--- title: "EigenLayer (EigenCloud)" url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/staking/eigenlayer" updated: 2026-08-30 license: CC-BY-4.0 license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" --- # EigenLayer (EigenCloud) | | | | --- | --- | | **Name** | EigenLayer (rebranded EigenCloud, 2025) | | **Type** | Restaking protocol / shared-security "collective" on [Ethereum](https://ethereum.org/) | | **Governance token** | EIGEN (airdrop claims May 2024; transferable 1 Oct 2024; initial supply 1,673,646,668.28466) | | **Governance model** | EigenGov — a Protocol Council (3-of-5 Safe) ratifying [ELIPs](https://github.com/eigenfoundation/ELIPs) + a 9-of-13 community multisig backstop; on-chain **forking** of EIGEN as the last-resort slashing mechanism | | **Secures** | AVSs (Actively Validated Services) via restaked ETH and staked EIGEN | | **Notable for** | Pioneering [restaking](/wiki/daos/staking/rocket-pool); the forkable "universal intersubjective work token" that can slash a colluding majority without assuming an honest one | | **Primary sources** | [eigencloud.xyz](https://www.eigencloud.xyz/), [docs.eigenfoundation.org](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/), [blog.eigenfoundation.org](https://blog.eigenfoundation.org/) | | **Related** | [Lido DAO](/wiki/daos/staking/lido-dao), [Rocket Pool](/wiki/daos/staking/rocket-pool), [DAO security & governance attacks](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks), [Soulbound tokens](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) | **EigenLayer** — rebranded **EigenCloud** in 2025 — is a protocol on [Ethereum](https://ethereum.org/) that pioneered **restaking**: letting ETH stakers reuse their staked capital to extend Ethereum's economic security to other applications. It is stewarded by [Eigen Labs](https://www.eigenlayer.xyz/) and the [Eigen Foundation](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/), and governed through the EIGEN token and a council-based framework called **EigenGov**. What makes it worth a place in a [DAO](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao) directory is not its size alone but a genuinely distinct idea about how a token can defend a network: EIGEN is designed to be **socially forkable**, so that a colluding majority can be slashed without the protocol ever assuming that most participants are honest. ## Restaking and shared security Ethereum's validators secure the base chain by staking ETH. **Restaking** lets that same staked ETH (or a liquid-staking token such as [Lido](/wiki/daos/staking/lido-dao)'s stETH) also secure additional systems — called **AVSs** (Actively Validated Services): oracles, data-availability layers, bridges, rollups, coprocessors. Three roles make it work. **Restakers** deposit ETH or LSTs and delegate. Many deposit indirectly by holding a **liquid restaking token (LRT)** — a receipt like [ether.fi](/wiki/daos/staking/ether-fi)'s eETH, whose DAO is consistently among EigenLayer's largest single sources of restaked ETH. **Operators** run the software an AVS requires and are the parties actually slashed for misbehavior. **AVSs** define the work and the slashing conditions. The thesis is _pooled security_: a new service can rent a share of Ethereum's ~multi-billion-dollar trust set instead of bootstrapping its own token and validator set from zero. The protocol's own flagship AVS is **EigenDA**, a high-throughput data-availability service. ([EigenLayer overview](https://docs.eigencloud.xyz/products/eigenlayer/concepts/eigenlayer-overview); [Stage-1 mainnet launch](https://www.eigenlabs.org/blog/eigenlayer-stage-1-mainnet-launch/)) Restaking is not Ethereum-only: on Solana, [Jito](/wiki/daos/staking/jito)'s (Re)staking programs re-pledge staked assets to secure **Node Consensus Networks** — the same shared-security pattern governed by a different DAO. ## Two kinds of faults — and a token you can fork EigenLayer's most-cited innovation is its answer to faults that Ethereum's consensus _cannot_ settle. It splits misbehavior into two classes. **Objective faults** are provable on-chain — a double-sign, an invalid state transition — and are punished by slashing the **restaked ETH** that a contract can adjudicate directly. **Intersubjective faults** are ones every honest observer can agree on but no contract can prove from the chain alone — an oracle reporting a price that was plainly false, say. These are backed not by ETH but by **EIGEN**. The defining property is **forkability**. EIGEN exists in a transferable form and a staked, slashable form (**bEIGEN**). If a majority of EIGEN stakers collude to attest to a result the wider community agrees is wrong, the token can be **forked**: the ledger splits, the colluders' stake is slashed on the honest fork, and honest challengers are made whole — the market then decides which fork is canonical. Because the punishment is a social fork rather than an on-chain proof, security does _not_ require an honest majority. This is the same backstop that once played out manually when the Steem community forked to Hive to escape a hostile stake takeover, formalized here as an explicit on-chain mechanism. Eigen Labs describes EIGEN as a "universal intersubjective work token." ([Eigen Foundation docs](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/); [Nethermind: EIGEN explained](https://www.nethermind.io/blog/eigenlayer-and-eigen-token-explained)) ## The EIGEN token EIGEN launched with an **initial supply of 1,673,646,668.28466** — a number that spells "1-Open-Innovation" on a phone keypad — with roughly **45% allocated to the community** (including a 15% stakedrop). Airdrop claims opened on **10 May 2024** while the token was still non-transferable, and EIGEN became **transferable on 1 October 2024**, debuting at a fully-diluted value around $6.4 billion. The staked form, bEIGEN, was upgraded in September 2024 to enable **Programmatic Incentives** — protocolized EIGEN rewards for stakers and operators. ([Eigen Foundation: initial supply](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/eigen-token/key-info); [CoinDesk: