---
title: "Cosmos Hub (ATOM)"
url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/cosmos-hub"
updated: 2026-09-11
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# Cosmos Hub (ATOM)

| Type | Layer-0 hub chain / sovereign-network DAO (chain `cosmoshub-4`) |
| --- | --- |
| Governance token | ATOM (staking, governance, fees) |
| Governance mechanism | Cosmos SDK `x/gov`: fully on-chain, stake-weighted, with delegator votes inherited from validators by default |
| Mainnet | Live since 2019; implementation is [gaia](https://github.com/cosmos/gaia) |
| Proposal deposit | 500 ATOM minimum, 14-day deposit window (at least 10% of it up front) |
| Voting period | 7 days (expedited: 3 days) |
| Quorum / threshold / veto | 40% / 50% / 33.4% (expedited threshold 66.7%) |
| Proposals to date | 1,050+ on-chain votes as of July 2026 |
| Website | [cosmos.network](https://cosmos.network) · [Hub docs](https://docs.cosmos.network/hub/latest) · [governance forum](https://forum.cosmos.network/) |

## What the Cosmos Hub governs

The **Cosmos Hub** is the first chain built on the Cosmos SDK and the origin of the `x/gov` module that most Cosmos app-chains still run today. Its token, **ATOM**, is bonded to validators for consensus and is the same weight that votes. Governance here is not advisory: an approved proposal changes chain parameters, spends the community pool, or swaps the node software itself. Proposal [#1049](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/1049), in voting as this page was written, is simply titled “Gaia v27.6.0 Upgrade”: the chain's own binary is a ballot question.

That makes the Hub one of the cleanest large-scale examples of [on-chain governance](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) in production, and a useful contrast to the Snapshot-plus-multisig pattern that dominates Ethereum DAOs. It is also the template two of this directory's other entries inherited: [dYdX](/wiki/daos/dexs/dydx) and [Osmosis](/wiki/daos/dexs/osmosis) both govern through the same module on their own sovereign chains.

## The pipeline: deposit, then vote

Every proposal passes through two windows, both defined by on-chain [gov parameters](https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/gov/v1/params/tallying):

- **Deposit period**, up to **14 days**. A proposal only enters voting once its deposits reach **500 ATOM**; the submitter must post at least 10% of that themselves, and anyone can top up the rest. Proposals that never reach the minimum expire.
- **Voting period**, **7 days**, fixed. There is no lead-in, no confirmation curve, and no per-topic track: a typo fix in a parameter and a full runtime upgrade get exactly the same week.

An **expedited** proposal compresses voting to **3 days** but raises the bar to **66.7%** Yes. The interesting detail is the failure mode: per the [x/gov specification](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/x/gov/README.md), an expedited proposal that misses its higher threshold is not rejected, it is _converted into a regular proposal and restarts voting_ under normal rules. Urgency costs you a stricter bar, not the proposal.

## Four options, and what each one actually does

Voters choose **Yes**, **No**, **NoWithVeto**, or **Abstain**, and the three tally rules each count a different denominator. Getting these apart is the whole skill of reading a Cosmos vote:

- **Quorum, 40%**: the share of bonded voting power that _cast anything at all_. Abstain counts here. It is the turnout test.
- **Threshold, 50%**: Yes as a share of Yes + No + NoWithVeto. Abstain is excluded. It is the majority test.
- **Veto, 33.4%**: NoWithVeto as a share of _all_ votes, abstain included. Clear it and the proposal fails no matter how large the Yes majority was.

Abstain is therefore not a null vote. It helps a proposal reach quorum while refusing to help it reach a majority, which is how large validators signal “this should be decided, but not by me”. NoWithVeto is the sharp one: on the Hub, `burn_vote_veto` is set to **true** while `burn_vote_quorum` and `burn_proposal_deposit_prevote` are both **false**. A vetoed proposal's 500 ATOM deposit is destroyed; one that simply fails, or never reaches quorum at all, is refunded in full. The Hub charges you for being _objectionable_, not for being ignored, which is a deliberate spam filter aimed at bad-faith proposals rather than unpopular ones.

## Validator inheritance: the default that decides most votes

The Hub's most consequential design choice is not a threshold, it is a default. Per the [module spec](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/x/gov/README.md): _“If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.”_ A delegator who votes after their validator overrides it; one who never votes has still voted, through whoever they staked with.

This is why Cosmos turnout numbers look healthy next to the single-digit participation documented on [voter apathy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) pages elsewhere in this wiki, and why that comparison is misleading. Turnout measures _bonded stake represented_, not people who formed a view. With `max_validators` set to **200** and a **5%** minimum commission, the practical electorate is a couple of hundred operators whose delegators mostly never override them. Cosmos did not solve apathy; it made apathy vote.

