---
title: "The Graph"
url: "https://caper.network/wiki/daos/infrastructure/the-graph"
updated: 2026-09-07
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# The Graph

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | The Graph |
| **Type** | Decentralized blockchain-data indexing protocol & DAO |
| **Founded** | 2018 ([The Graph](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Graph)) — Yaniv Tal, Brandon Ramirez, Jannis Pohlmann; mainnet December 2020 |
| **Governance token** | [GRT](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/resources/tokenomics/) — ERC-20; core protocol on [Arbitrum One](https://arbitrum.io/) since 2023 |
| **Governance** | [The Graph Council](https://thegraph.com/governance/) — 6-of-10 multisig, five stakeholder groups, ratifies [GIPs](https://github.com/graphprotocol/graph-improvement-proposals) |
| **Core developers** | Edge & Node, StreamingFast, Semiotic, Pinax, GraphOps — stewarded by [The Graph Foundation](https://thegraph.foundation/) |
| **Network (early 2026)** | 1.27T+ queries served, 75,000+ projects, 50+ Indexers, 60+ networks ([docs](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/about/)) |

**The Graph** is the indexing and query layer that lets applications read blockchain data without running their own infrastructure. Developers publish a _subgraph_ — an open API that defines how to extract, transform, and serve on-chain events — and anyone can query it in GraphQL. By early 2026 the network had served over [1.27 trillion queries to more than 75,000 projects](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/about/) across 60+ networks, alongside newer products for real-time streaming ([Substreams](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/substreams/overview/)) and enterprise SQL access (Amp). What makes it interesting as a _DAO_ is not the technology but who controls it: a work-token economy of Indexers, Delegators, and Curators, governed by a small elected Council rather than by direct token vote.

## The GRT work token: Indexers, Delegators, Curators

GRT is a **work token** — it is put to work securing and directing the network, not held passively for governance. Three roles stake or signal it ([docs](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/resources/roles/)):

- **Indexers** stake GRT as collateral, run node infrastructure, and serve queries; they earn indexing rewards (protocol issuance) and a share of query fees. Misbehaviour is slashable.
- **Delegators** delegate GRT to Indexers without running any infrastructure, taking a cut of the Indexer's rewards in exchange for lending stake and reputation.
- **Curators** [signal on subgraphs](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/resources/roles/curating/) they judge worth indexing, earning a slice of that subgraph's future query fees — the network's decentralized answer to "which data is worth serving."

This division of labour is the point: no single party both funds, secures, and directs the network. It also means governance power and economic power are deliberately separated — a Delegator with a large bag has no more say over the protocol than a small one.

## Curation is a bonding-curve market

Curation is where The Graph quietly runs one of DeFi's larger live **bonding-curve** experiments. When a Curator signals on a subgraph, GRT is deposited into a per-subgraph reserve and the Curator mints [Graph Curation Shares (GCS)](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/resources/roles/curating/) — ERC-20 shares that can only be minted or burned against that curve, never traded peer-to-peer. Being earlier to signal mints shares more cheaply, so early, correct curation is rewarded; the design uses a _nested_ curve (an inner curve per subgraph deployment, an outer curve at the [GNS / subgraph level](https://forum.thegraph.com/t/gip-0025-principal-protected-bonding-curves/3162)). A **1% tax** is charged on initial signalling and **0.5%** on auto-migration to a new version, and Curators collectively earn **10% of the query fees** a subgraph generates, pro-rata to shares.

The mechanism is itself under governance. [GIP-0025](https://forum.thegraph.com/t/gip-0025-principal-protected-bonding-curves/3162) introduced principal-protected curves, and [GIP-0058](https://forum.thegraph.com/t/gip-0058-replacing-bonding-curves-with-indexing-fees/4425) proposed replacing bonding curves outright with direct indexing fees. That one is worth reading for its modality: the thread still carries **Stage: Draft** and has had no post since 7 December 2023, so a proposal frequently cited as the curve's successor has sat unmoved for nearly three years. Even a market primitive is a governed parameter here — and a governed parameter can simply stall.

## The Graph Council: governance by delegated multisig

The Graph's defining governance choice is that **GRT holders do not vote on-chain to change the protocol**. Authority sits with [The Graph Council](https://thegraph.com/governance/), a **6-of-10 Gnosis Safe multisig** that [balances five stakeholder groups](https://thegraph.com/blog/introducing-the-graph-council/) — Indexers, token holders, technical/research experts, backers, and the initial team. The Council ratifies protocol upgrades, sets economic parameters, and administers the community treasury.

