--- title: "Maple Finance" url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/lending/maple-finance" updated: 2026-09-04 license: CC-BY-4.0 license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" --- # Maple Finance | | | | --- | --- | | **Type** | On-chain institutional credit / private-credit marketplace, governed by a token-holder DAO | | **Governance token** | [SYRUP](https://maple.finance/syrup) and staked **stSYRUP**, counted 1:1 as two separate `erc20-balance-of` strategies on the DAO’s [Snapshot space](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth) – the sole governance assets since MPL was retired | | **Governance process** | Maple Improvement Proposals (MIPs) drafted on the [Maple Governance Forum](https://community.maple.finance), then decided by off-chain token vote at [mapledao.eth](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth) | | **Vote mechanics** | 4-day voting period (345,600 s); quorum **58,200,000** SYRUP+stSYRUP on the most recent proposal – about 4.7% of supply, but roughly 36% of all staked SYRUP (space config read 4 September 2026) | | **Proposals on record** | 13, MIP-009 (Sept 2023) through [MIP-021](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0xce5c0b3e759cd071a5412d7935b2408db9def2ecc4f754764f5c2f08055ff3a5) (July 2026); no MIP-022 or MIP-023 has been put to a vote as of 4 September 2026 | | **Products** | Syrup (permissionless _syrupUSDC/syrupUSDT_ yield); Maple Institutional (permissioned lending pools) | | **Chains** | Ethereum (mainnet since May 2021), Solana, and other integrations | | **Founded** | 2019, by Sidney Powell and Joe Flanagan (Australia) | | **Reference** | [maple.finance](https://maple.finance) · [docs](https://docs.maple.finance/) · [Snapshot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth) · [DeFiLlama](https://defillama.com/protocol/maple) | **Maple Finance** is an on-chain credit business that runs as a token-holder DAO. Where a [peer-to-pool money market](/wiki/daos/lending/aave-dao) lends against volatile crypto collateral, Maple originates _institutional_ loans – over-collateralised digital-asset credit, and tokenised exposure to real-world private credit – and packages the yield into stablecoin products anyone can hold. The protocol has described itself as building “onchain asset management since 2019” ([maple.finance/about](https://maple.finance/about)); it launched on Ethereum mainnet in May 2021 and, by its [own reporting and DeFiLlama](https://defillama.com/protocol/maple), grew assets under management into the multi-billion range through 2025–2026 as the “RWA on-chain” thesis matured. ## What the DAO actually governs Maple is a governance-over-a-business, not a governance-of-a-primitive. Holders of [SYRUP](https://maple.finance/syrup) do not vote loan-by-loan; they set the _policy_ around an operating credit desk: how protocol revenue is used, what the token’s emission and buyback schedule looks like, which strategic initiatives the treasury funds, and how the two product surfaces – permissionless **Syrup** and permissioned **Maple Institutional** – are resourced. Day-to-day underwriting, borrower diligence and pool management sit with the Maple team and its delegates; the DAO governs the economic frame they operate inside. That split – a professional credit operation wrapped in token governance – puts Maple closer to [Ondo](/wiki/daos/lending/ondo-finance) and other real-world-asset issuers than to a fully permissionless lending protocol. ## From MPL to SYRUP: collapsing to one token Maple originally ran a two-token design (MPL and staked xMPL). The rebuild happened through a numbered, publicly recorded sequence of votes on the DAO’s [Snapshot space](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth): [MIP-009](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x29fccc3bac63744a55f9671399c079594e6b8369a21502cbce52e7dce9301094) (closed 12 September 2023) upgraded the token design and set a defined inflation schedule; [MIP-010](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x6f2a2a4fb2e80bfc2f134cd79a0ebb2a0a6c2e2d11e6a5a49db2fc7b4588a5ec) (9 September 2024) launched SYRUP and opened the one-time conversion of **1 MPL → 100 SYRUP**, structured so migrating holders were not diluted; [MIP-011](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0xa40eddf52876e5239d9ffcb2fa861d04c4fce146c050aa3580da72d21bcbc13e) set the conversion deadline at 30 April 2025; and [MIP-017](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x55f9b85129747b3ad984034b23f2b18a025e19adae4ea7b8d4ea0490fb885601) (18 May 2025) closed a final window and directed the unconverted remainder to strategic use. Documentation of the mechanics is in the [migration docs](https://docs.maple.finance/maple-for-token-holders/mpl-token/mpl-token-migration). The vote that settled _governance_ rather than supply was [MIP-012](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x90250c5a7ef3263d88c39007f7ea1a23b4668259e3745581a36b52b5d578746e), “stSYRUP as the Sole Governance Token”, which closed alongside MIP-011 on 30 December 2024. In practice the live Snapshot space counts SYRUP _and_ stSYRUP one-for-one as two