---
title: "Futarchy Labs (futarchy.fi)"
url: "https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/futarchy-labs"
updated: 2026-08-16
license: CC-BY-4.0
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
---

# Futarchy Labs (futarchy.fi)

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| --- | --- |
| **Category** | Decision markets · futarchy-as-an-integration for existing DAOs |
| **What it does** | Runs paired conditional markets on a DAO's own token for each proposal – one priced on the proposal passing, one on it failing – and publishes the difference as a signal beside the vote |
| **Built on** | [Gnosis Conditional Token Framework](https://github.com/gnosis/conditional-tokens-contracts); `FutarchyFactory` / `FutarchyProposal` / `FutarchyRouter` contracts, with ERC-20 wrappers around conditional positions |
| **Resolution** | [Reality.eth](https://reality.eth.limo/) attestation with [Kleros](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/kleros) arbitration in advisory mode; a Futarchy Oracle TWAP comparison in autonomous (FAO) mode |
| **Chain** | Gnosis Chain for the GnosisDAO pilot markets, traded through Swapr and composable with CowSwap |
| **Adopted by** | [Kleros (KIP-76, July 2025)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:kleros.eth/proposal/0xa213179debfca1cb5b8f65ac9d641e6e4e8fb5df480196c909e9ae1ab548daa7) · [Velora (PIP-72, October 2025)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xe260a3ef6ac3e39f38c1b2366cfb488dcd0b4dfeaf7125612ddeb9fa7e753821) · [GnosisDAO (GIP-145, February 2026)](https://snapshot.box/#/s:gnosis.eth/proposal/0x09cb43353c0ece5544919bf70a9810908098c728f27f9ca3e211871f7ad6bf1c) |
| **Chief Scientific Officer** | [Robin Hanson](https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/futarchy.html), who proposed futarchy in 2000 |
| **Surfaces** | [futarchy.fi](https://futarchy.fi/) · [docs](https://docs.futarchy.fi/) · [status](https://status.futarchy.fi/) · [GitHub](https://github.com/futarchy-fi) · [@_futarchy](https://x.com/_futarchy) |
| **Related** | [Futarchy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) · [MetaDAO](/wiki/daos/infrastructure/metadao) · [Snapshot](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) · [DAO tooling stack](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview) |

**Futarchy Labs** sells [futarchy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy) as a component rather than as a form of government. Where [MetaDAO](/wiki/daos/infrastructure/metadao) built a whole organisation whose every material decision is settled by market price, Futarchy Labs attaches a pair of conditional markets to a DAO's _existing_ [Snapshot](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/snapshot) process and lets the DAO decide how much authority to give the result. That difference is the reason it is the model most likely to reach an established treasury: nothing about the ballot changes, and the market's verdict starts as a number in a widget.

## What it actually deploys

A futarchy proposal begins with a single call to the Seer `FutarchyFactory`, which in one transaction deploys a `FutarchyProposal` contract, defines the binary YES/NO condition, and configures the oracle that will later resolve it, emitting a `NewProposal` event carrying the proposal address, the [conditional-tokens](https://github.com/gnosis/conditional-tokens-contracts) `conditionId` and the oracle `questionId` ([proposal lifecycle](https://docs.futarchy.fi/protocol/proposal-lifecycle/)). Creation is **permissionless**, and the docs are careful about what that does and does not mean: a proposal contract is “the act of instantiating a futarchy market, not the act of making a governance decision”, and it does not execute governance actions, enforce voting rules, or judge whether a proposal is good. Anyone can open a market about your DAO; only the DAO decides what a market's answer is worth.

Around that anchor sit a `FutarchyRouter` for split, merge and redeem operations, ERC-20 wrappers so conditional positions trade on ordinary AMMs, and the resolution path. In the advisory configuration the oracle is not asked to judge the proposal at all – it is asked, via [Reality.eth](https://reality.eth.limo/) with [Kleros](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/kleros) arbitration as the appeal, to attest to whether the DAO's own governance process approved or rejected it. The market prices a counterfactual; the oracle only records what the humans did.

## The operator defaults, in numbers

The [integration guide](https://docs.futarchy.fi/dao/integration/) is unusually specific about the parameters a treasury has to sign off, which is the part governance operators actually negotiate:

- **Liquidity:** a default pilot of **~$100k** of protocol-owned liquidity, roughly 50/50 token and stablecoin. At that depth a **$500** trade moves the price about **2%** – deep enough to resist casual pushing, thin enough that an informed trader can still move it. Milestone markets can run on **$25–50k**.
- **Decision window:** **7 days** by default, 3 for fast-moving proposals (with an explicit warning about thin markets), 14–21 for high-stakes ones. Prices are tracked continuously and averaged into a TWAP so the last hour cannot decide the question.
- **Threshold:** the default verdict is **YES > NO + 1%**, raised to **5–10%** for critical proposals. Under sponsorship the threshold can scale with the size of the sponsor's bond – and the docs flag that this scaling is a governance rule the DAO writes, not something the contracts enforce.
- **Custody:** the liquidity sits in a recommended **2-of-3 multisig** – typically two DAO representatives plus one technical co-signer, which may be Futarchy.FI's own operators – that creates and redeems the conditional positions and returns the funds to the treasury afterwards, minus impermanent loss and plus LP fees.

Those four lines are the whole risk surface of an advisory pilot, and none of them is a market-design question. A DAO adopting this is agreeing to lend its own token to a market maker it part-controls, on a schedule, with a signer set it should read carefully. See [Safe](/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/safe) for the custody layer that multisig sits on.

