---
title: "Yearn Finance"
url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/lending/yearn-finance"
updated: 2026-09-10
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# Yearn Finance

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | Yearn Finance (Yearn DAO) |
| **Type** | Protocol DAO — DeFi yield aggregator (automated vault strategies) |
| **Founded** | 2020 (Andre Cronje, as _iearn_ → yearn.finance); YFI token fair-launched 17 July 2020 |
| **Governance token** | YFI — [fair-launched with no premine](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/yfi), no team/investor allocation; original supply 30,000, expanded to 36,666 by [YIP-57](https://github.com/yearn/YIPS/blob/master/YIPS/yip-57.md) |
| **Governance model** | [Token-weighted](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) yGov via YIPs ([Snapshot](https://snapshot.org/#/veyfi.eth) + multisig execution); [veYFI](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/veyfi) vote-escrow layer since 2022 |
| **Products** | yVaults — automated, auto-compounding yield strategies; the original DeFi yield aggregator |
| **Notable for** | The canonical DeFi **fair launch**; a DAO that voted to mint its own supply and later adopted Curve-style vote-escrow |
| **Primary sources** | [yearn.fi](https://yearn.fi/), [docs.yearn.fi](https://docs.yearn.fi/), [gov.yearn.fi](https://gov.yearn.fi/), [yearn/YIPS](https://github.com/yearn/YIPS) |
| **Related** | [Curve DAO](/wiki/daos/dexs/curve-dao), [Convex](/wiki/daos/lending/convex-finance), [Frax](/wiki/daos/stablecoins/frax-finance), [DAO tokenomics](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics), [Coordinape](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/coordinape) |

**Yearn Finance** is the original DeFi **yield aggregator**: a protocol whose [vaults](https://docs.yearn.fi/getting-started/intro) take a user's deposit and route it through whatever lending and liquidity strategies are earning the most at that moment, auto-compounding the returns so an ordinary depositor gets an actively-managed yield without doing the work. It grew out of _iearn_, a set of contracts [Andre Cronje](https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/12/08/andre-cronje-defi-expressionist) built in 2020 to rebalance stablecoins across lending markets. Yearn matters to DAO history less for the vaults than for how its token arrived — the **YFI fair launch** became the template every "no premine, no VC allocation" project has cited since — and for what the DAO did afterward: it voted to _inflate its own supply_, then bolted a [Curve](/wiki/daos/dexs/curve-dao)-style vote-escrow lock onto governance. Yearn is a live record of a community repricing and re-architecting its own token by proposal. The contrast case is [Beefy](/wiki/daos/lending/beefy), a yield optimizer of the same vintage whose supply is fixed at 80,000 tokens with no mint function at all — which leaves it no version of that lever, and forces every cost onto the cash side of the balance sheet.

## The fair launch and yGov

On 17 July 2020 Cronje released **YFI** with what he described as "a completely valueless 0 supply token" — no allocation to himself, no team or investor slice, no premine. All **30,000** YFI were distributed to people who supplied liquidity to designated pools over roughly a week; the only way to get any was to use the protocol. ([Yearn docs: YFI](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/yfi)) That distribution — later shorthanded as the DeFi **"fair launch"** — put governance entirely in the hands of users from day one, and it is the property most often held up as the antidote to the [insider-heavy token distributions](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) common elsewhere.

Governance runs as **yGov**: **Yearn Improvement Proposals (YIPs)** are debated on the [governance forum](https://gov.yearn.fi/), ratified by [Snapshot](https://snapshot.org/#/veyfi.eth) token vote, and executed by a multisig — an [off-chain-signalling / on-chain-execution](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) split that predated most tooling and is still common today. Contributor pay was an early problem Yearn solved in public, pioneering peer-allocated compensation through [Coordinape](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/coordinape) (which spun out of Yearn) rather than top-down salaries.

## yVaults, the treasury, and a DAO that repriced its own token

The product is the **yVault**: deposit an asset, and Yearn's strategies farm it — supplying to lending markets, providing liquidity, harvesting and re-depositing rewards — abstracting a full yield-farming operation behind one token. Because that machinery earns real protocol revenue, Yearn's governance has repeatedly had to decide what to do with the money, and those decisions rewrote YFI's own economics twice.

First, supply. The 30,000-cap was never sacred: [YIP-57](https://github.com/yearn/YIPS/blob/master/YIPS/yip-57.md) (Feb 2021) minted **6,666 new YFI** — about **22%** of the supply — with one-third earmarked for contributor retention and two-thirds sent to the treasury under governance control, taking the total to **36,666**. A community that had prized its fixed, fairly-launched supply voted, in the open, to dilute itself to fund the protocol's future — one of the clearest examples of a DAO exercising [monetary policy over its own token](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics) by vote. Second, the treasury flywheel: [YIP-56 ("Buyback and Build")](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-56-buyback-and-build/8929) disbanded the old YFI staking-rewards system and redirected protocol earnings into **buying YFI back** from the market for the [treasury](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management) and contributor rewards — routing value to the DAO's balance sheet instead of paying it straight out to stakers.

