Concept Vote markets (governan…app/) , Hidden Hand (https://web.archive.org/web/20260517173915/https://hiddenhand.finance/) (Redacte…) from control (voting rights)

The major venues - Votium (h…) ). - Hidden Hand (https://web.archive.org/web/20260517173915/https://hiddenhand.finance/) – a mult…teral form of renting control.

How Caper approaches this A …ainst bribery. Voting weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T): t iscombines two holdings: the voter's balance of the caper's own token, vand the voter'sir balance of that caper's vote token, V the vote token's total supply, and T the circulating supply frozen when the proposal was raised (compute_vote_weight,which is soulbound and earned only by voting. A ballot countracts/common/src/lib.rs). Both terms must be non-zero for a ballot to count at alls only if the voter holds both, and each resists a vote mark…y the second phase belongs to.

A vote market is a marketplace… The payments are universally —– and only half-jokingly —– called bribes. The mechanism …ample of a broader phenomenon —– once a vote carries a predict…y of the tokens underneath it.

Why vote markets exist Vote m…o more than signal preference —– they direct gauge weights, th… whether or not it intends to.

How a vote market works Every…has three roles: - The venue —– the marketplace contract (Vot…The briber / incentive-poster —– a protocol (or DAO treasury) …roposal is live. - The voter —– a token-holder who either vot…ens they were already locking.

The major venues - Votium (https://votium.app/) —– the canonical Curve-wars mark…n on the Convex gauge cadence —– biweekly, Thursday to Tuesday —– and delegators are auto-alloc…https://hiddenhand.finance/) —– a multi-protocol "governance …adin (https://paladin.vote/) —– whose Quest (https://web.arc…oting power for a single vote —– the most literal form of renting control.

The economics: renting votes …s than a dollar of incentives —– a positive "bribe efficiency"…n be leased apart by the week.

Criticisms and risks The same… control while keeping upside —– the classic "empty voting" pr…he protocol's long-run health —– a recurring thread in how DA…ty for a single decisive vote —– a treasury raid, a fee switch, a parameter change —– without ever committing to th…rivate-and-shielded-voting) ).

Criticisms and risks The same…r where everyone can see it. The largest voting platform built the option in and then left it unused. Snapshot (/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) 's Boost feature, launched in March 2024, let anyone attach token rewards to a proposal, and a space could choose to reward only voters who picked a given outcome. Snapshot called that option a bribe, left it off by default and recommended it only for decisions such as how to split liquidity-mining rewards ( Snapshot Labs (https://paragraph.com/@shot/introducing-boost-governance-rewards-made-easy) ). It removed Boost from its interface in August 2026 as unused ( sx-monorepo #2294 (https://github.com/snapshot-labs/sx-monorepo/pull/2294) ). The intuitive counter – hide t…rivate-and-shielded-voting) ).

How Caper approaches this A …ld – one per ballot cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg of a tradon nothing else – and the only address it ca…y the second phase belongs to.

How Caper approaches this A …ty does not execute; it opens a 48-hourthe market window, and the action lands …olds at or above the trailing seven-day average locked whenat the window openedtrigger. So an actor who does buy an …y the second phase belongs to.

