History – Colony

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v1.5.0 · currentHow Caper approaches this rewritten outcome-only (Caper overlay): no formula, constants or fees; claims re-read against core and logic at HEAD–
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    How Caper approaches this Col…foundations/what-is-a-caper) start from the same conviction – thaboth refuse to let a wallet balance alone should not decide who controls an organisation – and reach it by different routes. In Colony,. Colony keeps earned influence lives in a separate quantity,(reputation) that, which decays tso track current engagement. In a caper, the earned signal is folded directlyhat it tracks recent work. A caper folds the earned part into vote weight itself: a member’'s weight comes from the caper …okens they hold together with the soulbound vote tokens they earn by voting, so a big bag alone can’'t capture control. v is soulbound in the transfer sense – its depositor role is the caper’s own state component and the updater is deny_all, so it can never move peer-to-peer – and fractional (DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, so the admin-gated escape hatch mint_vote_to can distribute v in any denomination a future logic chooses). It accrues on exactly one surface: a ranked ballot mints one v (VOTE_MINT), and buying, selling and transferring mint none – the trade-side accrual was removed in the genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026. That is the sharpest difference fromVote tokens cannot be bought, and no member can send them to another; Caper mints them for one thing, a ballot cast on a proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) . Unlike Colony’'s reputation, and it is sharper than it was: a newcomer can still obtain v at a published price, but only by voting, at the flat 100 XRD a ballot costs. What they cannot do is buy it on the curve, have it handed to them, borrowed to them, or bought off an existing member. Two consequences follow, both verifiable in compute_vote_weight and the exit that reuses it in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs. First, participation is a multiplier on stake, not a replacement for it: a large bag with no history still resolves to little weight, and buying the history costs real XRD at the same rate everyone else paid. Second, the very same formula sets a member’s payout when they exitthey do not decay, so they stay as a lasting on-chain record of the votes a member has cast. The same weight governs a member's way out: anyone who has voted can exit any time for their fair share (/wiki/dao-governance/concept…p/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) –of the exit() path reuses the identical helper ftreasury, so the record the treasury share – so the signal that govat sets a membern's your voice also governs the value you can walk away with. Unlike Colony’s reputation, a caper’s record does not decay: it is a permanent, on-chain history of capital put at risksay also sets what they can take with them. See leaving a caper (/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) .

v1.4.2Vote-weight formula replaced with outcome-only wording (VOICE.md §4 Caper overlay)–
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    How Caper approaches this Col…ignal is folded directly into the vote-weight formula. A: a member’s weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T), where t is the caper tokens they hold, v their owncomes from the caper tokens they hold together with the soulbound vote-token balance, V the vote-token supply across all members, and T the circulating token supply (compute_vote_weight, contracts/common/src/lib.rs)s they earn by voting, so a big bag alone can’t capture control. v is soulbound in the trans…istory of capital put at risk.

v1.4.1Split paragraphs over 150 words at sentence boundaries; wording unchanged.–
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    Reputation: earned, scoped, an…blocks of the 2018 whitepaper.Ethereum mainnet averaged 12.0… work that would replenish it.

v1.4.0Correct the chain, team-nesting and reputation-earning claims, and add what the chain shows: 150 colonies on Arbitrum against 3,713 on Gnosis, and no network event since 13 May 2026–
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    Category DAO framework (reputa… governance by lazy consensus —– vote only when someone object…tokens/the-metacolony-clny/) —– the token of the Metacolony t… and from reputation) Chains Historically Gnosis Chain (https://blog.colony.io/chain-migration/) ; from April 2024 multi-chain, starting with ArbitrumArbitrum One. The Gnosis Chain UI and reputation mining were discontinued (https://blog.colony.io/chain-migration/) after 31 December 2024, and the multi-chain rollout promised for Q1 2025 is still listed as coming soon ( colony.io (https://blogwww.colony.io/colony-is-going-multi-chain/) ) ) Status Early access closed. The network contract on Arbitrum has emitted no event since 13 May 2026; the last blog post is 12 February 2025 and the last changelog entry 13 December 2024 Related DAO tooling overvie…mentals/dao-governance-models)

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    Colony is a DAO framework buil…weights members by reputation —– a non-transferable, decaying …rameworks/aragon) and Moloch.

