---
title: "Polygon (POL)"
url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/polygon"
updated: 2026-08-26
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# Polygon (POL)

| Type | Multichain scaling network / network DAO (Ethereum-aligned) |
| --- | --- |
| Native token | POL — gas + staking on Polygon PoS, and the coordination token for the wider network |
| Migrated from | MATIC → POL, 1:1, native token from 4 September 2024 |
| Genesis supply | 10,000,000,000 POL, with 2% annual emission (PIP-17) |
| Governance | Three pillars — protocol (PIPs), system contracts (Protocol Council), community treasury |
| Protocol Council | 13-member multisig · 7/13 with 10-day timelock (regular), 10/13 with none (emergency) |
| Builder | Polygon Labs (network stewarded toward the Polygon community / Foundation) |
| Website | [polygon.technology](https://polygon.technology) |

## Overview

[Polygon](https://polygon.technology) began in 2017 as Matic Network, an Ethereum scaling sidechain, and is now a family of Ethereum-aligned chains coordinated under the **Polygon 2.0** roadmap. Its flagship [Polygon PoS](https://polygon.technology/polygon-pos) chain runs a permissionless proof-of-stake validator set that checkpoints to Ethereum, and the newer [AggLayer](https://docs.polygon.technology/interoperability/overview) is a cross-chain settlement layer designed to let many chains share liquidity and behave as one network. Governance of the protocol, its system contracts, and a community-owned treasury is what makes Polygon a [network DAO](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/types-of-daos) rather than a company product — a peer of [Arbitrum](/wiki/daos/networks/arbitrum-dao), the [Optimism Collective](/wiki/daos/networks/optimism-collective), and [ZKsync](/wiki/daos/networks/zksync-era) in this directory.

## POL: the migration and the token

In September 2024 Polygon completed the network's biggest token change: **MATIC was upgraded to POL 1:1**, and since [4 September 2024](https://polygon.technology/blog/matic-to-pol-migration-is-99-complete-everything-you-need-to-know) every Polygon PoS transaction pays gas in POL and staking is denominated in POL. As of mid-2025 roughly **99%** of MATIC had migrated; holders and delegators on Polygon PoS needed to do nothing, as the swap was automatic.

POL's economics are set by [PIP-17](https://github.com/maticnetwork/Polygon-Improvement-Proposals/blob/main/PIPs/PIP-17.md): a **10 billion** genesis supply minted to the migration contract, plus a **2% annual emission** split evenly — **1% to validator staking rewards** and **1% to the Community Treasury** — with minting capped on-chain at 10 POL per second. That schedule did not begin when PIP-17 was adopted: [PIP-26](https://github.com/maticnetwork/Polygon-Improvement-Proposals/blob/main/PIPs/PIP-26.md) deliberately let the original MATIC validator-reward schedule run to its natural end in June 2025 — tapering to 1.5% in its final year — and only **from July 2025** did the Polygon 2.0 rate of 1% annual emission for validator rewards commence. POL is designed as a _hyperproductive_ token: one stake is meant to secure and be paid across many Polygon chains and roles (block validation, ZK proving, data availability) rather than one chain alone, which is the economic backbone of the [Polygon 2.0](https://polygon.technology/blog/polygon-2-0-tokenomics) multichain design.

## Three pillars of governance

Polygon 2.0 organises decisions into [three governance pillars](https://polygon.technology/blog/kicking-off-the-polygon-governance-hub-a-unified-and-transparent-interface-for-community-governance), each with its own venue and process:

- **Protocol Governance** — changes to the core protocol move through the [Polygon Improvement Proposal (PIP)](https://github.com/maticnetwork/Polygon-Improvement-Proposals) framework: an idea is discussed on the [Polygon Community Forum](https://forum.polygon.technology), drafted against a template, refined on Protocol Governance Calls, and adopted by rough consensus. [PIP-1](https://github.com/maticnetwork/Polygon-Improvement-Proposals/blob/main/PIPs/PIP-01.md) and PIP-8 set the ground rules; a [PRC](https://github.com/maticnetwork/Polygon-Improvement-Proposals) track covers token standards.
- **System Smart Contracts Governance** — upgrades to the on-chain contracts that _are_ the protocol (bridge, staking, emission manager) are executed by the **Protocol Council**, not by a raw token vote.
- **Community Treasury Governance** — the 1%-of-emissions treasury is a self-sustaining ecosystem fund for public goods, research, grants, and adoption, allocated under community oversight.

This split is deliberate: high-stakes contract upgrades get a fast, accountable, timelocked body, while direction-setting and funding stay open to the wider community. It is a different answer to the same tension explored in [on-chain vs off-chain governance](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) and [progressive decentralization](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization).

## Where a PIP actually takes effect

The three pillars describe how Polygon reaches _consensus_ on a change; enacting one on Polygon PoS is a separate, on-chain step with its own thresholds. Consensus-parameter changes go through the governance module of **Heimdall**, the chain's validator-coordination layer, where a proposal needs a **33.4% quorum**, a **50% approval threshold**, and can be killed by a **33.4% veto**. A hard fork is stricter still: it requires **at least two-thirds of total validating stake** in favour. So a PIP that carries rough consensus on the forum can still fail at the validator set, and the stake that decides it is the stake that is actually validating — not the whole POL supply. ([Polygon governance fundamentals](https://docs.polygon.technology/pos/governance/governance-fundamentals))

That two-stage shape — social consensus first, a stake-weighted on-chain gate second — is the pattern described in [on-chain vs off-chain governance](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance), and the reason the [quorum and threshold](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) numbers matter as much as the vote itself.

## The Protocol Council

[The Protocol Council](https://web.archive.org/web/20260421104817/https://polygon.technology/blog/meet-the-polygon-protocol-council) (announcement archived; Polygon has since removed the post), defined in [PIP-29](https://github.com/maticnetwork/Polygon-Improvement-Proposals/blob/main/PIPs/PIP-29.md), is a **13-member multisig** implemented as four Gnosis Safe contracts — two on Ethereum and two on Polygon PoS — responsible for narrow, timelock-limited changes to system smart contracts. It has two thresholds:

- **Regular changes: 7 of 13** signers, subject to a **10-day timelock** before execution.
- **Emergency changes: 10 of 13** signers, executable immediately with no timelock.

The higher bar and dropped delay for emergencies trade some deliberation for the ability to patch a live exploit fast; the timelock on ordinary upgrades gives the community a window to react before a change lands. Structuring a small, publicly-named signer set with charter-bound powers is the same "constrain the multisig" pattern that [Safe](/wiki/daos/infrastructure/safe-dao) and ZKsync's security bodies use.

## How Caper relates

Polygon's governance is deliberately heavyweight — a PIP pipeline, a 13-signer council with timelocks, and a treasury board — because it stewards a multi-billion-dollar network where a bad upgrade is catastrophic. That machinery is appropriate at that scale, and it takes years and a foundation to stand up. [Caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) sits at the other end: a token, a treasury, and on-chain governance are created in a **single launch transaction**, so a small group gets working governance on day one instead of bootstrapping councils. The trade Caper makes for that simplicity is to hard-wire a member's protection into the token itself — the [exit right](/blog/the-exit-right). Rather than appointing a council to guard against a bad decision, a holder who disagrees can leave and reclaim a [canonical share of the treasury](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights), computed from the same vote weight that governs their say. Big networks need standing bodies; small ones are often better served by a door that is always open.