao-rekt) reports the proposal as BIP #76, filed by an anonymous wallet six days earlier and passed on 2.9% turnout with the governance’s instruction hold-up time set to zero seconds. The timelock this page flags as absent from the program’s own council is absent from ordinary realms too, and it is the only thing that would have given anyone a window to react. - A DAO can ratify its own attacker. After the October 2022 Mango Markets manipulation, the attacker put his settlement to the DAO itself. The CFTC complaint records that he “submitted a revised governance proposal stipulating that he would return approximately $67 million of the stolen tokens, $47 million would be kept by him as a purported bug bounty, and Mango Markets would not pursue any criminal investigations”, and that “The Mango DAO approved this proposal on October 13” ( CFTC (https://www.cftc.gov/media/8046/enfeisenbergcomplaint010923/download) ). His 2024 convictions were later vacated (https://nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/23cr10%20Opinion%20and%20Order.pdf) on 23 May 2025. The governance layer worked exactly as designed; what it was used for is the point. The plugin bullet also has a concrete case now. An Accretion Labs review (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library/master/audits/2025-accretion-realms-metaplex-nft-core-plugin-audit-A25REA2.pdf) dated 10 September 2025 found a critical flaw in the Metaplex Core NFT voter plugin – a missing program-ownership check that let a voter present fake NFTs and vote with them – plus a high-severity issue allowing votes to be cast on proposals that did not yet exist. Both were fixed. The plugin library (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library/tree/master/programs) now holds eight programs, and the Civic gateway addin the infobox names is client-side code rather than a program in that repository.

References The upgrade-author…program's own account layouts. The deployed version, the BonkDAO execution and the Sowellian deployment were read the same way on 19 September 2026, the first from the program’s own transaction logs and the second from the block at slot 431,127,240. - SPL Governance program RE…/ quadratic / gateway addins).

How Caper approaches this SPL… held; v is a soulbound token that accrues at 0.01 per XRD on both legs of every trade and at 1 per ballot cast,minted one per ballot cast and on no other surface – buying and selling mint none, since the genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026 – and a zero in either input st…s zero, so a holder who has neither traded nover voted has no exit to take however large their position. Those v tokens can never mov…sible (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM), because a per-XRD accrual rate cannot mint whole unitso the admin-gated escape hatch mint_vote_to can distribute v in any denomination a future logic chooses. Where a Realms DAO’s member…() gives every member who has taken partvoted a pro-rata claim on the treas…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this SPL… earns a trigger, which opens a 48-hourthe market window and locks athe trailing seven-day TWAPTWAP as a baseline; the action executes only if …(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this SPL…RD on both legs of every trade and at 1 per ballot cast, and a zero in either input s…s zero, so a holder who has nevither traded on the curvenor voted has no exit to take. Those v …) gives every member who has tradedaken part a pro-rata claim on the treas…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this SPL… answers the same question by removwelding the vote. Under its optimistic proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) system a caper tallies nothing: a proposal carries one typed action, and it passes if the token’s spot price is at or above a seven-day TWAP baseline locked when the proposal was created. Tweight function into the contract instead of exposing it as a plug-in. A caper does tally: a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) carries up to four executable options plus a standing “do nothing”, holders rank all of them on one ballot, and a Borda fold picks a leader that must clear 1.5 / option_count of the weight cast – and a leading “do nothing” fails the proposal outright. Every ballot carries the same canonical weight w = (t · v) / (V · T), so there is no registrar to reconfigure – not because there is no weight function in the governance path to configure. The canonical weight w = (t · v) / (V · T) is still live in compute_vote_weight, but read what it now prices: a member’s claim on the treasury at exit, not their say in a decision, but because the one there is cannot be swapped without replacing the logic component. A legislative pass then earns a trigger, which opens a 48-hour window and locks a trailing seven-day TWAP; the action executes only if the window’s own TWAP closes at or above that baseline. The tunable SPL Governance hands a DAO – which holdings count, and how much – is the one thing a caper does not expose. That weight, compute_vote_weight, prices two things at once: how far a member’s ballot moves the tally, and their claim on the treasury at exit. t is the caper tokens held; …(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this SPL Governance'’s pluggable weight is its stre…foundations/what-is-a-caper) is built the other way. Its vote weight is a fixed formula, not a swappable addanswers the same question by removing the vote. Under its optimistic proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) system a caper tallies nothing: w = (t · v) / (V · T), where a member's held governance tokens t are multiplied by their earned, non-transferable votes v (the compute_vote_weight formula in the Caper contracts). Aa proposal carries one typed action, and it passes if the token’s spot price is at or above a seven-day TWAP baseline locked when the proposal was created. There is no registrar to reconfigure because there is no weight function in the governance path to configure. The canonical weight w = (t · v) / (V · T) is still live in compute_vote_weight, but read what it now prices: a member’s claim on the treasury at exit, not their say in a decision. t is the caper tokens held; v is a soulbound token that accrues at 0.01 per XRD on both legs of every trade, and a zero in anyeither input still yields zero, so a bag tholder who hats never participates captures no control. Those votes are a soulbound proof-of-vote token (non-divisible, with mint and burn locktraded on the curve has no exit to take. Those v tokens can never move peer-to-peer – deposit is restricted to the DAO'caper’s own immortal state component) – there is no VSR-style registrar to reconfigurbut they are fully divisible (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM), because a per-XRD accrual rate cand not market to buy weight on. And wint whole units. Where a Realms DAO'’s members can only exitexit only by selling inton a secondary market, Caper's exit() gives every member who has vottraded a pro-rata claim on the treasury sized at exactly that canonical weight, pre-burn – a built-in …structural answer too. A caper'’s state tier – treasury, and proposal record and ballots – is deployed once and never m…isions do not depend on anyone'’s continued authority. The log…(/wiki/governance/execution) pasraised byon the $CAPER caper's own member itself, resolved the same way every other proposal is and routed through the proto…nce – own and move a treasury by vote – with participation, not capital, as the unit of powerwithout a signer set – with the price of the thing being governed, rather than a configurable weight function, as the settlement rule. See Caper proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) .