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    Reputation: earned, scoped, an…Colony. A member gains it by receiving payments, completing tasks, and evaluating others’ workbeing paid in the colony’s own token (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/reputation/) for work inside the colony —– never by buying it, because r…ield authority over another. Two details separate the deployed network from the 2018 whitepaper this page otherwise describes. The task and work-rating contracts are gone: what the colony contract set (https://github.com/JoinColony/colonyNetwork/tree/develop/contracts/colony) holds is expenditures, funding, rewards, domains and roles, with nothing for tasks or for rating another member’s work. And the payment route is narrower than it sounds, because the documentation states that payments in stablecoins earn no reputation at all ( Colony (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/reputation/) ) – a contributor paid in USDC accrues no say, however much they do. Its defining property is that …e honest submission is enough. That mining is the part to check before relying on any of it. Reputation is recomputed off-chain and written back as a root hash each cycle, so every member’s current score depends on the cycle running. The Colony Network contract (https://arbitrum.blockscout.com/address/0xcccccdcc0ccf6c708d860e19353c5f9a49accccc) on Arbitrum One has emitted no event of any kind since 13 May 2026 at 16:39 UTC – no mining cycle, no new colony, nothing – read on 19 September 2026 against a chain then some 44 million blocks further on. Decay, meanwhile, is a function of block height and does not need a miner. The two together mean that every score in every colony has been decaying for four months with nothing recording the work that would replenish it.

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    Lazy consensus: motions and di…. A member proposes an action —– say, “pay Alice 100 xDAI” —– and backs it by staking the c…inverts the usual DAO problem —– instead of demanding that a b…onflict worth their attention.

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    Domains, the Metacolony, and C…lony is organised into domains — nested teams that, which the documentation now calls teams (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/teams/) : each hold theirs its own budget and accrue theirs its own reputation, so a largen organisation can delegate spending authority downward without granting global control. The nesting is not built. Colony’s own documentation states that it allows only one layer of teams and that nested teams are forthcoming, so the tree described below is one level deep in practice. Payments, funding pots and pe…l) are three different things —– Colony never conflates “how m…olony-is-going-multi-chain/) . Where the network stands The migration off Gnosis Chain is the event that dates everything else. Colony announced on 10 December 2024 that after 31 December the Gnosis UI and reputation mining would be discontinued, moved CLNY liquidity to Arbitrum, and said the multi-chain vision would arrive in Q1 2025 ( Colony (https://blog.colony.io/chain-migration/) ). Eighteen months past that quarter, colony.io still lists chain support as coming soon, and the sign-up button on its own home page reads Early access closed. The chain gives the size of what moved. Counting every colony-creation event emitted by each network contract, read on 19 September 2026: Gnosis Chain (https://gnosis.blockscout.com/address/0x78163f593D1Fa151B4B7cacD146586aD2b686294) carries 3,713 colonies created between 8 September 2020 and 14 January 2025, and Arbitrum One (https://arbitrum.blockscout.com/address/0xcccccdcc0ccf6c708d860e19353c5f9a49accccc) carries 150, created between 9 April 2024 and 13 May 2026 – 84 in 2024, 61 in 2025 and 5 in 2026. The new deployment recovered about four per cent of the colony count of the old one, and cannot grow while sign-ups are shut. The product also moved away from the framework this page describes. colony.io now sells itself as a payment suite for teams – batch payments, streaming salaries, staged payments, an off-ramp – and every entry in its changelog (https://features.colony.io/changelog) falls between June and December 2024. The blog (https://blog.colony.io/rss/) stops on 12 February 2025. What is still true is the design: lazy consensus, staked motions and reputation-weighted escalation are in the contracts and documented down to their default parameters, which the docs note cannot be changed once the extension is enabled ( Colony (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/parameters/) ).

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    How Caper approaches this Col…tart from the same conviction —– that a wallet balance alone s… who controls an organisation —– and reach it by different rou…ulbound in the transfer sense —– its depositor role is the cap…t can never move peer-to-peer —– and fractional (DIVISIBILITY_…ng and transferring mint none —– the trade-side accrual was re…p/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) —– the exit() path reuses the id…helper for the treasury share —– so the signal that governs yo…istory of capital put at risk.

