Hirschman named two ways a member answers an organization in decline: leave, or object from inside. A caper asks its members for both, in order, before any money leaves its treasury.
Hirschman named two ways a member answers an organization in decline: leave, or object from inside. A caper asks its members for both, in order, before any money leaves its treasury.
In 1970 the economist Albert Hirschman published Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, a short book about how members respond when a firm, an organization or a state starts to decline. He named two responses. Exit is leaving: a customer buys elsewhere, a shareholder sells. Voice is staying and objecting: a letter, a motion, a vote. Hirschman's point was that the two reach management differently. Exit is impersonal and indirect: management learns of it from falling figures and has to search for the cause. Voice is direct and says what is wrong, but it costs the member more than leaving, and it works only as far as the member's influence inside the organization reaches.
Most institutions are built around one of the two. A listed company leans on exit: a shareholder who dislikes a decision sells, and the price records the judgement. A co-operative leans on voice: its members meet, debate and vote, and a member who leaves usually waits out a notice period to withdraw their share capital. Neither design asks the same members to use both on the same decision. A caper asks for both, in order, before any money leaves its treasury: voice on a ballot, then exit during a market window.
A caper is an organization on Radix with its own token, treasury and always-open market. It spends from its treasury only by proposal, and every proposal passes two tests in order.
The first is voice. Any holder can raise a proposal, such as a payment to a contributor, and members rank its options on a ballot that always includes "Do nothing". An option other than "Do nothing" has to win clear support among the votes cast; silence on the ballot passes nothing.
The second is exit. A pass on the ballot moves no money. Anyone can then open a market window, and during it holders trade or do not. If the token's price holds across the window, the spend goes ahead; if holders sell it down, the spend fails.
Because the two carry different information, as Hirschman said, and a spend benefits from both. The ballot records what members want and why. The window records what holders do once the decision is public, including anything they learned after the vote. A member who lost the vote and still thinks the spend is wrong can stop it only by selling, which costs them, and the people who sell are the people who would have paid for a bad decision.
The order also changes what silence means. On the ballot, silence passes nothing. In the window, a holder who does nothing lets the members' decision stand.
Take a contributor who wants paying for work they did. Someone who holds the caper's token raises a payout proposal naming the contributor's account, the currency and the amount. Members rank it against "Do nothing". If it wins, anyone opens the window. If the price holds, anyone can execute the payment, and the contributor receives it without joining the caper or holding its token. Paying someone from a caper's treasury walks through each step.
Hirschman's third term was loyalty: the attachment that keeps a member from leaving at the first sign of trouble and so gives voice time to work. A member of a caper earns vote weight by voting, never by buying, and their right to leave with their fair share of the treasury opens with their first ballot. A member can leave with their share only after using their voice at least once. Leaving a caper covers that right.
Caper runs on Stokenet, Radix's test network, so every window so far has decided test money. The design question a mainnet deployment would answer is how long a window has to run for holders to act on what they learn, which the deployment sets when it installs its logic.