How Caper approaches this SPL…per's exit gives every member who has voted a pro-rata claim on the treasu…(/wiki/governance/proposals) .

SPL Governance is the on-chain program that most decentralized autonomous organizations on Solana run on, and Realms is the open-source web app that fronts it. The program is, in its maintainers' words, "a program the chief purpose of which is to provide core building blocks and primitives to create Decentralized Autonomous Organizations" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – deliberately "DAO type and asset type agnostic" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) so a treasury, a protocol, or an NFT community can all be governed by the same primitive. It is the Solana equivalent of what OpenZeppelin Governor (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/openzeppelin-governor) plus Safe (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/safe) are on the EVM: a canonical governance kernel that everything else composes around.

Category On-chain governance framework (Solana) · program + shared front-end Program SPL Governance – part of the Solana Program Library (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) , now maintained by the Mythic Project (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) (took over the program and the Realms UI from Solana Labs) Front-end Realms (https://app.realms.today/) – the open-source governance UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) used by most Solana DAOs to create and run a realm Mainnet program IDs GovER5Lthms3bLBqWub97yVrMmEogzX7xNjdXpPCVZw (default) · GTesTBiEWE32WHXXE2S4XbZvA5CrEc4xs6ZgRe895dP (test) Vote model Token-weighted – a community mint and an optional council mint per realm; deposit = voting weight Extensibility Swappable voter-weight addins (plugins): Voter Stake Registry (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) , NFT voter, quadratic, gateway (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) Notable users Marinade (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/marinade) , Jito (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) , Mango, Metaplex, Helium (via VSR) Docs docs.realms.today (https://docs.realms.today/)

The primitive: a realm, two mints Everything in SPL Governance hangs off a realm. As the program README (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) puts it, the "Realm account ties Community Token Mint and optional Council Token mint to create a realm." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) Members deposit governing tokens into the program and use "the deposited amount as their voting weight to vote on Proposals." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) That is plain token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) at the base layer. The optional council mint is what makes the model expressive: a realm can run two voting populations at once. A small trusted council can hold veto or fast-track powers over the same DAO the broad community token governs – the program notes "users can submit Proposals that have a different voting population from a different mint that can affect the same DAO." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) It is the on-chain version of the two-chamber pattern many DAOs reach for, without bolting on a separate tool.