## veYFI: Yearn adopts vote-escrow

In 2022 Yearn added a [vote-escrow layer](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/veyfi) modelled on [Curve's veCRV](/wiki/daos/dexs/curve-dao). Locking YFI mints non-transferable **veYFI** for a term of **one week to four years**; a four-year lock carries **100%** weight, two years **50%**, and the weight decays as the unlock date nears and must be renewed. veYFI holders capture the bulk of gauge rewards — vaults emit **dYFI** (a token redeemable for YFI), and lockers can boost their share up to **10×** based on how much veYFI they hold relative to their vault deposits; unlocked depositors earn only the base [10%](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/veyfi). The distinctive twist is the **early-exit penalty**: leaving before the lock ends forfeits `min(75%, time_left / 4 years)` of the position — up to three-quarters — and the forfeited YFI is **redistributed to the remaining lockers**, so patience is paid for by the impatient. ([veYFI docs](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/veyfi))

The move placed Yearn firmly inside the [vote-escrow](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) lineage alongside [Curve](/wiki/daos/dexs/curve-dao), [Convex](/wiki/daos/lending/convex-finance), [Balancer](/wiki/daos/dexs/balancer-dao) and [Frax](/wiki/daos/stablecoins/frax-finance) — the same bargain of trading liquidity for time-weighted say, and the same open question of whether that locked weight stays with committed holders or gets aggregated and rented a layer up.

## The forum kept numbering, the ballot stopped counting

Yearn runs the two-venue arrangement most large protocol DAOs run: discussion and temperature checks on the [gov.yearn.fi](https://gov.yearn.fi/) Discourse forum, binding token votes on the [`veyfi.eth` Snapshot space](https://snapshot.box/#/s:veyfi.eth). The two have come apart. Read on **22 August 2026**, the space holds **80 proposals** and 346 followers, and its newest is [YIP-90, “yETH Optimistic Recovery Plan”](https://snapshot.box/#/s:veyfi.eth/proposal/0xe76f57663ce9311eb830ef097812702cbbb55fccbb280d254cdfc1f2c11c261a), opened **16 December 2025**. Re-read on **2 September 2026** the space still holds 80 proposals and 346 followers and YIP-90 is still the newest, so the gap runs unbroken from that December close — stated as an anchor rather than a day count, which would be wrong the day after it was written. Meanwhile the forum has gone on producing numbered proposals: [YIP-91, “yTranche”](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-91-ytranche/14659) was posted on 6 July 2026 and, at the time of reading, had drawn **no replies** in 261 views and had never appeared on a ballot. YIP-91 exists as a document and does not exist as a vote.

The gap is sharper because of what the ballot did last. [YIP-88, “Governance Overhaul—DAO Restructuring, stYFI, and Incentives”](https://snapshot.box/#/s:veyfi.eth/proposal/0x9b3a40326411eea6c51ec389a802ed695de53961fa49f6d3525e256513d0a7f9), closed on 10 October 2025 with **631.46 veYFI for and zero against** — and **sixteen voters**. A DAO that reorganises its own governance on sixteen ballots has not been outvoted; it has been left to a handful of people who still show up. Two more proposals followed in December, and then the venue went quiet.

This is the [divergence a proposal count cannot show](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-metrics-and-analytics): a forum that looks alive and a ballot that has not been used in eight months describe the same DAO, and only one of them is where power actually changes hands. The measurement that catches it is the date on the newest _binding_ vote, not the newest post — a check no proposal total, follower count or forum-activity chart performs. Every figure here is read live off [Snapshot](https://snapshot.org/#/)'s public GraphQL hub and the forum's own JSON, and both are re-checkable on demand.

## How Caper approaches this

Yearn's fair launch is rightly admired: no premine, no insider slice, governance in users' hands from block one. But the launch settled _who got the token_, not _how the token confers power_ — and there the story is familiar. YFI is transferable and tradable, so influence tracks holdings; the DAO minted 22% more of it by vote; and to re-couple control to commitment Yearn ultimately reached for a [Curve-style lock](/wiki/daos/dexs/curve-dao), inheriting the same ve-model tensions the rest of that [cluster](/wiki/daos/lending/convex-finance) lives with. A [caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) pursues the coupling Yearn's lock was reaching for without a lock to tokenise: its [voting weight](/wiki/governance/voting) combines the _stake_ a member holds with the _participation_ they have actually earned, and that participation record is **soulbound** — non-transferable by construction, so while a member accrues it by trading as well as by voting, it can never be bought off them, borrowed or aggregated the way locked veYFI can. Supply is not a governance lever either: a caper's tokens come from a [bonding curve](/wiki/markets/bonding-curve), not a mint proposal, so there is no equivalent of a YIP-57 dilution vote. And because that same earned weight is each member's [exit claim](/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper) on the treasury — the weight itself, not the [pro-rata slice by balance](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights) a rage-quit pays, say stays tied to real economic exposure. This is a design contrast, not a claim of superiority; the mechanics are on the linked pages and verified against the contract.

## References

- [`veyfi.eth` on Snapshot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:veyfi.eth) — the binding vote venue: 80 proposals, newest YIP-90 (16 Dec 2025), read 22 Aug 2026 (primary).
- [YIP-91 — yTranche](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-91-ytranche/14659) — a numbered proposal on the forum that never reached a ballot, posted 6 Jul 2026 (primary).
- [Yearn documentation](https://docs.yearn.fi/) — vaults, governance and the protocol overview (primary).
- [YFI — Yearn docs](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/yfi) — the fair launch, no-premine distribution and 30,000 supply (primary).
- [YIP-57](https://github.com/yearn/YIPS/blob/master/YIPS/yip-57.md) — the 6,666-YFI mint to 36,666 total, split contributor retention / treasury (primary).
- [YIP-56 — Buyback and Build](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-56-buyback-and-build/8929) — disbanding staking rewards for a treasury buyback flywheel (primary).
- [veYFI — Yearn docs](https://docs.yearn.fi/contributing/governance/veyfi) — the vote-escrow lock, 4-year 100% weight, 10× gauge boost and early-exit penalty (primary).
- CoinDesk, [Andre Cronje: DeFi Expressionist](https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/12/08/andre-cronje-defi-expressionist) (2020) — background on Yearn's founder and the fair launch.