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    References - Colony, Reputat…tps://github.com/JoinColony) . - Colony, Teams (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/teams/) and governance parameters (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/parameters/) ; colony.io (https://www.colony.io/) and its changelog (https://features.colony.io/changelog) . - Colony creation events and network activity read directly from Arbitrum One (https://arbitrum.blockscout.com/address/0xcccccdcc0ccf6c708d860e19353c5f9a49accccc) and Gnosis Chain (https://gnosis.blockscout.com/address/0x78163f593D1Fa151B4B7cacD146586aD2b686294) on 19 September 2026.

v1.3.0Correct the trade-side v mint: a ranked ballot is the only member-facing source (VOTE_MINT = 1), and fix the divisibility rationale that died with the rate–
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    How Caper approaches this Col…tracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, because a per-XRD accrual rate cannot mint whole units). It accrues at one flat rate on threso the admin-gated escape hatch mint_vote_to can distribute v in any denomination a future logic chooses). It accrues on exactly one surfaces: 0.01 per XRD of gross value on a buy, the same on aa ranked ballot mints one v (VOTE_MINT), and buying, sell,ing and exactly 1 per ranked ballot, the 100 XRD vote fee chargtransferring mint none — the trade-side accrual was removed atin that identical ratee genesis redeploy of 11 September 2026. That is the sharpest differe…m Colony’s reputation, and it cuts against the easy storyis sharper than it was: a newcomer can buystill obtain v, at a published price, but only by putvoting XRD through the curve, at the flat 100 XRD a ballot costs. What they cannot do is buy it on the curve, have it handed to them, borro…istory of capital put at risk.

v1.2.0Run #330: 'the earned record is the factor a newcomer cannot simply buy' inverted against deployed 3a8af9c — v accrues at 0.01/XRD on both trade legs as well as per ballot, so it is purchasable and merely untransferable. Also corrected V (vote-token supply, not 'votes ever cast') and the mint description.–
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    How Caper approaches this Col…into the vote-weight formula. Each time a member votes, the contract mints them exactly one soulboundA member’s weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T), where t is the caper tokens they hold, v their own vote-token — non-transferable bybalance, V the vote-token supply across all members, and T the circulating token supply (compute_vote_weight, construaction (its depositor role is the dao itselfs/common/src/lib.rs). v is soulbound in the transfer sense — its depositor role is the caper’s own state component and the updater is deny_all, so it can never move peer-to-peer) — and fractional (DIVISIBILITY_…ate cannot mint whole units). A member’s weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T)It accrues at one flat rate on three surfaces: 0.01 per XRD of gross value on a buy, wthere t is the caper tokens they hold, v the vote tokens they have earned, V the total votes ever cast, and T the circulating supply same on a sell, and exactly 1 per ranked ballot, the 100 XRD vote fee charged at that identical rate. That is the sharpest difference from Colony’s reputation, and it cuts against the easy story: a newcomer can buy v, at a published price, by putting XRD through the curve. What they cannot do is have it handed to them, borrowed to them, or bought off an existing member. Two consequences follow, bo…fiable in compute_vote_weight at contracts/common/src/lib.rs and the exit that reuses it in…t for it: a large bag with no voting history still resolves to little weight, but the earned record is the factor a newcomer cannot simply buyand buying the history costs real XRD at the same rate everyone else paid. Second, the very same formul…t() path reuses the identical compute_vote_weight helper for the treasury share — so the earned signal that governs your voice…olony’s reputation, a caper’s vote record does not decay: it is a…ermanent, on-chain history of having shown upcapital put at risk.

v1.1.1Vote token is DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM, not DIVISIBILITY_NONE, and accrues on trades as well as ballots (contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs)–
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    How Caper approaches this Col… never move peer-to-peer) and indivisiblefractional (DIVISIBILITY_NONEMAXIMUM, contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs, because a per-XRD accrual rate cannot mint whole units). A member’s weight is w = (t…in history of having shown up.

v1.1.0The reputation half-life is block-denominated: Colony's own '3.5 months' assumes ~15s Ethereum blocks, measured against mainnet's 12.05s on 23 Aug 2026 (run #291)–
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    Reputation: earned, scoped, an…ach domain and skill is halved — a reputation half-life of roughly 3.5 months, and the spec glosses that as a reputation half-life of “about 3.5 months”. The parameter is the durable half of that sentence and the duration is not: decay runs “on a per-block basis” (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/reputation/) , so 3.5 months holds only at the roughly fifteen-second Ethereum blocks of the 2018 whitepaper. Ethereum mainnet averaged 12.05 seconds a block over the ten thousand blocks ending at 25,820,470, read from a public RPC on 23 August 2026, which puts the same 600,000 blocks at about 84 days – and on a five-second chain at nearer 35. Both Colony’s specification and its current documentation still carry the original figure. Influence therefore tracks r…e honest submission is enough.

