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  9. DAOhaus & the Moloch framework

MANIFESTO · CAPER / OWN THE GAME
The launchpad that raises and deploys capital. Guaranteed entry / exit liquidity. Governance that can't be captured.

DAOhaus is the no-code home of the Moloch DAO framework — the lineage that gave the whole industry the word ragequit. Where a Safe multisig holds money and Snapshot holds opinions, a Moloch DAO fuses treasury, membership, proposals, and a guaranteed exit into one minimal on-chain contract. DAOhaus is the app that lets anyone deploy and operate one without writing Solidity, and the community (organised as HausDAO) that maintains the framework.

The Moloch lineage

The original Moloch v1 contract shipped in 2019 to fund Ethereum public goods, and its GitHub description — a line from Ginsberg's Howl — set the tone: a deliberately ruthless, minimal DAO. It introduced four primitives that recur everywhere in this wiki: shares (membership + voting power + a claim on the treasury), a guild bank (the pooled treasury), a simple proposal and majority vote, and — the innovation that mattered — ragequit: any member can burn their shares and walk away with a proportional slice of every asset in the guild bank.

Ragequit is a design answer to the tyranny-of-the-majority problem: a voting bloc cannot expropriate the minority, because the minority can always exit at fair value before a contested proposal executes. Moloch v2 generalised the model — multiple treasury tokens, guild-kick proposals, and a second non-voting unit called loot that carries exit rights but no vote.

Shares, loot, and the guild bank

A Moloch DAO tracks two internal units. Shares grant voting power, the right to submit and process proposals, and a redeemable claim on the treasury. Loot grants the same treasury claim but no vote — useful for paying contributors or investors economic upside without handing them governance control. Both are minted through proposals, and both can be ragequit.

Everything routes through proposals against the guild bank: request shares/loot in exchange for a tribute of tokens, spend treasury funds, add or kick members, or call an arbitrary external contract. Because exit is always available, Moloch DAOs can run on thin process — there is less need for elaborate governance machinery when the credible threat is "if you pass this, I leave with my share."

Baal — Moloch v3

The current framework is Baal, described by its repository as "a minimal yet composable DAO template continuing work from the Moloch, Minion, Compound/OZ and Safe frameworks." Baal keeps shares and loot as transferable ERC-20s, retains ragequit, and adds two things that make it modern:

  • Safe-native execution. A Baal DAO implements the Zodiac standard and runs as a module on a Gnosis Safe, so the treasury is a battle-tested Safe while governance logic lives in a separate, upgradeable module.
  • Shamans. Privileged roles (minting shares, managing membership, pausing transfers) are delegated to external shaman contracts rather than trusted addresses — composable permissions that pair naturally with roles tooling.

Who runs on it

The Moloch pattern anchors a whole class of grant and investment DAOs. The LAO and its MetaCartel-lineage cousins are Moloch-based venture DAOs; MolochDAO itself continues as a public-goods funder. DAOhaus lowered the barrier from "deploy a contract" to "fill in a form," which is why the framework shows up under so many small, purpose-built treasuries rather than the mega-DAOs that dominate DeepDAO rankings.

See also the broader DAO tooling stack for where a summoner sits relative to Tally, Aragon, and voting front-ends.

How Caper approaches this

Caper treats ragequit as a first-class primitive rather than an emergency hatch. Every caper holder can call exit on-chain, burning their tokens to redeem a proportional slice of the treasury — a direct descendant of Moloch's exit. The difference is what sizes the slice: a caper's exit share equals its canonical vote weight, the same metric that determines voting power, so the treasury claim scales with both what a member holds and the vote weight they have earned, not a flat pro-rata of one token. The exit right that Moloch pioneered for minority protection becomes, in Caper, the everyday accountability lever on the founder and the treasury.

CategoryDAO framework · no-code summoner · Safe module
FrameworkMoloch v1 (2019) → v2 → Baal (Moloch v3, HausDAO/Baal)
Summoner appDAOhaus — no-code UI to deploy and run a Moloch DAO
Governed byHausDAO (itself a Moloch DAO)
Signature mechanicRagequit — burn shares/loot to withdraw a proportional slice of the treasury
Membership unitsShares (vote + exit) · Loot (exit only)
LicenseOpen source (MIT / GPL); primary sources: Moloch v1, Baal