EIGEN debuts](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2024/10/01/eigenlayers-eigen-token-debuts-at-651-fdv)) ## Slashing and Operator Sets Slashing went live on mainnet on **17 April 2025**, several years after launch and only after a deliberately staged rollout. AVSs now define custom slashing conditions and organize operators into **Operator Sets**, with **Unique Stake** allocation so a given slice of ETH is slashable by only one Operator Set at a time. Slashing is **opt-in** — operators are not automatically enrolled into any AVS's conditions. A later upgrade, **ELIP-006 Redistributable Slashing**, let AVSs _repurpose_ slashed funds (for lending or insurance reimbursement, for example) instead of burning them. ([Intro to slashing: AVS edition](https://www.eigenlabs.org/blog/intro-to-slashing-on-eigenlayer-avs-edition/); [eigenlayer-contracts releases](https://github.com/Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts/releases)) How that penalty is actually assessed, and how it compares with the fixed schedules on Ethereum and Cosmos, is covered in [staking and slashing](/wiki/economics/staking-and-slashing). ## Protocol governance (EigenGov) Upgrades to EigenLayer's core contracts flow through **ELIPs** (EigenLayer Improvement Proposals), reviewed and approved by a **Protocol Council** introduced on **4 December 2024**. The council operates a **3-of-5 [Gnosis Safe](/wiki/daos/networks/gnosisdao)** — two seats for the Eigen Foundation and three independent members drawn from across the ecosystem (Sigma Prime, Unit410, and security engineer Gonçalo Sa) — and executes changes through a **timelock enforcing a minimum 10-day delay** on any queued transaction. Sitting above it as a backstop is a **9-of-13 Community Multisig** of Ethereum-community members, who normally act as observers monitoring the council's queued actions and can intervene if something is wrong. It is an explicitly _council-and-multisig_ model rather than open [token-weighted voting](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) — the Foundation frames it as a staged path toward decentralization, not decentralization already achieved. ([Introducing the Protocol Council](https://blog.eigenfoundation.org/the-protocol-council/); [Technical architecture](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/protocol-governance/technical-architecture); [ELIPs repository](https://github.com/eigenfoundation/ELIPs)) ## EigenCloud and the 2025–2026 pivot In 2025 the project rebranded to **EigenCloud**, positioning restaking-secured services — **EigenDA** (data availability), **EigenCompute**, and **EigenAI** — as a "verifiable cloud." The pivot came against a hard market backdrop: EIGEN fell roughly **91% across 2025**, shedding about $700 million in market capitalization. On **19 December 2025** the Eigen Foundation proposed a governance overhaul to tie token value to real usage: a new **Incentives Committee** (Foundation and Eigen Labs representatives, ratified by the Protocol Council) would adjust emissions without slow contract upgrades, steering rewards toward **"productive stake"** — tokens actively securing live services under genuine slashing risk, rather than idle restaked balances — and a fee model would route about **20% of AVS reward fees**, plus EigenCloud service fees, into EIGEN buybacks. ([CoinDesk, Dec 2025](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/12/19/foundation-behind-restaking-protocol-eigenlayer-plans-bigger-rewards-for-active-users)) ## How Caper approaches this EigenLayer's headline safeguard against a colluding majority is to **fork the token** — it deliberately refuses to assume that most holders are honest. A [caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) reaches for the same distrust of a bought majority with narrower, different tools. It does not fork; instead the _decisive_ governance factor is an earned, non-transferable record. A member's voting weight — and their treasury share at [exit](/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) — is `(t · v) / (V · T)`: their held stake `t` multiplied by `v`, [soulbound](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens) proof-of-vote tokens minted one per ballot cast and 0.01 per XRD of gross trade value, and locked to the account. Stake still counts — `t` is a multiplier, so this is not a "your bag doesn't matter" system — but `v` is a second factor that has to be accrued and can never be bought off the members already holding it, so acquiring the float does not by itself transfer their standing. And where EigenLayer's ultimate backstop is exit-by-fork, a caper gives every member who has voted or traded a standing exit: redeem at any time for a treasury share sized by that same (t·v)/(V·T) weight, so even a captured vote cannot seize the value dissenters are entitled to withdraw. These mechanics are verified against the caper contract and described neutrally on the [voting](/wiki/governance/voting-mechanisms) and [execution](/wiki/governance/execution) pages. ## References - [EigenCloud](https://www.eigencloud.xyz/) — project site (formerly eigenlayer.xyz). - [Eigen Foundation documentation](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/) — token, governance, and the ELIP process. - [Introducing the Protocol Council](https://blog.eigenfoundation.org/the-protocol-council/) — the 3-of-5 council and community multisig. - [Key information on the initial EIGEN supply](https://docs.eigenfoundation.org/eigen-token/key-info). - [Intro to slashing on EigenLayer](https://www.eigenlabs.org/blog/intro-to-slashing-on-eigenlayer-avs-edition/) — Operator Sets, Unique Stake, redistribution. The EigenCloud blog has been rehomed: blog.eigencloud.xyz now redirects to eigenlabs.org/blog (checked 26 August 2026). - [eigenfoundation/ELIPs](https://github.com/eigenfoundation/ELIPs) and [Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts](https://github.com/Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts) — proposals and core contracts.