How Caper approaches this A …foundations/what-is-a-caper) gives a vote market nothing to bid for, becausedoes hold votes – since 29 August 2026 there is no vote. Aa proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is not tallied: it passes if the caper's spot price at the close of a 48-hour window is at or above a seven-day time-weighted average locked when the proposal was raised. There is no ballot to rent, no delegate to pay and no gauge weight to direct – the only way to consentdecided by a ranked ballot before anything executes – so the question this page asks is live rather than moot. What a caper does not have is a weight that can be leased apart from the position underneath it, and that is a property of the weight formula rather than a rule against bribery. Voting weight is w = (t · v) / (V · T): t is the voter's balance of the caper's own token, v the voter's balance of that caper's vote token, V the vote token's total supply, and T the circulating supply frozen when the proposal was raised (compute_vote_weight, contracts/common/src/lib.rs). Both terms must be non-zero for a ballot to count at all, and each resists a vote market by a different mechanism. - v cannot be sent to anyone. The vote token is minted soulbound: its to hold, and the only way to dissent is to sell. That does not abolish the underlying trade so much as change what depositor role admits only the caper's own state component and the corresponding updater is deny_all, so a peer transfer aborts on the receiving side and the rule can never be relaxed. It is earned rather trade is. Anyone who wants a proposal to pass can buy the token and hold spot above the baseline; anyone who wants it defeated can sell. What can no longer be done is the thing this page is actually about: leasing control apart from economic exposure. Buying an outcome means holding the asset while the outcome lands, and pushing a price up to carry a treasury raid means paying the holders you intend to raid. A briber in a ve-model pays a rent; here they pay the price. The cost is a different exposure rather than none. A caper'shan held – one per ballot cast, and 0.01 per XRD of gross value on each leg of a trade – and the only address it can be paid to is the contract that burns it on exit (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) . There is no veCRV analogue to delegate to a venue, because there is no transferable weight token to delegate. - t is clamped to what the voter still holds at the count. A ballot records the balance at cast, but the crystallization crank folds it as min(balance at cast, balance now), so a stake borrowed for a vote and returned before the tally is counted at whatever is left (fold_ballot_batch, contracts/logic/src/lib.rs). Renting weight for a single proposal is the ordinary shape of a governance-lending pool like Paladin (https://paladin.vote/) 's; here the loan's own repayment prices it out. The second phase makes the same point about money. A ballot that clears its supermajority does not execute; it opens a 48-hour window, and the action lands only if the token's time-weighted price across that window holds at or above the trailing seven-day average locked when the window opened. So an actor who does buy an outcome – and buying the token is the one route to weight that remains – has to still be holding when the window closes. A vote market's whole premise is that control is cheaper than ownership; a caper's answer is to make the cheapest available control a purchase you have to keep. The exposure this trades into is a different one and worth naming: governance here is only as honestard to move as itsthe market is hard to movedeep, so a thin order book is the attack surface that a vote market would otherwise …timistic-governance) for the design family thise second phase belongs to.

How Caper approaches this A …foundations/what-is-a-caper) does not try to outlaw vote-buying — a public chain cannot — but it changes what a rented majority can actually take. Two design choices do the work: - Voting weight is not just a bag. A member's weight is the produgives a vote market nothing to bid for, because since August 2026 there is no vote. A proposal (/wiki/governance/proposals) is not tallied: it passes if the caper's spot price at the close of a 48-hour window is at or above a seven-day time-weighted average locked when the proposal was raised. There is no ballot to rent, no delegate to pay and no gauge weight to direct of– the governance tokens theyonly way to consent is to hold, and the vote tokens they have earned, normalised by the totals of each ( voting mechanisms (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) ). Buyingonly way to dissent is to sell. That does not abolish the underlying trade so much as change what the trade is. Anyone who wants a proposal to pass can buy the tokens alone does not hand you control; a big bag by itselfnd hold spot above the baseline; anyone who wants it defeated can sell. What cannot capture a decision, which raises the cost of renting an outcome. - The minority can exit with its share. If a coalition does win a vote, every outvoted member can leave and withdraw their canonical share of longer be done is the thing this page is actually about: leasing control apart from economic exposure. Buying an outcome means holding the asset while the outcome lands, and pushing a price up to carry a treasury raid means paying the holders you intend to raid. A briber in a ve-model pays a rent; here they pay the price. The cost is a different exposure rather treasury on the way out ( the exit right (/blog/the-exit-right) ). Renting a majority to loot a treasury is self-defeating: the value you voted to capture walks out the door with the members you outvoted. The point is not that a caper prevents vote markets from forming — it is that the prize at the end of a captured vote is smaller and more fragile than in a standard emissions DAO, so the market has less to bid forhan none. A caper's governance is only as honest as its market is hard to move, so a thin order book is the attack surface that a vote market would otherwise have been – the same critique this page makes of cheap bribe efficiency, relocated from the bribe to the curve. See the bonding curve (/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) for how a caper's price is formed and optimistic governance (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance) for the design family this belongs to.