Realms: the shared front-end Almost no one interacts with the raw program. Realms (https://app.realms.today/) is the open-source UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) – "a sophisticated, fully on-chain platform designed to simplify and enhance the management of decentralized autonomous organizations on the Solana blockchain" (https://docs.realms.today/) – that the large majority of Solana DAOs deploy and operate through. Its docs frame a realm around three moving parts: "DAOs, proposals, and votes." (https://docs.realms.today/) Because the front-end is shared and open source, a new Solana DAO gets a working governance surface – proposal creation, delegation, treasury views, member lists – without building any of it, the same way an EVM project reaches for Tally (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/tally) or Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) rather than shipping its own governance app. Realms and the program are maintained together by the Mythic Project (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) .

Proposals, votes, and a governed treasury A "Proposal is an instance of a Governance created to vote on and execute a given set of instructions." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) It moves through draft → voting → executing → completed, and a "vote is tipped once it passes the defined vote_threshold" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – early resolution once the outcome is mathematically settled, rather than always waiting out the clock. What separates SPL Governance from a pure off-chain signalling tool (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) is that the treasury is the DAO. Assets are held in specialised governance accounts that only a passed proposal can move: - ProgramGovernance – controls program (smart-contract) upgrades. - MintGovernance – controls an SPL token mint (issuance). - TokenGovernance – controls transfers out of a token account (the treasury proper). Because execution is on-chain and account-scoped, a Realms DAO owns and moves its own funds by vote – the proposal is the transaction, not a request for a multisig to act later.

The plugin architecture: voter-weight addins The program is "modular and uses an open/close architecture where individual parts of the program\u2019s behavior can be customized through external plugins." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) The default one-token-one-vote weight "can be swapped with a custom program implementation" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – an addin that computes each member's voting power however the realm wants. This is the most consequential design choice in the stack: governance math is pluggable. The addins in wide use: - Voter Stake Registry (VSR) (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) – the dominant one, built by the Blockworks Foundation (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) . It lets a realm "control which token mints can be used to vote, and at what scaling factor" (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) , and lets members "lock up tokens with different vesting schedules" (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) where "locked up tokens may have extra voting weight." (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) It also supports clawback (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) of locked grants. That makes VSR Solana's vote-escrow (ve) (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) analogue – time-lock for weight. - NFT voter (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) – voting power derived from NFT holdings across accepted collections, for NFT-native communities. - Quadratic and Gateway plugins (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) – a quadratic-weighting addin, and a Civic-gateway addin that gates voting behind identity/uniqueness passes. An addin can also cap the max voter weight, so quorum is measured against an effective supply rather than the raw mint – the same accounting problem token-weighted systems (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) everywhere have to solve.

In production SPL Governance and Realms are the default governance layer for the Solana ecosystem. Marinade (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/marinade) runs its mDAO in Realms with MNDE locked under VSR; Jito (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) governs JTO, StakeNet, and its NCN fee routing through it; Mango, Metaplex, and Grape are long-running Realms DAOs; and Helium (https://github.com/helium/voter-stake-registry) governs HNT through its own fork of VSR after migrating to Solana. Because the program and UI are shared, these DAOs differ mainly in which addin and which council setup they choose – the kernel underneath is identical.

Limits and failure modes - Council centralisation. The council mint that makes two-chamber governance possible is also the usual point of centralisation – an early-stage realm is frequently a small multisig council wearing a DAO's clothes until the community token is genuinely distributed. - Upgrade authority. A DAO is only as trustless as its ProgramGovernance discipline. If the realm's own program upgrade authority isn't itself governed (or is retained by the team), the on-chain execution guarantees are advisory. - Plugin trust. A voter-weight addin is unrestricted code that decides who has power. A buggy or malicious registrar config can silently mis-weight votes, and VSR lockups concentrate weight with the earliest, longest-locked holders – the ve trade-off (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) in full. - Turnout. On-chain execution does not fix voter apathy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) ; a realm still has to reach quorum, and many run on a thin active minority.

How Caper approaches this SPL Governance's pluggable weight is its strength and its exposure: VSR turns voting power into freely-tradeable capital plus an optional lockup multiplier, so a large enough bag – or a long enough lock – still buys the most say. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) is built the other way. Its vote weight is a fixed formula, not a swappable addin: w = (t · v) / (V · T), where a member's held governance tokens t are multiplied by their earned, non-transferable votes v (the compute_vote_weight formula in the Caper contracts). A zero in any input yields zero, so a bag that never participates captures no control. Those votes are a soulbound proof-of-vote token (non-divisible, with mint and burn locked to the DAO's own immortal state component) – there is no VSR-style registrar to reconfigure and no market to buy weight on. And where a Realms DAO's members can only exit by selling on a secondary market, Caper's exit gives every member a pro-rata claim on the treasury sized at exactly that canonical weight, pre-burn – a built-in credible exit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) rather than a purely political one. Same job as SPL Governance – own and move a treasury by vote – with participation, not capital, as the unit of power. See Caper proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) .