v1.0.2Source-pointer repair: the canonical vote weight is compute_vote_weight at contracts/common/src/lib.rs, not the logic package; ballot-era fee rules cited to contracts/ballot/src/lib.rs.–
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    How Caper approaches this Col…es follow, both verifiable in compute_vote_weight at contracts/common/src/lib.rs and the exit that reuses it in contracts/logic/src/lib.rs. Fi…in history of having shown up.

v1.0.1Replace placeholder github.com link with the source file the claim is read from–
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    How Caper approaches this Col…eer-to-peer) and indivisible (DIVISIBILITY_NONE (https://github.com/) , contracts/core/src/caper_dao.rs). A member’s weight is w = (t…in history of having shown up.

v1.0.0Accuracy: repoint the contract citation from the deleted path contracts/src/caper_dao.rs to contracts/logic/src/lib.rs, where the curve/weight/exit math actually lives after the 2026-07-20 workspace split.–
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    Category DAO framework (reputa…AO tooling overview (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview) , Aragon (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/frameworks/aragon) , Governance models (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models)

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    Colony is a DAO framework buil…ht. Where Snapshot (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) and token voting (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/voting/voting-and-de…e frameworks layer (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview)…ongside Aragon OSx (/wiki/daos-governance/tooling/frameworks/aragon) and Moloch.

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    How Caper approaches this Col… both verifiable in contracts/src/caper_daologic/src/lib.rs. First, participation is a…out when they exit (/wiki/daos-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit…in history of having shown up.

v1.0.0Repoint in-content DAO links to canonical typed taxonomy paths (2026-07-17 split carryover)–
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    Category DAO framework (reputa…AO tooling overview (/wiki/daos/tooling/dao-tooling-overview) , Aragon (/wiki/daos/tooling/frameworks/aragon) , Governance models (/wiki/daos/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models)

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    Colony is a DAO framework buil…ht. Where Snapshot (/wiki/daos/tooling/voting/snapshot) and token voting (/wiki/daos/concepts/voting/voting-and-delegation) weight a mem…e frameworks layer (/wiki/daos/tooling/dao-tooling-overview)…ongside Aragon OSx (/wiki/daos/tooling/frameworks/aragon) and Moloch.

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    How Caper approaches this Col…out when they exit (/wiki/daos/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) — …in history of having shown up.

v1.0.0New cornerstone: Colony — reputation-weighted, task-based DAO framework (reputation decay, lazy consensus/motions, Metacolony/CLNY, multichain); contract-verified How-Caper contrast–
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    Category DAO framework (reputation-weighted, task-based governance) What it is A framework for running organisations on reputation earned by contribution, with governance by lazy consensus — vote only when someone objects Builder JoinColony (https://github.com/JoinColony) (Colony Network; whitepaper by Alex Rea & Jack du Rose) Native token CLNY (https://docs.colony.io/learn/payments-and-tokens/the-metacolony-clny/) — the token of the Metacolony that maintains the network (distinct from any colony’s own token, and from reputation) Chains Historically Gnosis Chain (https://blog.colony.io/chain-migration/) ; from April 2024 multi-chain, starting with Arbitrum (https://blog.colony.io/colony-is-going-multi-chain/) Related DAO tooling overview (/wiki/dao/tooling/dao-tooling-overview) , Aragon (/wiki/dao/tooling/aragon) , Governance models (/wiki/dao/concepts/dao-governance-models)

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    Colony is a DAO framework built on a single idea most governance tools skip: influence should be earned, not bought. Where Snapshot (/wiki/dao/tooling/snapshot) and token voting (/wiki/dao/concepts/voting-and-delegation) weight a member by the coins in their wallet, a colony weights members by reputation — a non-transferable, decaying score accrued by doing the work. Around that it wraps lazy consensus, a workflow designed so that a healthy organisation almost never has to vote at all. It is one of the longest-running frameworks in the space, developed by JoinColony (https://github.com/JoinColony) from a 2018 whitepaper (https://joincolony.github.io/colonynetwork/whitepaper-tldr-colony/) , and it sits in the frameworks layer (/wiki/dao/tooling/dao-tooling-overview) of the DAO stack alongside Aragon OSx (/wiki/dao/tooling/aragon) and Moloch.

