---
title: "Token Engineering Commons (TEC)"
url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/token-engineering-commons"
updated: 2026-08-13
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# Token Engineering Commons (TEC)

| Organisation | Token Engineering Commons (TEC) |
| --- | --- |
| Status | 🔴 Closed - wound down by member vote; token redemption executed 10 December 2025 |
| Type | Public-goods funder for [token engineering](https://tecommons.org/) |
| Founded | Forum opened October 2020; the [Hatch](https://forum.tecommons.org/t/pre-hatch-impact-hours-distribution-analysis/376) and Commons Upgrade ran through 2021 into 2022 |
| Website | [tecommons.org](https://tecommons.org/) (still live, still recruiting - see below) |
| Forum | [forum.tecommons.org](https://forum.tecommons.org/) |
| Voting | Conviction voting in the commons; [Snapshot space tecommons.eth](https://snapshot.box/#/s:tecommons.eth) for signalling (28 proposals, 130 followers) |
| Token | [$TEC](https://optimistic.etherscan.io/token/0x8fc7c1109c08904160d6ae36482b79814d45eb78), Optimism `0x8fc7c110…4d45eb78`. `totalSupply()` read 1,107,830.7438 TEC on 13 August 2026 |
| Code | [github.com/CommonsBuild](https://github.com/CommonsBuild) (58 public repositories) |
| Section | [Public-goods DAOs](/wiki/daos/public-goods) |

The **Token Engineering Commons** was the flagship deployment of the [augmented bonding curve](/wiki/markets/bonding-curve), and it is now the DAO industry's best-documented deliberate wind-down. Between July and December 2025 its remaining members argued for closing it, voted to close it, and then closed it on-chain - publishing the reasoning, the treasury arithmetic, the redemption formula and the claim contract as they went. Almost every DAO that dies leaves an unresolved treasury and a forum that simply stops. The TEC left a receipt.

The organisation described itself as [the world's first explicit economic commons on a blockchain](https://forum.tecommons.org/t/tec-shutdown-proposal/1520), built on Elinor Ostrom's design principles for [governing a commons](/wiki/economics/commons-governance) and funded through a curve that minted $TEC to anyone who deposited into its reserve. It funded [cadCAD](https://cadcad.org/), the Token Engineering Academy and the Bonding Curve Research Group, among others.

## The case its own stewards made for closing

On 23 July 2025 the steward _rex_ published [“Sunsetting the $TEC: Proposal & Treasury Distribution Framework”](https://forum.tecommons.org/t/sunsetting-the-tec-proposal-treasury-distribution-framework/1500), and its argument is unusually blunt for a document written by the people whose roles it eliminates. The numbers it put on the table:

| Measure | July 2025 |
| --- | --- |
| Treasury and reserve, combined | ~$300,000 |
| Common Pool | $225,000 |
| Reserve backing the curve | $54,000 |
| Dormant funds in inactive multisigs | ~$25,000 |
| Operating cost | ~$10,000 per month |
| $TEC supply | 1.209M tokens |
| Spot price / fully diluted valuation | $0.18 / $217,000 |
| Treasury value per token | $0.25 |

The decisive line is the last two rows together: the token traded at roughly a **33% discount to the treasury standing behind it**, in a favourable market. A token below its own redeemable backing is a market saying it expects the organisation to consume the difference. The proposal read that as a mandate rather than an insult, noting that the TEC had briefly broken even in 2024 before grants funding resumed without a sourcing plan, that governance participation was low, and that signers were going inactive faster than the treasury was shrinking. Its framing was a software end-of-life: deprecation notice, scheduled shutdown, archival and handoff.

A [fuller shutdown proposal](https://forum.tecommons.org/t/tec-shutdown-proposal/1520) followed on 17 October 2025 from _natesuits_, extending the plan from the token to the organisation and arguing the case on legacy grounds - that a commons which taught the field how to launch should also demonstrate how to close.

## Eleven voters closed it

[“Proposal: Initiate the Sunsetting Process for the $TEC Token”](https://snapshot.box/#/s:tecommons.eth/proposal/0xec36a9a998e84dd79196d49f830e7eba81f51ea9be641a757ad55268a0049438) ran on [Snapshot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:tecommons.eth) from 30 July to 4 August 2025 and closed **264,496.79 $TEC for, 6,773.42 against, 0 abstaining** - a 97.5% majority cast by **eleven addresses**. Queried through [Snapshot's GraphQL hub](https://hub.snapshot.org/graphql) on 13 August 2026 it is still the newest of the space's 28 proposals; nothing has been put to the space since.

