DAOhaus is the no-code home of the Moloch DAO framework – the lineage that gave the whole industry the word ragequit. Where a Safe multisig holds money and Snapshot holds opinions, a Moloch DAO fuses treasury, membership, proposals, and a guaranteed exit into one minimal on-chain contract. DAOhaus is the app that lets anyone deploy and operate one without writing Solidity, and the community (organised as HausDAO) that maintains the framework.
The original Moloch v1 contract shipped in 2019 to fund Ethereum public goods, and its GitHub description – a line from Ginsberg's Howl – set the tone: a deliberately ruthless, minimal DAO. It introduced four primitives that recur everywhere in this wiki: shares (membership + voting power + a claim on the treasury), a guild bank (the pooled treasury), a simple proposal and majority vote, and – the innovation that mattered – ragequit: any member can burn their shares and walk away with a proportional slice of every asset in the guild bank.
Ragequit is a design answer to the tyranny-of-the-majority problem: a voting bloc cannot expropriate the minority, because the minority can always exit at fair value before a contested proposal executes. Moloch v2 generalised the model – multiple treasury tokens, guild-kick proposals, and a second non-voting unit called loot that carries exit rights but no vote.
The v2 contracts then forked in two directions. DAOhaus kept a fixed contract and put a no-code app in front of it; OpenLaw's Tribute DAO Framework, generalised out of The LAO, instead broke the same model into adapters a DAO could vote to replace. Tribute has since been archived; DAOhaus is still summoning DAOs.
The lineage also has a 2026 continuation that is not DAOhaus’s. Moloch-Mystics, the organisation Baal was written in and which HausDAO’s copy forks, published majeur, a rewrite whose README keeps ragequit and adds prediction markets on proposals, split delegation, on-chain SVG metadata, soulbound badges for the largest shareholders, and support for a Wyoming DUNA, the nonprofit wrapper a DAO can register as. It has no releases and claims no audit, and its last commit is 23 March 2026, but it is deployed: on Ethereum its summoner contracts have created 148 clones between them, and the same summoner bytecode is live on Base and Arbitrum (read 19 September 2026). It is the nearest thing in the Moloch family to the design this wiki describes, because it pairs a soulbound membership token with an exit that is still flat pro-rata.
A Moloch DAO tracks two internal units. Shares grant voting power, the right to submit and process proposals, and a redeemable claim on the treasury. Loot grants the same treasury claim but no vote – useful for paying contributors or investors economic upside without handing them governance control. Both are minted through proposals, and both can be ragequit.
Everything routes through proposals against the guild bank: request shares/loot in exchange for a tribute of tokens, spend treasury funds, add or kick members, or call an arbitrary external contract. Because exit is always available, Moloch DAOs can run on thin process – there is less need for elaborate governance machinery when the credible threat is "if you pass this, I leave with my share."
The current framework is Baal, described by its repository as "a minimal yet composable DAO template continuing work from the Moloch, Minion, Compound/OZ and Safe frameworks." Baal keeps shares and loot as transferable ERC-20s, retains ragequit, and adds two things that make it modern:
Baal deploys on Ethereum mainnet, Optimism, Arbitrum, Gnosis Chain, Polygon and Base, with Sepolia for testing, per the supported-networks page of the developer docs.
A framework page that says only “the current framework is Baal” hides the more useful fact, which is that the contracts and the product are on very different clocks.
The contract layer has stopped moving. HausDAO/Baal's default branch is not main but a feature branch, feat/baalZodiac, and its last commit landed on 11 June 2024 (a factory upgrade); main itself has been untouched since 28 March 2022. The original Moloch v1 repository last saw a push on 30 December 2022. For a framework this is not necessarily decay – Moloch's whole design claim is minimalism, and a small audited contract that has not changed in two years is doing what it promised. But it does mean that anything new in the DAOhaus world arrives around the contracts rather than inside them, through Zodiac modules, shamans and off-chain tooling.
The product layer, by contrast, is actively maintained. The Admin App is the current operating surface, rebuilt from April 2026 as a repository of its own whose last commit is 3 September 2026, the user guide is maintained by the PublicHAUS community, and the developer docs carry the contract reference, subgraph endpoints and deployment addresses. Reading the two clocks together is the honest summary: frozen primitives, moving surface.
That surface narrowed in 2026, on a dated day. On 30 April 2026 the v3 monorepo that had held the Admin App, the summoner and the v3 subgraph took a README line saying the project has been packed away in the attic, not actively maintained but preserved for reference, and had its workflows disabled; the Moloch v2 supergraph took the same line the same day. Neither repository was archived, so both still read as live to anyone checking the GitHub flag rather than the README.