References - SPL Governance program README (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – solana-labs/solana-program-library - Mythic Project fork (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) – current maintainer of the program and Realms UI - Realms documentation (https://docs.realms.today/) · developer resources: spl-governance (https://docs.realms.today/developer-resources/spl-governance) - governance-ui (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) – the open-source Realms front-end - Voter Stake Registry (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) (Blockworks Foundation) · governance-program-library (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) (NFT / quadratic / gateway addins)

SPL Governance is the on-chain program that most decentralized autonomous organizations on Solana run on, and Realms is the open-source web app that fronts it. The program is, in its maintainers' words, "a program the chief purpose of which is to provide core building blocks and primitives to create Decentralized Autonomous Organizations" (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – deliberately "DAO type and asset type agnostic" (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) so a treasury, a protocol, or an NFT community can all be governed by the same primitive. It is the Solana equivalent of what OpenZeppelin Governor (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/openzeppelin-governor) plus Safe (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/safe) are on the EVM: a canonical governance kernel that everything else composes around.

Category On-chain governance framework (Solana) · program + shared front-end Program SPL Governance – originally part of the Solana Program Library, whose monorepo Solana Labs archived on 11 March 2025 (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library) . The maintained line is the Mythic Project fork (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) Front-end Realms (https://app.realms.today/) – the open-source governance UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) used by most Solana DAOs to create and run a realm Mainnet program IDs GovER5Lthms3bLBqWub97yVrMmEogzX7xNjdXpPPCVZw (default) · GTesTBiEWE32WHXXE2S4XbZvA5CrEc4xs6ZgRe895dP (test) Upgrade authority Held by a governance PDA of a seven-member council realm running on a second SPL Governance deployment – the program governs itself. Last upgrade executed by proposal on 8 July 2026 Vote model Token-weighted – a community mint and an optional council mint per realm; deposit = voting weight Extensibility Swappable voter-weight addins (plugins): Voter Stake Registry (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) , NFT voter, quadratic, gateway (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library) Notable users Marinade (/wiki/daos/staking/marinade) , Jito (/wiki/daos/staking/jito) , Mango, Metaplex, Helium (via VSR) Docs docs.realms.today (https://docs.realms.today/)

The primitive: a realm, two mints Everything in SPL Governance hangs off a realm. As the program README (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) puts it, the "Realm account ties Community Token Mint and optional Council Token mint to create a realm." (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) Members deposit governing tokens into the program and use "the deposited amount as their voting weight to vote on Proposals." (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) That is plain token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) at the base layer. The optional council mint is what makes the model expressive: a realm can run two voting populations at once. A small trusted council can hold veto or fast-track powers over the same DAO the broad community token governs – the program notes "users can submit Proposals that have a different voting population from a different mint that can affect the same DAO." (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) It is the on-chain version of the two-chamber pattern many DAOs reach for, without bolting on a separate tool.

Realms: the shared front-end Almost no one interacts with the raw program. Realms (https://app.realms.today/) is the open-source UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) – "a sophisticated, fully on-chain platform designed to simplify and enhance the management of decentralized autonomous organizations on the Solana blockchain" (https://docs.realms.today/) – that the large majority of Solana DAOs deploy and operate through. Its docs frame a realm around three moving parts: "DAOs, proposals, and votes." (https://docs.realms.today/) Because the front-end is shared and open source, a new Solana DAO gets a working governance surface – proposal creation, delegation, treasury views, member lists – without building any of it, the same way an EVM project reaches for Tally (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/tally) or Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) rather than shipping its own governance app. Realms and the program are maintained together by the Mythic Project (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) .