Eleven voters is not an anomaly in this dataset. The space's preceding proposal, a coordination-team funding request, drew ten. A DAO whose participation has collapsed to a double-digit voter set can still execute a decision perfectly well - what it can no longer do is claim the decision represents its membership. This is the endgame of [voter apathy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy): not a failed vote, but a passed one nobody contested.

## How the wind-down was actually executed

The mechanics were published as they happened, in [“TEC Token Sunset”](https://forum.tecommons.org/t/tec-token-sunset/1531) (2 December 2025) and its replies. On **10 December 2025** the vote cleared the DAO's delay app and executed. Per the implementing contributor's own account, that single execution burned roughly 24,000 $TEC from the Common Pool, approved the transfer of the reserve's rETH and DAI to the claim contract, and **closed the bonding curve** - buy and sell calls against it now revert with `APP_AUTH_FAILED`. The $TEC snapshot was taken at Optimism block `144895034`.

Both reference blocks resolve first-party against an Optimism RPC node:

| Block | Timestamp (UTC) | What it marks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `138850000` | 2025-07-23 19:26:17 | The day the wind-down was announced |
| `144895034` | 2025-12-10 17:47:25 | Dissolution; the curve stops trading |

Forty-one addresses held different balances at the two blocks. Redemption runs through **TECClaim** in [CommonsBuild/tec-shutdown](https://github.com/CommonsBuild/tec-shutdown), and the design is worth reading if you ever have to build one: a UUPS-upgradeable contract that creates a _non-transferable_ clone of the $TEC token using MiniMe's `createCloneToken`, frozen at the snapshot block, so the claim ledger cannot itself be traded. Holders burn snapshot tokens to claim a proportional share of the redeemable assets, which prevents double claims; the owner can adjust balances before activation, block addresses, and reclaim whatever is unclaimed after a deadline.

## The redemption cap worth copying

The transferable idea in the whole exercise is one line of the final plan. Each address's claim was capped at the **lower** of two balances:

1. its $TEC balance on 23 July 2025, the day the wind-down was announced publicly; or
2. its $TEC balance at dissolution on 10 December 2025.

Take the two cases in turn. Someone who bought $TEC after the announcement - while it traded below treasury value - is capped at their July balance, so the purchase buys no extra claim. Someone who sold after the announcement is capped at their December balance, so the sale is not undone. The cap therefore removes the entire trade: for the four and a half months between announcement and execution, **no market action could change what anyone was owed**. What is left is a claim on the treasury fixed by who was a member when the news broke.

This is the wind-down analogue of a snapshot block, and it solves a problem snapshots do not. A single snapshot at dissolution rewards whoever front-runs the announcement; a single snapshot at announcement traps sellers into a claim they no longer want. The minimum of the two is the only choice under which the announcement is not itself a trading opportunity - and it costs nothing but a second balance query. Any DAO facing [a redemption event](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) can copy it.

## The website that never got the memo

As of 13 August 2026 - eight months after the curve stopped trading - [tecommons.org](https://tecommons.org/) answers HTTP 200 with a front page inviting readers to _Build With Us_ and _Get $TEC_. There is no sunset notice anywhere on it. The token it points at cannot be minted; the curve behind that button is closed.

No link checker can see this, because nothing is broken: the site resolves, the pages load, the links work. The organisation's real status is legible in three other places - its [Snapshot space](https://snapshot.box/#/s:tecommons.eth) (silent since August 2025), its [forum](https://forum.tecommons.org/) (where the shutdown threads are the most recent substantial activity), and its [GitHub](https://github.com/CommonsBuild), whose four most recently pushed repositories are `tec-shutdown`, `TECredeem`, `tec-dao` and `TECsunsetcomingsoon`, all created in the closing weeks of 2025. Its X account [@tecmns](https://x.com/tecmns) is dormant.

For anyone auditing a directory of DAOs, that is a usable rule: **a project's repository names change before its marketing does**. The corollary matters too - the same gap in reverse is a live project with a frozen website.

## How Caper approaches this

The TEC needed a proposal, a vote and a purpose-built claim contract to give members back their share of the treasury, and eleven people decided it for everyone. In [a caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper), redemption is not an event that has to be organised - it is a standing right. A holder calls [exit](/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) whenever they want, hands back their vote tokens and governance tokens, and receives that share of the treasury plus the curve's price for the tokens, in one transaction. Nothing has to pass first.

The consequence is that the failure mode the TEC's stewards were reacting to - a token trading below the treasury behind it while the organisation spends the difference - is not left to a vote to correct. Anyone who thinks the treasury is worth more than the token can act on that view alone, and the act itself returns the assets. A caper can still end; it just does not need eleven people to agree before anyone can leave.