## The adoption ladder

Futarchy Labs' [adoption levels](https://docs.futarchy.fi/dao/adoption-levels/) are a staged surrender of authority, and the staging is the product. **Advisory futarchy** is the recommended entry point: every major proposal gets a YES/NO market whose recommendation appears next to the Snapshot vote, and delegates remain free to ignore it – the documented risk of this level is not a technical failure but that “delegates may initially ignore futarchy advice”. **Milestone futarchy** runs the same machinery against roadmap commitments rather than proposals. **Sponsored proposals** let outside activists bond capital behind a proposal and buy tokens at a vested discount if the market approves it – new capital and new ideas, with self-dealing as the named hazard. Only at the last level, the **Futarchy Autonomous Optimizer (FAO)**, does a market actually govern: an on-chain governor holds a defined scope of treasury or parameters and executes whatever the oracle's TWAP comparison approves, with no vote in the loop.

It is worth being precise that the three live adoptions below are all at level one. Futarchy is being _consulted_ at real DAOs; it is not yet _deciding_ at any of them outside MetaDAO, which built its own.

## Who has adopted it, and by what margin

Three DAOs have authorised a Futarchy Labs pilot by an on-chain vote, and each vote is worth reading for a different reason. Tallies below are read directly from the Snapshot hub.

- **Kleros** – [KIP-76, “Futarchy-Based Governance Rule for PNK Minting”](https://snapshot.box/#/s:kleros.eth/proposal/0xa213179debfca1cb5b8f65ac9d641e6e4e8fb5df480196c909e9ae1ab548daa7), closed 14 July 2025 with **35,592,086 PNK for** and **1,847,764 against** on 18 votes. The earliest of the three, and the only one that binds futarchy to a specific power – minting the governance token – rather than to advice in general. Kleros later told GnosisDAO it had been running futarchy.fi “for several months… both as an advisory tool and as a safeguard mechanism for sensitive proposals”.
- **Velora** (formerly ParaSwap) – [PIP-72, liquidity funding for futarchy experimentation](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xe260a3ef6ac3e39f38c1b2366cfb488dcd0b4dfeaf7125612ddeb9fa7e753821), closed 7 October 2025: **182.7m for**, **36.3m against**, and **136.7m abstaining** on 56 votes. The abstention is the finding – 38% of all weight cast declined to take a side on whether the DAO should try letting a market advise it.
- **GnosisDAO** – [GIP-145](https://snapshot.box/#/s:gnosis.eth/proposal/0x09cb43353c0ece5544919bf70a9810908098c728f27f9ca3e211871f7ad6bf1c), a nine-month advisory pilot with $100k of returnable GNO/WETH liquidity, closed 14 February 2026 with **117,291 GNO for** against **5.99** – six tokens – on 67 votes. Running from February, the pilot is live through roughly November 2026. Gnosis's own claim in [the proposal](https://forum.gnosis.io/t/gip-145-should-gnosis-dao-run-a-9-month-advisory-futarchy-pilot-with-100k-temporary-liquidity/11816) is not to be first but to be the first _large_ DAO, joining Kleros and Velora.

Futarchy Labs also priced its own adoption before that vote: a conditional market on GNO under approval versus rejection ran for five days, and the pass market's TWAP settled about **2.5%** above the fail market's. The proposal then needed a public turnout appeal from its own author to reach quorum – a mechanism pitched partly against [voter apathy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy) having to ask for votes to authorise itself.

## What to check before adopting it

The sharpest objection came from a GnosisDAO delegate in the proposal thread, and it is an incentive question rather than a mechanism one: if the estimated price impact of a proposal is well under a percent, why would anyone take liquidity risk, contract risk and lock-up uncertainty to trade it? Futarchy Labs' [answer](https://forum.gnosis.io/t/gip-145-should-gnosis-dao-run-a-9-month-advisory-futarchy-pilot-with-100k-temporary-liquidity/11816) is that a thin margin is itself information – the proposal barely matters – and that on Kleros the absolute impact on contested proposals frequently traded above 4%. Read plainly, that concedes the shape of the tool: it is loudest on divisive decisions and near-silent on the routine business that fills most of a DAO's docket.

Three further things a treasury should verify rather than assume. The liquidity is a _loan_ with a return date, and impermanent loss on it is real. The custody is a multisig with an outside co-signer, not a trust-minimised contract. And the advisory oracle resolves on what the DAO's governance process decided, so the market's usefulness rests on that process staying legible – the same dependency that makes the [off-chain vote](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance) the weak point elsewhere in the stack. The general critique of the mechanism – thin markets, metric gaming, subsidised manipulation – is covered on [futarchy](/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/futarchy).

As a liveness check on the vendor itself: the [futarchy-fi](https://github.com/futarchy-fi) GitHub organisation carries 33 public repositories, with the interface, market-data API, indexers and liquidity-manager contracts all pushed to within days of 16 August 2026, alongside the FAO governor and an experimental Bayesian market engine.

## References

- [Proposal lifecycle](https://docs.futarchy.fi/protocol/proposal-lifecycle/) – factory, condition, oracle, settlement and redemption, in order.
- [DAO integration guide](https://docs.futarchy.fi/dao/integration/) – the liquidity, window, threshold and custody defaults quoted above.
- [Adoption levels](https://docs.futarchy.fi/dao/adoption-levels/) – advisory, milestone, sponsored, FAO.
- [Live systems and public repos](https://docs.futarchy.fi/deployments-and-addresses/) – the surfaces and repositories the project publishes.
- [GIP-145 forum thread](https://forum.gnosis.io/t/gip-145-should-gnosis-dao-run-a-9-month-advisory-futarchy-pilot-with-100k-temporary-liquidity/11816) (17 November 2025) – pilot specification, the Kleros and Velora precedents, and the delegate incentive objection.