--- title: "Rocket Pool" url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/staking/rocket-pool" updated: 2026-09-17 license: CC-BY-4.0 license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" --- # Rocket Pool | | | | --- | --- | | **Name** | Rocket Pool | | **Type** | Protocol DAO (liquid staking) | | **Governance token** | RPL (ERC-20 on Ethereum; an optional node-operator stake since Saturn I, carrying extra rewards and [pDAO voting power](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting)) | | **Product** | rETH — a permissionless, decentralized ETH liquid-staking token | | **Governance model** | Two-tier: an on-chain **Protocol DAO** (RPL holders, square-root-weighted) plus a trusted-node **Oracle DAO**; an elected **security council** guards upgrades | | **Node model** | Permissionless megapools – anyone can run a node with a 4 ETH bond per validator and no allowlist. Since [Saturn I](https://saturn.rocketpool.net/) reached mainnet on 18 February 2026, RPL is optional | | **Scale** | 611,616 ETH staked across 19,113 validators in 103+ regions; rETH quoted at ~2.16% APR and node staking at ~3.57% ([rocketpool.net](https://rocketpool.net/stake), read 17 September 2026) | | **Notable for** | The decentralization-first alternative to curated liquid staking, and a rare square-root anti-whale governance weight | | **Links** | [rocketpool.net](https://rocketpool.net/stake) · [docs](https://docs.rocketpool.net/) · [governance forum](https://dao.rocketpool.net/) · [RPIPs](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/) | **Rocket Pool** is a decentralized [liquid-staking](/wiki/daos/staking/lido-dao) protocol on Ethereum, governed by RPL holders and a set of trusted oracle nodes. It issues **rETH**, a reward-bearing token that appreciates against ETH as staking rewards accrue. Where the largest staking protocols run a curated, DAO-approved set of professional node operators, Rocket Pool's defining choice is a _permissionless_ operator set: anyone can run a node by posting an ETH bond and RPL collateral, with no allowlist. That decision shapes both the product and the governance, which Rocket Pool splits across two distinct DAOs. Sources throughout link to Rocket Pool's own documentation and its [RPIP](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/) improvement-proposal register. ## rETH and the permissionless node-operator model Solo staking on Ethereum requires 32 ETH and continuous uptime. Rocket Pool lets anyone deposit from 0.01 ETH upward for **rETH** — a token whose exchange rate rises as the underlying validators earn rewards — while a separate class of participants, **node operators**, actually run the validators. An operator spins up a _megapool_ validator, posting a personal bond of **4 ETH** that the contracts pair with 28 ETH of liquid-staker deposits to make up a 32 ETH validator. [Saturn I](https://saturn.rocketpool.net/) took that shape to mainnet on 18 February 2026, and with it the change that matters most to this page: **RPL is no longer part of the bond**. The documentation now reads that an operator [“may optionally stake RPL to their node to qualify for additional rewards and to gain voting power within the protocol DAO”](https://docs.rocketpool.net/node-staking/responsibilities) (read 17 September 2026). Running a validator and holding governance power are separate purchases now, where one used to require the other. Because operators are permissionless, Rocket Pool's node set is far more numerous and geographically diffuse than a curated one — the [Lido](/wiki/daos/staking/lido-dao) centralization critique is the exact problem Rocket Pool designs against. The tradeoff is that permissionless operators can't be trusted with protocol admin, which is precisely why governance is split in two. See the [protocol docs](https://docs.rocketpool.net/) for the full megapool and rETH mechanics. ## Two DAOs: the pDAO and the oDAO Rocket Pool separates _who sets policy_ from _who reports trusted facts_: - **Protocol DAO (pDAO)** — the RPL-holder governance body that shapes protocol direction: parameters, treasury/inflation, upgrades. Voting power is a function of _effective RPL stake_ held by node operators (see the next section). - **Oracle DAO (oDAO)** — a small set of well-regarded staking-ecosystem members running special nodes that supply data the smart contracts cannot compute for themselves (validator balances, the rETH exchange rate, reward Merkle trees) and execute mandated administrative steps. Its remit, membership, and slashing rules are fixed by [RPIP-24, the oDAO Charter](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-24). This is a deliberate answer to a hard problem: a permissionless validator set needs some trusted party to attest to off-chain reality, but that trusted party should not also control policy. The oDAO is intentionally narrow — an oracle and executor, not a legislature — while the pDAO holds the political power. Rocket Pool has openly worked to [reduce the residual centralization](https://www.theblock.co/post/237808/rocket-pool-promises-to-fix-centralization-concerns-related-to-pdao) in how the two interact. ## On-chain pDAO governance: square-root weight and layered votes The Houston upgrade moved the pDAO fully on-chain ([RPIP-33](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-33)), replacing pure [Snapshot](https://snapshot.org/) signalling with binding contract execution. Two features stand out: - **Square-root voting weight.