Proposals, votes, and a governed treasury A "Proposal is an instance of a Governance created to vote on and execute given set of instructions." (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) It moves through draft → voting → executing → completed, and a "vote is tipped once it passes the defined vote_threshold" (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – early resolution once the outcome is mathematically settled, rather than always waiting out the clock. What separates SPL Governance from a pure off-chain signalling tool (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) is that the treasury is the DAO. Assets are held in specialised governance accounts that only a passed proposal can move: - ProgramGovernance – controls program (smart-contract) upgrades. - MintGovernance – controls an SPL token mint (issuance). - TokenGovernance – controls transfers out of a token account (the treasury proper). Because execution is on-chain and account-scoped, a Realms DAO owns and moves its own funds by vote – the proposal is the transaction, not a request for a multisig to act later.

The plugin architecture: voter-weight addins The program is "modular and uses open/close architecture where individual parts of the program's behavior can be customized through external plugins." (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) The default one-token-one-vote weight "can be swapped with a custom program implementation" (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – an addin that computes each member's voting power however the realm wants. This is the most consequential design choice in the stack: governance math is pluggable. The addins in wide use: - Voter Stake Registry (VSR) (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) – the dominant one, built by the Blockworks Foundation (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) . It lets a realm "control which token mints can be used to vote, and at what scaling factor" (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) , and lets members "lock up tokens with different vesting schedules" (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) where "locked up tokens may have extra voting weight." (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) It also supports clawback (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) of locked grants. That makes VSR Solana's vote-escrow (ve) (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) analogue – time-lock for weight. - NFT voter (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library) – voting power derived from NFT holdings across accepted collections, for NFT-native communities. - Quadratic and Gateway plugins (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library) – a quadratic-weighting addin, and a Civic-gateway addin that gates voting behind identity/uniqueness passes. An addin can also cap the max voter weight, so quorum is measured against an effective supply rather than the raw mint – the same accounting problem token-weighted systems (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) everywhere have to solve.

In production SPL Governance and Realms are the default governance layer for the Solana ecosystem. Marinade (/wiki/daos/staking/marinade) runs its mDAO in Realms with MNDE locked under VSR; Jito (/wiki/daos/staking/jito) governs JTO, StakeNet, and its NCN fee routing through it; Mango, Metaplex, and Grape are long-running Realms DAOs; and Helium (https://github.com/helium/voter-stake-registry) governs HNT through its own fork of VSR after migrating to Solana. Because the program and UI are shared, these DAOs differ mainly in which addin and which council setup they choose – the kernel underneath is identical.

Who can upgrade the kernel Every Realms DAO's on-chain execution guarantee rests on one assumption its own governance cannot check: that the program holding its treasury will not be replaced underneath it. SPL Governance is deployed under Solana's upgradeable loader, so someone can replace it. The question has an exact answer, and it is worth reading in full because it is unusually good. The default program's ProgramData account names an upgrade authority of HF7gCq7BMB6cFfhharTGGm31sqDdpmvLTgF4WEoW8y9n. That address is off the ed25519 curve, so it is a program-derived address and not a wallet – no private key exists for it. Reading the last transaction it authorised settles which program derives it: the upgrade at slot 431,624,473 on 8 July 2026 logs GOVERNANCE-INSTRUCTION: ExecuteTransaction from a second SPL Governance deployment (https://explorer.solana.com/address/GoVERLMGbGF8kwAwhyNgF1BQ2uyQPawHCWbnFRmLZCf) at version 3.1.1, which then invokes the loader. SPL Governance is upgraded by an SPL Governance proposal. The kernel governs itself with its own machinery, one deployment removed. The realm that holds that authority is named Realms Security council 8, and its parameters are all on-chain: - Seven seats, one vote each. The council mint has zero decimals and a total supply of 7; ten member records exist and seven of them hold a deposit of exactly 1. The community mint attached to the same realm has a supply of 0. - Community voting is switched off. The governance account's community_vote_threshold is Disabled and its minimum community weight to open a proposal is u64::MAX. Only the council votes. - Five of seven carries it. The council_vote_threshold is YesVotePercentage(60), measured against the whole council supply, and the program rounds the requirement up ( get_min_vote_threshold_weight (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/program/src/state/proposal.rs) ). Sixty per cent of seven is 4.2, so four votes – 57 % – is not enough and five are required. The veto threshold is the same 60 %. - 72 hours of voting, then a 24-hour cool-off in which only Deny and Veto votes are accepted, with council vote tipping set to Early, so a fifth yes ends the vote the moment it lands. - No timelock. The governance's transactions_hold_up_time is 0 – the config imposes no delay of its own between a proposal succeeding and its instruction executing. - The council can resize itself. The same PDA that holds the upgrade authority is also the mint authority of both the council and community mints, so a passed proposal can issue an eighth seat. Read against the alternatives this is a strong answer: not a founder's keypair, not a company multisig, but a quorum rule enforced by the same program it governs, with every parameter publicly readable. Read strictly it is still a small-committee arrangement with no delay attached: five people can, in principle, replace the program that executes the treasury decisions of every Realms DAO, and there is no window in which those DAOs could react. That is the honest shape of the trust assumption, and it is one almost no Realms DAO states in its own documentation.