independent balance strategies, so staking earns yield rather than voting power; “sole” refers to MPL’s retirement, not to a staking requirement. Supply is best read from the chain rather than from a schedule. The Ethereum [SYRUP](https://maple.finance/syrup) contract (`0x643C4E15d7d62Ad0aBeC4a9BD4b001aA3Ef52d66`) reported a `totalSupply()` of **1,244,677,492.51 SYRUP** at Ethereum block 25,900,561 (4 September 2026, 01:07 UTC). Of that, **163,969,389.67 SYRUP – 13.2% of supply –** sat inside the stSYRUP staking contract (`0xc7E8b36E0766D9B04c93De68A9D47dD11f260B45`) at the same block, at an exchange rate of 1.0510 SYRUP per stSYRUP. ## The arc from quarterly votes to a standing rule Maple’s most instructive governance feature for the wider DAO industry is what it did to its _revenue and buyback policy_. For eighteen months the DAO re-legislated the same question every quarter, and the vote record is the clearest statement of the cost: - [MIP-013](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0xba17754580db5a504bbd821a259a93063cfbf79504784e67d4acea1e9246056c), “Fee Buyback Mechanism” (closed 27 January 2025), created the buyback; [MIP-016](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x4fafeb3fa1a74451da00e2b894b8d4a3844e572fc231d9aeb5d8f8dea4e3e045) (5 May 2025) continued it for Q2 and [MIP-018](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x972ba9729fb8089d80e874595eb8f905affe744d8e80e3687bc5f4e82bc9cd61) (29 July 2025) raised it for Q3. Three votes, one recurring decision. - [MIP-019](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x8151eb49b56770b882e8d9b6affd4a698572fc6eec31001c74bd977f61c84374), “Activate the SSF and Sunset Staking” (31 October 2025), stood up the **Syrup Strategic Fund** and ended the old staking-rewards program, tying value to revenue instead of inflation. It passed 66,270,651.54 For to 488,845.21 Against on 26 votes. Coverage: [The Defiant](https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/stsyrup-holders-vote-to-end-staking-rewards-launch-syrup-strategic-fund). - [MIP-020](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0x4f64d40ee5a2de205969b630f5ceb6e88d8b7bffc9444d58e612c9af67eaf814), “H1 2026 SSF Allocation” (26 January 2026), was the next discretionary allocation vote – 82,090,483.60 For, nothing against, on **ten votes**. - [MIP-021](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0xce5c0b3e759cd071a5412d7935b2408db9def2ecc4f754764f5c2f08055ff3a5), “A Rules-Based Buyback That Scales With Revenue” (13–17 July 2026), finally replaced the per-quarter sizing decision with a formula. 61,300,404.59 For to 20,256.90 Against on 17 votes. That arc – discretionary, then quarterly, then rules-based – is a live example of a treasury DAO deliberately narrowing the surface where a vote (or a signer) can act, to shrink the gap between a passed policy and its execution. **A caveat on where the arc currently stops.** A forum thread titled “MIP-023: Hyper-Programmatic Revenue Model and Governance Parity” circulates as a proposal for a roughly 90% fully programmatic SYRUP buyback. As of 4 September 2026 it is a _draft_: the [mapledao.eth vote record](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth) runs contiguously from MIP-009 to MIP-021 with no MIP-022 or MIP-023 on it, and no version of it has been archived. Until it is voted, the standing policy is MIP-021’s rule, not the programmatic model. This page previously stated otherwise, which is a reminder that a governance-forum thread is a proposal, not an outcome – see [verifiability](/wiki/policy/verifiability). ## The electorate: a quorum sized on supply, met by six addresses Maple sets its quorum as a share of _total supply_, and raises it as supply inflates: the bar was 34,913,160.5 tokens through the MIP-012–MIP-016 era, 53,600,000 for MIP-017 and MIP-018, 56,000,000 for MIP-019, 57,500,000 for MIP-020 and **58,200,000** for MIP-021. Against the chain reading above, the current bar is about **4.7% of SYRUP supply**. The electorate that actually turns out is a much smaller pool, which is what makes the ratio worth stating. Only 13.2% of SYRUP is staked, so 58.2 million is roughly **36% of every staked token**. And turnout has fallen as the bar has risen: 56 votes on MIP-017 (May 2025), 42 on MIP-018, 26 on MIP-019, **10 on MIP-020** and 17 on MIP-021. [MIP-021](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth/proposal/0xce5c0b3e759cd071a5412d7935b2408db9def2ecc4f754764f5c2f08055ff3a5)’s per-voter record makes the concentration explicit. Of 61,320,661.49 tokens cast by 17 addresses, the largest single voter carried **22,137,278.03 – 36.1%** of the whole vote; the top three carried 72.5%, and the top five 91.8%. The top five together hold 56.26 million tokens, just under the 58.2 million bar, so **six addresses are sufficient to constitute quorum** on this DAO. The proposal cleared quorum by 5.4%, and 99.97% of the weight cast was For. This is the ordinary shape of a supply-weighted [token-weighted vote](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/token-weighted-voting) with a [supply-denominated quorum](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design) rather