Two kinds of rot are visible from DAOhaus’s own pages. summon.daohaus.club, yeet.haus and moloch.daohaus.fun have no DNS record, and the site’s ecosystem component still links the first two. And of the twelve subgraph endpoints the developer docs publish, seven answer deployment does not exist: every Moloch v2 endpoint, plus v3 on Ethereum mainnet, Gnosis Chain and Sepolia. Polygon, Arbitrum, Base and Optimism answer (probed 19 September 2026). A Moloch v3 DAO on mainnet is therefore readable on-chain and not through the published API, which is the layer every interface actually uses.
The clearest thing DAOhaus shipped in 2026 is not a contract change at all. It is a stack for running an autonomous agent as a member of a Moloch DAO, split across three repositories: moloch-skills (agent skills for reading and acting on Moloch v3 DAOs), moloch-agent (a local CLI runtime), and moloch-service (a hosted helper that proxies subgraph reads and pins artifacts to IPFS).
What makes it worth a wiki entry is that the trust boundary is written down rather than assumed. The service's own README states that it “must never receive private keys”, that it “does not sign transactions”, and that it “does not make governance decisions”; signing stays in the local agent runtime. That is a deliberate split between reading the DAO, which is centralised and convenient, and acting on the DAO, which is not.
The published vote-decision flow is more interesting still, because it is an explicit answer to a question most voting tools leave to the voter. It states that agents “should not vote only from proposal text”, and requires a proposal to be classified first – signal, membership, treasury, metadata, governance settings, or arbitrary execution – and then checked for whether “action data match[es] proposal text” before any vote is cast. The document is careful to be “opinionated about how agents decide, not what values they must hold,” leaving the mandate to the operator.
Two things follow for the rest of this wiki. First, that final classification bucket is the whole problem of typed versus arbitrary execution: a proposal that can encode any call is one an agent (or a human) cannot judge from its title. Second, an agent holding shares is a legal-personhood question as much as a technical one – the same question MIDAO started selling a wrapper for in the same year. The general case – what changes when software holds the shares rather than assisting whoever does – is covered at autonomous agents as DAO members.
The same year, DAOhaus handed over its own upkeep to the same kind of software. Its developer documentation states that the protocol is now maintained with the Superprism Refactory, an agentic maintenance stack, and that agents monitor the issue queues and pick work off them (DAOhaus, May 2026). The repositories bear it out: every substantive merge into the Admin App this year arrives from a codex/ branch, and so does the agent runtime’s own Gnosis Chain support, merged on 4 September 2026.
It is worth stating the two halves together, because they are the same bet made twice. DAOhaus publishes a procedure for an agent to decide how to vote in someone else’s DAO, and it has put agents on the queue that decides what its own contracts and app become. The failure modes differ: a bad vote is bounded by one proposal, while a maintainer that drifts changes what every DAO on the framework runs.
Baal's sponsorThreshold, proposalOffering and minRetentionPercent, and the agent runbook's "no new proposal while three are in voting" rule, are compared against Compound and Moloch's equivalents at proposal throttles and rate limits.
The Moloch pattern anchors a whole class of grant and investment DAOs. The LAO and its MetaCartel-lineage cousins are Moloch-based venture DAOs; MolochDAO itself continues as a public-goods funder. DAOhaus lowered the barrier from "deploy a contract" to "fill in a form," which is why the framework shows up under so many small, purpose-built treasuries rather than the mega-DAOs that dominate DeepDAO rankings.
See also the broader DAO tooling stack for where a summoner sits relative to Tally, Aragon, and voting front-ends.
Caper treats ragequit as a first-class primitive rather than an emergency hatch. A caper holder calls exit on-chain, burning their tokens to redeem a slice of the treasury – a direct descendant of Moloch's exit. Unlike ragequit it is not open to every holder: exit takes an amount of soulbound vote tokens alongside the governance tokens and asserts it is positive (assert!(vote_amount > dec!(0), "Exit requires vote tokens")), so a member who has never cast a ballot – the only way a member earns vote tokens – has nothing to hand back and no exit to take.
The difference is what sizes the slice: a caper's exit share equals its canonical vote weight, the same metric that determines voting power, so the treasury claim scales with both what a member holds and the vote weight they have earned, not a flat pro-rata of one token. The exit right that Moloch pioneered for minority protection becomes, in Caper, the everyday accountability lever on the founder and the treasury.