Who maintains it The other half of the same question is who writes the code that gets deployed, and the answer changed quietly. Solana Labs archived the Solana Program Library monorepo – last push 11 March 2025 – and broke its programs out into individually maintained repositories under the solana-program organisation (https://github.com/orgs/solana-program/repositories) . Thirty-nine repositories live there today: token, token-2022, stake-pool, the associated-token-account program, memo, and the rest. Governance is not among them. What happened instead is that maintenance moved to a community fork. The archived README now opens with a one-line redirect – "This repo still exists in archived form, but the maintained version has now relocated to" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) the Mythic Project's copy (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) – and that fork, together with the Realms front-end (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) and the addin library (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library) , is where the work now happens. It is live work, not a courtesy fork: the program repository was pushed the day this page was last checked, and the on-chain deployment was upgraded a month before that. So the governance layer of an entire L1's DAO ecosystem sits outside the official program organisation of that L1, maintained by a separate team, and upgraded by a seven-member council. None of those three facts is a defect on its own. Together they are the thing a DAO choosing Realms should know it is choosing, and the wider pattern is covered on DAO tooling discontinuity (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity) .

Limits and failure modes - Council centralisation. The council mint that makes two-chamber governance possible is also the usual point of centralisation – an early-stage realm is frequently a small multisig council wearing a DAO's clothes until the community token is genuinely distributed. As the section above shows, the program's own governance is exactly this shape. - Upgrade authority. A DAO is only as trustless as its ProgramGovernance discipline. If the realm's own program upgrade authority isn't itself governed (or is retained by the team), the on-chain execution guarantees are advisory – and the same question applies one layer down, to the governance program itself. - Plugin trust. A voter-weight addin is unrestricted code that decides who has power. A buggy or malicious registrar config can silently mis-weight votes, and VSR lockups concentrate weight with the earliest, longest-locked holders – the ve trade-off (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) in full. - Turnout. On-chain execution does not fix voter apathy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) ; a realm still has to reach quorum, and many run on a thin active minority.

How Caper approaches this SPL Governance's pluggable weight is its strength and its exposure: VSR turns voting power into freely-tradeable capital plus an optional lockup multiplier, so a large enough bag – or a long enough lock – still buys the most say. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) is built the other way. Its vote weight is a fixed formula, not a swappable addin: w = (t · v) / (V · T), where a member's held governance tokens t are multiplied by their earned, non-transferable votes v (the compute_vote_weight formula in the Caper contracts). A zero in any input yields zero, so a bag that never participates captures no control. Those votes are a soulbound proof-of-vote token (non-divisible, with mint and burn locked to the DAO's own immortal state component) – there is no VSR-style registrar to reconfigure and no market to buy weight on. And where a Realms DAO's members can only exit by selling on a secondary market, Caper's exit gives every member a pro-rata claim on the treasury sized at exactly that canonical weight, pre-burn – a built-in credible exit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) rather than a purely political one. The upgrade question above has a structural answer too. A caper's state tier – treasury, proposal record and ballots – is deployed once and never migrated, so past decisions do not depend on anyone's continued authority. The logic tier can be replaced, but only by an UPGRADE proposal (/wiki/governance/execution) passed by the $CAPER caper's own members and routed through the protocol registry: there is no separate council, and no key that shortcuts it. Same job as SPL Governance – own and move a treasury by vote – with participation, not capital, as the unit of power. See Caper proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) .