The major venues - Votium (h…te/) — whose Quest (https://web.archive.org/web/20260607055132/https://docs.paladin.vote/quest-v2/cre…ction ( Paladin docs (https://docs.paladin.vote/) web.archive.org/web/20260607041413/https://docs.paladin.vote/) , archived June 2026). Paladin also runs governanc…teral form of renting control.

Why vote markets exist Vote m…oneered by Curve (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/curve-dao) , locked token…rected: Balancer (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/balancer-dao) and its Au…apper, Aerodrome (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/aerodrome-finance) on Ba… whether or not it intends to.

The major venues - Votium (h…lt around Convex (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/convex-finance) 's vlC…teral form of renting control.

Criticisms and risks The same…ger where everyone can see it. The intuitive counter – hide the ballots – does not work either. The shielded voting DAOs actually deploy decrypts and publishes every vote the moment the proposal closes, which leaves the proof of delivery a briber needs perfectly intact; only receipt-freeness removes it, and no DAO runs receipt-free voting at scale ( private and shielded voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/private-and-shielded-voting) ).

Concept Vote markets (governance "bribery") Also called Vote incentives, vote bribery, governance bribes, vote renting Category Voting & incentive design Core idea A secondary market where protocols pay token-holders to vote a particular way, turning voting power into a rentable, cash-flow-bearing asset Depends on Vote-escrow tokenomics (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) and gauge-directed emissions Major venues Votium (https://votium.app/) , Hidden Hand (https://hiddenhand.finance/) (Redacted), Paladin / Warden Quest (https://paladin.vote/) Central tension Separates economic ownership (cash-flow rights) from control (voting rights)

A vote market is a marketplace where anyone can pay the holders of a governance token to vote a particular way. The payments are universally — and only half-jokingly — called bribes. The mechanism is not an attack or an exploit: it is an openly-run, smart-contract-mediated auction for voting power, and for several protocols it has become the single largest recurring flow of value in their governance. Vote markets are the clearest working example of a broader phenomenon — once a vote carries a predictable cash reward, that vote becomes an asset that can be priced, rented, and traded independently of the tokens underneath it.

Why vote markets exist Vote markets are a downstream consequence of vote-escrow tokenomics (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/vote-escrow) . In the ve-model pioneered by Curve (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/curve-dao) , locked tokens (veCRV) do more than signal preference — they direct gauge weights, the on-chain vote that decides how newly-minted token emissions are split across liquidity pools ( Convex: voting and gauge weights (https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/why-convex/voting-and-gauge-weights) ). Because a gauge vote literally routes real money, a project that wants deep liquidity has two options: buy and lock the governance token itself, or pay existing lockers to point their votes at its pool. The second is almost always cheaper, and the market that formed to price it became known as the Curve wars ( Votium: why Votium (https://docs.votium.app/general-information/why-votium) ). The same logic reappears anywhere emissions are vote-directed: Balancer (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/balancer-dao) and its Aura wrapper, Aerodrome (/wiki/daos/organizations/dexs/aerodrome-finance) on Base, Frax, and any protocol that copies the ve(3,3) gauge design inherits a vote market whether or not it intends to.

How a vote market works Every vote market has three roles: - The venue — the marketplace contract (Votium, Hidden Hand, Warden Quest) that escrows incentives and distributes them after a vote. - The briber / incentive-poster — a protocol (or DAO treasury) that deposits a reward and names the gauge or proposal it wants votes for. On Votium, bribers post to a biweekly round (https://docs.votium.app/explainers/briber-manual) that runs while the Convex gauge proposal is live. - The voter — a token-holder who either votes manually for the incentivised option or, far more commonly, delegates to the venue, which allocates their vote to whichever option pays the most and airdrops them the proceeds ( Votium vlCVX FAQ (https://docs.votium.app/faq/vlcvx-faq) ). The delegation step is what turns a scattered electorate into a liquid, auction-clearing bloc: the venue aggregates thousands of small holders and sells their combined weight to the highest bidder each round. Voters do no work and simply collect a yield on tokens they were already locking.