The trade is real in both directions. Inheritance guarantees a decisive result within seven days and removes the quorum-failure mode that stalls [token-weighted](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) DAOs. It also means [delegation](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/voting-and-delegation) chosen for yield, uptime, and commission silently becomes delegation of political authority, and unstaking to escape it costs a **21-day** unbonding period.

The same default carries a credit risk. A double-sign by the validator you picked slashes **5%** of your bonded ATOM whether or not you voted with them, and that 21-day queue means you cannot step out of the way once it happens; see [staking and slashing](/wiki/economics/staking-and-slashing) for the Hub's live penalty parameters.

## Proposal 848, and the fork that followed

The clearest case study in Hub governance is **[Proposal 848](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/848)**, “ATOM Halving: Set the max. Inflation Rate to 10%”, submitted 11 November 2023. Its final on-chain tally, in ATOM:

- Yes: **73,165,204** · No: **56,667,012** · NoWithVeto: **11,669,550** · Abstain: **36,323,836**

Run the three tests separately and the result is a lesson in denominators. Yes took **51.7%** of the non-abstain vote, clearing the 50% threshold by under two points, while amounting to only **41.1%** of everything cast. NoWithVeto reached **6.6%**, nowhere near the 33.4% needed to burn it. The proposal passed, and it is still in force: the Hub's live [mint parameters](https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/mint/v1beta1/params) read `inflation_max: 0.10` today, against an `inflation_min` of 7% that a later reduction attempt failed to move.

What happened next is the part DAO designers should sit with. The losing 48% did not accept the outcome and did not keep arguing. They left, and took the state with them: [AtomOne](https://atom.one/) launched as a self-described minimal fork of the Hub, airdropped ATONE to over a million ATOM addresses, and rebuilt governance around the specific things its founders objected to, including a live on-chain constitution and the removal of delegation-based voting. A two-point margin on one parameter produced a chain split, which is [exit](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) in its rawest form: when a governance system offers no way out short of forking, forking is the way out. See also [how DAOs fail](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail).

## Treasury, and the Hub in July 2026

The Hub's [treasury](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) is the **community pool**, funded by a **2%** community tax skimmed from staking rewards and spent only by passing proposal. It is a protocol-native fund with no multisig standing between a vote and a disbursement, and, like most on-chain treasuries, it is easier to fill than to deploy well.

Live chain state gives a fair picture of the Hub's current position. Read off the Hub's public REST endpoints on 1 September 2026: of **528.35M** ATOM in [supply](https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/bank/v1beta1/supply/by_denom?denom=uatom), **337.53M** is [bonded](https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/staking/v1beta1/pool) — a bonded ratio of **63.9%**. Because that sits below the protocol's `goal_bonded` of 67%, inflation bids for more stake, and it is no longer drifting toward the ceiling but [sitting on it](https://cosmos-rest.publicnode.com/cosmos/mint/v1beta1/inflation): the chain reports an inflation rate of exactly `0.10`, its `inflation_max`. That is the dynamic Proposal 848 capped rather than removed. Governance has kept widening what the chain does: [Proposal 1007](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/1007) (August 2025) enabled permissionless CosmWasm contract deployment, passing with 97.4M ATOM Yes against 1.4M No. It has also kept saying no, rejecting two IBC client-recovery proposals (#1047 and #1048) in July 2026 alone.

## How Caper approaches this

Inheritance is the assumption [Caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) declines. There is no delegation layer in the contract and no validator standing in for you: if you do not vote, nothing votes your balance. A member's weight comes from what they personally hold and the vote tokens they have personally earned – 1 per ballot cast, with trades and transfers minting none – computed as `(t × v) / (V × T)`, where `t` is their governance-token balance, `v` the vote tokens they have accumulated, `V` the vote-token supply, and `T` circulating supply. Holdings alone do not carry a vote, and participation alone does not either; the two multiply.

The pass rule differs in the same direction. Rather than testing turnout against total bonded stake, [settlement](/wiki/governance/execution) compares the leading option's share of the weight actually cast against a threshold of `1.5 / number of options`, and refuses to pass a proposal whose leading option is a “no”. Weight is also clamped at the tally to the smaller of what a voter held when they voted and what they hold then (a clamp anyone can re-apply downward until the result settles), so selling out of a position after voting shrinks the vote it bought. See [proposals](/wiki/governance/proposals) and [voting](/wiki/governance/voting) for the full mechanism, and the [networks directory](/wiki/daos/networks) for sibling chains, including [Polkadot](/wiki/daos/networks/polkadot), which reaches for conviction locks where Cosmos reaches for delegation.