References The upgrade-authority, council and mint figures on this page were read directly from Solana mainnet on 13 August 2026 via getAccountInfo, getProgramAccounts and getTransaction against the public RPC, and decoded against the program's own account layouts. - SPL Governance program README (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – Mythic-Project/solana-program-library, the maintained line · the archived solana-labs original (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) , which carries the relocation notice. - the solana-program organisation (https://github.com/orgs/solana-program/repositories) – the 39 repositories the SPL monorepo was broken into; governance is not one of them. - governance.rs (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/program/src/state/governance.rs) and proposal.rs (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/program/src/state/proposal.rs) – the GovernanceConfig field order and the threshold-rounding rule used to decode the council's parameters. - Realms documentation (https://docs.realms.today/) · developer resources: spl-governance (https://docs.realms.today/developer-resources/spl-governance) · governance-ui (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) , the open-source Realms front-end. - Voter Stake Registry (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) (Blockworks Foundation) · governance-program-library (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-program-library) (NFT / quadratic / gateway addins).

SPL Governance is the on-chain program that most decentralized autonomous organizations on Solana run on, and Realms is the open-source web app that fronts it. The program is, in its maintainers' words, "a program the chief purpose of which is to provide core building blocks and primitives to create Decentralized Autonomous Organizations" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – deliberately "DAO type and asset type agnostic" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) so a treasury, a protocol, or an NFT community can all be governed by the same primitive. It is the Solana equivalent of what OpenZeppelin Governor (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/openzeppelin-governor) plus Safe (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/safe) are on the EVM: a canonical governance kernel that everything else composes around.

Category On-chain governance framework (Solana) · program + shared front-end Program SPL Governance – part of the Solana Program Library (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) , now maintained by the Mythic Project (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) (took over the program and the Realms UI from Solana Labs) Front-end Realms (https://app.realms.today/) – the open-source governance UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) used by most Solana DAOs to create and run a realm Mainnet program IDs GovER5Lthms3bLBqWub97yVrMmEogzX7xNjdXpPCVZw (default) · GTesTBiEWE32WHXXE2S4XbZvA5CrEc4xs6ZgRe895dP (test) Vote model Token-weighted – a community mint and an optional council mint per realm; deposit = voting weight Extensibility Swappable voter-weight addins (plugins): Voter Stake Registry (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) , NFT voter, quadratic, gateway (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) Notable users Marinade (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/marinade) , Jito (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) , Mango, Metaplex, Helium (via VSR) Docs docs.realms.today (https://docs.realms.today/)

The primitive: a realm, two mints Everything in SPL Governance hangs off a realm. As the program README (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) puts it, the "Realm account ties Community Token Mint and optional Council Token mint to create a realm." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) Members deposit governing tokens into the program and use "the deposited amount as their voting weight to vote on Proposals." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) That is plain token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) at the base layer. The optional council mint is what makes the model expressive: a realm can run two voting populations at once. A small trusted council can hold veto or fast-track powers over the same DAO the broad community token governs – the program notes "users can submit Proposals that have a different voting population from a different mint that can affect the same DAO." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) It is the on-chain version of the two-chamber pattern many DAOs reach for, without bolting on a separate tool.

Realms: the shared front-end Almost no one interacts with the raw program. Realms (https://app.realms.today/) is the open-source UI (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) – "a sophisticated, fully on-chain platform designed to simplify and enhance the management of decentralized autonomous organizations on the Solana blockchain" (https://docs.realms.today/) – that the large majority of Solana DAOs deploy and operate through. Its docs frame a realm around three moving parts: "DAOs, proposals, and votes." (https://docs.realms.today/) Because the front-end is shared and open source, a new Solana DAO gets a working governance surface – proposal creation, delegation, treasury views, member lists – without building any of it, the same way an EVM project reaches for Tally (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/tally) or Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) rather than shipping its own governance app. Realms and the program are maintained together by the Mythic Project (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) .

Proposals, votes, and a governed treasury A "Proposal is an instance of a Governance created to vote on and execute a given set of instructions." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) It moves through draft → voting → executing → completed, and a "vote is tipped once it passes the defined vote_threshold" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – early resolution once the outcome is mathematically settled, rather than always waiting out the clock. What separates SPL Governance from a pure off-chain signalling tool (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) is that the treasury is the DAO. Assets are held in specialised governance accounts that only a passed proposal can move: - ProgramGovernance – controls program (smart-contract) upgrades. - MintGovernance – controls an SPL token mint (issuance). - TokenGovernance – controls transfers out of a token account (the treasury proper). Because execution is on-chain and account-scoped, a Realms DAO owns and moves its own funds by vote – the proposal is the transaction, not a request for a multisig to act later.