The major venues - Votium (https://votium.app/) — the canonical Curve-wars marketplace, built around Convex (/wiki/daos/organizations/lending/convex-finance) 's vlCVX. Rounds run on the Convex gauge cadence — biweekly, Thursday to Tuesday — and delegators are auto-allocated to the best-paying gauges ( voter manual (https://docs.votium.app/explainers/voter-manual) ). - Hidden Hand (https://hiddenhand.finance/) — a multi-protocol "governance incentives marketplace" built by Redacted (https://mirror.xyz/0xE90c74145245B498fef924fAdC7bb34253c7cF90/Lf-yrb7Q1bHt0tk1OI2VXlevhnZA5Xq2Z215WOLmIx0) that runs bribe markets for Aura, Balancer, Frax and others from one interface, positioning bribery as a routine emissions-marketing channel rather than a fringe tactic. - Paladin (https://paladin.vote/) — whose Quest (https://docs.paladin.vote/quest-v2/creating-a-quest/fixed-quests) (formerly Warden Quest) offers fixed-price incentives: a buyer sets an exact reward-per-vote and a vote target, so both sides know the rate in advance instead of bidding into an open auction ( Paladin docs (https://docs.paladin.vote/) ). Paladin also runs governance lending pools, letting a proposer borrow raw voting power for a single vote — the most literal form of renting control.

The economics: renting votes Vote markets are efficient precisely because they are cheap for the buyer. Through much of the Curve wars, a protocol could direct more than a dollar of emissions to its pool for less than a dollar of incentives — a positive "bribe efficiency" that made renting votes strictly cheaper than earning them by buying and locking the token outright ( Votium (https://docs.votium.app/general-information/why-votium) ). For the voter, the incentive frequently exceeded the value of the emissions their own tokens would have earned passively, so delegating to a vote market became the default yield strategy for ve-lockers. The result is a clean separation of two things that token-voting is supposed to bundle together: economic exposure (holding the token and its cash-flows) and control (deciding where the protocol's money goes). In a healthy vote market these can be leased apart by the week.

Criticisms and risks The same separation that makes vote markets efficient is what makes them contentious: - Cash-flow rights decouple from control. A buyer can steer emissions without holding a meaningful long-term stake, and a locker can sell control while keeping upside — the classic "empty voting" problem that governance scholars flag as a core weakness of tokenised voting rights ( Vote Delegation in DeFi Governance (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.11940) ). - Rent extraction and plutocracy. Concentrated holders and aggregators capture most of the bribe flow, reinforcing the whale-dominance already documented in token-weighted voting (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) ( Who controls DAOs? (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096720924000216) ). - Short-termism. Because rounds clear weekly, capital chases the highest immediate bribe rather than the protocol's long-run health — a recurring thread in how DAOs fail (/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail) . - Governance capture. A well-funded actor can rent a majority for a single decisive vote — a treasury raid, a fee switch, a parameter change — without ever committing to the protocol it is voting on. Vote markets make the price of temporary capture explicit and low. Defenders counter that a transparent, on-chain bribe is strictly better than the alternative it replaces: an opaque one. Formalising the vote market at least puts the price of influence on a public ledger where everyone can see it.

How Caper approaches this A caper (/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) does not try to outlaw vote-buying — a public chain cannot — but it changes what a rented majority can actually take. Two design choices do the work: - Voting weight is not just a bag. A member's weight is the product of the governance tokens they hold and the vote tokens they have earned, normalised by the totals of each ( voting mechanisms (/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) ). Buying tokens alone does not hand you control; a big bag by itself cannot capture a decision, which raises the cost of renting an outcome. - The minority can exit with its share. If a coalition does win a vote, every outvoted member can leave and withdraw their canonical share of the treasury on the way out ( the exit right (/blog/the-exit-right) ). Renting a majority to loot a treasury is self-defeating: the value you voted to capture walks out the door with the members you outvoted. The point is not that a caper prevents vote markets from forming — it is that the prize at the end of a captured vote is smaller and more fragile than in a standard emissions DAO, so the market has less to bid for.