than a Maple-specific failing – but it is the number a governance operator should read before treating a quorum as evidence of a broad mandate. Compare the participation figures on [GnosisDAO](/wiki/daos/networks/gnosisdao) and [Uniswap](/wiki/daos/dexs/uniswap-dao), and the delegation-based answers surveyed in [voting and delegation](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/voting-and-delegation). ## Products: Syrup and Maple Institutional **Syrup** is the permissionless surface: depositors mint yield-bearing _syrupUSDC_ / _syrupUSDT_, earning yield sourced from Maple’s lending activity plus a points-style **Drips** rewards program that multiplies with longer capital commitments. Both are ERC-4626 vaults, so their size can be read directly rather than quoted. At Ethereum block 25,900,561 (4 September 2026, 01:07 UTC), `totalAssets()` on syrupUSDC (`0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b`) was **$964.29 million** against 816.22 million shares, and on syrupUSDT (`0x356B8d89c1e1239Cbbb9dE4815c39A1474d5BA7D`) **$395.26 million** against 346.21 million shares – **$1.360 billion** across the two Ethereum vaults, at share prices of 1.1814 and 1.1417 respectively. Maple also runs the products on other chains, so this is the Ethereum figure, not the protocol total. **Maple Institutional** is the permissioned surface, where vetted borrowers access over-collateralised digital-asset credit and where Maple has built facilities such as an on-chain warehouse line for asset-backed loans. Both surfaces feed the same revenue engine that the SSF taps for buybacks. Protocol-wide AUM moves with subscriptions and credit demand and is best read from [DeFiLlama](https://defillama.com/protocol/maple) rather than a fixed number. ## Where Maple sits in the DAO landscape Maple is one of the clearest cases of a DAO governing a _credit institution_ rather than an automated protocol. It shares the real-world-asset frame with [Ondo Finance](/wiki/daos/lending/ondo-finance), the yield-bearing-stablecoin frame with [Sky (formerly MakerDAO)](/wiki/daos/stablecoins/sky-dao), and the on-chain-lending frame with [Aave](/wiki/daos/lending/aave-dao) and [Morpho](/wiki/daos/lending/morpho) – but differs from all of them in how explicitly it has converted governance from a discretionary body into a rules-writing one. For the [lending directory](/wiki/daos/lending), it is the reference point for “institutional credit, run as a DAO.” ## How Caper approaches this Maple’s progression is really about one thing: shrinking the distance between a policy the token approves and the action that carries it out. [Caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) attacks the same distance, but it does not close it by making the ballot self-executing. A Caper proposal is settled in **two phases**. The ballot picks a winning option; then a price window opens, and the proposal passes only if the time-weighted average price over that window is at or above the baseline frozen when the proposal was triggered (`resolve_proposal` in the protocol logic sets `passed = window_twap >= twap_baseline`). A ballot majority is necessary and never sufficient – the market has to ratify it. Execution is then a further, separate call that asserts the proposal is both settled and passed before it will move anything. What Caper does remove is the discretionary gap Maple had to legislate away: nothing between the settled verdict and the transfer is a human decision, because [execution](/wiki/governance/execution) is an on-chain function on the [proposal](/wiki/governance/proposals) itself rather than a multisig honouring a signal. And where Maple routes revenue to a strategic fund, a Caper’s value flows to its own on-chain treasury; a member’s exit claim on that treasury is computed by the same function as their vote weight, so influence and payout come from one figure rather than two negotiated ones. ## References - [mapledao.eth on Snapshot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mapledao.eth) – the DAO’s complete vote record (13 proposals, MIP-009 to MIP-021), including per-proposal quorum, tallies and per-voter weights. Queried keylessly via the [Snapshot GraphQL API](https://hub.snapshot.org/graphql) on 4 September 2026. - [Maple Governance Forum](https://community.maple.finance) – where MIPs are drafted and discussed before a vote. The forum is Cloudflare-walled to automated requests; the Snapshot record above is the citable outcome. - Ethereum contracts, read at block 25,900,561 (4 September 2026): SYRUP `0x643C4E15d7d62Ad0aBeC4a9BD4b001aA3Ef52d66`, stSYRUP `0xc7E8b36E0766D9B04c93De68A9D47dD11f260B45`, syrupUSDC `0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b`, syrupUSDT `0x356B8d89c1e1239Cbbb9dE4815c39A1474d5BA7D`. - [Maple Finance](https://maple.finance) – protocol site; [About](https://maple.finance/about) (“onchain asset management since 2019”). [Documentation](https://docs.maple.finance/); [MPL→SYRUP migration](https://docs.maple.finance/maple-for-token-holders/mpl-token/mpl-token-migration). - [DeFiLlama – Maple](https://defillama.com/protocol/maple) – live TVL/AUM across all chains.