The plugin architecture: voter-weight addins The program is "modular and uses an open/close architecture where individual parts of the program\u2019s behavior can be customized through external plugins." (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) The default one-token-one-vote weight "can be swapped with a custom program implementation" (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – an addin that computes each member's voting power however the realm wants. This is the most consequential design choice in the stack: governance math is pluggable. The addins in wide use: - Voter Stake Registry (VSR) (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) – the dominant one, built by the Blockworks Foundation (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) . It lets a realm "control which token mints can be used to vote, and at what scaling factor" (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) , and lets members "lock up tokens with different vesting schedules" (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) where "locked up tokens may have extra voting weight." (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) It also supports clawback (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) of locked grants. That makes VSR Solana's vote-escrow (ve) (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) analogue – time-lock for weight. - NFT voter (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) – voting power derived from NFT holdings across accepted collections, for NFT-native communities. - Quadratic and Gateway plugins (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) – a quadratic-weighting addin, and a Civic-gateway addin that gates voting behind identity/uniqueness passes. An addin can also cap the max voter weight, so quorum is measured against an effective supply rather than the raw mint – the same accounting problem token-weighted systems (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) everywhere have to solve.

In production SPL Governance and Realms are the default governance layer for the Solana ecosystem. Marinade (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/marinade) runs its mDAO in Realms with MNDE locked under VSR; Jito (/wiki/daos/organizations/staking/jito) governs JTO, StakeNet, and its NCN fee routing through it; Mango, Metaplex, and Grape are long-running Realms DAOs; and Helium (https://github.com/helium/voter-stake-registry) governs HNT through its own fork of VSR after migrating to Solana. Because the program and UI are shared, these DAOs differ mainly in which addin and which council setup they choose – the kernel underneath is identical.

Limits and failure modes - Council centralisation. The council mint that makes two-chamber governance possible is also the usual point of centralisation – an early-stage realm is frequently a small multisig council wearing a DAO's clothes until the community token is genuinely distributed. - Upgrade authority. A DAO is only as trustless as its ProgramGovernance discipline. If the realm's own program upgrade authority isn't itself governed (or is retained by the team), the on-chain execution guarantees are advisory. - Plugin trust. A voter-weight addin is unrestricted code that decides who has power. A buggy or malicious registrar config can silently mis-weight votes, and VSR lockups concentrate weight with the earliest, longest-locked holders – the ve trade-off (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) in full. - Turnout. On-chain execution does not fix voter apathy (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) ; a realm still has to reach quorum, and many run on a thin active minority.

How Caper approaches this SPL Governance's pluggable weight is its strength and its exposure: VSR turns voting power into freely-tradeable capital plus an optional lockup multiplier, so a large enough bag – or a long enough lock – still buys the most say. Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) is built the other way. Its vote weight is a fixed formula, not a swappable addin: w = (t · v) / (V · T), where a member's held governance tokens t are multiplied by their earned, non-transferable votes v (the compute_vote_weight formula in the Caper contracts). A zero in any input yields zero, so a bag that never participates captures no control. Those votes are a soulbound proof-of-vote token (non-divisible, with mint and burn locked to the DAO's own immortal state component) – there is no VSR-style registrar to reconfigure and no market to buy weight on. And where a Realms DAO's members can only exit by selling on a secondary market, Caper's exit gives every member a pro-rata claim on the treasury sized at exactly that canonical weight, pre-burn – a built-in credible exit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) rather than a purely political one. Same job as SPL Governance – own and move a treasury by vote – with participation, not capital, as the unit of power. See Caper proposals (/wiki/governance/proposals) .

References - SPL Governance program README (https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/blob/master/governance/README.md) – solana-labs/solana-program-library - Mythic Project fork (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/solana-program-library/tree/master/governance) – current maintainer of the program and Realms UI - Realms documentation (https://docs.realms.today/) · developer resources: spl-governance (https://docs.realms.today/developer-resources/spl-governance) - governance-ui (https://github.com/Mythic-Project/governance-ui) – the open-source Realms front-end - Voter Stake Registry (https://github.com/blockworks-foundation/voter-stake-registry) (Blockworks Foundation) · governance-program-library (https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-program-library) (NFT / quadratic / gateway addins)