** A node operator's pDAO power is scored on the _square root_ of their effective RPL stake — so the larger the stake, the less voting power per RPL. The explicit goal, per Rocket Pool's design notes, is to temper large operators and let blocs of smaller operators actually move a vote. This is a rare on-chain anti-whale weight, distinct from the linear [token-weighted voting](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) most protocols use. - **Snapshot-and-override voting.** Eligibility, delegation state, and power are frozen at a snapshot when a proposal is created. There are two voting periods: first delegates (and direct voters) cast votes, then members who had delegated their power get a window to _override_ their delegate's choice. A **veto quorum** lets the community instantly defeat a proposal — and the proposer forfeits their bond — to deter spam and proposals that skipped off-chain signalling. Proposal creation and challenges are bonded throughout, so putting a bad proposal on-chain has a real cost. The full rules live in [RPIP-4](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-4) and the [governance guides](https://docs.rocketpool.net/). ## The security council and upgrade guardrails A fully on-chain, permissionless governance layer needs a circuit breaker. Rocket Pool elects a **security council** whose members can pause the protocol quickly if something goes wrong and can make certain parameter changes without waiting out the normal delay. The council is itself controlled by the pDAO, which sets the required quorum and can replace members. [RPIP-60](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-60) formalizes these _protocol upgrade guardrails_: upgrades authorized by a pDAO vote pass through a mandatory delay during which the security council can veto, and are then executed on-chain by the oDAO. [Saturn I](https://saturn.rocketpool.net/) has now run that pipeline end to end, so it is a record rather than a plan: halving the operator bond to 4 ETH, introducing megapools, express and standard deposit queues, adjustable commission and an RPL fee switch, it was authorized by pDAO vote, executed by the oDAO after the mandated delay, and has been live on Ethereum mainnet since **18 February 2026**, the date the upgrade’s own site gives beside its statement that Saturn is live. ## How Caper approaches this Rocket Pool's answer to plutocracy is a _concave function of capital_: square-root the RPL stake so whales get less power per token, add a trusted oracle set for facts, and elect a council to catch emergencies. It is clever, and it needs no participation history — power is still bought with RPL, just at a diminishing rate. [Caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) makes a different bet. A caper's vote weight is `(t·v)/(V·T)` — held tokens `t` times the member's _earned_ [soulbound](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) votes `v`, over supply — computed by the contract's `compute_vote_weight` helper and reused verbatim by `exit()` to size a member's treasury share. The vote token is `DIVISIBILITY_MAXIMUM`, minted one per ballot cast and by nothing else, and non-transferable (its depositor role is locked to the DAO itself), so no member can ever sell another the participation they have already earned — and capital cannot mint its own without voting. This is not a bagless system — `t` is a genuine multiplier, so stake still counts — but the decisive factor a well-funded buyer cannot acquire is the earned soulbound record, not a curve applied to their capital. And there is no separate oracle DAO or elected council to trust: typed `PAYOUT`/`INVEST`/`DIVEST` proposals execute directly against a protocol-controlled treasury vault. Honestly, that means a caper forgoes exactly the professional operator layer and emergency council Rocket Pool provides; the wager is that earned, untransferable weight plus a minimal on-chain surface beats a trusted set you have to keep honest. ## References - [Rocket Pool](https://rocketpool.net/stake) — protocol site and rETH overview. - [Rocket Pool documentation](https://docs.rocketpool.net/) – megapools, node operation, and Houston governance guides. [A node operator’s responsibilities](https://docs.rocketpool.net/node-staking/responsibilities) is the source for the 4 ETH bond, the 28 ETH of borrowed deposits, and optional RPL. - [RPIP-33](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-33) — implementation of an on-chain pDAO; [RPIP-4](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-4) — community resolutions and voting. - [RPIP-24](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-24) — the Oracle DAO Charter; [RPIP-60](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-60) — protocol upgrade guardrails. - [Saturn I](https://saturn.rocketpool.net/) – live on mainnet since 18 February 2026 (megapools, 4 ETH bond, queues, RPL fee switch). - [Rocket Pool governance forum](https://dao.rocketpool.net/) — live pDAO discussion and proposals.