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    Reputation: earned, scoped, and decaying Reputation is the heart of Colony. A member gains it by receiving payments, completing tasks, and evaluating others’ work (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/reputation/) inside the colony — never by buying it, because reputation is non-transferable. It is also scoped: reputation is tagged to the domain (team) and skill in which it was earned, so an expert in one area does not automatically wield authority over another. Its defining property is that it decays. Per Colony’s reputation specification (https://joincolony.github.io/colonynetwork/whitepaper-tldr-reputation/) , every 600,000 blocks a member’s reputation in each domain and skill is halved — a reputation half-life of roughly 3.5 months. Influence therefore tracks recent contribution: stop showing up and your say fades, no matter how much you once did. Because computing every member’s reputation on-chain would be prohibitive, it is calculated off-chain by reputation miners who stake CLNY and submit updates with cryptographic proofs, secured by an “innocent until proven guilty” challenge game in which a single honest submission is enough.

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    Lazy consensus: motions and disputes Colony’s governance model, lazy consensus (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/lazy-consensus/) , treats agreement as the default. A member proposes an action — say, “pay Alice 100 xDAI” — and backs it by staking the colony’s native token. If nobody objects within the staking window, the action simply executes: no vote, no quorum, no turnout problem. A vote happens only when someone disagrees and stakes tokens to raise an objection, which escalates the decision to a reputation-weighted vote. The staking makes objections costly and honest: the side that loses forfeits a portion of its stake to the side that wins, and members who vote can be rewarded from the staked pool. This inverts the usual DAO problem — instead of demanding that a busy, apathetic electorate turn out for every routine payment, Colony only pulls the electorate in when there is genuine conflict worth their attention.

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    Domains, the Metacolony, and CLNY A colony is organised into domains — nested teams that each hold their own budget and accrue their own reputation, so a large organisation can delegate spending authority downward without granting global control. Payments, funding pots and permissions all resolve against this domain tree. The network itself is governed by the Metacolony (https://docs.colony.io/learn/payments-and-tokens/the-metacolony-clny/) , the colony responsible for developing and maintaining Colony Network infrastructure; its token, CLNY, is what reputation miners stake and what the Metacolony uses for its own disputes. This is a deliberate three-way separation worth noting: a colony’s token (optional, for staking motions), reputation (earned influence, non-transferable), and CLNY (network-level) are three different things — Colony never conflates “how many tokens you hold” with “how much say you have.” After years of running exclusively on Gnosis Chain (https://blog.colony.io/chain-migration/) , Colony began a multi-chain rollout on Arbitrum in April 2024 (https://blog.colony.io/colony-is-going-multi-chain/) .

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    How Caper approaches this Colony and Caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) start from the same conviction — that a wallet balance alone should not decide who controls an organisation — and reach it by different routes. In Colony, earned influence lives in a separate quantity (reputation) that decays to track current engagement. In a caper, the earned signal is folded directly into the vote-weight formula. Each time a member votes, the contract mints them exactly one soulbound vote token — non-transferable by construction (its depositor role is the dao itself, so it can never move peer-to-peer) and indivisible ( DIVISIBILITY_NONE (https://github.com/) ). A member’s weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T), where t is the caper tokens they hold, v the vote tokens they have earned, V the total votes ever cast, and T the circulating supply. Two consequences follow, both verifiable in contracts/src/caper_dao.rs. First, participation is a multiplier on stake, not a replacement for it: a large bag with no voting history still resolves to little weight, but the earned record is the factor a newcomer cannot simply buy. Second, the very same formula sets a member’s payout when they exit (/wiki/dao/concepts/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) — the exit() path reuses the identical compute_vote_weight helper for the treasury share — so the earned signal that governs your voice also governs the value you can walk away with. Unlike Colony’s reputation, a caper’s vote record does not decay: it is a permanent, on-chain history of having shown up.

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    References - Colony, Reputation (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/reputation/) and reputation specification (whitepaper TL;DR) (https://joincolony.github.io/colonynetwork/whitepaper-tldr-reputation/) . - Colony, Lazy Consensus (https://docs.colony.io/learn/governance/lazy-consensus/) . - Colony, The Metacolony and CLNY (https://docs.colony.io/learn/payments-and-tokens/the-metacolony-clny/) . - Colony blog, chain migration (https://blog.colony.io/chain-migration/) and going multi-chain (Arbitrum, April 2024) (https://blog.colony.io/colony-is-going-multi-chain/) . - JoinColony, GitHub / Colony Network (https://github.com/JoinColony) .