Proposals move through the [Graph Improvement Proposal (GIP)](https://github.com/graphprotocol/graph-improvement-proposals/blob/main/gips/0001-gip-process.md) process: an author drafts a GIP, the community debates it on the [governance forum](https://forum.thegraph.com/), and the Council votes to accept or reject. In February 2024 the Council added a six-member [Technical Advisory Board](https://thegraph.com/blog/) to shepherd research and the core roadmap. The result is a _representative_ DAO — deliberately fast and expert-led, but one where a token holder's leverage is voice in a forum, not a vote that settles on its own.

## From hosted service to a decentralized network

For years most applications used The Graph's centrally-run _hosted service_ rather than the token-incentivised network. That changed in 2024: the [hosted service was retired in June 2024](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Graph), forcing all traffic onto the decentralized network, and the Foundation ran a **Sunrise Upgrade Program** (allocating up to 4 million GRT) to migrate projects across. In parallel the core protocol contracts moved to [Arbitrum One](https://arbitrum.io/) for cheaper staking, delegation, and reward flows. The migration is the clearest test of the whole design — the subsidised training wheels came off and the fee market had to stand on its own.

## Where power actually sits

The Council model buys speed and technical competence at the cost of a familiar DAO tension: the people who fund the network (Delegators, token buyers) are not the people who decide it. Supporters argue that protocol-parameter design is genuinely specialist work that a broad token vote handles badly, and that the five-group balance and public GIP process keep the Council accountable. Critics note that "accountable via forum" is weaker than "bound by vote," and that a 6-of-10 multisig is a concentrated point of trust for a network this large. Both readings are fair; The Graph is the reference case for asking a DAO the blunt question — _when a decision is made, whose signature actually settles it?_

## How Caper approaches this

The Graph shows a bonding curve doing one job – pricing _attention_, where early Curators who signal correctly are rewarded. [Caper](/wiki/foundations/what-is-a-caper) points the same primitive at a different one: pricing a project's own token at launch. Its [bonding curve](/wiki/markets/bonding-curve) follows an increasing schedule, so the earliest backers of a caper pay the lowest price and later demand pays more – funding a venture directly from the curve rather than signalling on someone else's data.

On governance the two answer the same question – _whose signature settles a decision?_ – and give opposite answers. The Graph's is a 6-of-10 Council: expert, fast, and accountable through a forum rather than a ballot. A caper's is a ballot _and_ a market, in that order. A [proposal](/wiki/governance/proposals) offers two to five ranked options, always including a “do nothing”, and members cast ranked ballots weighted _w = (t · v) / (V · T)_; the leading option carries only if it takes `1.5 / option_count` of the weight actually cast and is not the “do nothing”. Passing the ballot only earns the right to trigger, which locks the caper's trailing average token price as a baseline and opens the market window – and the action executes only if the token's time-weighted average price across that window is at or above the baseline. There is no council and no multisig, and no expert body either; the price of that is the same one [futarchy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) pays: a market can veto a decision the members already voted for without ever being able to say what was wrong with it.

Where a caper does keep something The Graph deliberately separates is the link between economic and governance standing. On The Graph a large Delegator has no more protocol say than a small one, by design. On a caper the two are joined at exactly one point: both trading and voting mint the same soulbound token – 0.01 _v_ per XRD of gross value on buys and sells alike, and one _v_ per ballot, since the 100 XRD vote fee is charged at that same rate – and holding some is a precondition of [exit](/wiki/foundations/leaving-a-caper), which pays out _w = (t · v) / (V · T)_. A holder who has neither traded nor voted cannot redeem from the treasury at all. See [how vote tokens are earned](/wiki/governance/voting).

## References

- [The Graph — About / network overview (docs)](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/about/)
- [Indexers, Delegators, Curators — network roles (docs)](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/resources/roles/)
- [Curating & Graph Curation Shares (docs)](https://thegraph.com/docs/en/resources/roles/curating/)
- [The Graph governance & the Council](https://thegraph.com/governance/)
- [Graph Improvement Proposals (GIP repository)](https://github.com/graphprotocol/graph-improvement-proposals)
- [GIP-0025 — Principal-Protected Bonding Curves](https://forum.thegraph.com/t/gip-0025-principal-protected-bonding-curves/3162) · [GIP-0058 — Replacing Bonding Curves with Indexing Fees](https://forum.thegraph.com/t/gip-0058-replacing-bonding-curves-with-indexing-fees/4425)
- [The Graph — Wikipedia (founding, hosted-service sunset)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Graph)
